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ABSTRACT 
Following Algeria’s bloody war of independence, a new, revolutionary military establishment 
gradually formed out of several largely independent revolutionary units, stationed mostly on Algeria’s 
borders.  It soon expanded with the addition of revolutionary fighters from within Algeria, and from 
French-trained forces, many of whom had fought against the revolutionary forces during the 
Revolution, and had deserted late in the war from the French military to join the new Algerian 
military.  A particularly powerful group of officers emerged from the latter group, the “French 
Officers,” who apparently engaged in a long-term and ultimately successful bid for national political 
power. 
This thesis, which is concerned with the politics behind the massive human rights violations 
in Algeria, particularly the periods immediately after Independence, and between 1991 and 2002, the 
“Algerian Civil War,” seeks to explore a central question: why did the Algerian military turn against 
its own people?  While not denying the role of other groups (e.g., religious groups, ethnic groups) in 
the violence, the central focus of this thesis is on the distinctive and effective structure and role of the 
military, which was apparently the dominant political power in Algeria after Independence, and 
particularly on the role of the French Officers, who appear to have manipulated the presidency 
through coups d’état and assassinations, in their struggle to achieve political hegemony in Algeria by 
the 1990s. Central to this was the role played after Independence by Houari Boumédiène in 
establishing political and military organisations that were particularly susceptible to the growing 
influence of the French Officers. 
Central topical foci of the thesis include examinations of the possible effects (on the central 
question, listed above) of: professionalization of the military; civil-military relations; historical 
influences; ethnic and religious influences; political parties and party formation; corruption and 
economic opportunism; international relations and continuing French influence; and the unique role of 
the French Officers in the national politics of Algeria. 
Methodologies used in this study included the analysis of elite (non-random) interviews, 
based upon a questionnaire approved by the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee, which the author conducted in Europe and via “Skype” with nearly two dozen prominent 
Algerian expatriates, for the most part in exile, including former civilian leaders and military officers. 
Historical analysis was also a central part of the methodology, as well as discourse analysis applied to 
significant memoirs and newspaper accounts. 
The thesis concludes that the immediate self-interests of the French Officers had a 
determinate effect on politics in Algeria, and particularly on the way in which the military turned 
against its own people after 1991. The continuing support that the French Officers apparently received 
from France, while not unexpected, is surprising in its extent and continuity, particularly after acts of 
terrorism thought to be linked to the Algerian government occurred in France.  An unexpected finding 
of this research is the significance of corruption and economic opportunism in the Algerian military 
regime’s long-term strategy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Preface 
Today, after 20 years of one of the bloodiest civil wars per capita in history, one that 
has cost between 100,000 and 200,000 lives, Algeria is sometimes described, perhaps 
ironically, as “an immense media-generating construction.”1 Since 1992, the public has been 
told that the war in Algeria was justified by the fundamentalist attack on the Algerian State 
and on the nation’s democracy, expressed in the outcome of the elections of 1990. However, 
the crisis in Algeria did not begin with the fateful elections of the 1990s. Thousands of people 
had already been arrested, tortured and executed since the country’s independence in 1962. 
The end of the revolutionary war was quickly followed by a period of protracted conflicts 
that have persisted, in many respects, up to the present day. From the beginning it was felt 
that Muslims in Algeria were “barbarians,” and that the only institution that was equipped to 
deal with these “barbarians” was the Algerian army.  
It should not be surprising that the Algerian Army has held the real power in Algeria 
since independence. It dominates and controls the whole political and bureaucratic system, 
and after more than forty years of authoritarianism, it still retains unchallenged power. Many 
observers feel that the institutions and organisations of the country were established primarily 
to support the military regime, and to give it credibility and legitimacy. Political parties were 
outlawed until the Constitution of 1989 was promulgated. Algeria’s brief familiarity with 
political rights and pluralism within a democratic system lasted from 1989 to 1991. This brief 
taste of democracy impacted the military regime, however, and democracy did not last 
beyond 1992. The military stopped the elections; even though more than twenty parties 
competed. The emerging multi-party system had almost ended the military’s hold on political 
power in Algeria, and the Army resumed its violent governance of the country in order to 
prevent the Islamists, who won the elections of 1991 by a large majority, from assuming 
power.   
This thesis explores three central questions: why did the Algerian military turn 
against its own people? Did structural and organisational changes in the Algerian 
military influence the pattern of human rights violations in postcolonial Algeria?   Did 
that pattern change in the 1990s? I examine the different stages that led the Army to use 
                                                          
1
 Lounis Aggoun, Jean-Baptiste, Françalgérie, crimes et mensonges d'Etats: histoire secrète de la guerre 
d'indépendance à la "troisième guerre" d'Algérie (France: Découverte, 2005).   
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violence against Algerian civilians. It appears that active revolutionaries and young soldiers, 
most of whom had taken on the responsibility to protect the country and the civil rights of the 
Algerian people, were largely innocent of human rights violations.   
There has been, however, a group of anti-revolution officers who became involved at 
the end of the revolutionary war, belatedly switching their allegiance from France to Algeria, 
and then claiming an increasingly larger share of the power. The ‘French Officers’, so-called 
because of their training in French military schools, initially supported the French troops, 
fighting against Algerian revolutionaries during most of the War of Liberation. Most of these 
‘French Officers’ were born in Algeria by the late 1930s, received their secondary education 
in French,
2
 and in the mid-1950s embarked on careers in the French military, only very late in 
the war choosing to switch to the National Liberation Army.
3
 After independence they 
received military training at prestigious institutions, such as the Ecole Superieure de Guerre 
in Paris, and the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow, and they continued to communicate 
primarily in French.
4
  
Their apparent goal, rather than providing training for the young soldiers on Algerian 
military bases, soon became clear: it was to seize political control of the country by 
becoming, initially in a de facto sense, the primary decision-makers in Algeria. Soon they 
were able to determine who would become president and prime minister of the country. As 
my study will demonstrate, this is one of the primary causes of the protracted and massive 
human rights violations that Algerians have suffered since the liberation war. That violence 
was, and still is, the most disturbing aspect of the failure of democracy in Algeria, a very 
brief and limited system change that was only seen in Algeria for the first time after the 
promulgation of the 1989 Constitution. It is apparently the weakness of the Algerian civilian 
political elites, especially those in the Islamic movements, that has helped the military 
(directly and indirectly), and particularly the French Officers, in maintaining their control, 
and continuing their persistent violations of the human rights in Algeria. 
The domination of the armed forces in the Algerian political system began well before 
independence. In 1957, the future role of the army and the security services was specified in a 
formal revolutionary declaration. Through the coup d’état of 1963 against the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government  (GPRA), and another coup in 1965 against Ahmad Ben Bella, 
                                                          
2
 Perthes Volker, Arab elites: negotiating the politics of change (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p. 176, and 
See Brahimi, A. H., “Aux origines de la tragédie algérienne (1958-2000), Témoignage sur "Hizb França" 
(Hoggar, Geneva, 2000)  
3
 Volker P. (2004) 
4
 Abdelhamid Brahimi,  Personal interview, London, September 2009.  
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revolutionaries struggled against the French Officers for political and even military power. 
With the formation of a military regime to lead the Revolutionary Council, as well as the 
single political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), Algeria faced many changes that 
affected national security, the political structure and even international relations. This study 
will examine these changes, which resulted in human rights violations after each of the many 
military coups that took place in the post-independence era.   
My central focus is upon the role that the French Officers played in the political 
system after independence, as well as their interventions into the bureaucratic system, which 
resulted in the failure of democracy in Algeria, 1989-1992. It was the growing power of the 
French Officers that explains, more than any other variable, why the Algerian military turned 
against its own people. There were, of course, other factors, including the development of a 
distinctive military ethos, the lure of corruption and economic opportunism, the establishment 
of dysfunctional political party systems, and interference in Algerian politics by high-level 
authorities in France, among others. The central focus of this thesis, however, is on the 
emergence of dysfunctional and violent civil-military relations in Algeria, and the principal 
causes that led to this state of affairs. 
This thesis addresses three theoretical questions about the formation of a military 
ethos and the impact of political parties on human rights violations in post-colonial Algeria. 
The first question is regarding the fundamental structure of the Algerian military since the 
creation of this institution after the independence of the country in 1962. This study will look 
at the formation of the military in Algeria after that liberation war. What was the premise on 
which the military was structured after independence? What was the objective of the military, 
or at least of the French Officers, in taking power in Algeria? I will examine in detail the 
legalization of the different political roles which the military, through the apparent political 
control of the French Officers, has exercised in Algeria, especially regarding the Constitution 
of 1989, and the brief period of democratisation, 1989-1992. What were the factors that 
enabled the development of a military ethos that supported political and military intervention 
after independence, and particularly during the crisis of 1990s? How did civilian political 
elites regard the democratisation that took place in 1989-1992? How have they regarded the 
human rights violations in the post-colonial era? This study is divided into three parts: First, a 
description and analysis of the structure and the characteristics of the Algerian military from 
independence to the failure of their political party, the FLN, by 1991; second, the history, 
patterns and extent of military intervention into political life; third, an analysis of the 
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situation and principal causal factors that enabled the military to declare a state-of-
emergency, and to abort the democratization process, after the election of 1991.  
Another question involves the role of political parties in the security arena. The 
ideologies that drive parties in the domestic political arena also lead them to define the 
national interest in different ways that are critical for understanding the formation of their 
particular groups. This is particularly the case in regard to the secular parties, the former 
national revolutionaries, and the Islamic movements, and is linked to ideological issues as 
well as to ethnic groups. Domestic politics in Algeria demonstrate that human rights 
violations during the most violent period, 1991-2001, were influenced by cultural and 
ideological factors. Under the slogan of the Islamists, “Islam is the only solution,” and the 
slogan of the secularists, “Algeria is not Iran or Afghanistan,” conflict involving the military 
and different ethnic groups, including the Arabs, the Berbers, and the French, became 
routinized and deeply entrenched, and widespread human rights violations were the inevitable 
result. 
A third primary question will focus on the role of the international communities in 
Algeria after independence and especially during the period of the most pervasive human 
rights violations in the 1990s. The relationship of France with the Algerian regime apparently 
aggravated the insecurity and the instability of the political system after independence, and 
neo-colonialism, together with the professionalization of the Algerian Army, accompanied 
and accentuated the violence. This begs the question, were human rights violations a sort of 
‘tool’ brandished indirectly by a former colonial power?  
The international factor is crucial to understanding Algeria; a section will focus on 
international law and the efforts of the international community to intervene in the upheaval 
in Algeria, and whether these efforts were legitimate and/or desirable. It will also deal with 
the role of France in the efforts of the international community to resolve the crises. In spite 
of the catastrophic humanitarian situation, overt and protracted violence, and daily massacres 
in cities and small villages in Algeria during the 1990s, international human rights 
organisations satisfied themselves with non-intervention, or at most, with recording mere 
observations of the often grotesque violations. Most of their reports stated that Algeria was 
culturally a country of terrorism and Islamic extremism. In fact, at the time that Algerians 
expected the support of, and a ‘firm stand’ from, the international community against the 
human rights violations, a United Nations delegation visited Algeria in 1998, drafted a report 
to the UN absolving the Algerian military of past crimes and human rights violations, and 
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essentially gave a green light to the Algerian authorities to deal with Algerian Islamists as 
“terrorists.” It ignored the massacres, torture, disappearances and arrests.5    
Algerian elites who gained control over the political processes after the 1992 coup 
d’état found convenient justifications to respond to international critics in the many 
contradictions between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the “war on 
terror.” Economic factors also played a part in creating the crises of 1988 and the 1990s. 
Algeria’s principal source of revenue was based on the export of gas and oil. Agriculture 
accounted for only a small part of the country’s income. By the 1980s, Algeria, like many 
third world countries, faced a difficult situation when the international price of oil fell 
unexpectedly. The fall in oil prices, in turn, affected other sources of income, including 
agriculture. This economic crisis influenced the political situation. As social divisions 
widened, Algerian citizens began to demand more political openness as well as fundamental 
changes in their situation. Algerian youth have been the major victims of the social and 
economic crisis. Indeed, the control of the economy exercised by unaccountable elites, 
including senior military officers, has failed to provide the majority of civilians with the 
means to resolve their problems. Finally, the corruption manifested mostly by the military 
regime since independence has prevented civilians from participating in the political and 
economic life of the country.    
 
2. Background  
The author of this research is an Algerian in political exile.  Some readers of this 
thesis may accuse me directly or indirectly of a certain lack of objectivity. They might 
believe that I have taken sides against a particular party among the political organisations in 
Algeria, all of whom were guilty to some extant of human rights violations by the 1990s.  It is 
difficult, of course, for any Algerian not to support some strand of political thought in 
Algeria. No Algerian family was safe from the privation and suffering during the worst years 
of the crisis in the 1990s, or even, for that matter, at the present time. It is indisputable that 
academic research has to be as objective as possible, maintaining a distance from personal 
feelings. I have tried my best to keep my background, my thoughts, and my personal feelings 
apart from any side in the Algerian conflicts. For example, although I use the term 
“massacre” frequently in this work, I have done so only because this term, while admittedly 
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laden with negative connotations, is preferable to “indiscriminate mass killings” or 
“indiscriminate mass murders”. The reality is that such mass killings frequently, almost 
routinely, took place, and use of the term “massacre” actually seems to be less laden with 
negative semantics in this context.  Moreover, it is the term that most of the observers, and all 
of my interviewees, have tended to use. Nevertheless, it is admittedly not a term that the 
Algerian military would tend to use except, of course, in reference to alleged killings by 
Islamists.  At any rate, it is impossible to be fully objective in any social science thesis, as 
Max Weber noted nearly a century ago, although I have done my best.  
This research, moreover, is not intended to be a legal report or bill of indictment 
against any party in Algeria, or elsewhere, but rather an academic study based on unhindered 
analysis, without pressure from anyone to drive this research towards a specific point of view. 
I conducted a series of elite, open-ended interviews in 2009-2010 with a range of former 
Algerian politicians and military leaders in exile. These interviewees expressed a wide range 
of perceptions of the Algerian crisis. As regards to other key politicians and military officers 
with whom I could not speak directly, I used their comments in the international media, 
before the UN, and their writings in their books and memoirs to supplement my extensive 
elite interviews.  
The number of participants in this research from the ranks of the active military was 
limited simply because of the innate difficulties in interviewing active-duty officers. As the 
subject of this thesis cannot safely be raised inside Algeria, the only people who can 
reasonably participate are those who are outside of Algeria, most of whom having sought 
asylum in different countries worldwide. Likely because of the potential for danger, many 
officers refused to take part in this research. Some of them refused to attend face-to-face 
meetings, giving various excuses, and only later, following repeated invitations, agreed to 
participate in open dialogue over the phone or on-line through “Skype.”  
A distinctive feature of this research is its presentation of the views of the 
participants, some of whom supported the regime, or manifested other views and thoughts 
from the regime’s perspective. As noted above, it was not possible to communicate with 
active officers from the military regime in Algeria. They are, in my view, people in the 
shadows, never seen in the media apart from the highest levels of leadership. Algeria is not a 
democratic country in which citizens can freely see their MPs or government ministers to 
share ideas. While the media in Algeria may be supported by strong organisations and even 
foreign countries, they have failed to transmit ideas other than those of the French media, 
largely supporters of the regime. The political leaders in Algeria appear to allow only their 
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supporters’ voices from amongst journalists and academics. Even these people were reluctant 
to participating in my research.    
As regards to personal security, it is not acceptable for any researcher to put himself 
or his participants in danger. The violence of the Algerian military has long been directed at 
journalists and researchers in Algerian universities and overseas. Nevertheless, there are 
some limited secondary academic references that support the Algerian military agenda to be 
found in academic papers and newspaper and magazine articles published inside Algeria and 
in France. These sources have been used where appropriate, together with documentaries and 
declarations made by military spokesmen and other political supporters of the regime.   
Primarily because of the factors mentioned above, this research has been driven by a 
political methodology which is based in its primary sources of elite interviews, memoirs of 
key participants, and a literature review within the fields of political science and international 
law. This work is a case-study analysis.  The subject is intensely political, and constantly 
changing; frequent updates of Algerian politics in Europe and North African TV interviews 
have also been helpful in examining the thoughts of politicians, authors and editors. The 
Algerian crisis was driven by generals and revolutionaries, some of whom are still alive. 
Some of those who have survived are beginning to write their memoirs, useful sources for my 
study, especially those of generals and other senior military officers, as it has been impossible 
to persuade most of them to participate in my research.
6
 
Lecturers and supervisors always advise their students to be objective, and to avoid 
personal and intellectual bias.     
…[that] the researcher should remain neutral and “detached” from the 
research subject tells us that researcher aspires to the goal of “objectivity” 
in the research process. This framework…is one of many paradigms one 
can bring to the fieldwork experience.
7
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With that in mind, the subject and the research questions have been limited to the 
study and political analysis of the role of the military and its relations with civil society. The 
study focused on the Algerian regime only, and not on the Algerian opposition. There is little 
doubt that Algeria has been controlled by the military since independence. There is no doubt 
that the military regime has been deeply involved in the Algerian violence, and became at 
several points a virtual killing machine that swept up thousands of civilians. There is also no 
doubt that opposition militants, Islamic extremists and radical Berbers had a hand in human 
rights violations after independence. However, because the research question has focused on 
the role of the military, the only group that has continuously held power in Algeria, I have 
opted to focus upon the military in power, largely disregarding the role of the Islamic groups 
and other armed ethnic groups and militias in the human rights violations. Although such 
groups have periodically gone into revolt against the regime, and thereby spawned at least 
some of the reactive violence that has taken place, as, for example, in the Kabilya region,
8
 the 
fundamental question that I have sought to address, why the Algerian military turned against 
its own people, must remain my primary focus. Military-initiated violence seems to have 
come first, was far greater, and apparently caused and perpetuated the limited and mostly 
reactive civilian violence that followed. 
Primary to all of this, in my analysis, has been the enduring role of the French 
Officers. Their intimate relationship with power and violence tended to be hidden from the 
public and the news media, disappearing behind opaque government agencies and artificial 
political parties. These latter groups worked as opposition parties with democratic platforms, 
but in reality were little more than political cover for an authoritarian military regime. Led by 
military officers who were apparent remnants of French colonialism,
9
 these parties also 
served as intermediaries between the aspirations of Western countries to promote their 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
a study which examines the arguments of the regime, but I could not find anyone who was willing to defend it. 
Hence, this study has been based on the research participants’ views, as well as those of the media and published 
political analysts. Even though there are different subjects, there are many books and articles which have been 
written lately supporting my research results; I could not find one book defending the military and its massive 
human rights violations in the 1990s, except in passing in the memoirs of generals, some of which have been 
released recently. I have used these in my research mostly as secondary resources although they might also be 
said to represent primary information as regards the attitudes and behaviour of key participants.    
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economic interests in Algeria, and their own embedded secular-cultural influences there.   
The ‘decision makers’, the ‘Men of the Shadows’, were the immediate stakeholders in the 
authoritarian power structure of the state. The French Officers were not themselves 
influenced by the many executive power transfers that followed independence. While 
presidents and governments have come and gone, one way or another, mostly in coups, the 
French Officer elites have tended not to be affected, even when the Algerian government 
shifted its loyalties from the Eastern socialist camp to the Western capitalist camp. 
Apparently, as long as they have been protected by the French, who have maintained a 
special trusteeship in Algeria, they have continued as the unseen manipulators of Algerian 
politics. I have concluded that their continuing presence has explained, more than any other 
variable, why it is that the Algerian military has violently turned on its own people. These, 
then, have been the foci of my research.  
 
3 An Overview of the Case Study 
The case of Algeria is sufficiently rich and complex that it cannot easily be reduced to 
a single, grand explanatory scheme. Algeria was the only country in the Arab world that took 
convincing steps towards liberal democracy in the period from 1989 to 1991.
10
 It was, in a 
sense, a bloody and unsuccessful precursor to the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 and 2012. The short 
period of democracy in Algeria resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, including 
students, who were killed mostly in the capital, Algiers, and, in particular, at Algiers 
University in 1988, when the single political party system theoretically ended, and honest 
competitive elections were held for the first time. The political and security crisis was not 
new to the Algerian people; they had experienced similar conditions almost daily since before 
the independence of the country in 1962. The period of the 1990s was described as the worst 
era that Algerians have seen since the liberation war, however. Tragically, perhaps, this was 
Algeria’s only ‘political spring’.   
Algeria has been torn by brutal political violence since independence. At the time that 
the French forces left Algeria, the Algerian revolutionaries had little capacity to build a new 
government, one capable of driving the country towards development. Because of the 
conflict, the French authorities further intervened under a program launched by General de 
Gaulle in Evian in 1961. De Gaulle clearly had his own political interests in the Algerian 
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case. Algerian independence had taken on an international dimension which may even have 
threatened French political stability. Promoting de Gaulle as a hero, it was thought, might 
stop the crisis, which was rapidly spreading to France. General de Gaulle’s attempts to 
improve relations with the Third World would be (and later were) furthered by the ending of 
the Algerian war, or, as de Gaulle called it, the advent of ‘cooperation’. As de Gaulle 
emphasized at the time, “No other country has spent a higher proportion of its national 
income on foreign aid than France.”11 The French crisis was effectively ended by an election 
in Algeria, with the FLN victorious. Both de Gaulle and the Algerian Muslims, in fact, felt 
that they had been victorious. By March 1962, Algerians seemed to have taken control of 
their country for the first time in their history.  
The Algerian military, which was mostly formed outside the borders, in Ghardemau 
in Tunisia and in Ouajda in Morocco, was identified as the L’Armée nationale populaire 
(ANP), and took political power in Algeria immediately after independence. Today it 
continues to dominate and control the political system. Its power seems unchallenged, and is 
apparently based upon institutions and organisations that were created to support the regime 
and give it credibility, without regard for the wishes of the Algerian people. Political parties 
were outlawed until the Constitution of 1989 was promulgated. As noted above, Algeria only 
became familiar with political rights and pluralism within a democratic system with the 
Constitution of 1989. Although these changes impacted the military regime, democracy did 
not last beyond 1992. The military intervened shortly after the elections, despite the fact that 
more than twenty parties and most Algerians had participated. The new multi-party system 
had the potential of ending the military’s hold on Algeria, and the military was apparently 
reduced to instituting violence in order to prevent the Islamists, who won the elections by a 
large majority, from assuming power.  
While there is no doubt that the extremists from within the Islamists had a hand in the 
violence that occurred in the country during the crisis of the 1990s, it was, according to the 
most reliable evidence, the military regime that ultimately provoked and directed a bloody 
war against civilians. At the very least, the violence of the 1990s was triggered by the 
military coup that followed the parliamentary elections of 1991. Many civilian protestors 
suffered in the widespread violence that followed, and an escalating cycle of violence 
between the military regime and Muslim armed insurgents was set in motion. Human rights 
organisations, including NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, spoke of hundreds of 
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thousands of deaths in extensive massacres (they used this word). This number was later 
confirmed by President Bouteflika in 1999.
12
 In fact, the Algerian League for the Defence of 
Human Rights, Salaheddin Sidhoum, and a range of NGOs have confirmed that the 10 years 
of crisis claimed the lives of an estimated 100,000–200,000 people, with over 7,000 people 
arrested by security forces and countless ‘disappeared’.13 During the crisis, some 1200 people 
were reportedly killed each month; victims of massacres, indiscriminate armed attacks and 
apparently targeted assassinations.
14
 The Islamic Armed Group (GIA), notorious for its 
brutality, was said to be responsible for a significant part of the violence.
15
 However, 
government security forces were most likely the primary agents of direct abuses of human 
rights, particularly in their repeated failure to protect civilians from the attacks of unknown 
assailants.
16
 Women were often the targets of violence, and suffered abduction, slavery, rape, 
and summary execution.
17
 The activities of self-defence groups, legalised by a 1997 law, also 
added to the insecurity as some of the leaders of these groups reportedly evolved into local 
warlords, terrorising local populations. Between 150,000 and 200,000 people joined these 
militia groups and 80,000 others were recruited as communal guards. It is significant that 
they were all apparently armed by the military.
18
  
According to Meziane Ait-Larbi and others, the “condemnation of these abuses is 
necessary, but not enough.”19 To understand the nature of these human rights violations and 
massacres, in particular, there is a need to  more closely identify the victimised groups, make 
progress towards clarifying the responsibilities, and bring increased respect for human rights 
to Algeria. While the overall blame for the violence tended to focused by the Algerian 
government, international media and Western bureaucracies on the Islamist groups, the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the Islamic Front for the 
Armed Djihad (FIDA), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and other 
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groups, which were labelled by the US government as terrorists, the evidence continues to 
point to the Algerian military regime as the fundamental source of the post-independence 
violence in Algeria. The use of a variety of sources has helped to correct the lack of a 
comprehensive means of systematically collecting the relevant data. Witnesses, including 
many of my interviewees, as well as most human rights organisations, have accused the 
Algerian military of deliberately escalating the violence by using Islam as a scapegoat, 
wearing Islamic dress during their operations, and attributing deaths to Islamic 
fundamentalism.  
This thesis will outline some of the most credible evidence that points to the military 
regime and the secret agencies in particular, as those primarily responsible for the violence 
and human rights violations after independence, and particularly during the crisis of the 
1990s. In fact, and as noted above, according to many of my interviewees, were the military 
regime deemed innocent of propagating the violence, at the very least it would be guilty of a 
breach of trust and indirect violence in its failure to protect unarmed civilians.
20
 However, 
many witnesses have confirmed the direct involvement of the military in the massacres and 
violence against civilian populations.
21
 
Based upon public statements and my own elite interviews, it appears indisputable 
that the Algerian military officers, and particularly the French Officers, were the primary 
propagators of the human rights violations after the War of Independence. I will argue that it 
was this early and consistent history that was the main source of an Algerian military ethos, 
one that incorporated a propensity for human rights violations, authoritarianism and neo-
colonialism. This history actually dated back to the Ottoman era. It is no exaggeration to say 
that Algerians have lost hope because of the protracted nature of the violence, even as the 
first of their legitimately indigenous and representative leaders were finally in key leadership 
positions.
22
 The liberation war against the French left more than a million Algerians dead, 
many of them killed in near genocidal actions during the seven years of war. A great number 
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of citizens were jailed, tortured and disappeared, millions of people were forcibly displaced 
from their farms and properties, and the end of the war in 1962 did not put a stop to this 
systematic pattern of violence.  
Political parties have periodically played important roles in the crisis. The conflict 
among the revolutionaries themselves ended with the creation of a single political party (the 
National Liberation Front -FLN-), dominated by revolutionaries who saw themselves as the 
only group who had the right to hold power in Algeria. These legions of revolutionaries 
organised themselves to occupy the most favoured positions in the military, in politics and in 
the emerging social hierarchy. Others positioned themselves within the bureaucracy. The 
military coups of 1963, 1965 and 1991 affected the lives of thousands of innocent Algerian 
citizens as well as members of foreign organisations; thousands more people were arrested or 
displaced.  
The collapse of the single party, the FLN, was primarily the result of conflicts among 
elites who held power through this political party. These conflicts ultimately resulted in a 
massive “population outburst”23 on 5 October 1988. The violent response of the government 
resulted in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians and damage that cost the country 
billions of dollars. Despite the apparent intentions of those behind these events, and of those 
who were directly responsible for the violence that led to the deaths of hundreds of young 
people at the hands of the armed forces, significant changes subsequently took place in the 
political system in Algeria, spread across a variety of the departments of government. These 
changes, which began after the popular outburst of October 1988, did not happen by 
chance.
24
 Within a few months, in 1989, a constitutional amendment provided for democratic 
elections, and enabled more than sixty political parties, including Islamic movements, and 
organisations from different ethnic groups across the political spectrum, to participate in the 
local elections of 1991-1992. This was the first time since independence that Algerians had 
experienced such political freedom and democracy.  
According to General Khaled Nazzar, however, Algeria has never actually been 
governed by civilians. After independence, Algeria was governed by a military regime that 
operated behind the façade of a single political party, and apparently controlled most of the 
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elements of government, including the ministries and the presidency.
25
 This hegemony of the 
military over the Algerian bureaucracy has affected the social and political ethos of citizens. 
According to a variety of observers, new divisions were created in Algerian society, 
structuring the basis of ongoing clashes and contentious relationships among citizens. Those 
considered nationalists, who believed in the Revolution and/or a ‘holy war’ against French 
colonialism, were considered supporters of the military regime. Those who did not share 
these beliefs were branded as ‘traitors’.  
The origins of the Algerian Army can be traced back to the liberation war and the 
National Liberation Army (ALN),
26
 and evolved out of the specific characteristics of the 
Liberation Army. The present army was most influenced by the way in which it overcame 
conflicts among the politicians, and declared armed revolution against the French occupation, 
establishing the foundation of the contemporary relationship between the military and the 
political system in Algeria. The first principle governing the new civil-military relations in 
Algeria became: “While politicians are in conflict and unable to take the initiative and to 
make decisions, the military will have to take ownership and make critical decisions.”27  
Whatever the shortcomings of the Algerian polity since independence, however, 
virtually all of my interviewees stressed that violence was not an acceptable solution. 
Tragically, early political figures that put their trust in the emerging political leadership, 
particularly during the Congress of Soummam Valley in 1956, were often later summarily 
executed by their colleagues, the products of a bloody and ongoing competition for power. 
According to Saadallah, throughout the history of Algeria the people have never been led by 
their peers. At key junctures when they had the opportunity to seize power, competition, 
jealousy, opportunism and corruption intervened. Many revolutionaries were killed by jealous 
and selfish competitors; indeed, political selfishness became paramount. Abane Ramdane, the 
designer of the Soummam Congress and an architect of Algeria’s future politics, was himself 
killed by his own close colleagues, Abdelhafid Boussouf and Krim Belkacem. At a time 
when the Tunisian people were led by a single leader, Bourghiba, and the Moroccan people 
by Mohamed V, and when Egypt and other countries likewise had single, charismatic leaders, 
the Algerians were unable to agree on a single leader. Rather, the revolutionary leadership 
was guided by a group of people, the leaders of the Willayas, and later came under the 
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control of the three ‘Bs’; Boussouf Abdel Hafid, Belkacem Krim, and Ben-Toubal 
Lakheder.
28
 The fundamental conflict among the FLN leaders was based on more than 
misunderstandings or differing viewpoints; it went back to the 1930s, and the time of the 
French colonial authorities.  This was the key moment when Messali Hadj,
29
 the leader of the 
Star of North Africa and a former member and leader of the Party of the Algerian People 
(PPA), was seeking to bring about the complete independence of the country through a 
revolution against the French. Ferhat Abbas was pursuing the rights of Algerians under 
French rule for a French Algeria (Algérie Française), ignoring Algeria as a historical entity. 
This conflict of views continued among the leaders of the FLN.  
It was the competition for power among the revolutionaries and in the military bases 
outside of Algeria’s borders, then, that ultimately contributed to open conflict and, in a 
number of cases, massacres. Violence became the only likely way for competitors to seize 
power. This competition created a kind of contrived ethnic division within Algerian society, 
with modernity pitted against tradition and regionalism. These factors opened a wide gap 
between the internal and external revolutionaries; it nearly resulted in a new war between the 
ANP and the ALN, the military arm of the FLN. Boumédiène later took power by force and 
illegitimately created a military regime from senior, French-trained officers, the “French 
Officers”, likely because of their close alignment with French foreign policy and their 
discrete presence as a self-interested group. They later became the leadership cadre of the 
military associations.  
The French Officers, who made up a relatively small group within the Algerian 
military, largely arose out of the French colonial army, joined the revolutionary forces only at 
the end of the war, and used the conflict among the FLN leaders to gain political power, 
which they gradually achieved by establishing an allegedly corrupt network, the “Algérie 
Française.”30 They achieved some of their key goals through the presidency of Chadli 
Benjedid (1978-92), when General Larbi Belkheir became the head of the High Council for 
Security, Secretary-General of the Presidency, and head of the Cabinet.  He attained the rank 
of major-general. At the time of the elections of 1991-92, Belkhir was the Minister of the 
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Interior. The French Officers ultimately came to power in 1992 through a coup d’état against 
the president, ending his program of democratisation and free elections. They remain the 
most important political actors within the regime. They have allegedly built a strong network 
of secret agents to assist them in exercising authoritarian control over the country, including 
its politics, economy and even the social life of civilians. Their central means of control, as 
noted repeatedly above, appears to be violence. But by the election of the most recent 
president, Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika, these French Officers have started to get a bit of a wake-up 
call, especially after the death of high ranking members of the group such as Arbi Belkheir, 
Mohammed Lammari, Smain Lammari, Tunsi and others. Nezzar, Zarhouni and a handful of 
other French Officers went to the retirement. Bouteflika convened a presidential group to 
examine the role of the military in the government, but, as the military had both the 
institutional knowledge and experience in decision making, Bouteflika and his group made 
little headway. The ineffectiveness of their efforts was particularly compounded by the 
entrenched corruption, which marked the Algerian economy during that period in particular.   
 
4. Comparative Themes and Issues  
This thesis is situated within a broad subfield of political science, comparative 
politics.  In this capacity it will address the subject of the “Military Regime, Political Power 
and Human Rights Violations in Postcolonial Algeria.” Algeria is a unique case among the 
countries of the region, and is notable for a number of reasons. Its colonial experience was 
longer and more intense than in most of the other comparable cases. This will be explored in 
the chapter outlining the historical background of Algeria, which examines the era of 
colonialism and the lives of native born Algerians during different periods prior to 
independence in 1962.  
The French began their colonial venture in Algeria in 1830; they faced strong 
resistance from the Berbers and the Arabs for decades. The French suppressed the most 
important resistance movements and encouraged the settlement of millions of Europeans in 
Algeria.  Most of the settlers were French, and came to live in the country during the century 
that followed, eventually obtaining much of the best land, orienting the economy toward their 
interests, and establishing a hegemonic Parisian government that undermined existing 
indigenous political institutions. However, this historical period and the epoch of the 
liberation war in particular, became a formative influence on the development of Algerian 
political power and the military regime following independence.    
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The second chapter, then, emphasises colonial history and the war of liberation. It is 
noteworthy that Algeria’s decolonisation experience was especially traumatic and unique.31 
After seven years of intense warfare between 1954 and 1962, the Algerians carried out a 
guerrilla war in an effort to force France to accept Algerian independence and achieve their 
dream of having an indigenous power base for the first time in the country’s history. A 
million Algerians died in this liberation war, adding to the millions that were killed in the late 
colonial period. 
The third chapter examines the sources and expressions of Algerian political power 
following independence, including the formation and political role of the military, and the 
structuring of violence. As described above, there is no doubt that Algeria remains dominated 
by what is essentially a military regime. Few, if any, civilians have had significant roles in 
decision making following independence. Perhaps because of significant human losses in 
war, and difficulties in establishing a new state structure, Algerians in the postcolonial era 
have struggled with many of the same problems present in the colonial era. Violence, in 
particular, remains the most egregious problem. The military arm of the ANP competed for 
power using violence against the revolutionaries of the GPRA beginning soon after 
independence. This chapter, then, examines the formation of the Algerian regime and its 
relation to human rights violations in the postcolonial era. The role of the military in political 
decisions, their intervention in the political crisis, their contribution to human rights 
violations after 1992, and the political factions within the military introduce the subject of 
military professionalism, and its implications in Algeria.  
It should be added that Algeria has never had a fully professional army, where 
military service was universally regarded as a profession, enshrined in the Constitution. 
Rather, the military has consistently resisted the legitimate transfer of power to civilians. 
Regime legitimacy was said to be based upon its “revolutionary background”, a political and 
emotional standard used to justify what appeared to be the illegitimate retention of power. 
Power rested in the hands of senior military officers following independence. The supreme 
irony in this is that these officers are remnants of French colonialism and gave no support to 
the Revolution, finally joining it just before the cease-fire. Many of the French Officers 
fought with the French against the Revolution. Their continuing control over the regime 
appears, in most cases, to be largely based on their tactical and strategic uses of violence, and 
on their international ties to the Western community, and to France in particular. The 
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international community appears to have closed its eyes to the illegitimate retention of power 
since independence and the massive human rights violation carried out by the government. At 
times, it has appeared to be relieved that military once again intervened in politics, and has 
lent their active support to authoritarian “solutions”, giving their tacit approval to massacres 
and violence. France and the international community have even supported the current 
amnesty law proposed by Bouteflika’s regime,32 ostensibly because they are afraid of the 
possibility that economic interests will receive government support should the Islamist parties 
achieve power.  
Chapter four discusses the French-Algerian relationship through two points of view. 
The first focuses on the role of the French, looking at French penetration of Algerian politics, 
culture and economy. Penetration follows two paths: the military penetration into Algerian 
political, institutional and social organisations; and the French penetration of international 
relations, the French-Algerian relationship in the postcolonial era. The second perspective 
examines the relationship between the Algerian military and France, focusing on the 
difficulties that challenged the two states’ formal relationship in many sectors outside of 
military and security arrangements. The Algerian relationship with other countries is also 
discussed, in particular Algeria’s interactions with Russia, China and the United States. These 
relationships have provided significant support to the Algerian regime. France, perhaps 
because of its colonial background, has attempted to keep Algeria under its political and 
economic direction. The obvious way to facilitate this has been to build a strong relationship 
with the Algerian regime. This chapter attempts to demonstrate that France has been dealing 
with Algeria according to its most striking bias: for over 130 years it has viewed Islam as the 
main obstacle to French political and economic control, if not the creation of an acceptable 
Algerian civilisation.
33
 This chapter attempts to provide a brief explanation of the role played 
by France and other European countries in support of political violence, and to determine 
whether there are other useful lessons that can be drawn from the Algerian experience in 
order to better understand current events in the Middle East and North Africa.  
In answering the research question, “why does the Algerian Army see the necessity of 
violence as a security solution to the political crisis in Algeria?”, chapter five examines two 
other factors that are critical to understanding the military in its violent interventions against 
civilians: corruption and economic opportunism. These appear to have contributed 
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significantly to violence and military dictatorship in Algeria. The military, in exercising an 
authoritarian system, has dominated virtually all sectors of the country, 
including political and economic power tied to the livelihoods of people through the wealth 
enjoyed by the state from oil, gas and natural resources. While this resource-based wealth 
contributed to a fiscal surplus, it has apparently not affected the lives of most citizens 
positively. They still suffer from poverty, unemployment, lack of housing, and sporadic 
violence, which have directly affected all aspects of society.  
The corruption manifested by the military regime since independence has created an 
environment in which it is difficult for civilians to participate in the political and economic 
systems of the country. In the absence of democratic legitimacy of the political regime, laws 
have little force and regulatory provisions that might otherwise serve to protect the public and 
private property are essentially unimportant.  Rather, decision makers seem to treat them as if 
they were expressions of their own personal rights. Corruption has become the norm in 
Algerian society. This chapter, then, examines the behaviour of bureaucrats, and how their 
activities affect the country’s economic system. Key officials have apparently come to use 
public funds for their own purposes, and to maintain their domination over the population. It 
is a pattern well-known to Africans, in which:  
…bureaucrats attempt to increase their level of compensation by lobbying 
lawmakers from the military class and politicians and by engaging in other 
activities to influence the political system and maximise benefits accruing 
to them.
34
 
Chapter six analyses the interaction of political parties, governance and human rights 
violations. The main focus of the chapter is the qualified role of political parties, including 
the FLN as the single party before 1989, and their causal relationship to the violence that has 
periodically overtaken the country. The FLN has served as the political face of the military 
regime since the revolutionary era; by national charter, it became part of the military regime 
headed by Boumédiène, and then by the French Officers. The FLN was the only political 
party formally part of Algerian politics for decades. Members of opposition parties that 
challenged “the Revolutionary Party” ran the risk of being arrested, killed or sent into exile.35  
The military regime’s overt and repeated violation of human rights, especially during 
the 1990s, have been publicly decried by humanitarian organisations outside the country, 
although virtually all of the Algerian political parties have preferred to remain silent on this 
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subject, especially after the early 1990s. Some of them clearly supported the 1991 military 
coup and its operations against civilians in the cities and villages. Algerian parties have 
always been weak; they have had little legitimacy, and most of them were formed by the 
military intelligence services. Moreover, Algeria had no parliament during Boumédiène’s 
period.  A “revolutionary council” served in that role. This council was dominated by French 
Officers, particularly after the death of Boumédiène in 1978. By the time of the presidency of 
Benjedid, and after a secret military agency was created by Boumédiène to serve as 
protection for him and his regime, the French Officers came to dominate most of the highest 
positions in the country, including military, political and economic positions. 
With the Constitution of 1989, which was developed after a violent demonstration in 
Algiers on October 5, 1988 that resulted in several hundred civilian deaths, a majority of 
them young, the single party system was ended, and over fifty political organisations 
emerged to be involved in the political competition of 1990-91. The military coup a year 
later, in January 1992, quickly ended the young democracy. Military intervention 
immediately suppressed the election results, after a majority of the seats in the parliament had 
gone to the Islamists. They had been represented by FIS in the first round of the legislative 
elections. The military argued that they had secured the country against what they called 
“extremist fundamentalists.”36 The military coup effectively ended political rights and the 
right of free speech, while bringing the country under a state of emergency and martial law, 
which cancelled the laws of the country and suspended the Constitution.  
Algeria’s civil society, then, is very weak, and its political parties are divided and 
unpopular, most of them having been created just a year before the 1992 coup. The parties 
that had strong popular voices were destroyed or seriously undermined, including the FIS, 
FFS and the FLN, whose leadership rejected the coup and subsequent civil war in Algeria.  
According to Cavatorta: 
 …the civil war that affected Algeria was largely interpreted as the 
inevitable outcome of the confrontation between the secular and liberal 
values of many within Algerian society and the inherent anti-democratic 
and violent nature of political Islam.
37
  
Scholars and some of the participants in this research have held contrasting views 
regarding the political system of Algeria. The single party, which was the political face of a 
military authoritarian regime, failed to address the protracted crisis in Algeria.  This failure 
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appears to have been largely due to the regime’s lack of legitimacy. Scandals resulting from 
corruption have been linked to the violence that has beset Algeria since independence. When 
the multi-party system was launched in the elections of 1989, which were supported by the 
army, ostensibly because it wished to cease exercising its political role, the incoherence of the 
political system consequently led to a crisis of violence, which has persisted ever since. 
Former Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche noted that the multi-party system in Algeria has 
not proceeded in the way that the regime had wanted and had previously planned:  
…they hoped to lead a transition like that which had taken place in the 
Eastern European countries. But the enormous electoral victories of an 
Islamist party (FIS) in June 1990 (municipal elections) and in December 
1991 (legislative elections) frightened the hardliners, who deprived the 
Islamists of their electoral victory. Since then, the multi-party system does 
not assure the participation of the population in the institutions of the state 
but serves only as a democratic façade for a regime that refuses electoral 
alternation.
38
  
It is worthwhile to note that this political system was new to Algerians and was 
practiced just for a short time, beginning in 1990 and effectively ending with the coup of 
January 1992. Since this time, there has been no real political opposition from political or 
humanitarian organisations in the parliament. Such opposition groups have chosen to express 
their views from exile in Europe and the US. Moreover, key elements of democracy, such as 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly, have been denied by 
executive orders under the state of emergency that the military declared after the coup of 
January 1992. Since then, the military has dominated virtually all sectors of political power. 
They have changed presidents and governments, consulting neither with their citizens, their 
political parties, nor even with nationally-known personalities. The recently established 
political parties appear to be tools in the hands of the military: the only tangible role that they 
are apparently playing is legitimizing the authoritarianism and the hegemony of the military.  
Chapter six, then, addresses the role played by the political parties to transfer power 
peacefully to the Algerians after the French colonial era. Why did the peaceful transition 
from the single-party to multi-party system fail, despite the series of elections that Algerians 
held during the 1990s? In Algeria, it was the military that established the state. The driving 
factor in this was a single party, the FLN, which was established back in the revolutionary era 
when a group of revolutionaries formed a party, the National Liberation Front, in November 
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1954, and then added a military wing, the “National Liberation Army.” Both of these entities 
became political parties and have essentially played the same role ever since.  
Abane Ramdane, the leader of the Coordinating Committee and one of the key figures 
in the Algerian Revolution, was unsuccessful in his call for the separation of the military 
from the politics, which he made before the Soummam Congress on 20 August 1956. The 
assassination of Ramdane in Marrakech in December 1957 assured the victory of the military 
in taking power from civil society.
39
 Since independence, the military have been the main 
source of political change in the Algerian bureaucracy, the political parties, the government 
and even in the presidency.
40
 Of the seven presidents since independence, five of them have 
had a military background. Ministers of government have tended to be former (and even 
acting) military officers. The military authorities have tended to hand over power to the same 
faces. Senior officers, as they move up in rank, assume progressively more important public 
offices.      
5. Methodology  
The research for this project is comprised of primary and secondary sources. First, it 
examines through, elite interviews, the perceptions of ex-patriot members of the Algerian 
political elite, mostly regarding the Algerian military and pays special attention to 
perceptions of the intervention in the 1990s. Second, it examines secondary resources, 
including the United Nations Charter, United Nations Human Rights Conventions, academic 
studies and reports of non-governmental organisations, and media reports,
41
 to clarify and 
contextualize the elite perceptions.  
I have used the following research methodologies: historical analysis, elite interviews, 
and discourse analysis.  All of these are set in a larger approach to understanding Algerian 
politics and crises: the case study approach, with an implicit comparative analysis, as is 
typical in comparative politics.  Set out below is an explanation of how I have employed each 
of these research methodologies in my thesis. Following that is a summary of how I have 
analysed political and legal material, and a description of how I have applied theory to the 
case study of Algeria. 
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5.1. Historical Analysis  
I begin with an historical review that forms the basis of my analysis. This part of my 
research clarifies the formation of the Algerian military since the time of the resistance 
against the French occupation of Algeria. To understand what happened historically it is 
necessary to explain why it happened. Historians tend to have contrasting explanations in 
their analyses. This study relies heavily on the many interviews that I conducted with 
members of the political elite, including those who were part of various Algerian political 
transformations, better to understand how the military was formed, and why it engaged 
institutionally in such massive violations. I have reviewed and analysed the opinions of the 
interviewees with what scholars have written in relation to my subject. There is a practical, if 
admittedly somewhat idealistic, side to my analysis. If fundamental misunderstandings are 
more fully clarified, this may help Algerians to end the violence through dialogue and 
democratic behaviour, even barring the support of the international communities and human 
rights organisations.  
This part of my thesis focuses on three key interrelated historical questions and 
concerns: First, what is the effect of colonialism on Algeria, its global implications and, 
ultimately, the interaction between colonialism and human rights violations in Algeria?  
Second, what is the relationship between the past, in the context of the paradigm of 
colonialism, and the present, with its reigning paradigm of globalisation? I compare these two 
different paradigms and will analyse the links between them, especially in relation to the 
effects on national identity and culture. Third, I analyse the effects of post-colonialism on 
subject nations, especially in relation to its effects on the struggle for human rights.  I proceed 
via a definitive account of the history of human rights told from the perspective of those 
struggling to obtain them. Using a focus on industrialisation, war, national self-determination, 
and globalisation as lenses through which to look at their evolution, this study will attempt to 
bring both a historical context and conceptual insight to modern debates about the role of 
human rights in a multicultural world. 
5.2. Qualitative Elite Interviews 
The main research component of this project is based on nearly two dozen elite 
interviews that sought to explore the Algerian military and its role into the human rights 
violations, especially in the 1990s. These research interviews were conducted between May 
and October 2009, with key politicians from different political parties and humanitarian 
organisations in Algeria. Key retired military officers were also interviewed, providing 
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alternative perspectives. The analysis seeks to compensate for an obvious shortcoming: each 
of the interviewees expressed opinions, rather than objective analysis; the analysis of these 
opinions represents my attempt, however imperfect, to construct an objective analysis.  
There are many different established interview methods that can be useful to achieve 
the data that I sought. According to McNamara (1999), “Interviews are particularly useful for 
getting the story behind a participant’s experiences”.42 There are four types of interviews:  
informal, conversational interviews; the general interview guided approach; standardized, 
open-ended interviews; and closed, fixed-response interviews. However, the types of 
interviews most useful for this research were “open-ended” interviews. This kind of interview 
provides the richest source of information. It is useful in probing for clarity and additional 
information. Nevertheless, “probing for clarity is often a matter of asking for a more specific 
response, or an explanation.”43 This, in turn, often redirects our understanding of a political 
question, and then clarifies it. There are three broad categories of interview methods that 
differ primarily in the extent to which they are “standardised”, and whether or not the 
interviews take place in an individual or a group setting. These fundamental types of research 
interviews are structured, semi-structured and unstructured.
44
 These distinct interview 
methods are in-depth qualitative interviews.
45
 My research interview methodology focused 
on structured interviews, standardised questions directed to some interviewees and, where 
necessary, more specific questions to others, depending on their works and backgrounds as 
related to my questions.
46
 My questions and process were submitted for approval to the 
Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of the University of 
Waikato, and received a rigorous review.  The questions are attached in Appendix 8.  
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Bias
47
 is an important concern in social science research if only because its manifest 
presence generally leads to inaccurate estimates.
48
 According to Boehmke, “selection bias 
occurs when the presence of observations in the sample depends on the value of the variable 
of interest.”49 Boehmke argues that researchers should take special care to design their studies 
in ways that mitigate nonrandom selection. I tried to remain normatively neutral to the 
responses that I received from my interviewees. As noted above, the participands were not 
chosen randomly, but rather from three groups thought to be capable of providing quality 
primary and secondary information. Additionally, I sent out more than one hundered emails 
to key figures requesting face-to-face, phone or skype interviews, and even occasionally 
requested written responses as witnesses or opinion leaders.  Unfortunately, I received 
relatively few responses from these e-mail communications.  I discovered that the only 
people likely to provide quality information on this difficult and dangerous subject were 
those prominent exiles living in Europe and the US, most of whom were strongly disposed to 
criticise the military regime.  In the end, I could not gain a response from a single prominent 
exile (or, for that matter, official within Algeria) who would provide information in support 
of the military regime.   
I succeeded in conducting several informal interviews with officials working at the 
time for either the military or occupying relatively senior positions in the Algerian 
administration.  Their responses were close to those of the prominent exiles in condemning 
official crimes, massacres and corruption in the past. Moreover, because I could not reach the 
leaders of the current regime, I had to relie on media interviews, such as those of French TV 
with General Khalid Nezzar, Prime Minister Belaid Abdessalam, and the DRS’s official 
outlet and daily newspaper, El-Nahar, with President Anis Rahmani. Bias in the responses of 
these sources, and in my inclusion of these responses, was, at times, unavoidable.  
 
5.3. Discourse Analysis  
I have used discourse analysis of the discursive strategies employed by the military 
and their representatives in power to clarify the debate over the role that government has 
played in Algeria. This method, as applied to this research, focuses on the problematic 
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involving assignment of responsibility regarding rampant human rights violations in Algeria. 
It highlights the role of discourse in understanding this problem. It should be noted that the 
case of Algeria is rich and complex; it cannot easily be reduced to a single, grand explanatory 
variable, although the reader will note that I have done my best to do so. Any effort to argue 
economics, or class structure, or cultural values to an explanatory account for all of the major 
moments in Algeria’s political trajectory is bound to be artificial. An emphasis on discourse 
analysis provides depth in exploring the pattern of the development of protracted human 
rights violations. Culture, social structure, the economy, and the political institutions are, of 
course, all contributing factors. Additionally, by consciously comparing the Algerian case to 
others, I have been able to generate insights that further clarify the Algerian experience.  
In a valid, albeit circular fashion, a discourse analysis of the Algerian case has also 
revealed insights into the struggle for democracy in the Arab world. This is especially the 
case regarding the Algerian elections. It must be noted that my case study, independent 
Algeria, included at least ten elections involving the presidency, government and local 
councils during the ten years of crisis. Discourse analysis has also helped to uncover critical 
dimensions of the Algerian regime’s protracted response to the democratic crisis, and how it 
dealt with this matter at both internal and external levels, in particular, when security issues 
became internationalised following the massacres of 1994-1995.   
5.4. International humanitarian intervention: theory and practice 
The massacres of civilians in Algeria in 1994-95 provided a significant impetus for 
the international community to intervene in the Algerian crisis. International humanitarian 
organisations, including the Human Rights Commission, noted that tens of thousands of 
Algerian civilians had been killed, and publicly lamented the lack of humanitarian 
intervention.
50
 Legal actions, declarations by United Nations officials, and active support of 
Algerian human rights by NGOs, stand in stark contrast to the decision by France to exercise 
its veto power in the United Nations’ Security Council to prevent international humanitarian 
intervention in Algeria in 1995.  
                                                          
50
 The rationales for political intervention to address human rights violations has encountered strong critics 
among scholars and politicians. Many academic and judicial scholars look to Humanitarian Intervention as a 
violation of state  sovereignty, something protected by the international law.  According to Kelly Kate Pease and 
David P. Forsythe, “The most fundamental principle of international law is state sovereignty, which is often 
misconstrued as national sovereignty” [Kelly Kate Pease and David P. Forsythe, “Human Rights, Humanitarian 
Intervention, and World Politics,” Human Rights Quarterly, 15, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 290-314]. The Algerian 
regime has strongly rejected all suggestions of human rights intervention proposed by NGOs, for example, 
despite clear evidence of hundreds of massacres in small villages and cities since the coup d’état of 1992, and 
especially during the period of the High Commission of the State, when Algerians killed en masse, apparently 
(in some cases, at least) for no reason.  
 28   
 
Regarding international humanitarian intervention, the legality of international 
intervention is explained well in the work of John Rawls,
51
 who concludes that “the right of a 
people to settle their own affairs without the intervention of foreign powers” is an 
international norm that state representatives would consent to if deprived of compelling 
information.
52
 Many social contract theorists, on the other hand, reject the collectivist 
assumptions of Rawls’ arguments, especially forceful in his work,  A Theory of Justice. I 
have opted to examine the Algerian case from both perspectives– the views espoused by 
Rawls and by his opponents - and then explore humanitarian intervention in relation to non-
humanitarian and self-interested international interventions, such as interventions which are 
based on the desire to pursue economic and political agendas, a practice that remains all-too-
common among the powerful states.  
My analysis also extends to the Islamists and Islamic rules and practices in relation to 
democracy and politics. Islamists in Algeria, as everywhere else in the Islamic world, have 
distinct ideas regarding the practice of religion, evident in their understanding of practices 
and political activities that are obligatory or forbidden, in their ideas regarding modernity, 
and especially in their conceptualisations of human rights and democracy. I have engaged 
with Muslim scholarship to a limited extent in examining what the West has sometimes 
called the ‘radicalism, fundamentalism and terrorism of Islamists.’53 
5.5. International humanitarian interventions after 9/11 
My thesis briefly addresses the changes that have occurred in both the legal and 
political international climate since the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 
September 2001. From the Algerian perspective, the attacks of 9/11 have systemically 
changed the world. Simply stated, the concept of humanitarian intervention changed after 
9/11. Some of the arguments formerly heard, e.g., that only “disinterested” intervention is 
permissible, ring hollow as long as terrorism remains a serious security threat to the major 
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powers. Whether the effects of 9/11 will make humanitarian intervention more or less likely 
remains to be seen, as the complex Libyan crisis has made clear. It is possible, moreover, that 
the “war on terror” could entirely eclipse humanitarian intervention as a defining feature of 
American, French, indeed all of Western foreign policy. It could lead, instead, to more 
interventions, which rather than being justified on humanitarian grounds, are justified on the 
need, for example, to remove the threat of terrorism and ‘weapons of mass destruction’. In 
my analysis, I have explored whether there are presently any signs within the international 
community that would indicate whether humanitarian intervention is likely to increase or 
decrease in the Algerian crisis, and whether such intervention would be justified on political, 
economic or military grounds.  
Finally, through this research I have concluded that human rights violations, which 
have plagued the country since its inception, have been present throughout Algerian history, 
imbued with personalistic and uniquely opportunistic features. These changed the path of the 
Revolution and established the authority of an illegal and non-centralized leadership that 
forced people to accept it through the massive use of violence.
54
 After independence, the 
military fashioned itself into an authoritarian regime, and dominated civil society under the 
direction of the French Officers, in what seemed to amount to a new colonial programme. 
There is a subjective and frankly applied aspect to this research.  The citizens of 
Algeria have paid a huge price in blood and wealth for their elusive independence. A 
thorough understanding of the problem, however, has a practical side: it can assist people to 
seek their rights, reject dictatorship for valid and intelligible reasons, and insist on a 
reasonable and civil society. The author of this research cannot help but to feel that there 
must be a demonstrable alternative to military dictatorship in Algeria, to protracted and 
extensive human rights violations, but in order to identify this alternative, we must 
understand the root causes of why it is that the Algerian military has turned against its own 
citizens.   
In conclusion this study seeks to address a key question, and to identify an underlying 
dynamic.  Military ethos and the impact of political elites on human rights violations are 
particularly appropriate foci in the case of Algeria. In my estimate, the intervention of the 
military in politics has resulted in a protracted dictatorship. This fundamental clash between 
the tenets of civil society and a military ethos has resulted in extreme human rights violations. 
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Ultimately, it may be that the weakness of political elites that encouraged the military, or 
rather a faction within the military, to dominate politics, and to rule the country according to 
their personal interests. This may substantially answer the central question, ‘why did the 
Algerian military turn against its own people?’ although the following pages will attempt a 
far broader explanation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 A BRIEF REVIEW OF ALGERIAN HISTORY 
Introduction 
The history of Algeria took place in the fertile coastal plain of North Africa, which is 
often called the Maghreb (or Maghrib). North Africa served as a transit region for people 
moving towards Europe or the Middle East.  The region's inhabitants were thus deeply 
influenced by populations from other areas.
55
 In fact, Algeria has been subject to a number of 
foreign invasions and has been affected by the influence of multiple civilizations. Phoenician 
traders settled on the Mediterranean coast in the first millennium, B.C. As ancient Numidia, 
Algeria became a Roman colony, part of what was called Mauretania Caesariensis, at the 
close of the Punic Wars (145 B.C.). Conquered by the Vandals around A.D. 440, it fell from 
a high state of civilization to virtual barbarism, from which it partly recovered after an 
invasion by Arabs in about 650. Christian during its Roman period, the indigenous Berbers 
were then converted to Islam. They fell under the control of the Ottoman Empire by 1536, 
after which Algeria was controlled by the Barbarousa brothers and then the Ottoman Khalif 
for about three centuries.  
Most scholars who have written about Algerian history have focused on the Ottoman 
period, followed by the period of French colonialism, from 1830-1962. They have tended to 
begin their narratives by analyzing the revolt of Emir Abd al-Qadir in 1832. Others have 
taken as their starting point the seventh century invasions of the pre-Hilaliennes.
56
 Regardless 
of where one begins an analysis of Algerian history, it is clear that Algeria has existed as a 
political and social entity for several millennia. This chapter seeks to provide a brief account 
of that history relevant to the thesis question, one that recognizes the socio-linguistic legacy 
of Algeria, and that provides some clarity regarding the relevant constituents of Algeria’s 
unique social and cultural history.  
A number of phases of Algerian history are briefly discussed in this chapter, with 
emphasis upon political and military resistance to foreign domination.
57
  French absorption of 
Algeria in 1848 is, of course, centrally relevant.  New laws under Louis Napoleon III that 
included full citizenship to Algerians opened doors for dozens of political parties and 
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humanitarian organizations seeking basic human rights on behalf of Algerians. This chapter 
will touch on the more significant parties and organizations that formed in the face of the 
subsequent colonial politics and the military regimes that have dominate the country since.  
This chapter will briefly take into account three eras that were the foundation of 
modern Algeria, starting from the Ottoman occupation, through to the Barbarousa brothers, 
the French invasion of Algeria in 1830, and the new generation of Muslim leadership, which 
emerged from within Algeria during World War I and grew to maturity during the 1920s and 
1930s.
58
 Various groups were formed in opposition to French rule, most notably the National 
Liberation Front (FLN), and the National Algerian Movement. The period that covers the 
Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), in all its brutality and length, is central to this 
thesis as the most recent, and perhaps most important turning point in the country's history. 
 
I. Algeria before the War or Independence 
1. Introduction  
Algeria has been subjected to many foreign invasions and has been affected by the 
influence of multiple civilizations. The most important part of Algerian history for this 
research, however, started with the French occupation of the country in 1830, when it was 
still a region that had been contested by Spanish troops and Turkish Ottomans. The French 
suddenly became interested in colonizing it, mostly for economic and geostrategic reasons. 
However, by the end of fifteenth century, following the Christian re-conquest of Andalusia in 
1429, which had been occupied by Muslims since 711, the Spanish tried to protect their 
presence in the Mediterranean and North Africa.  During the subsequent Spanish occupation 
of ports on the Algerian coast, the Algerian population of the harbour cities refused to be 
ruled by Christians, and sought the support of the Turkish Empire in the name of Islam. In 
1518, when Algiers and several other ports were besieged by the Spaniards, the Ottoman 
Turks finally intervened. The temporary settlement with the Turks in Algiers which 
subsequently transpired did not include other regions on the Algerian coast, however. A 
number of wars consequently resulted. Aruj (or Baba Arouj), an Algerian leader who was 
killed in battle with the Spaniards in 1518, provided the reason whereby his younger brother, 
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Khair-Eddine, was able to secure military aid from Selim I.
59
 Together they drove out the 
Spaniards from most of their new territory, and prevented the coronation of Charles V in 
Algiers in 1541. Under Khair-Eddine's regency, Algiers became the center of Ottoman 
authority in the Maghrib, from which Tunis, Tripoli, and Tlemcen would be overcome, and 
Morocco's independence threatened.
60
  
Algeria was formally ruled by the Ottomans through a series of ‘deys’.61  Because of 
its distance from Constantinople, the regency of Algiers was treated as an autonomous 
province. The assumption of power by the Ottomans in Algeria led to the installation of an 
elective monarchy and forms of government which ultimately affected Algeria deeply. The 
dey was chosen by local civilian, military, and pirate leaders to govern for life, and ruled with 
a high degree of autonomy from the Ottoman sultan.
62
 By the fifteenth century, Algiers was 
given the power to choose its dey, who then received the nomination of Constantinople.
63
  
Military Proconsuls of Africa, the “Sultans of Algiers”, exerted their authority not only on the 
Mediterranean coastal area of Algeria, but on the Pashas of Tunisia and Tripolitaine.
64
 
Politics, the military, and the economy were all based on taxes that the Sultan’s 
government forced citizens and farmers to pay. Piracy in the Mediterranean, and taxes on  
commercial ships, were the major incomes of the kingdom. Moreover, national and 
international businesses included trade and exchange, and both imports and exports were 
controlled by Jewish merchants, and especially by two Jewish families, the Busnach and 
Bacri,
65
 who had built up a commercial empire that extended from Marseille to Alexandria, 
and ultimately came to control the finances of the Dey himself.
66
 Additionally, the Bacri and 
Busnach families loaned money and arranged grain shipments to the Southern provinces of 
France, and later to Napoleon Bonaparte’s armies in Italy and Spain. Bacri and Busnach did 
not press for reimbursement for their major expenditures until after the Napoleonic wars, by 
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which time they owed money to the Dey of Algiers, Khodja Husein. The French could not 
repay the debt, and Bacri and Busnach notified the Dey that they were dependent on French 
repayment to settle their own debts.
67
  
Thus, a private financial affair became an affair of state. Negotiations between the 
two nations broke down on 29 April 1827, when the Dey struck the French consul with a fan 
during an argument over the King of France’s refusal to respond to his inquiries about the 
repayment of the debt. The Dey of Algiers insisted that no insult was aimed at the King of 
France, but the French responded with a military intervention. In mid-July, a French squadron 
arrived at Algiers and demanded an apology and a hundred-gun salute. The Dey refused these 
demands, and the French blockaded Algiers. Algerian forces responded by destroying French 
trading posts at Bône and La Calle. The Algerians and French were at a stalemate until 2 
March 1830, when France’s domestic politics became settled enough for the government to 
make an official decision on the matter. Charles X and the French admiralty decided to 
invade Algiers and occupy Algeria.
68
 
2. The French Invasion and the Algerian Resistance  
Algeria was far different from other countries under European colonial rule at that 
time. Even distant India was ruled by the British through local leadership. In that case, all of 
the major administrative positions were held by ethnic Indians, who dealt directly with their 
own people in their official functions, including the provision of public services. The British, 
in this instance, demonstrated significantly more respect, and less belligerence, toward the 
Indian people than did the French toward the Algerians. The British, in fact, did not even 
occupy much of India. In the case of Algeria, repeated efforts at French settlement, as if 
Algeria were part of France, appeared to be designed to ensure that Algeria would forever 
serve as an extension of France across the Mediterranean, even more than a settlers’ colony. 
Large numbers of Europeans were encouraged to move to Algeria, and to become farmers, 
shopkeepers, and administrators there. By the twentieth century, a fully articulated European 
society had taken root, one with an identity of its own.
69
 The Pieds noirs’ influence in Paris 
was such that Algeria was considered to be an integral part of metropolitan France, thereby 
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assuring that settlement in Algeria would remain a good opportunity and an assured route to 
successful business investments.
70
   
On 16 May 1830, the French military therefore mobilized their forces, brought 
together a full range of military expertise and materiel, and prepared to invade Algiers.
71
 A 
few weeks later Algiers fell, and France’s supreme military commander, Marshal Louis de 
Bourmont, took over, landing in Algeria on 14 June 1830,
72
 a few hundred meters from the 
Peninsula of Sidi Ferruch.
73
 The Dey’s treasury was in French hands, and the fort protecting 
Algiers finally fell, but not before the Dey had mined it. Three weeks after the capture of 
Algiers, the French sent a reconnaissance column to nearby cities. Blida (thirty miles south of 
Algiers) was attacked and almost wiped out. On 5 July 1830, the Algiers Governor, Dey 
Husayn, capitulated and presented to de Bourmont an act of surrender, officially marking the 
beginning of French colonial rule in Algeria.
74
 Just 350 km East of Algiers, the Dey of 
Constantine, Ahmad Hajj, sought to solidify the Ottoman presence. From 1836 to 1837, he 
stoutly defended his city against the French.
75
 The French invasion of Algeria had been 
planned well in advance, preying upon the manifest weakness of the Ottoman Empire. The 
French, for their part, harboured expansionist hopes of opening the long bridge to Africa and 
the Middle East in this extensive new era of “colonialism with a clear conscience”.76 
 The French army nevertheless faced strong resistance. Religious sects and social 
communities soon called for a holy war.
77
 Although the revolution of July 1830 overthrew 
Charles X, the French maintained their expeditionary forces, adding another column to 
Médéa (Southwest of Algiers) in 1831.  Subsequent resistance soon forced them to retreat 
back to Algiers. Indigenous leaders, such as Dey Ahmed in the East, and the old Marabout of 
the Qadriya of the Mahi Eddin sect in the West, mounted strong opposition. In the western 
Algeria, not far from Oran, Mahi Eddin’s son (Abd al-Qadir) was selected leader (Emir) of 
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the western resistance, which had begun in Mascara. The young leader, Emir Abd al-Qadir, 
quickly became a hero of Algerians, presenting himself as ‘the commander of the faith’, and 
using the principles of Islam while preaching Jihad. Abd al-Qadir became an inspiration for 
independent Algeria by creating, through military skills and astute diplomacy, a veritable 
state in western Algeria in the 1830s, seriously rivaling French territorial ambitions. In the 
Treaty of Tafna (1837), the French ultimately had to acknowledge his political authority.
78
 
Conflicting ambitions between the Algerian emirate and France eventually provoked yet 
another war that ended with Abd al-Qadir’s surrender in 1847.  
 In Algiers, the French high command had taken over the administration of the capital, 
and had decided to clear the country of Ottoman leaders and foreign sympathizers, forcing 
most of them to return to, or seek refuge in, Turkey. A docile group of ‘collaborating’ Jewish 
and Moorish merchants was nominated to relatively non-influential positions in the local 
Algiers municipal office, and soon indulged in gross corruption.  A Moorish merchant was 
installed under French protection as “Dey Titteri”; the Arabs and Berbers in the city quickly 
revolted against him, and forced him to flee.
79
  
The relative status of the Algerians and the French settlers was complicated from the 
beginning. Under the Constitution of 1848, Algeria was officially declared to be a French 
territory. Algeria was divided into two sections, one civilian, and the other military. The 
civilian section was largely European, and centered on Algiers and the ports. The military 
section was situated in the countryside and was almost wholly native-born, Arabs and 
Berbers. Algeria was divided into three provinces, the Algerian natives were ruled through 
local chiefs recognized by the military governors, and these chiefs apparently ruled rather 
more liberally than the settlers would have preferred.
80
 The rationalist ambitions of Emperor 
Louis Bonaparte, Napoleon III, for Algeria were evident in the Imperial Decree of 1857, 
which established a network of railways, and support for the Saint-Simonian socialist Prosper 
Enfantin’s plans to industrialise the region.81  
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On the other hand, the relationship between the Algerian locals (al-Ahali) and the 
French military regime in Algeria was very weak and quickly resulted in violence against the 
Algerian Muslims. The unexpected collapse of the Second Empire in the war with Prussia in 
1870-1871 was welcomed by the French in Algeria, who had been confirmed republicans, 
and had been relegated by Napoleon III to settlers in an “Arab Kingdom”. This collapse, 
moreover, gave the Algerian public the opportunity to assume control over the central 
administration and local government in Algeria. However, the dreams of many Algerian 
Muslims of participation in a political system with equal rights and power sharing, as 
Napoleon had originally promised, were dashed. The power rested in the hands of a military 
regime, and was only occasionally transferred, if at all, to French immigrants.  Local Muslims 
were excluded from political life, and according their history could not accept this clear 
discrimination. In an early revolt, the French military ruthlessly killed many of the Muslim 
civilians in Algiers and Kabilya, the latter governed by a Muslim leader, Ahmed el-Muqrani.  
The French government refused to give el-Muqrani control over Bordj Bou Arréridj, 
as had been promised, and they rejected his offer to install another leader from the pieds 
noirs. El-Muqrani then revolted against the French with his army, holding out against the 
French until Bordj-Bou-Arréridj, with the assistance of his brother, Boumezreg, his cousin, El 
Hadj Bouzid, and Sheik El Haddad.
82
 Using his position and influence over the Rahmania 
brotherhood, El-Muqrani was able to overcome the dissension in his camp and retake Bordj-
Bou-Arreridj. He was ultimately successful in his revolt, and the French army was forced to 
retreat to Algiers in defeat. Local Muslims strongly supported the revolt, and their numbers 
quickly grew, especially after the proclamation of jihad against the French by Sheikh Haddad 
and leaders of the Muslim community on April 8, 1871.
83
  
However, El-Muqrani was killed on 5 May 1871 at Taouraga. Under the command of 
his brother, Boumezreg, the uprising continued until 20 January 1872, when he was arrested 
by the French. The local Muslims in the region subsequently faced severe repression, 
discrimination, excessively high taxes, and a radically deteriorated quality of life.
84
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3. French Rule in Algeria  
The first colonial settlers established a specific definition of assimilation which never 
actually meant the assimilation of the colonised people, but rather focused on the 
expropriation of land. Napoleon III was one of the first French leaders who was seriously 
concerned about the Algerian crisis. In 1863, he passed a law aimed at “reconciling an 
intelligent, proud, warlike and agrarian race” in which it was stipulated, inter alia, that 
“France recognises the ownership by Arab tribes of territories of which they have permanent 
and traditional benefit”.85 The settlers attempted to deny the history of the colonised peoples. 
The senatus-consulte of 1865 worked to expropriate land and deny the newly colonised 
peoples citizen status. This ‘article of special importance’, which followed the abrogation of 
the Cremieux decree, reads as follows:  
The native born Muslim is a Frenchman; nevertheless, he will continue to be 
ruled by Muslim law. He can be admitted to the army and the navy. He can be 
appointed to civil posts in Algeria. He can, upon request, be admitted to French 
citizenship; but in this event he must be governed by the civil and political laws 
of France.
86
 
 
The French senatus-consulte of 1865 insitutionalised this deprivation of full French 
citizenship; it subjected the colonised to French laws while explicitly denying them the 
political rights that would have been part of French citizenship.
87
 According to Azzedine 
Haddour, “this fracture manifested itself at the disjunction between public citizenship and 
private identity, between family and life and the life of the nation, between past and 
present.”88 Haddour noted that the French government had framed the citizenship regulation 
unfairly, dashing Algerians’ last hopes of reasonable treatment under French rule.  Algerians 
had now been confined politically to very limited and private spheres of domestic and 
religious life, the sole remaining bases of their identity and cultural belonging.  “That is, the 
political life of the nation forced the colonised to fall back on old cultural practices from a 
congealed past.”89 The new ‘Algerian system’ came to resemble the future apartheid system 
of twentieth century South Africa.   Haddour noted that:  
                                                          
85
 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (London: MacMillan London Ltd, 1977), p.  31. 
86
 Contemporary Jewish Record - April 1945,  “Palestine in the Changing Middle East - the Stateless People - 
Thomas Mann's "Joseph" - Anti-Semitism in Britain,” Bernard D. ; Hannah Arendt; Harold Rosenberg; George 
Orwell Weinryb, The American Jewish Committee, 1945, pp. 115-117.  
87
 Azzedine Haddour, A Colonial Myths: History and Narrative (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2000). 
88
 Haddour, A. (2000). 
89
 See Memmi, A., The Colonizer and the Colonized (London: Souvenir Press, 1974), pp.111-112; and Fanon, 
F., Toward the African Revolution (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1970), pp. 44 ff.   
 39   
 
The ideology of assimilation foreclosed the possibility of a workable 
political project in colonial Algeria. In fact, this ideology put in place a 
regime of apartheid, characterised by its Manichaean violence, 
compartmentalizing and segregating the nation into a French Algeria - 
which enjoyed the rights of political citizenship - and native born Algerians, 
to which these rights were denied.
90
 
 
However, the French authorities continued to usurp individual human and property 
rights. They sold tens of thousands of hectares to settlers and even European countries, and 
practiced a systematic policy of higher taxes and lower return for agricultural products, which 
forced local farmers to give up their lands to pay for their mounting debts to the French 
government. The lands of Muslims Algerians, legally protected by the act of 1873, which was 
aimed specifically at preventing sub-division of land holdings, had major loopholes, and a 
wide variety of forms of corruption subsequently took hold throughout the country.
91
          
The nature of the French colonial regime in Algeria and the theories of assimilation it 
promoted were thus determined by French colonial laws, especially the senatus-consulte of 
1863 and 1865, and its underlying ideological function. According to Tocqueville,  
...there are two ways to conquer a country, the first is to submit its 
inhabitants to dependency and rule over them directly or indirectly; such is 
the English rule in India. The second is to replace the indigenous people by 
the conquering race.
92
  
 
However, the patently uncivil relationship between the Muslim community and other 
(mostly settler) communities and the French government was apparently based upon racism, 
discrimination and routine deprivation of basic rights. Algerians could not meet publicly to 
discuss their issues in the community, nor even leave their home districts without permission 
from the French authorities. French state-sponsored racism kept Algerians at the bottom of 
society, relegating them to working as servants, or unskilled labourers and peasants, while 
only French citizens or other settlers were allowed to assume the skilled jobs and positions in 
social institutions.  Muslims were required to obtain police clearance and French 
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administrative authorization for any meaningful employment, clearances which, in practice, 
were never given.
93
    
The new emperor disliked the European settlers in Algeria because they had voted 
against his accession to power, and hence listened sympathetically to the complaints of native 
born Algerians regarding oppression and land-grabbing. Benjamin Stora noted that Napoleon 
III refused to inflict on the Arab population the fate that had befallen the Indians of North 
America, which he described as “an impossible and inhumane thing”.94 Napoleon, after his 
visit to Algeria in 1860, became even more sympathetic with the plight of the Algerian 
Muslims, and soon implemented the ‘politics of the grand chiefs’ to deal with the Muslims 
directly through their traditional leaders. In 1863, during another trip of Algeria, he 
proclaimed that:  
Algeria is not a colony...but an Arab kingdom...The natives and the 
colonists have an equal right to my protection and I am no less the Emperor 
of the Arabs than the Emperor of the French.
95
 
Nevertheless, discontent was rampant among the settlers, who tended to advocate 
simple attachment of the colony to France.
96
  This discontent intensified as Napoleon III 
made his respect and sympathy for the Arab population ever more apparent, declaring 
publicly that he wanted to foster the prosperity of the “[Arab] race - intelligent, proud, 
warlike, and agrarian.”97 He issued two decrees in 1863 affecting tribal structure, land tenure, 
and the legal status of Muslims in French Algeria, although his plans quickly began to 
unravel. French officials sympathetic to the settlers took much of the tribal land they 
surveyed into the public domain.  Napoleon kept up his support for native born Algerians’ 
rights as a counter-balance to the fervently republican settlers.  
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Two laws voted by the Senate on 22 April 1863 and 14 July 1865, known as the 
‘Senatus-Consult’, defended the native born Algerians’ land rights and granted native-born 
Algerians the right to citizenship. However, in their application, the Senatus-Consult ended 
up discriminating against Arabs and Berbers, the vast majority of native-born Algerians. In 
formalising land rights, the courts reduced traditional land-holdings precipitously.
98
 Intended 
to facilitate the granting of citizenship by a ‘well-meaning Emperor’,99 the second Senatus-
Consult allowed Algerians to apply for French nationality, but only if they allowed their 
Statut Personnel to be French, thus subjecting themselves to French courts in such matters as 
marriage and inheritance.
100 
In reality, the offer of citizenship amounted to little: the Muslims 
simply could not relinquish their religion and their cultural identity.
101
 The application 
procedure, especially, met with a generally hostile response from the Algerian Muslim 
population. Between 1865 and 1 November 1867 only 56 Muslims and 115 Jews applied.
102
 
However, under the terms of the law, all Algerians were subjects of the Empire, and therefore 
subject to its taxes. Similarly, the education system, which had been opened to Algerians with 
the goal of assimilating them into French culture, taught only in the French language.  
In 1870, Muslims chiefs saw the decree as heralding the dissolution of native born 
Algerian society, and openly declared that they would not accept “settler rules.”  The 
colonists did not care, convinced that the Arabs no longer had the strength or the capacity to 
revolt.
103
 Algerians in the military zone subsequently revolted. French repression was re-
doubled, and the ideal of assimilation was exposed as fundamentally misleading. Algerians 
were not being treated as equals with equal rights as the French settlers, but rather as inferiors 
to both the French and the other Europeans, all of whom enjoyed full rights. Stora noted that 
France’s aim was “to ensure the absolute and complete subjugation of the population to the 
                                                          
98
 Ministere de Justice Francais, Archive des Cases de France Colonialisme en Algerie, See website : 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/archives/_private/niveau%201/intro.htm . 
Napoleon III had determined to halt the expansion of European settlement beyond the coastal zone and to 
restrict contact between Muslims and the colons, whom he considered to have a corrupting influence on the 
indigenous population. He envisioned a grand design for preserving most of Algeria for the Muslims by 
founding a royaume arabe (Arab kingdom) with himself as the roi des Arabes (king of the Arabs). See Charles 
Robert Ageron, Michael Brett, Modern Algeria: a History from 1830 to the Present, 9
th
 Edition (London 1991), 
Pp. 37-46. 
99
 Morsy M, North Africa 1800-1900 (United Kingdom: Longman Group, January 1984), p.160.  
100
Charles-Robert Ageron, Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present (London: Hurst and Company, 
1990), p. 39.  
101
 Azzedine Haddour, A. Colonial Myths: History and Narrative (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2000), p. 5.  
102
 Magali Morsy, North Africa 1800-1900: A Survey from the Nile Valley to the Atlantic (Longman, 1984).  
103
 Charles Robert Ageron, Michael Brett, Modern Algeria: a History from 1830 to the Present, 9
th
 Edition 
(London, 1991), p. 46. 
 42   
 
needs and interests of colonization.”104 It became obvious that the colonised were ‘subjects’ 
not ‘citizens’ and were liable to special provisions: they were in effect restricted to the lowest 
economic and social classes in the colonial society, required to perform menial tasks, literally 
reduced to the status of slaves in their own homeland, with no standing in the courts, and 
subject to detention without due process.
105
  
The debates of the corps legislative of 1870 favoured the institution of a civil regime 
because it seemed to be in the best interests of the European settlers and native born 
Algerians.
106
 While the decree of June 1870 provided that the General Councils would be 
selected by Europeans, Jews, Arabs and Berbers, the right to vote for the latter two categories 
of people was in fact repealed by the decree of 28 December 1870 on the basis that it violated 
‘the principle of public law by conferring the right of suffrage and candidature upon persons 
who were not native born Algerians or naturalized French citizens.’107  
French policy against Algerians changed every time the French authorities had a 
change in leadership in Algeria. Algerian Muslims had always fought for their identity, and 
now the French government suddenly accepted them as French subjects, if not citizens, if 
they had been born in Algeria.
108
 The decree of Crémieux in effect granted French citizenship 
to Jews born in Algeria.
109
 According to Azzedine Haddour, the Cremieux decree opened a 
wedge at the core of native-born Algerians, separating Arabs from Jews.   
…It must be stressed that the liberal government which passed the 
Cremieux decree of 24 October 1870 granting citizenship to the indigenous 
Jews was essentially racist vis a vis the Arabs and Berbers. Whereas the 
decree of June 1870 allowed Europeans and Jews to select the Conseils 
generaux the decree of 28 December 1870 denied suffrage for the Arabs 
and Berbers in the basis that it violated the principle of public law by 
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granting the right of suffrage and candidature upon persons who were not 
French.
110
  
 
Following what appeared to be a concerted strategy of divide-and-rule, the French 
had, in effect, created a new category within Algerian society, consolidating a loyal 
intermediary layer of Jews between the Muslim natives and the French and European settlers, 
and had forced Muslims to choose between Islamic and French law.
111
 The French had 
created a system that was, according to Governor General Gueydon, a ‘serfdom of the 
natives’.112 In 1865, the French Government had laid down the principles for the treatment of 
the native born Algerian population in Algeria regarding their citizenship and their relation to 
the mother country. Later, the Napoleonic code of 1881 had supplemented this with a special 
‘native code’, which gave more rights to Muslims and Jews, including expanding their 
possible employment opportunities beyond the lowest and the most difficult jobs in society. 
This 1881 code revision also gave them significantly more freedom of movement in the 
country, and abolished the travel permit requirement.
113
 Despite the revision of the 
Napoleonic code, as far as the Muslims were concerned, the basic principles went unchanged 
until 1919, when they were altered only slightly.  
French proposals for Algerian inclusion as part of France were summarily rejected by 
the French government, principally because the settlers’ primary goal was the establishment 
of a ‘good life’ in Algeria, with virtually no regard for the wellbeing of the Muslim 
community. According to General Hanoteau, an officer of the bureaux Arabs: “What our 
settlers’ dream of is a bourgeois feudalism in which they will be the lords and the natives the 
serfs”.114 Algerian Jews tended to acquire French citizenship, and thereby came under the 
control of French authority, while Algerian Muslims consistently refused to be controlled 
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except by their own governors and Islamic law. Following charges of anti-Semitism lodged 
by Muslim politicians in the election of 1898, Governor Laferrière bent to the colonists’ 
demands for autonomy, granting financial independence and the creation of an elected 
colonial assembly. Algeria became a ‘small French Republic’ in which “the voter’s card 
became the title of nobility in this novel feudal system”.115 
 
4. The Algerian Political Resistance  
Algerian resistance to French rule was continuous over the next century, and included 
peaceful legal pressures as well as periodic violent attacks on French troops by individuals 
and organised revolutionary groups.  Organisations and political movements also pursued 
their objectives of attaining and guaranteeing human rights and political independence 
legally. These goals were pursued both within Algeria and also via international human rights 
movements. As discussed above, if the early-armed movement was organised by Abd al-
Qadir, the earliest movement for political reform was, in fact, an integrationist group, made 
up of young Algerians. Its members were drawn from the small, liberal elite of well educated, 
middle-class évolués who demanded an opportunity to prove that they were French as well as 
Muslim.
116
  
A number of political parties and humanitarian organisations were created in both 
Algeria and France, seeking basic human rights on behalf of Algerians who were dying every 
day either directly by the bullets and shrapnel of the French army, or as a result of illness and 
famine that occurred under the oppressive colonial economic system. In the face of the 
Muslim Algerians’ suffering, the response of the French authorities was negative, 
authoritarian and, according to historians, humiliating.
117
 
Many French leaders were concerned about protecting what they had gained in the 
colonisation of Algeria, and they did not want to lose ground in the face of claims that they 
had violated the basic rights of Muslims, although this was plainly evident at the time. They 
tried to enact a set of reforms to preserve the elite status of the French settlers in Algeria. In 
1908, the French government, and its Prime Minister, George Clemenceau, received a strong 
request from Algerian Muslim leaders to end military conscription of Muslim Algerians. 
However, the request continued, if the State granted Muslims full citizenship, resistance to 
                                                          
115
 Ageron C. R. (1991), p. 53. 
116
 Metz, Helen Chapan, ed. Algeria: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994). 
117
 It has been mentioned by many scholars in different sources, such as Belkacem Saadallah, Al-Haraka al-
Wataniya Al-Jaza’irya (Algerian National Movement), Vol 3 (Algiers: Institute of Social Sciences, University 
of Algiers, 1977);  Stora, B. Algeria 1830-2000, A Short History, 2001  
 45   
 
conscription would be dropped.
118
 Demands for reform again intensified in 1911, when the 
Young Algerians called for an end to unequal taxation, advocated a broadening of the 
franchise, more schools, and protection of indigenous property. The Young Algerians added a 
significant voice to the reformist movement against French colonial policy that had begun in 
1892, and this continued until the outbreak of World War I. Demands for preferential 
treatment for ‘the intellectual elements of the country’ were further strengthened by the 
significant role that Algerians played in WWI, where a great many fought and died for 
France. Clemenceau appointed reform-minded Charles Jonnart as Governor General of 
Algeria as the war came to a close. Reforms promulgated in 1919, and known collectively as 
the Jonnart Law, expanded the number of Muslims permitted to vote to about 425,000 from 
the total local population of over four million that time.
119
  
The most popular Muslim leader in Algeria after the First World War was Emir 
Khaled Ibnu Hachim, grandson of Abd al-Qadir, an officer in the French army before 
entering politics and leading an Algerian political movement in late 1919 under the banner 
‘Emir Khaled’.120 He disagreed with members of the group over acceptance of the Jonnart 
Law. Some Young Algerians were willing to work within the framework set out by the 
reforms, but Emir Khaled, as he was known, continued to press for the complete Young 
Algerian program. He was able to win electoral victories in Algiers and to enliven political 
discourse with his calls for reform and full assimilation, but by 1923 he tired of the struggle 
and left Algeria, eventually retiring in Damascus.
121
    
 
 4.1. The Star of North Africa, the Federation of Elites and the Algerian Popular 
Union
122
  
Prior to 1930 there were two kinds of elite organisations operating in Algeria, the first 
of which was concerned with exploring the future relationship between Algeria and France, 
and the second, principally of the Muslim Reform Scholars, was concerned with the 
relationship between Algeria and the Arab and Islamic world. After 1930, two other political 
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organisations were created, the first organised movement and widely known political group 
among Algerians, the Star of North Africa (Étoile Nord Africaine) and the Federation of 
Elites (La Fédération Des Élites). Their main objective was to attain basic human rights for 
Algerians from the French government.
123
 In addition, there were many smaller organisations 
founded at this time, based around schools, universities and so forth. But these two particular 
organisations, discussed below, were the first real political parties that articulated the desires 
of the Algerian people.
124
 It should be noted that the Star of North Africa eventually was 
replaced by the Algerian People’s Party, or the PPA, discussed below.  The Communist party, 
which had a greater base of support among the lower socio-economic groups in Algeria and 
France at that time, was also established during this period.
125
 
The Federation of Elites was an organisation established in 1930, which sought the 
right of equality with French citizens. The Federation was committed to achieving two 
distinct objectives.  The first was to work with the French colonial rulers to obtain the rights 
of integration and equality.
126
 In other words, the goal was to completely integrate all 
Algerian and European citizens as one society, with each citizen being given the same rights.  
The second objective was to ensure that the Muslim Algerians, within that integrated society, 
had the right to attend mosques, religious schools and maintain the Arabic language.  Many 
conferences were held across Algeria from 1930-1936. In each conference, the issue of how 
Algerians could protect their religion and their culture under the French government was 
addressed. 
127
 
 The Star of North Africa began in Paris in the 1930s under the leadership of Dr. 
Mohamed Saleh ben Djalloul, and a pharmacist, Ferhat Abbas.  The PPA came later and was 
established in Algeria. Their representatives, however, were from the upper classes, and 
included highly educated Algerians, mostly professionals such as journalists and lecturers. 
These representatives, which the French authorities assisted by providing them with money 
and positions in order to establish a bridge between the colonial rulers and the labour sector 
of the population in Algeria and France, worked with France to implement a comprehensive 
colonial reform proposal by Algerian Governor General, Maurice Violette. Unfortunately, the 
French Senate, sensitive as ever to pressures from Algerian Europeans, voted down the bill 
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when it came before the National Assembly. Not long afterwards, the Popular Front and a 
new government took severe measures, by decree, to prevent “all disorder manifestations 
against French sovereignty, all active or passive resistance to the laws, decrees, regulations or 
order of the public authority”.128 The failure of the Blum-Violette reforms was a serious blow 
to Abbas and his supporters. 
Abbas’ political career began in 1934 with his election to office as Municipal 
Councillor of Sétif, as a member of the Federation des Elutes Musulman.  In Le Jeune 
Algerien, a French newspaper published in Algeria, he clarified his position.  He wrote, in his 
answer to the question of ‘what Nationalism really means’ that “it is the fight for our 
economic and political emancipation…we have once and for all swept away all dreams which 
France has achieved in this country.”129 And he continued with his oft-quoted phrase: 
...if I had discovered the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and I 
would not blush for it as a crime. Men who die for a patriotic ideal are 
honoured and respected. My life is not worth more than theirs. But I would 
not die for an Algerian fatherland because such a fatherland does not exist. I 
cannot find it. I questioned history. I questioned the living and the dead. I 
searched through the cemeteries: nobody could speak to me of it. You 
cannot build on air.
130
 
 
However, the the National Union of Algerian Youth (Union Nationale de la Jeunesse 
Algérienne-UNJA), soon emerged and launched its program among young Algerians at a 
time when Violette had started to mobilize French society, calling attention to the dangers of 
the Algerian political elites’ movements. He gave a memorable speech in the National 
Assembly, noting that: 
These Muslims, when they protest, you become indignant; when they 
approve, you become suspicious; when they keep quiet, you become afraid. 
Gentlemen, these men have no political country of their own. They do not 
even claim their religious country. They crave to be admitted to your 
country. Should you refuse, you may well fear that they will soon create 
one.
131
   
 
However, UNJA’s most important contribution during this period was the first 
successful Islamic conference held in 1936. It brought together intellectuals, religious 
scholars and politicians from across the political spectrum.  The Islamic conference was 
established to return back the self-confidence of the elite members and to unite the various 
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groups that had arisen into one, united organisation that could press the French colonial rulers 
for the recognition of basic and universal human rights.
132
 In 1938, Abbas created a party 
called the Algerian Popular Union ‘Union Populaire Algerienne’ (UPA), attracting moderates 
like himself who advocated political emancipation within the French framework. Even 
though Abbas and the French authority clashed from time to time, Abbas had not lost faith in 
France: when war broke out, he enlisted in the medical corps and, issued a romantic farewell 
to his political friends: “If I am killed, someone else will continue my task, vive la France!, 
vive l’Algerie!”133  
One of the objectives of the UPA was to bridge the gap that had appeared in Algeria 
between the young and old generations. The young generation had generally struggled to find 
quality education and employment, had very little French education and thus very little 
positive experience with France, and was in direct contrast to the older generation.  The older 
Algerians, who had received their education in French schools, who had knowledge of the 
positive aspects of French humanism, and many of whom had respectable, professional jobs, 
were much more supportive of retaining ties with France than the younger generation. The 
attitude of the older generation is best summed up by Ben-el-Haj when he wrote that: 
...before everything we are all French people, our Nation is France ….our 
religion has no intervention in our citizenship…I looked in the history and I 
couldn’t find something named Algeria….134  
 
Thus, there was clearly a gap between the elites of the younger generation and those 
of the older generation. Neither group of elites could reach an agreement that could form the 
basis of a political party. This fundamental difference of opinion, based on different 
experiences, meant that both elites were destined to fail. Despite their differences, both 
groups respected the authority of Ben Badis who signed an agreement at the Islamic 
conference of 1936, on behalf of all the groups present, that they would support the 
implementation of the Violette Charter. That document would provide the right to gain 
French citizenship to those Algerians who studied in French schools and attained a certain 
level of education, meanwhile allowing them to retain Islam as their religion. The Violette 
Charter was a step forward in the sense that it guaranteed Algerians the right to retain Arabic 
as their language and Islam as their religion, to practice their culture and to retain the right to 
attend mosques for Islamic education, even if they wanted to apply for and obtain French 
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citizenship.  Although a step in the right direction, the right to apply for French citizenship 
under these conditions was not open to all Algerians – only those who were educated in 
French schools, and who attained a high level of education therein.  The Algerian working 
class, therefore, was essentially excluded from the benefits that the Violette Charter.
135
 
Ben-Djalloul, the leader of the elites who had won the local elections of October 1934 
in Constantine, received support from Abbas and the reformers of Constantine, including Ben 
Badis. Relying on this broad base of support, the movement protected its members from 
conflicts with the French colonisers, but it failed to reach its goals in the citizenship program 
according to the Charter of Blum–Viollette.  Abbas, an important member in the national 
elite, had been very close to the French colonialists; more than that, he disagreed with 
anything associated with the word “Algeria”. He introduced himself as the French 
Representative and would accept nothing except the French flag in Algeria. According to 
Abbas, the civil war in the cities and the mountains of Algeria was a kind of internal problem 
that could happen anywhere in world.
136
    
After the Russian Revolution, the Algerian Communist Ahmed Messali Hadj began 
an underground struggle to build a revolutionary movement with the central goal of 
overthrowing French colonialism. He was the founder of the “Mouvement National 
Algérien,” an early Algerian nationalist group and rival of the “Front de Libération 
Nationale”. By the Second World War, Abbas, once a well-known Algerian social-
democratic reformist became a Communist and joined with Hadj to build a militant workers 
party — Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty. In 1947, in the wake of the Second World War 
and fearful of nationalistic uprisings, the government established a parliamentary assembly in 
Algeria, made up of half European and Algerian delegates, with the purpose of upholding 
French colonial rule.
137
  
Before concluding this section it is important to note that within the groups mentioned 
above, there remained an ideological difference of opinion as to whether Algeria belonged to 
France, or whether Algeria, in fact, even existed.
138
 This conflict was evident in the 
relationship between Abbas and Hadj.  As Hadj organised the migrant labourers, Abbas 
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organised the middle class.
139
 Abbas’ moderate demands were based on his own intuition that 
there was no coherent national sentiment to awaken. He told Entente on 23 February 1936: 
If I could find the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist, and I would not 
blush from it as a crime ... I will not die for the Algerian fatherland, because 
this fatherland does not exist
140
  
 
Hadj disagreed and in that same year l’Étoile organised mass demonstrations and 
published a manifesto demanding independence. The French Communist Party (PCF) 
attacked Hadj for playing into the settlers' hands by supporting their demands for secession. 
Without PCF support, l’Étoile was easily suppressed by Leon Blum’s popular front 
government in January 1937.
141
 
 
4.2. The Islamic Association of Algerian Scholars (AUMA), 1931 
The Association of the Algerian Muslim Scholars (Association des Uléma Musulmans 
Algériens, or AUMA), was established in May 1931 in Algiers, but it was officially 
registered with the French authorities and was functioning legally by the end of 1920.
142
  
Omar Ismail was the organiser who invited scholars and the leaders of Quranic schools to 
form the association. It brought together 72 Algerian scholars from across Algeria and from 
various schools of thought. The administrative board consisted of 13 members, and as a result 
of internal elections, Abdel-Hantomid Ben Badis was elected the head. Under the leadership 
of  Ben Badis, the reformist AUMA organised and shared ideas with the religious scholars as 
a tactic in order to obtain legal agreement from the colonial authorities. It is important to note 
that the highest positions in the UPA were occupied by students of Ben Badis.   
This religious organisation of scholars and students had a program to promote the 
purification of Islam in Algeria and a return to the Quran and Sunna (the tradition of the 
Prophet). Their slogan was: “Islam my religion, Arabic my Language and Algeria my 
Nation.”143 Their program was based on teaching the Islamic principles and the rules of 
Sharia as a foundation of social life.
144
 
                                                          
139
 Neil MacMaster, Colonial migrants and racism: Algerians in France, 1900-62 (New York, Macmillan Press, 
1997); Rabah, Issaoui,  Immigration and national identity: North African political movements in colonial and 
postcolonial France (University of Michigan: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009).  
140
 Jean-François Lyotard, Political writings (Translated by Bill Readings and kaven Paul Geiman) (Regents of 
the University of Minnesota, 1993), p. 293.  
141
 Ibid, and also: Horne, A. (1977). 
142
 For more details, see Saadallah, B. (1977); Stora, B. (2001).  
143
 Martin Stone, The agony of Algeria (United Kingdom: C. Hurst and CO Ltd, 1997), p. 148. 
144
 See Islam and the Algerian State, ch. 2.  
 51   
 
The AUMA succeeded in mobilising Algerians into a strong support base.  They were 
located primarily in the city of Constantine. They did not presume to engage in politics aside 
from furthering their teaching and disabusing Algerians of non-Islamic practices.  Their role 
was formally limited to schools, mosques, and the teaching of religion and culture, and thus 
the French authorities welcomed and encouraged their activities.  
 Although their support was based in the Constantine region,
145
 they presented 
themselves as the voice of Algeria in order to press effectively for their legitimate rights from 
the French government, which was based in Algiers.  The AUMA soon chose to move to 
Algiers and received a strong response among the Muslim community there as well, with 
whom it had closer ties than did the other nationalist organisations. Ben Badis accepted the 
move to Algiers because of the need to be in close proximity to the central administration of 
the colonial authorities, as well as the practical need to be close to the organisation’s sponsor, 
an old association that had been the basis for AUMA’s creation, ‘Nadi al-Taraqi’. Along with 
this reform-based association, and under the leadership of Ben Badis, for the first time since 
the colonial invasion, the Algerian movement established a reform-orientated network, with 
many branches, independent schools and mosques for teaching and preaching in the cities and 
the smaller villages.
146
 Despite this large number of branches, schools and mosques, however, 
and perhaps because the Islamic reformers had quickly gained popularity and influence, the 
French authorities refused their applications for permission to preach in official mosques.
147
 
The French authorities initially looked at Abbas as a good example for Algerians.  Abbas’s 
movement never believed that Algeria could be an independent country.  Rather, they thought 
that Islam in Algeria could not survive without France. At the time, the opposition elite, led 
by Hadj, also looked to France for its ideological model, although Hadj’s views did not allow 
for the possibility of Algerian independence. Abbas summed up the philosophy of the liberal 
integrationists, in opposition to the claims of the nationalists, when he denied in 1936 that 
Algeria had a separate identity. Ben Badis responded that he, too, had looked to the past and 
found that:   
...this Algerian nation is not France, cannot be France, and does not want to 
be France... [but] has its culture, its traditions and its characteristics, good 
or bad, like every other nation of the earth.
148
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In any case, the French authorities rejected any movement toward reform, whether 
instigated by integrationist or nationalist organisations. Because of this policy, the 
government in Paris was ultimately blamed for the political developments in Algeria. In the 
meantime, the French liberals saw evolution as the only possible route to diffusing political 
power in Algeria, and attacked Hadj as a demagogue and the AUMA for religious 
obscurantism. Helen Chapan Metz noted that:  
...at all times, however, the French government was confronted by the 
monolithic intransigence of the leaders of the European community in 
Algeria in opposing any devolution of power to Muslims, even to basically 
pro-French sophisticated. The colons also had powerful allies in the 
National Assembly, the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the business 
community, and were strengthened in their resistance by their almost total 
control of the Algerian administration and police.
149
 
 
 The tolerance of AUMA by the French colonial ministry in 1931 was based upon two 
factors: first, it filled the gap which had been created by the French authorities in the Arab 
villages when the movement of Emir Khaled, the Star of North Africa, was disestablished.  
Another factor may have been the strategy of Ben Badis, who played on both sides, 
sometimes with France via his family, which had good relations with the French government, 
and other times with the Algerian community as a scholar, developing a following around the 
country.
150
  
At a conference held in Algiers on 7 July 1936, for the first time in the history of 
Algeria since colonisation, Algerians became unified under one banner, demanding basic 
human rights for the Algerian community from the French government.  The conference 
brought together different thinkers and parties with their different ideological backgrounds 
and ideas regarding their situation in relation to French colonialism. This meeting was 
supported by the wider Algerian community, which was in need of a united voice, a political 
defender of their rights, and a force capable of putting a stop to military conscription, which 
the French government had imposed on young Algerians.
151
     
Ben Badis, by virtue of his personality and religious education, was respected by 
Algerians at all levels of society, and soon adopted a strategy of non-confrontation with the 
French government. Instead of meeting with their representatives and challenging them 
                                                          
149
 Helen Chapan Metz (1994). 
150
 Belkacem Saadallah, Abhaath wa Araa’ fi Tarikh al-Jaza’ir (Chapter: Taamulat fi Tarikh al-Thawra), Vol. 4 
(Beirut, Dar al-Ghareb al al-Islami, pub. 1, 1996); also: Horne, A. (1977). 
151
 Saidallah, B. (1977) . 
 53   
 
directly, he chose to position himself as a ‘mere’ religious leader, confining himself to 
teaching the younger generation and resolving the association’s problems within the rules of 
the religion, through the mosques and Quran schools (Katateeb). This approach ensured that 
Ben Badis and his association were kept apart from the struggle between Algerians and the 
French government. The French rulers did not see him as a threat, since he seemed only 
concerned with issues concerning religious education.
152
   
Unfortunately for the French, this approach was part of a deliberate strategy to ensure 
that Algerians would not forget their religion, or their country.  Ben Badis was struggling 
against two equally destructive forces: the French rulers, who wanted to deny Algerians their 
basic human rights, and the Algerian leaders (such as Hadj and Abbas) who supported the 
continued rule of France over Algeria.  On the other hand, the internal religious sects (such as 
Sufism and Tourouqiyah) were only concerned with practicing their religion, and avoided the 
question of who should govern Algeria.  Ben Badis tried to convince Algerians that both 
paths were unsatisfactory.  It was not until the 1936 conference in Algiers that the French 
Army began to become concerned with the true agenda of Ben Badis and his AUMA. At that 
conference, it became apparent that Ben Badis disagreed with the approach adopted by Hadj 
and Abbas. Hadj, who had said that he could not identify Algeria as a separate entity in 
history, received a terse response from Ben Badis who, in his article in Shihab Magazine 
wrote: “…if you have not seen it, I have seen it clearly from the earliest centuries and it has 
been strong by virtue of Islam, and it will be strong in the future…”153  
Ben Badis had refused France’s demand for the support of Algerians against the 
Germans in World War I.  At that time, he had considered revolting against the French Army 
occupation of Algeria, and using the opportunity provided by World War I to demand human 
rights for Algerians, in return for their support of France. Ben Badis ultimately died under 
suspicious circumstances in 1940.
154
  In any event, France seems to have demanded the 
support of the Algerian community against their enemies.  After a meeting in 1938, the 
AUMA decided by a majority of members (16 votes to 12) that it would not provide any 
support to France. With this decision, the AUMA association faced many difficulties, which 
made their work impossible, especially in the period between WWI and World War II.  
Internal conflicts developed among the AUMA’s members after they were attacked by the 
French Army.  Most of them were arrested or killed, and their subsequent clashes with other 
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movements, particularly with the PPA, effectively separated them from the other elites.
155
 
Moreover, with all that had happened to the AUMA association, the Etoite Nord Africain 
(ENA) continued its struggle from Paris and Algiers, until Governor-General Lebeau 
obtained (without major difficulty) a decree from the Front Populaire government formally 
banning the ENA in 1937. On 27 August 1937, Hadj was arrested, along with five leaders of 
the PPA who had directed the organisation’s relationship with France’s enemies; Germany 
and Italy.
156
 
With the establishment of the Algerian Popular Front in France in 1936, there was a 
sense of expectation on the part of those Algerians who were seeking political change. It was 
thought that the climate would now be more favorable towards reform and that this would act 
as a spur for several different political strands to come together in the first Algerian Muslim 
Congress. These included the AUMA, the Fédération des Elus Indigènes (FEIA), as well as 
the Algerian Communist Party, which had initially been formed as an offshoot of the French 
Communist Party, but had achieved independent status in 1936. The ENA, with its radical 
nationalist agenda, was not included in this Congress, which presented a list of demands to 
the French Government that included guaranteeing equal rights for all Algerians, but without 
mentioning independence.
157
 The French government responded to these with a decree, 
known later as the Blum–Viollette proposals.158  
The main thrust of the proposals was to extend French citizenship, with the political 
rights that this entailed, to about 25,000 Algerian Muslims, focusing on the most highly 
educated people, and certain categories of army personnel and civil servants, regardless of 
their religious beliefs. The proposals failed for a number of reasons. On the one hand, while 
some of the Algerian political elite welcomed them as a step forward, these proposals were 
too limited in scope to satisfy the growing demand for equality and did nothing to appease 
nationalist demands for independence. On the other hand, even the modest Blum–Viollette 
proposals were regarded as a major step forward, one which could give Algerians a first taste 
of independence. The European colonists and their settlers, the pieds noirs, demonstrated 
against the proposals and ultimately forced their withdrawal. In late 1939, the French 
authorities formally rejected the policy of assimilation and the exclusive insistence upon 
French culture as the only tolerated culture in the country.  
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Algerians were further angered by subsequent political changes. They merely 
confirmed that Algerians would never have the same rights as the French settlers.  In 1943, 
Algerian notables issued a manifesto demanding a new status for Algeria. Hadj was 
consequently arrested by the French army and jailed in the high security Lambessa Prison in 
Batna (Southeast of Algiers). Soon thereafter, when he was transferred to the Sétif, he met 
with Abbas and agreed to a change of political tactics in dealing with the French authorities. 
He now included the possibility of struggling for independence. In 1944 a new movement, 
the Friends of the Manifesto and Freedom (Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberte, or AML) was 
recognized by the PPA.  According to the PPA at the time:  
…at the end of hostilities, Algeria will be set up as an Algerian state 
endowed with its own constitution, which will be elaborated by an Algerian 
constituent assembly, elected by universal suffrage by all the inhabitants of 
Algeria.
159
 
 
Abbas subsequently published the Manifeste du peuple algérien (Manifesto of the 
Algerian people, or MPA), demanding the implementation of the principle of self-
determination and the creation of an autonomous (not independent) Algerian state. In May, 
the Addendum au Manifeste (Addendum to the Manifesto) included a demand for the 
sovereignty of the Algerian nation. The French government continued to favour its own very 
narrowly defined concept of selective ‘assimilation’ and Abbas and the nationalists therefore 
moved ahead with the AML.  The first AML congress pronounced itself opposed to Algerian 
independence. By April 1945, the French were continuing to abuse human rights in Algeria, 
and Hadj was arrested and sent to the exile in the Congo Brazzaville. In the midst of this 
political crisis, a grave economic crisis hit Algeria, causing massive impoverishment and 
even famine in the countryside. 
5. The Massacres of 8 May 1945 
The 8
th
 of May 1945 was a defining moment in the history of Algeria. The 
background to the events of that day, and its repercussions, ultimately defined the political 
future of the country. The capitulation of Nazi Germany put an end to the appalling cruelty of 
the war in Europe. While this date, for the Algerian communities of Sétif, Guelma and 
Kharrata, may have been comparable to other instances of European violence in the past, 
there was a profound political difference, and it is no exaggeration to regard the importance 
of this day for the overall direction of Algeria as central. Although it has largely been 
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undervalued, resigned to a place in history as merely an internal problem, or even little more 
than a civil clash, subsequent events have identified it as a turning point in the history of 
Algeria.
160
  
Lounis Aggoun and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire, two major historians of the period, have 
divided the colonial war in Algeria into three parts.
161
 The first part began in 1830; the 
second dated from Sétif in May 1945; and the third part began in November 1954.  In May 
1945, scuffles broke out in Sétif which resulted in a violent French response with numerous 
casualties on both sides.  This was followed by systematic massacres of Algerians perpetrated 
by French troops and the colonial militia. It should be noted that the indigenous population 
had only been allowed to engage in very limited gatherings, viz., peaceful celebrations of the 
end of WWII. During the celebrations, an Algerian flag suddenly emerged. Furious, the 
police force intervened, seized some of the marchers (those who had raised the Algerian 
flag), and a scuffle broke out. Shots were fired, and a riot broke out that quickly spread 
beyond Sétif into several nearby communities, with significant casualties and property 
damage. The assessment of the damages is difficult to determine exactly even today, although 
it is certain that hundreds were initially killed and wounded, and that the level of French 
repression was significant. 
Manfred Halpern gives an account of the events in which it is estimated that 100 
Europeans, and 1500 Muslims were killed.
162
 As the riots spread from the Sétif area,
163
 so did 
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the bloodshed. Algerian sources eventually estimated that the number of Algerians killed 
during the riots as more than 45,000, 
164
 as opposed to the more conservative French estimate 
of between 15,000 and 20,000. Regardless of the exact statistics, it is clear that these were 
mass killings.  Most historians today regard the riots and subsequent violence as the prologue 
to the War of Independence in Algeria.
165
 The massacres convinced most Algerians of the 
need for armed struggle, and the violence and repression primed them to accept the sacrifices 
that appeared to be necessary to achieve real emancipation for the country. This was not new.  
Since France had colonized Algeria in 1830, its systematic use of violence to maintain its 
colonial dominance never waned.
166
 Even the author of Democracy in America, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, noted that there were annoying demands “to which any people who will want to 
make war against the Arabs will be obliged to confront.”167 He thus believed it was “of the 
highest importance not to let remain or raise any city in the fields of Abd al-Qadir,” and “to 
destroy all that resembles a permanent aggregation of population”.168 It was thus seen widely 
as a peculiar war, but a war without mercy, and one which would have to be waged for a long 
time against most of the Algerian population. 
The repression, led by the French Army, but also by European militias, was 
characterized by high levels of violence resulting in thousands of victims. What occurred 
during those few days after 8 May 1945 was some of the bloodiest repression in Algeria’s 
violent history. Significantly, the media was completely missing.  The French, along with the 
other recently victorious European nations, were busy celebrating the end of WWII, and thus 
no French (or other European) newspapers deemed it necessary to send a special 
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correspondent to the Constantine area until long after the repression had ended. However, a 
wave of summary executions, massacres of civilians, bombardments of small villages by the 
navy and air force, and lesser human rights violations occurred. The historian Annie Rey-
Goldzeiguer noted that:  
…the only possible assertion is that the figure passes a centuple of the 
European losses and that it rests, in the memories of all, as the memory of a 
massacre, which marked this generation.
169
 
 
In Algeria, nothing could ever again be as it had been before the massacres of May 
1945. The gap widened between the majority of Muslim Algerians and the European 
minority, and the conflict became entrenched in the hearts of the two sides. These events 
were indisputably the turning point. The power of collective action had failed throughout the 
colonial period, but on that day of 8 May 1945, a new generation was making its entrance, 
one that would make armed struggle an absolute principle. At the AML congress, the PPA 
took over. The nationalist leaders’ original plan to seek autonomous status in federation with 
France was scrapped. The majority now opted for a separate state, united with the other 
Maghreb countries, proclaiming Hadj the undisputed leader of the Algerian people. The 
administration was aghast and pressed Abbas to dissociate himself from his partners.
170
  
Almost one year later, French authorities tried to approach Muslim Algerian leaders 
to gain their cooperation in covering up the events of 1945. Abbas was released from prison 
and he promptly proclaimed a new federal platform that he had drafted in his prison cell. He 
announced the formation of the Democrat Union of the Algerian Manifesto (l’Union 
Démocrate du Manifeste Algerien, or UDMA) as a new party. For his part, upon his release 
from five-year house arrest, Hadj returned to Algeria and formed the Movement for the 
Triumph of Democratic Liberties (Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques, 
or the MTLD), which quickly drew supporters from a broad cross-section of society. 
Committed to unequivocal independence, the MTLD firmly opposed Abbas's proposal for 
federation. The PPA continued to operate, but clandestinely, always striving for an 
independent Arab and Islamic Algeria. The Special Organisation (Organisation Spéciale, OS) 
was created within the MTLD by Hocine Ait Ahmed in 1947 to create a new operational 
front after political protest through legal channels was suppressed by the authorities. Ait 
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Ahmed was later succeeded as chief of the OS by Ahmed Ben Bella, one of the early 
Algerian nationalist leaders.
171
 Within a very few years the Algerian Revolution had begun in 
earnest.
172
 
 
6. The Outbreak of the Algerian Revolution, 1954 
From the beginning of the Sétif uprising to the outbreak of the Algerian rebellion in 
1954, Abbas and Hadj experienced political declines, primarily because after Sétif the 
Algerian population had lost hope in ‘solutions’ that involved the continued rule of France 
over Algeria. For some of the young religious students from the Ben Badis schools, it was a 
time of preparation to play a part in changing the situation that they had inherited from their 
parents. With the war, a new generation of Algerian Muslims had emerged. However, unlike 
Abbas, who came from a wealthy family and had grown up in an environment of bourgeois 
liberalism, and Hadj, who had spent his childhood in and around Paris, both of them having 
had a good education so that they were able to become practical, disciplined, and believers in 
the efficacy of collective organisation,
173
 many other young Algerians had joined the French 
Army during the Second World War as volunteer soldiers, nurses and doctors. Some of them 
were killed fighting for the French, and most appeared to foster the single hope that the 
French government would eventually give them their rights. As the FLN leader Belkacem, 
who had fought bravely in the French Army in World War II, observed:  
I never had a chance to know adolescence…I belong to the Algerian 
generation that passed from the total innocence of childhood into the 
maturity of man.
174
   
  
   However, Belkacem and his fellow Algerians never imagined that the French 
authorities would reject them as citizens, and relegate them to nearly the status of slaves on 
their farms. Past violence and the new French policy, which was hardest on the poorest 
Algerian workers, ultimately seemed to have conditioned a group of young nationalists. In 
their early twenties in 1947 and shielding themselves behind the legal status of the MTLD, 
which was still headed by Hadj, this group of young nationalists conceived of the idea of 
creating a covert para-military organisation, so that they would be ready at any time to take 
action. The founders met secretly throughout 1947. The group had no single, recognized 
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leader, but its strongest personality was Ben Bella.
175
 The other members were well educated 
and displayed great enthusiasm. They included Ait Ahmed,
176
 Mohamed Boudiaf, a French 
army veteran, Lakhdar ben Tobal, a miller’s son from Eastern Algeria, and Abdelhafidh 
Boussouf, also of modest means.  Because they had the same goals and interests, they were 
rapidly able to work together to raise a small clandestine army of around 500 men, and to put 
them through vigorous training without arousing French suspicions.
177
 Because they were 
part of the MTLD party, they were able to gradually influence the centrist politicians of the 
MTLD. Hadj, the party leader, implicitly accepted and encouraged the concept of a 
paramilitary organisation without formally approving of it. As he became the most 
recognized political personality in Algeria, and very popular among the Algerian masses, the 
younger activists became increasingly impatient with his autocratic policies.
178
  
Thus, while the OS conducted preliminary operations, including an event in 
Mostaganem in 1949, these were limited, essentially exercises and preparation for a future 
revolution.
179
 A few months later, in Oran, Ben Bella himself led a masked raid on the central 
Post Office (La Grande Poste) and, according to Behr, got away with more than three million 
francs, the first organized robbery in support of the Revolution. The French government was 
sufficiently worried after they became aware of the OS to appoint as new Governor-General 
of Algeria, in 1951, a former police director of Paris, Roger Léonard. In March 1952, after 
they had been captured and before they had been brought to trial, Ben Bella and another 
member of OS managed to escape from Blida prison and make their way to Cairo through 
Tunisia and France. With an Algerian liaison, they gradually rebuilt the OS network, which 
had been shattered by French police raids.
180
         
According to Ali Agouni, Hadj’s friend and a leader of the PPA, most of the early 
fighters, who took initiative in the field and were among the first to open fire on the French 
Army, were from Hadj’s party. While the MTLD continued its internal haggles in congresses 
and meetings, nine young men - le Club des Neuf - were preparing to get a solid organisation 
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started.
181
 In March 1954, the Club des Neuf became the Revolutionary Committee of Unity 
and Action (Comité Révolutionaire pour l’Unité et l’Action CRUA). By July, the CRUA 
members were warned that a revolt was imminent. In September the CRUA members divided 
Algeria into six regions (wilayas), and selected commanders for each. Meanwhile, the MTLD 
had openly and permanently split. Some of its members remained with Hadj, while others 
were drawn into the new secret revolutionary movement.
182
 On 10 October the six interior 
chiefs of the CRUA met for the last time, deciding to start the revolt at midnight on the first 
of November 1954. The timing of the revolution against French authority was felt to be 
important to its success, and yet it was a difficult moment for the Algerians: it was winter and 
a French public holiday.  Nevertheless, it was considered the best moment to initiate the 
revolt.
183
  
In Quandt’s view, the Algerian revolution was anti-politics and anti-party. Like 
populists everywhere, these self-appointed fighters for their country’s freedom saw 
themselves in a heroic light, sacrificing all for the people. Those who represented parties 
were seen as self-interested and divisive; they weakened the common will, playing into the 
lands of the French, who were skilled at divide-and-rule politics.
184
  According to Quandt, if 
one examines the history of French colonisation of Algeria, one will understand that 
Algerians had been working diligently for reform in the political arena over the course of 
many years, and that this peaceful struggle might have ultimately been the decisive factor in 
eventually attaining their national independence had things worked out differently.  
However, the more accurate interpretation of events may be that revolution in Algeria 
was the only option. The political processes had not brought the results that they had 
promised – years of creating political parties had resulted in few real material gains.  
Revolution, in this interpretation, was a last resort, one only undertaken after all other 
peaceful methods had failed, and prompted by the bloodshed that occurred in Sétif on 8 May 
1945 and the days that followed. 
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In 1954, from within Hadj’s MTLD, Algerian Muslims initiated a revolt against the 
French colonial administration. After an internecine conflict in Hadj’s party between 
centralists in Algiers and local nationalists, the FLN emerged under the leadership of a group 
loyal to Hadj.  This later divided into a political front, under the leadership of Ben Bella, and 
a military front, the National Liberation Army (ALN).
185
 This latter armed group began to 
attack French police stations and other government offices in the Batna bases in the 
Constantine region. In the following months the revolt gradually spread to other parts of the 
country. The MTLD was reorganised into the Algerian Nationalist Movement, which, led by 
Hadj, unsuccessfully competed with—and at times fought against—the FLN.186 Agouni, the 
President of the PPA, and Hadj’s friend, clarified that Hadj had never opposed the revolution.  
He was, in fact, the first to affirm publicly that violence was the only way to attain Algerians’ 
rights from the French colonial administration. However, the FLN needed a clear identity, 
one that could help it to prevail in achieving its goals.  
Conflict among leaders of the old parties and the new youth organisations soon 
emerged and intensified after the revolution began. While many revolutionaries were arrested 
and executed by the French Army in raids at the end of 1954 and early 1955, Algerian 
political elites nevertheless continued to engage in their internal conflicts, which were 
especially evident between centralists and Hadj supporters.
187
 On the other hand, the AUMA 
Assembly
188
 was worried about its lack of control over events, and was concerned at the 
direction that the struggle for Algerian rights was taking. It was especially concerned that the 
revolution might be diverted if the FLN became unduly influenced by other political groups 
and began to abandon the objective of Algerian independence via jihad. The AUMA only 
confirmed their full support of the FLN in January 1956, once it became apparent that the 
FLN had embraced the reformers’ strategy of jihad. 189  
The FLN relationship with the Algerian Communist Party (PCA) was also an issue 
that needed to be resolved if the FLN’s goal of uniting all Algerian political parties into one 
strong organisation was to be achieved. The FLN received significant support from the 
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AUMA and the centralists within the MTLD, except for Hadj, who controlled much of the 
countryside, and who was organising frequent attacks in the cities, initiating these from 
Algiers.  The Communist Party, after a lengthy debate, was integrated into the ALN, the 
military arm of the FLN, in July 1956.
190
  
     1955 was a difficult year for the French army.  It faced a growing revolution, and 
found itself on the edge of a civil war with Algerian Muslims, a large part of the population 
who had nothing to lose, and everything to gain, in such a conflict.  The FLN carried out 
more extensive attacks on the colonists in the eastern region in particular. The French 
responded with severe reprisals. The FLN aimed to achieve a unification of Algerian political 
parties, regardless of their particular agendas, and hoped to convert the old elites to their 
cause, so that there would be no opposition to their goals within the Algerian society..
191
 
Indeed, the FLN ultimately achieved the primary goals of its original plan during the long 
years of the revolution. Unexpected events in its relationship with the older parties nearly 
caused the revolution to falter, however, especially after the Summam congress in 1956. The 
revolution had by then been taken up by the Algerian population, and was driven now more 
by popular participation than by political leadership.   
 
II. The FLN Conferences and the Road to Independence  
1. The Algerian Nationalists (FLN) and the Revolution of 1954   
Algerians were fighting politically for their right to be free of discrimination in 
employment, education, land ownership and political and economic control of the country. A 
variety of administrative organisations had been created after 1919, when the French 
authorities declared that Algeria was constitutionally part of France. Unfortunately, this law 
provided for the absorption by France of Algerian land, but not of Algerians, who would not 
be considered, per se, as French citizens. The violence committed by the French Army, 
especially evident in the bloodshed of May, 1945, served to further polarize the European and 
the Algerian communities, despite numerous concessions that the French administration in 
Algeria had made towards the Algerians. As Ruedy notes: 
…central government concessions to the Muslims had emboldened them to 
the point of insurrection and the latter, embittered by the low price France 
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attached to Algerian life, [were] more determined than ever to push for 
separation.
192
 
 
  According to the revolutionary theorist, Frantz Fanon, colonialism not only 
expropriated the colonized, but it also appropriated their past in order to distort their 
history.
193
 The French experience in Algeria confirmed the profound gap that existed between 
the two societies. The French apparently became convinced that native born Algerians were 
not quite human, and therefore that their application for human rights must ultimately be 
denied. Algerians had sought their full and equal rights over the previous hundred years, and 
had focused not necessarily on achieving national sovereignty, but rather on securing 
treatment as fellow human beings by the settlers. The French colonial practices pursued in 
Algeria had the ultimate goal of forcing the native born Algerian Muslims to break with, or at 
least weaken significantly, their attachment to their culture and religion, which the colonists 
believed were the main reasons behind Algerian underdevelopment. 
In their reaction to the Algerians’ aspirations for freedom and equality, the French 
establishment rejected the essence of their humanity. Faced with this worldview, the political 
movements in Algeria saw violence as the only workable strategy, the last resort in a 
seemingly endless crisis with the French government. The FLN saw itself as essentially 
forced into the open after the rapidly expanding war had taken thousands of lives, mostly of 
peasants and workers. Moreover, the colonial power had never demonstrated any concern 
about the loss of life of the Algerian Muslims. This was repeatedly demonstrated. The FLN 
consequently launched al jihad, practicing Islamic rules in forging an indigenous revolution, 
one that employed religion and culture in its struggle for freedom and national liberation. 
Their principles included the use of extreme violence against French troops and the 
destruction of the French economic infrastructure. The latter meant destroying, insofar as 
possible, factories and commercial bases. However, some revolutionaries resorted to sowing 
the same sort of terror among European civilians in Algeria as that which had been applied by 
the French Army against the Muslim villages. According to Islamic principles of war, it is 
forbidden to kill civilians, be they women, children, the elderly or unarmed. The massacres of 
August 20, 1955, were a major turning point in Algerian War of Independence. FLN attacks 
on civilians in various cities and villages in North Constantine had many critics among the 
intellectuals and Islamic scholars in Algeria, and drew strong criticism from the international 
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community. The French massacres of Muslims, before and after the FLN massacres, tended 
to legitimize this ‘mistake’ of the FLN, however. The French Army massacres of 1945, for 
example, which killed thousands of Algerian civilians in a few months,
194
 underscored a 
protracted French security policy that was increasingly based on goals that looked very much 
like genocide; the eradication of Algerian Muslims from French ‘owned’ lands. This 
persisted well into the 1950s.  Jacques Soustelle claimed that the FLN-led mobs that killed 
123 people in August 1955, including 71 Europeans and several Muslim office holders, 
represented a legitimate response to French policies of the previous decades. In the 
consequent French revenge attacks, the FLN claimed that at least 12 000 Muslims died in a 
wild and indiscriminate reaction that involved police, troops and settler vigilantes.
195
  
Whatever the numbers of victims on both sides, Zighout Youcef, who had replaced 
Didouche Mourad as the leader of Willaya Two, achieved his apparent goal of moving the 
war to civilians, and between the two communities.
196
 The French government increasingly 
recruited civilians, and incited revenge killings of native-born Algerians in cities and rural 
areas. They further intensified segregation and increased the hatred between the two peoples. 
Thus, most of the children of Algerian farmers were encouraged to join the revolution, if only 
to defend themselves and their families. The French Army was well practiced in violence.  
Perhaps the most brutal of the massacres were those of Philippeville in Skikda, and of 
Constantine.  These served as unambiguous evidence of the French willingness to commit the 
most brutal sort of violence, in clear violation of international law.  What was perhaps even 
worse was the subsequent denial of virtually all human rights, including the rights to 
investigation and redress of the murder of family members.  In so doing, the French 
authorities, in essence, had denied Algerians even a semblance of a civil society, while 
depriving them of their fundamental rights and freedoms. James Heartfield and Sheffield 
Hallam note that:  
If France had merely torn up the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen as a public demonstration that would 
have been bad enough, but what they did was apparently even 
more destructive. They denied Algeria its freedom in the name 
of the Rights of Man. The republican sentiments of the 
revolution, universal in their aspiration, were tied down to the 
narrow and particular interests of French rule. What was truly 
human was debased into a narrowly chauvinistic ideology that 
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denied the humanity of the Algerians, even as it pretended to 
represent all humanity. In Algeria, France debased humanism, 
and made it into a sham.
197
  
 
The French government ultimately denied the rights of the Algerian people to self-
determination, despite the best attempts by the political left-wing and nationalist parties in 
Algeria and France to counter this. As the war became inevitable, the revolution began to 
organize itself, to consolidate its demands and objectives, and to unite its leaders at home and 
abroad through the principles that had been enshrined in the Soummam Charter, written in 
August 1956, when all of the revolutionary leaders from around the country had gathered in a 
village house in a meeting, later to be called the Congress of Soummam.  
 
2. The Soummam Valley Congress, August 1956 
After nearly two years of a revolution that had begun in earnest in November 1954, 
and after it had expanded to most of the regions of the country, it became necessary to define 
general political and military strategies. The FLN needed to develop an approach that would 
clearly outline its direction, and for this reason leaders of the revolution were summoned to a 
conference in the Soummam Valley on 20 August 1956. It was felt that such a meeting would 
be able to determine the preferable political goals of the revolution, and to organize the 
political, military and social life in revolutionary Algeria. The Congress of Soummam 
changed the course of the revolution and, as noted by Stora, made official “the bankruptcy of 
the former political organisations of the old parties”.  ”Grass-roots militants” rallied behind 
the FLN, while the UDMA and the AUMA were dissolved.
198
 Ramdane organised the 
Congress, directing it to establish centralised leadership, which would ostensibly drive the 
revolution to achieve its goals. The Congress resulted in the adoption of a forty-page 
declaration that included the above mentioned principles, but also declared that there would 
be no cease-fire with France before France recognised Algeria’s independence, that 
negotiation would begin only on the basis of the recognition of existing Algerian territory, 
and that there would be no dual citizenship privileges for the pieds noirs.
199
  
Frantz Fanon based his views on the Charter of Soummam and the environment in 
which the Charter was drafted. He was privy to its internecine battles. At Soummam Valley, 
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the difference between internal and external factions, the military versus the political wings 
of the FLN, were in full view, albeit only to party intimates. Soummam was also the stage for 
the struggle involving one of the major theoreticians of the party, Ramdane, a militant 
opponent of the militarization of the party who justly feared for the future of the Algerian 
state.
200
  
Fanon noted at the time that “...it evokes little or not enough the danger of the drifts 
induced by the insufficiency of political control that the Charter of Soummam had…put 
forward.”201 The Charter itself had been drafted in an ‘apologetic tone’.  If the political effort 
was made, it argued, the inherent truth of the liberators’ cause would emerge and prevail. On 
the ground, the leaders looked to the Charter for direction, and especially to its organisational 
standards. The military’s efforts to comply with the political regulation contained in the 
Charter proved to be insufficient, however.
202
 Within a year, Ramdane and the CCE/CNRA 
recognised that following the Charter was impossible.
203
 From this point on, the 
revolutionaries derived their principles from precedents set in the revolt of November, 
1954.
204
 The Charter had laid out the approved priorities of the politicians as well as those of 
the groups fighting from inside the country. It relegated those who were living in Egypt and 
Tunisia, and those who were still free to move between France and Morocco, to a second 
level of power, and hence set the stage for the conflict between the military and the 
politicians, as well as between those fighting inside Algeria, and those outside of the 
country.
205
  
According to Stora, the Charter of Soummam was the only legal action that the 
Algerian revolution launched under the leadership of the FLN. It was historic in the 
‘legislative’ work that it accomplished; it also initiated a struggle for control at the highest 
levels of the national organisation. Conflict among leaders broke out as soon as they received 
news of the Congress, througha letter sent by Ramdane to most of the members of the FLN. 
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Ben Bella was the first to respond: he immediately rejected the Charter and the Congress of 
Summam’s legitimacy. He composed a three-point response. He insisted that the Congress 
had been “non-representative”.206 He and his associates ignored the Charter and chose, rather, 
to carry on individually, emphasizing the regionalism that the Congress had initially 
promoted. He had already noted in his refusal to attend the Congress that the major leaders of 
the widely disparate Algerian regions, such as Oranie and the Eastern zone, and other areas 
located outside the country, had been unaware of the meeting and did not attend. Ben Bella, 
according to Sidhum, was seeing himself as destined to occupy a role far above the one that 
he was playing in the revolution.
207
 He attacked “the questioning, once again, of the Islamic 
charter [regarding] our future political institutions”, and rejected the secularism of the 
emerging state structure. He made it clear that he would forever refuse to take his “place” in 
the European minority.
208
 Leaders located outside the country also criticized the letter. Two 
years later, with Egyptian support, they decided to hold another congress in Tripoli, Libya, 
which was subsequently referred to as the Tripoli Congress. This meeting was organized by 
leaders outside the country along with some of those who had missed, or been disappointed 
by, the Summam Congress.
209
  
The French at this point confronted the revolution with maximum military force while 
dismissing the revolutionaries as mere terrorists. The forty-page platform drafted in Tripoli, 
however, clarified the objectives of the revolution, formalized the military structures that had 
been evolving ad hoc, and established, for the first time, a set of authentically revolutionary 
institutions. Most notable among their objectives was a reaffirmation of the goal of complete 
independence, and the pledge never to accept a cease-fire until France recognized the 
principle of such independence. The Soummam Congress had created a new organisation, the 
Conseil Nationale de la revolution Algerienne (CNRA), which was in effect Algeria’s first 
sovereign parliament.
210
 The CNRA established legislative power to coordinate and develop 
the many emerging organisations involved in the revolution. The Soummam coordinators 
democratically shared membership in the revolutionary council with most of the earlier 
political leaders. Seventeen members of CNRA came from older organisations, such as the 
CRUA, UDMA, MTLD and even the reformist AUMA. For the role of executive power, the 
conferees created another body, the Comite de Coordination et d’execution, or CCE. This 
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committee was the most powerful body among the revolutionary groups, and was comprised 
of five members, Benyoucef Benkhadda, Saad Dahleb, Belkacem, Larbi Ben M’Hidi and 
Ramdane.
211
 Ramdane had been the principal architect of the Soummam Congress. He was a 
Kabyle, was well educated and religious, and was a politician who believed in democracy and 
the sharing of ideas and decisions. Ramdane had risen rapidly in his position among the FLN 
leadership after 1955, and by the time of the Congress of Soummam had become the most 
powerful internal FLN member.
212
     
The Soummam Congress also established a military command structure for the Army 
of National Liberation (ALN).
213
The ALN, which was intended to coordinate the 
revolutionary activities of numerous small, armed bands that developed during the previous 
two years, quickly became an organized body, was controlled by the central leadership of the 
CCE, and functioned under the rules and decisions of the military department of the 
Executive Coordinating Committee of the CNRA.
214
 According to Sidhum, this control was 
the only way to guide the revolution, and to achieve its aims of independence and the creation 
of a strong country with a legitimate regime and a well-organized society.  This plan, 
however, was not agreeable to FLN leaders, including Ben Bella, Boussouf and others from 
the ‘second military generation’, those who had limited their roles to preparing themselves 
for after the revolution. Ramdane was killed on December 27, 1957, as the result of a bloody 
internal competition for power among FLN leadership.
215
 Fanon’s investigation into the 
revolution’s problems, and the counter-revolution, or thermidore, that had soon overtaken the 
radical revolution, confirmed the likelihood that Ramdane had been ‘removed’ by forces 
inside the FLN.
216
  
Abdel-Hamid Brahimi has spoken of the death of Ramdane, and has added crucial 
details, based upon the account that he received from his friend, Ben-Tobal, who apparently 
witnessed Ramdane’s murder. Brahimi says that the murder of Ramdane was the result of a 
bloody competition for power, and the jealousy of his colleagues based upon his growing 
popularity and political power. In addition to Ramdane’s popularity among the Algerian 
community, he was respected by the French authorities, especially after the Soummam 
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Congress.  When the first legislative charter of the revolution was announced, Ramdane was 
the only person who had been able to challenge the FLN members for the top leadership 
position. His colleagues apparently laid plans to stop him, however.  Ben-Toubal, Belkacem 
and Boussouf decided to jail him outside the country so that he would lose his popularity and 
legitimacy. This was a risky plan, however, and the conspirators soon came to see the need to 
remove him completely. They killed him in Nadhour, Morocco.
217
 They had apparently 
suggested that he visit an FLN installation near there. Although he apparently sensed a trap, 
he nevertheless went along with the conspirators, and was strangled in a farmhouse.  
Boussouf and Belkacem were said to have been involved personally in his murder, over the 
objections of Ben-Tobal.
218
 The three ‘Bs’ announced Ramdane’s death in the el-Moudjahid 
newspaper, saying that he had been shot by French soldiers during a battle on a mountain 
inside the country.
219
  
Meanwhile, the French government struggled to defend French civilians and property. 
French civilians and military officers had become insecure in their daily lives. FLN 
operations were mainly focused on military bases and on the economic infrastructure of the 
French community, targeting business suppliers, factories, telephone lines, power plants, 
etc.
220
 The killing of civilians increased in response to attacks by the French army against 
Algerians.  According to Bachir Boumaaza, the French military had carried out a series of 
massacres in Muslim villages and farms.
221
 After February, 1956, the new French socialist 
government closed the last doors to negotiation, despite the openness of the FLN to this, 
especially after the Soummam Congress. The French government seems to have blocked any 
possibility of solving the Algerian problem politically, refusing to enter into any conversation 
on independence. The FLN leaders had offered to meet in Tunisia with the new socialist 
Prime Minister of France, Guy Mollet, and were rejected unequivocally.
222
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secret negotiations with FLN members, which had been ongoing, were brought to a halt by 
the October 1956 French hijacking of an airplane carrying top Algerian politicians, including 
Boudiaf, Mohammed Khider, Ait Ahmed, Ben Bella, and Mostafa Lacheraf, an important 
figure in the intellectual and military leadership of the FLN.
223
  
The problems that France was facing in its former Tunisian and Moroccan 
protectorates were fully apparent in the hijacking of the FLN aircraft.
224
 At that time, both of 
the leaders of the two neighbouring countries believed that a solution was possible through 
the establishment of a Franco-North Africa Community, one in which both countries would 
come together, along with an autonomous Algeria, which would then receive its full 
independence in stages.
225
 By October, 1956, the Tunisian leader had prepared a proposal to 
be discussed in a meeting with the FLN leaders. Both countries had agreed to the plan, and 
had tried to push the FLN to accept it as the basis of their further discussions with the French. 
After Ben Bella and his colleagues were arrested at the Algiers Airport, however, the 
Morrocan/Tunisian plan was scrapped. Amnesty and cease fire based upon partial 
independence was fully and finally rejected.  It is worth noting here that some observers of 
the incident, including former Algerian politicians, have accused the leaders of Tunisia and 
Morroco of participating in the hijacking, in the hope that they would be relieved of the costs 
and threats that they had experienced with their intervention in the Algerian crisis. Moreover, 
despite the significant support that the Algerian Revolution had received from Morocco and 
King Mohammed V from the beginning, the Algerian revolutionary leaders had not actually 
been formally received by the Morrocan King until October 1956, in Rabat. Finally, that the 
King had chosen to fly in a separate aircraft with some of his entourage, rather than in the 
company of Ben Bella and his colleagues from the FLN’s external affairs branch, and this 
suggested the likelihood of conspiracy in the minds of many observers.  Had the King of 
Morroco betrayed the Algerian Revolution?  Moroccan government officials attempted to 
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allay these suspicions at the time, arguing that the King had to avoid giving offence to France 
by appearing to give the Algerian mission official recognition.
226
   
As noted above, this was perhaps the first act of air piracy against a civilian airplane 
in world history. Of special significance to the future of French-African relations, Ben Bella 
and his three associates had been the guests of King Mohammed V at the time of their arrest, 
and the King was therefore compelled to regard their arrest, at least officially, as a personal 
affront and as a French betrayal. This had long-term diplomatic implications. Moreover, after 
Ben Bella was arrested, both of the leaders (Bourguiba, the President of Tunisia, and King 
Mohamed V) resigned themselves to the inevitability of a long war, while the FLN (and 
many other North Africans) interpreted France’s apparent act of air piracy as a sign that no 
Fourth Republic Government could be trusted, even if its intentions appeared conciliatory.
227
 
In Tunisia, the message of Ben Bella’s “kidnapping” was greeted with consternation.228 It 
was clear to all those waiting for the conference in Tunisia to begin that arrangements for the 
meeting had been made formally by the Tunisian and French officials, further casting 
suspicion on King Mohammed V and the French Army.  Moreover, the French Government 
had shown that it had neither the authority nor the will to take any steps that could possibly 
lead to an Algerian settlement.
229
 
Edward Behr has noted that the French government at the time had to choose between 
accepting a moderate proposal for change, or rejecting any political solution, and thus 
becoming responsible for the inevitable outbreak of violence. Even French military victories 
would have to be followed by some reforms, given that France would face pressure from 
European and international communities. Moreover, the French army was facing a deep 
conflict between its own leadership and senior politicians, with the true extent of the rebellion 
ignored, and much made of overly optimistic army reports.
230
  
In Paris, Guy Mollet, the socialist premier who was assisting in the negotiations 
between Morocco, Tunisia and France with the FLN, found that his position had been 
undermined by the hijacking and briefly wondered whether he should resign.
231
 General 
Lacoste himself also claimed that he had been taken unawares, but decided to underwrite his 
subordinates’ initiative. French government leaders were well aware of the Tunisian and 
Moroccan proposals, and King Mohammed V had even, in guarded terms, discussed them 
                                                          
226
 Behr, E. (1961), pp. 120-122. 
227
 For more details: see Horne, A. (1977), pp. 314-348. Behr, E (1961), pp. 117-131. 
228
 Behr, E.(1961). 
229
 Behr, E. (1961), pp.122-124. 
230
 Stora, B. (2001).  
231
 Behr, E. (1961).  
 73   
 
with the French ambassador in Rabat. The hijacking is considered today to have been one of 
the major events that accelerated and broadened the internationalisation of the Algerian 
conflict.
232
    
The FLN had fallen on hard times by 1956-58.  The revolution was going badly, and 
deep divisions resulted from the death of Ramdane, the arrests of Ben Bella and his close 
associates, and the two moderately effective lines of defense established by the French 
military, based around the Morice Line,
233
 which separated the country from Tunisia.
234
 The 
Algerian Revolution appeared at this point to have little chance of succeeding unless the 
revolutionaries attacked cities and included civilians as targets.  They had come to see such 
attacks as their only possible response to the French army, which had destroyed many of the 
villages where most of the native born Algerian population lived. The FLN moved the war 
into Algiers, based on a decision by the CCE. Larbi Ben M’Hidi had been captured and 
summarily executed after being severely tortured by the French. Survivors of village 
massacres were increasingly forced into Algiers. Khedda, the head of the Algiers 
Autonomous Zone, had fled to Tunisia; elsewhere in Algeria the arrival of strong French 
reinforcements had threatened to reverse earlier FLN successes. Ahmed Zabana, an ALN 
member, was tried by a French Army court martial and became the first revolutionary to be 
sentenced to death; he was quickly executed in the high-security prison of Ferhat-Tazoult in 
Lambeze, Batna (400 South East of Algiers) on June 19, 1956. The French were soon holding 
massive show trials, resulting in a number death sentences. To compound their difficulties, 
the FLN units had, in many areas, become unwieldy and more vulnerable as their numbers 
swelled with untrained volunteers.
235
  
The FLN’s entire connection network was out of action, with the political-
administrative section badly mauled, its fund-raising network destroyed, and the entire 
Muslim population of Algiers cowed beyond belief. The French paratroopers’ practice of 
making extensive use of hooded informers (who pointed out FLN sympathizers as they 
streamed out to work from the heavily guarded Kasbah precincts), moreover, was to have a 
lasting psychological effect on the Muslim population of Algiers.
236
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The subsequent ‘Battle of Algiers’, which featured what was perhaps the world’s first 
systematic use of urban terrorism, included the use of crude bombings of bus stops, cafes and 
soccer stadiums.  The rebels hoped to “create a climate of insecurity” among the French, and 
to provoke reprisals that would turn “moderate Arabs into rebels.”237 The French responded 
by using torture to extract intelligence. Morgan notes that the “torture produced immediate 
results” and the French were slowly able to dismantle urban terrorist cells.238 By the end of 
1957, the French military command felt that the war had been won. Lacoste, the Resident 
Minister, kept repeating that victory would come to the side that held out for the last quarter 
hour.  As would soon be seen, however, the war was not yet finished.   
In April 1958, the French decision to build the electrified ‘Morice Line’ along the 
Tunisia-Algeria border threatened to cut off Tunisia as a source of supply.
239
 A meeting of 
the CNRA was arranged to take place in Cairo, and the CCE became a nine man affair, a 
direct precursor to the later ‘Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (GPRA).’240 
The FLN installed two bases outside the country along the frontiers of Tunisia and Morocco, 
and even installed electric lines. Jounud (Algerian soldiers) managed to establish new 
connections with the internal revolutionary command, providing significant additional 
support to the revolutionaries. The FLN then turned to diplomacy to put additional pressure 
on France in the UN, effectively internationalizing the conflict, and setting the stage for an 
Algerian Dien Bien Phu.
241
 As more information emerged regarding French atrocities in the 
countryside, the UN demanded that France pursue a more peaceful, democratic and fair 
solution to the Algerian problem. The US was repeatedly mentioned as a possible participant 
in a ‘peacekeeping operation’ in Algeria. FLN diplomacy was largely successful in spreading 
its message that a new Algeria was now emerging, and Lacoste was moderately supportive. 
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The various factions of the French Republican Front were increasingly divided, until gaps 
had widened between the politicians and the military, among French citizens, and even 
between the metropole and the pied Noirs. The Algerian struggle had even affected leftist 
parties in France, and the stage was set for a serious conflict within France itself.
242
 While the 
French army tried to exploit the growing conflict among French politicians, Lacoste prepared 
a legal outline for Algerian elections, which would have given the Europeans in Algeria a 
political monopoly, each one of their votes worth seven times an Algerian vote. This 
inequality, already embedded in a statute drafted in 1947, was adopted by the Council of the 
Ministers, but was then withdrawn by Bourges-Maunoury by the end of September 1957. A 
new legal outline, greatly watered down to reduce the influence of Muslim elected officials, 
was finally passed on November 29, although its application was postponed until the end of 
the war. Lacoste remained Resident Minister in Algeria, but without any real authority. 
General Raoul Salan, former Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in Vietnam, and who 
by 1957 was commander of the Tenth Military Area and Chief Army Commander in Algiers, 
was reportedly pleased with his new position in Algeria, and “intended to win the war with 
his spirited colonels.”243  
The FLN continued its policy of pressuring the French government through 
diplomacy in the UN and with Arab and socialist countries. The international community, 
and socialist countries in particular, had emphasized the Algerian case in UN debates after 
1955, when the UN first placed it on its agenda.
244
  Internally, the General Union of Algerian 
Workers (UGTA), a trade union and part of the FLN, was recognized by the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) over its competitor, the Union of Algerian 
Workers’ Federation (USTA), which had been controlled by the Algerian National Militants 
(MNA) two years before the creation of the GPRA. The GPRA would soon be in charge of 
all such organisations. The General Union of Algerian Muslim Students also played an 
important role; it was involved with various international cultural groups, and took an active 
part in the international propaganda campaign.
245
 The progress of the FLN, which remained 
the central revolutionary organisation, was initially guided by the Soummam Congress, even 
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in its internal conflicts, until it was swept away by the FLN leadership, most notably with the 
murder of Ramdane in 1958.  
In its early stages, the FLN focused upon diplomacy. The initial emphasis was on 
attaining the fundamental rights of Algerians, including the right to freedom in their own 
homes, and publicizing the striking degree to which these rights had been denied by the 
French. Torture, execution and other human rights violations by the French Army had 
become commonplace. The French in effect were now demonstrating (and the FLN were 
publicizing) to the world that human rights and international law had been suspended in 
Algeria. Two events particularly stood out in the international media: the hijacking of the 
plane and arrest of the FLN leaders, in 1956, and the French bombing of a village on the 
border with Tunisia, Sakiet Sidi Youssef, on February 8, 1958. These two events had a 
particularly strong emotional impact on world opinion.
246
 The French authorities soon came 
to be seen as guilty of committing atrocities in Algeria by most international observers, from 
those in the UN to those advocating Atlantic European solidarity. 
 
3. The Algerian Revolution and the Power of General de Gaulle  
On 13 May 1958, the French military, under the command of Generals Massu and 
Salan, went into open insurrection against the French government, establishing a “Committee 
of Public Safety,”247 and then taking the island of Corsica in a bloodless coup.  The coup was 
poised to take over the government of France if the conspirators’ principal demand, bringing 
General de Gaulle back as leader of France, was not met.  The Fourth Republic bowed to this 
demand.
248
 Mollet’s government fell on 21 May 1957, launching the third phase of the 
Algerian War, which continued until September 1959 and witnessed the end of the Fourth 
Republic and the return to power of General de Gaulle in May 1958. After Mollet, the Fourth 
Republic had entered what was to become a terminal crisis. Successive governments were 
little more than reshuffling of ministries between socialists, Christian Democrats and 
Radicals, each of which quickly found that it was overwhelmed by events in Algeria.
249
 
Eventually President Rene Coty tried to stop the crisis by calling upon the Christian 
Democrat, Pierre Pflimlin, to form the government. But this only brought matters to a head, 
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because Pflimlin had already declared his support for negotiations. His appointment on 13 
May 1958 provoked demonstrations in Algiers.
250
 General Salan called an unscheduled 
meeting of the Committee of Public Safety, presided over by General Massu, head of the 
Tenth Paratroop division. The committee promptly assigned itself the mission of facilitating 
General de Gaulle’s accession to power.251 General de Gaulle was shortly thereafter named 
by French President, René Coty, to head a government of national unity, invested with 
extraordinary powers to prevent the “abandonment of Algeria,” and General Salan announced 
that the Army had “provisionally taken over responsibility for the destiny of French 
Algeria”.252 Under the pressure of General Massu, Salan supported de Gaulle’s rise to power, 
and declared ‘Vive de Gaulle’ loudly from the balcony of the governor-general’s palace in 
Algiers on 15 May. Two days later, Charles de Gaulle, who returned to government after 10 
years of absence, announced that he was ready to “assume the powers of the Republic.”253  
From the beginning, the French political crisis was solely the product of French 
military occupation in Algeria.  Public expressions, especially of students and the pied noirs, 
to decline any negotiations with the FLN, and to focus exclusively on the rights of the 
settlers, came to dominate French military thought.  A march of thousands of pro-French 
demonstrators took place in Algiers on 26 April. Students in Algiers formed shock troops in 
support of French Algeria, and met in a forum in front of the offices of the governor-general 
in order to attract attention to an official procession paying tribute to the memory of fallen 
soldiers. The operation succeeded beyond the wildest hopes of its various protagonists.
254
  
The French Government had in effect hidden the full reality of the Algerian War from 
the citizens of France, and found in their negotiations with the military a great opportunity to 
relieve the pressure that the military had brought to bear.  Attempting to exploit this, the ALN 
stepped up the tempo of operations, inflicting in the week of 13 May alone 300 casualties, 
dead and wounded. Alistair Horn mentions that among the dead that week was the famous 
paratroop leader, Colonel Jean Pierre, who had earlier escaped with serious wounds during an 
attack by revolutionaries, led Youcef Amar. It should be noted that while the French had 
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suffered many casualties that week, “at the same time the ALN’s losses had been twice that 
number.”255  
General de Gaulle soon joined the political battle against the supporters of the French 
Army in Algeria, and an often violent debate soon centered around the theme of integration. 
Only four months after de Gaulle came to power, the conflict with the generals once again 
intensified. The army continued to paint its integrationist slogan on walls, pavement and even 
road surfaces: “Algérie Française”. From the first, public opinion in Paris and across France 
had been convinced that only General de Gaulle could resolve the crisis, eliminate the 
prospect of civil war, and end the Algerian conflict. On May 26-27, after a frank exchange of 
views between General Paul Ely, Commander of the Army, and de Gaulle, Ely was 
persuaded to resign. The next day, the press release from de Gaulle announced that he “was 
beginning the regular process necessary for the establishment of a republican government 
capable of ensuring the unity and independence of the country.”256  
Two weeks into his position, de Gaulle traveled to Algeria where the situation was 
increasingly complicated because of growing tensions with the French settlers. His famous 
declaration in Algiers, “Je vous ai compris”, or, “I have understood you”, was quickly 
followed by a new constitution, which gave de Gaulle far greater powers. He could now 
dissolve the National Assembly,
257
 and he possessed dictatorial powers in the case of events 
that he deemed serious.
258
 The Constitution ruled that the executive power was placed beyond 
the reach of Parliament, whose role was now considerably reduced.  
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De Gaulle focused on Algeria, referring to the French-Algerian relationship at every 
opportunity, attempting to bring Muslims and Europeans in Algeria together while 
disparaging the concepts of “French Algeria” and “integration”. De Gaulle, based on his 
experience with both societies, concluded that “the ‘integration’ offer came several years too 
late, and the last minute adherence to this slogan by the Europeans, who had previously 
bitterly opposed it, made it even more suspect to the Muslims.”259 Stora and Douglas, along 
with many other historians, note this rapid political transformation.  
On 28 September 1958, the Europeans and the Muslims voted overwhelmingly in 
favor of the constitution of the Fifth Republic. On 3 October, from Constantine, General de 
Gaulle announced the future economic and social transformations that the government had 
committed itself to financing in Algeria: 15 billion francs in public works projects and urban 
development, and a gradual program for schooling young Muslims. On 21 December 1958 
General de Gaulle was elected president of the French Republic and of the French 
Community.
260
   
The rebellion continued, however, and the FLN continued to demonstrate that it was 
still a force to be reckoned with in both politics and security in Algeria, and even in French 
international relations. The FLN was already on the wane at the time of the 13 May uprising, 
and it suffered a tremendous blow from the warming of Franco-Muslim relations shortly 
thereafter. Nevertheless, it continued to pressure the new French government diplomatically, 
despite its own bloody internal competition for leadership.  After the borders were sealed by 
the ‘Morice lines’, most of the battles took place in the cities.   
When de Gaulle announced, on 16 September 1958, that he was prepared to grant the 
Algerians self-determination, there was serious consternation among a majority of French 
Army officers, and open expressions of fears that the Algerians would be given the right to 
vote, and would choose the FLN as the single representative party of the revolution. Because 
of the strong opposition against him among the French military in Algeria, de Gaulle delayed 
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implementing his plans for more than two years, during which time he had more than a 
thousand officers transferred out of Algeria. During this period, de Gaulle approved the 
independence of Madagascar and much of the rest of French Africa, while consolidating his 
plans for elections in an independent Algeria. His press conference on 23 October 1958 
shocked both sides of the conflict in Algeria, but especially the French Army, which seemed 
at the time on the verge of winning the war. De Gaulle’s plan was becoming reality. The 
Mostaganem speech, in which he offered “the peace of the brave,” with no conditions other 
than that of leaving the “knife in the cloakroom,” was quickly rejected by the GPRA, 261 in 
effect widening the gap between the French, and the Muslim majority. This further pressured 
de Gaulle to end French colonization throughout Africa.  
De Gaulle did his best to convince the generals in Algeria that his plan was the only 
viable option, while he renewed and intensified military force against the FLN both inside 
and outside the country. General Challe led French military assaults against the FLN and its 
supporters in civilian villages. The Algerian auxiliary forces, the Harkis, fought with the 
French, using their knowledge of the local terrain to aid the army in locating guerrilla bands, 
and hitting them again and again until they were broken.
262
 By the end of 1959 the FLN’s 
mountain strongholds had been largely pacified, and the war turned to French military attacks 
against civilians in the countryside, and on Muslim villages. Some villages were completely 
destroyed, acts carried out by the French Army without mercy, and in open violation of the 
human rights that France had repeatedly defended in international venues.  Douglas noted 
that “the brutality of the French methods, including the relocation of two million Algerians 
into camps in order to isolate the FLN, alienated the population.”263 The French Foreign 
Legionaires and the French Secret Services committed most of the reported criminal acts in 
the Algerian war. The military successes that General Challe achieved tended to be based 
upon placing French civilians in the frontlines, fighting alongside the military, including the 
commission of massive human rights violations, often in public places in cities, while 
employing the tactics of guerrilla warfare.   
Severe international pressure was soon exerted on the de Gaulle government, from 
countries such as China and Russia, that recognized the FLN as the legitimate government of 
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Algeria, and insisted that Algeria immediately be given its formal independence.  De Gaulle 
knew that ultimately the way ahead in Algeria required a political solution, and this led to the 
final phase of the war, the endgame, which began with de Gaulle’s nationwide media address 
on 16 September 1959. According to de Gaulle, there were three possibilities for Algerians. 
The first was succession, which he warned would open the door to chaos and communist 
dictatorship; the second, full integration, whereby Algerians would become part of the French 
people; and the third, implicitly de Gaulle’s preferred choice, was self-government by 
Algerians in close association with France.
264
 
 
4. The CCE and the GPRA: The Negotiations Approach  
Conflict among the FLN leaders had always been the major flaw in the Algerian 
Revolution. By the early period of de Gaulle’s government, the revolutionaries had nearly 
lost hope of achieving national independence. Colonel Omar Oumrane described this loss of 
hope in a letter: “the hour is grave,” he wrote. He indicated that the military situation was 
worrying and that the revolution was losing its way: “the revolutionary spirit has disappeared 
among leaders, officers and militants alike, to give away to bourgeoisification, bureaucracy 
and opportunism.”265 Oumrane urged his colleagues in the FLN to make a speedy 
proclamation of provisional government, one that would take responsibility of opening a new 
political approach in the fight for independence. This new diplomatic offensive would take 
full advantage of the contentious atmosphere of the Cold War, and open a “second front”, 
promoting instability inside France itself.
266
 The security emphasis of the French military had 
to be unmasked and revealed for its basis in human rights violations, and its failure to deal 
effectively and humanely with the Algerian crisis. In the same vein, Abbas expressed his 
views in support of Oumrane’s ideas to Belkacem and other leaders of the FLN around the 
Wilayas in Algeria, saying that Ramdams’s death had left a blot on the CCE, which could 
only be expunged if it were dissolved and swallowed up in the wider framework of a properly 
constituted government
267
   
The CCE had proven itself to be ineffective and unable to guide the revolution, “while 
a government in exile could exert more authority and prestige.”268 On 9 September, 
agreement was reached in Cairo on the principles and structure of a provisional government.  
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A press conference was called to announce the creation of the GPRA. Abbas declared that the 
new Government would assume its duties from that day on. The new government would be 
located temporarily in Tunisia, the capital of Algeria’s diplomatic representative abroad.269 
As to the new government’s ministers, there was strong competition among leaders to take 
part. One of the strongest positions was taken by Belkacem, who insisted on remaining the 
Minister of the Armed Forces while continuing his CCE function and serving as Vice-
President to Ben Bella, who in turn passed the leadership of the new government to Abbas, 
who had extensive experience in dealing with the French Government.. The position of 
foreign minister was taken by Dr. Lamine Debaghine; Ben Tobbal took the Ministry of the 
Internal Affairs; Boussouf kept the Ministry of Communications, as well as the key role of 
running the intelligence services.
270
 Most of the ministers were nominated in absentia.
271
 The 
FLN was largely unaffected by the creation of the GPRA, now headed by Abbas. The CCE 
was disestablished, and Abbas became the first leader of a centralised FLN.    
The revolution was now driven by three key powerful men: the “three Bs”, Belkacem, 
Boussouf and Ben Tobbal, the same men who had brought about the downfall of Ramdane. 
The military intelligence service, under the leadership of Boussouf, acted energetically in 
bringing about the exclusion of many capable leaders including Colonel Ouamrane, who was 
widely thought to have had priority in leadership selection, and especially to have been the 
most likely candidate to at least share the supreme leadership of the revolution. The GPRA 
had been his own creation from the beginning.  Boussouf, who had occupied a variety of 
positions in the military and politics of the revolution, departed from his position as 
commanding general of the Fifth Military Base, leaving Boumédiène in charge. One year 
later, in December 1959, Boumédiène established an ALN general staff under his direction in 
competition with GPRA. These two structures, which were ostensibly to be complementary, 
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were soon in conflict with each other. The GPRA had been designed to win the support of the 
international community and to undertake any eventual negotiations with France regarding 
Algerian independence.
272
  The ALN, which had been weakened in 1958-1959 because of its 
isolation by the French Army, was quartered on the edge of the key neighborhoods, and was 
soon reorganized.
273
         
It was significant in the context of the internal power struggle that the GPRA received 
the support of many of the Arab nations, who hastened to recognize the new government. 
Communist bloc countries, in particular, welcomed the new government, with countries such 
as China, Russia and other countries in Eastern Europe and even South America giving 
moral, if not material, support to the GPRA.
274
  
5. De Gaulle’s Plan and Algerian Independence: 1960 - 1962 
General de Gaulle apparently already had a plan for resolving the Algerian crisis 
when he returned to power in late 1958.  He had hoped from the first to put an end to the 
international community’s harsh criticism of France.  Some of the most strident critics were 
pushing the French government to settle the crisis in Algeria, whatever the price.  De Gaulle 
revealed his plan to the public immediately after his visit to Algeria in 1958. The timing was 
not auspicious, however. While the French army was celebrating their victories over the 
ALN, civilians were struggling with their personal insecurity in Algiers and the other major 
cities. The FLN, which had been pursuing a policy of integration since 1930s, now insisted 
on full independence.  De Gaulle’s plan was effectively derailed, and he found himself 
waiting for the results of the security operations, the reactive policy which the military in 
Algeria, led by General Challes, preferred.  For their part, the Army experienced some 
notable successes in their war efforts, but they were not “winning” the war per se, and at this 
juncture seemed unlikely to do so.       
  By 1960, de Gaulle had come to recognise that the war against the FLN would be 
never ending, and that he had to put a stop to it.  He recognised that peace in Algeria could 
only take place through the granting of full independence.  The primary remaining problem 
concerned the future status of the almost one million European colonists, many of whom had 
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been born in Algeria. Sensing the direction of French policy, the colonists and army, both of 
whom advocated full integration of Algeria with France, staged major protests in 1960 and 
1961.  Both were put down by de Gaulle, who had now turned to negotiation as the only way 
to end the war in Algeria. Abbas had stubbornly sought integration with the French since the 
mid-1930s and 1940s, only to be repeatedly rebuffed by the French, who would only agree to 
limited integration of Muslim elites.  Between 1958 and independence in 1962, the de Gaulle 
government tried and failed to win over the Muslim public. By then, however, they could no 
longer accept the presence of harkis and pieds noirs, seen as permanent threats, in a future 
‘peaceful coexistence’.  Because of his longstanding support of integration, in mid-1961 
Abbas was forced to resign from his position as prime minister of the GPRA and was 
immediately replaced by Ben Yusuf Benkhedda. Shortly thereafter, negotiations with the 
French government began, and in March, 1962, an agreement was signed. The accord 
provided for a ceasefire on both sides and for Algerian independence after a transition 
period.
275
 
On 8 January 1961, de Gaulle had organised a general vote on the single political 
question of self-determination for Algeria, a proposal which won the support of 72.25 percent 
of the votes in France, and 69.09 percent of the votes in Algeria. The public support was a 
great advantage for de Gaulle, who then faced the wrath of the partisans of French Algeria. A 
number of military officers in Algeria openly denied the authority of the Head of State, also 
the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and this, in effect, constituted mutiny. 
Immediately after the referendum, secret discussions took place. On 15 March de Gaulle 
announced that there would be a meeting with the FLN at Evian.
276
 At this point, the FLN 
was prepared to refuse to attend the roundtable discussions. On 22 April 1961, a meeting was 
held by French Generals Salan, Jouhaud, Challe and Zeller to discuss the possible seizure of  
power in Algiers to prevent negotiations with the FLN or any other Algerian representatives, 
and to force France to retain the name of French Algeria (Algérie Française). De Gaulle was 
directly threatened by this, and exercised his full powers under Article 16 of the Constitution 
to defend himself and the role of the President of the Fifth Republic.
277
  He began to appear 
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in the media in uniform, firmly condemning this attempted putsch, led, officially at least, by 
retired generals, bringing what amounted to an attempted coup d'état to an end after only four 
days. The supporters of an ‘Algérie Française’ then formed a Secret Army Organisation 
(Organisation de l'Armée Sucrète - OAS), and embarked on a campaign of terror in mainland 
France and Algeria. A massive wave of violence was carried out by the military against 
civilians in both France and Algeria, and numerous assassination attempts were made on de 
Gaulle, most notably at Pont-sur-Seine on 8 September 1961. According to Behr, the OAS 
was a terrorist organisation created to assassinate de Gaulle and to end the negotiations with 
the FLN. More than one hundred and fifty plastic bombs were detonated in France and 
Algeria during March and April, one of which took the life of the Mayer of Evian, Camille 
Blanc.
278
 General Challe was said to have been behind the distribution of tens of thousands of 
sub-machine guns and pistols from the police armory in Algiers to European extremist 
organisations. These organisations backed the OAS soldiers, committing violence against any 
civilian who chose to return to France or to support the independence agreement.  
[Around fifty thousand members in large units from Algiers and Oran] were 
needed to prevent further ‘activist’ outbreaks...The paratrooper units and 
the Foreign Legion [were] undergoing drastic reorganisation, and large 
numbers of troops [were] tied up in internal security duties; it was difficult 
to keep up full-scale operations against the FLN guerrillas.
279
  
 
The climate was therefore tense when the final phase of the negotiations between 
representatives of the French government and the FLN began in Evian on 7 March 1962. 
These negotiations followed on from the meetings at Melun (25-29 June 1960) between the 
French government and the GPRA, which had been made possible by the French army's total 
control of the territory, although they produced no conclusive results. Nevertheless, the Evian 
accords, signed on 18 March 1962, brought an end to the hostilities and gave independence to 
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Algeria. De Gaulle expressed the wish that they would form the basis for Algeria and France 
to “march fraternally together along the road of civilisation.”280 The Evian accords, discussed 
in further detail below, were subsequently approved by 90.7% of the population of mainland 
France, in the referendum of 8 April 1962. 
 
6. Evian and the Proclamation of the Cease-Fire  
In May 1961 the French government and the FLN resumed the negotiations broken 
off at Melun in June 1960. With the internal political difficulties of the French and the FLN, 
the negotiations had not taken place until the following March, nearly a year after the 
collapse of the generals’ putsch.  The negotiators were able to arrive at a cease-fire and at an 
agreement ending French sovereignty over Algeria. Talks with the FLN reopened at Evian in 
May 1961; the subsequent months of negotiation initially failed, with both sides witnessing 
some of the war’s most horrifying episodes.281 The war started again with attacks on civilians 
carried out on both sides. OAS gunmen were reported to have shot and killed Algerians who 
were lying helpless in hospital beds.
282
 Bombs were set off at many targets in Algiers, Oran 
and Paris. The FLN committed atrocities as well, most notably the shooting of European 
teenagers sunning themselves on a beach.  Since General Challe was in prison, the logical 
and obvious leader of the OAS was Salan, who had gone into hiding with Robert Martel after 
the collapse of the putsch.
283
 The settlers feared that the failure of the putsch meant they were 
shortly to be thrown to the wolves. Moreover, the Army now had no way to initiate 
negotiations with Paris.     
After several false starts, which led to the prolonging of the war in the cities and along 
the borders, the French government announced that a cease-fire would take effect on 19 
March 1962. The GPRA made it known that settlers would not be welcome in the new 
Algeria. At Evian it became apparent how distant the two sides were. The GPRA did not 
stray from the generalities it had been putting out for public consumption. Its delegates 
seemed ready, on the main points at hand, to hold out for all of their demands, and willing in 
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that regard to accept complete failure. They were particularly adamant that two of their 
demands be met, those regarding the unity of the Algerian territory and the unity of the 
Algerian people.
284
 The French dream to keep control of the Sahara, and to continue to rule 
over French minorities, from Jewish citizens to Pieds noirs, faced strong opposition from the 
GPRA, which based the future economics of this new country on absolute national 
sovereignty, which, in turn, included complete control over the oil and gas of the desert. 
 In their final form, the Evian Accords allowed the settlers equal legal protection as 
Algerians over a three-year period. Those rights included respect for property, participation in 
public affairs, and a full range of civil and cultural rights. However, after that period 
Europeans would be obliged to become Algerian citizens or be classified as aliens with an 
attendant loss of rights.  
As noted above, the French electorate approved the Evian Accords by an 
overwhelming 90.7 percent vote in a referendum held on 8 April 1962.  Despite this approval, 
however, members of the French army in Algeria banded together in the OAS, and launched 
an armed campaign against Muslims in an attempt to prevent the implementation of the 
accord. By late April, their leader, General Salan, was captured, and by late June the army 
revolt ended. During April of 1962 settlers had begun to leave Algeria in large numbers: 
around 350,000 colonials left Algeria during that month alone. Within a year, 1.4 million 
refugees, including almost the entire Jewish community and some pro-French Muslims, had 
joined the exodus to France. By October, less than 30,000 Europeans remained.
285
 The toll 
that the war had taken was enormous, and not only in terms of the migration that occurred 
following the Evian Accords. After more than seven years of fighting, at least 100,000 
Muslim and 10,000 French soldiers had been killed; in addition, many thousands of Muslim 
civilians and a smaller number of colonists lost their lives.
286
  
 
7. The Proclamation of Independence, 5 July 1962 
The resolution of the Algerian war came down to Evian, and intensive negotiations 
over what was arguably the most complicated case in French political history. The Evian 
accords represented the most significant change in Algerian history.  Independence had been 
won, but it was difficult for the revolutionaries in the FLN to realize that circumstances had 
changed and that France was now resigned to the reality of a sovereign Algeria. The victory 
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had raised the hopes of the Algerian people, especially with the ceasefire of March 19, 1961.  
It is not an exaggeration to say that the ALN proceeded to dash those hopes in favour of 
opportunism and selfishness in a bloody competition for power. This behaviour would sow 
the seeds of the massive of violence that later occurred in the country, and continues to the 
present day.    
It is virtually certain that, had it not been for the large settler community in Algeria, 
France would never have gone to war to keep Algeria French. Protecting the settlers 
remained the government’s most passionate and worrisome concern. French peace overtures 
were made when the Sahara had not yet been included as part of the new country.  The 
GPRA had rejected any agreement that did not regard Algeria as it had been before the 
French occupation, and this necessarily included the Sahara. The FLN saw this as a 
secondary question, and hence accepted the initial French proposal except for several points, 
including the French demand that they keep the French minorities then living in Algeria.  As 
noted repeatedly above, however, protecting the settlers remained the French government’s 
most passionate and worrisome concern. Nevertheless, there were strong grounds for 
agreement, including that:  
 Europeans in Algeria would remain French; they would enjoy Algerian civil rights, at 
least in the interim, and would be permitted to participate in Algerian political, 
administrative and municipal life without having to make any formal request to do so. 
Within three years of self-determination they could ask to become Algerian citizens. 
Algeria would then cease to regard them as French, and thus the unity of the Algerian 
people would be preserved. France could continue to regard the settlers as French.
287
 
The Algerian negotiators refused the French demand that the Europeans hold dual 
citizenship as long as they lived in Algeria; after several years France would allow 
them to renounce their Algerian nationality, if they wished, and remain French. In 
fact, the settlers quickly found a place for themselves in the rapidly expanding 
mainland economy; reclaiming farms that had gone to ruin became a common 
economic pattern. Many settled in the South of France to get the best of both 
countries, and they became the main political and cultural bridge of the future 
relationship between the two countries.  
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 The other issue that played a key part in the agreement involved the property rights of 
the Europeans, and French rights to the petroleum deposits in the Algerian desert, 
which the French government had already ceded to third parties for the mining and 
transport of oil and gas. The GPRA agreed to respect the property rights of the 
Europeans as well as to accord French petroleum companies preferential treatment in 
the granting of new permits for exploration and exploitation, and to undertake no 
discriminatory measures against such companies.
288
 
 In essence, the parties agreed that the Algerian people consisted only of non-
Europeans. The European settlers could choose to become Algerian citizens within a 
few years of independence, but if they refused, they would remain foreigners. In 
either case, their rights with respect to language, religion, and other civil liberties 
would be respected.
289
   
John Talbott has described what de Gaulle was thinking in his declaration of October 
1961 when he noted that de Gaulle envisioned the future relationship between France and 
Algeria to be one of association, not quite a commonwealth arrangement, but not quite a 
relationship between sovereign states either. France, the senior partner in this association, 
would continue to supply the junior member with the technical expertise and economic 
assistance provided under the Constantine Plan, and would still enjoy certain vestigial rights 
to the use of defense bases, and so on.
290
 De Gaulle dropped references to ‘association’ and 
spoke instead of “France’s co-operation291 offered to the new Algeria for its life and 
development….”292 In other words, France would not take responsibility for Algeria’s well-
being, but offered some foreign aid to this new nation.  The reality of the situation was now 
clear: Algeria was to be left in a significantly worse situation, at least initially, than before 
independence. 
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8. Independence  
On 16 March 1962, peace finally, if only temporarily, returned to Algeria’s cities. A 
ceasefire was also proclaimed in the countryside. The Foreign minister of the GPRA, 
Belkassem, met with his team of negotiators and digned his name next to those of the French 
negotiators appointed by General de Gaulle. The French Prime Minister, Michel Dibré, 
declared: “We are reaching the end of a painful ordeal. Malraux spoke of victory, but it is 
instead a victory over ourselves. Now everything will depend on what France will 
become.”293  Three days later, the Organisation Armée Secrete (OAS) leaders proclaimed that 
the French forces would now be considered “occupation troops” in Algiers. The activist 
supporters of “Algérie Française” gathered in Bab al-Ouad (a suburb in Algiers) and seized 
power against the wishes of their government. Armed protestors attacked the military trucks 
of the French Army as they began their exodus to France, killing 35 and wounding at least 
150.   
On 26 March protestors from the more extremist settler groups, along with the OAS, 
declared a general strike in the region of Algiers. They gathered at Glieres Plateau and at 
Laferriere Square, appearing at first to be nothing more than peaceful protestors.  Their real 
objective was to break through the encirclement around the district.
294
 At the same time, other 
protestors met in the central part of Oran, the second largest city, 500 kilometers west of 
Algiers.  The OAS soldiers then attacked a clinic belonging to Doctor Jean-Marie Larribère, a 
communist militant who was very well known in the city. After this, they turned on bars and 
well-known cafés, shopping malls and factories. The violence quickly intensified, with the 
loss of hundreds of Muslim lives as bombs were detonated in public places such as weekly 
markets and mosques. Socialists, including scholars and intellectuals, were killed in cold 
blood. The public library and four schools were destroyed.  Hundreds of Oranies left their 
homes in the city in search of safety with their families in the villages and in the countryside. 
The violence continued for some time, and the remaining settlers’ flight to France 
accelerated: “it became apparent that the Europeans of Algeria had begun to leave their native 
land en masse, headed for the metropole.” 295 Most of the pieds noirs had left Algeria by 
May, 1962. The OAS leaders who were still free knew they had lost the struggle.  
As a French colonial organisation reflecting the fury and despair of a dying society, 
the OAS continued in ever more destructive paths as the movement toward independence 
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accelerated, but it had lost hope of changing the regime in France or altering the course of 
history.
 296
  
 On 18 June 1962, and after the rejection of an agreement between Jean-Jacques 
Suisini, in the name of OAS, and the FLN, OAS soldiers attacked Oran, and left behind them 
a city engulfed in smoke and fire.  OAS commandos attacked at least six banks following the 
announcement of the former leader of the first foreign regiment of paratroopers and head of 
the Oran’s OAS, Colonel Dufour, that “the OAS should lay down its weapons,” and make 
preparations to flee.  Most of the OAS commandos were subsequently captured and the last 
of them went into exile by the end of June.
297
  
On 1 July 1962, 6 million Algerian voters answered “yes” to the question, “Do you 
want Algeria to become an independent state cooperating with France under the conditions 
defined by the declaration of March 19, 1962?” A mere 19,534 voters said “No”, according to 
results announced on 3 July.  Out of 91.23 percent of registered voters, 99.72 percent 
participated in the poll.
298
 July 5
th
, 1962, was the official end of the war, although the 
violence continued.  Hundreds were wounded in Oran alone on the eve of independence. 
Nevertheless, this date marked Algeria’s full and final independence, and the end of the 
French military presence in Algeria. The French continued to control key aspects of Algerian 
life through their agents. Significantly, on 12 July 1962, Ben Bella moved into Oran, and yet 
another battle for power among FLN leaders began, and in some respects continues, as will 
be seen in the following chapters.     
The Evian Accords signed in March 1962 gave Algeria immediate independence 
while providing French aid to help reconstruct the country. The French Sahara, with its oil 
resources, was also handed over to Algeria. In return, the FLN guaranteed protection and 
civil rights for the French Algerians choosing to remain in the country, and the option of 
choosing either French or Algerian nationality after three years.
299
  
After almost eight years of war that had shattered Algeria, with over a million 
Algerian casualties and over two million Algerians who had lost their homes, the trauma 
continued. For over a century the French had deprived the Algerians of virtually all 
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opportunities to become involved in the country’s infrastructure and institutions. Algerians 
had been held in a subclass of servants, unskilled labourers and peasants. The departure of the 
French left the country without the skilled labour to keep the country running. Literacy, at 70 
per cent before the invasion of the French, had dropped to less than 10 per cent by the end of 
the colonial period. French military officers and administrators had penetrated the highest 
levels of Algerian government, however, and some observers believe that this de Gualle’s 
plan from the beginning.
300
 Moreover, internal conflicts within the FLN that had been set-
aside during the war soon re-emerged, and power struggles between various factions of the 
FLN began again in earnest.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MILITARY AND THE STRUCTURING OF VIOLENCE IN ALGERIA 
 
1. Introduction  
The previous chapter focused on the historical background of Algeria, beginning with 
the French colonial period, exploring the political resistance and the War of Independence 
and following through to the end of colonialism in 1962 and the formation of a new Algeria 
for “Algerians”. This chapter examines the post-colonial period and the political phases that 
Algeria has experienced since, focusing on the political crisis experienced by the new 
government of Algeria. There was no doubt that France’s departure left behind a massive 
hole in the country, with a lack of skilled labour, particularly in the education, medical and 
justice sectors. A majority of the Algerians who took up arms against the French were 
uneducated. Even the remaining elites and FLN leaders were far removed from the mechanics 
of politics, lacking the requisite skills in decision making and governing a newly independent 
Algeria. The few who had the political experience before and during the conflict had either 
been arrested or killed by the French, or had been killed by their supposed allies. The deaths 
of Ramdane at the hands of his friend Boussouf, and Chaabanie who was killed by 
Boumédiène and Ben Bella, robbed the country of political and institutional knowledge. This 
chapter, then, will focus on the formation of Algeria and its bureaucracies.  
At the centre of this new wave of violence that followed the end of the colonial period 
was an internal conflict that emerged among the FLN members in a bloody competition for 
power, and an invasion by the ANP army in late 1962, led by Boumédiène and formed 
outside of Algeria’s borders.  These young fighters had been brothers-in-arms with those 
whom they now attacked.  Influenced by the opportunistic leaders of the National Liberation 
Front, they were now caught up in what became a bloody race for governance without any 
real professional skills to justify the roles they were trying to claim. The violence that 
resulted continued, increasingly targeting civilians and intellectuals, until October 1988, 
when Algerians finally revolted. This virtual coup against the status quo resulted in the deaths 
and injury of hundreds of young civilians, most of them students in high schools and 
universities, attacked by the Algerian army. It was the new army, then, that attacked civilians 
in the first significant violence after the coup d’état of Boumédiène against GPRA in 1962-
63. This wave of discontent assumed a more violent aspect with mass riots and popular 
demonstrations, shaking the Algerian state to its very foundations. According to Bougherira, 
the result was to place pressure on the slow process of reforms that had begun in the early 
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1980s so that by 1989, the state adopted a new constitution, radically transforming the 
political life of contemporary Algeria.301 A number of changes followed. For the first time in 
the history, Algeria adopted a multi-party democratic system. However, the formation and 
electoral dominance of FIS, and the coup d’état that followed, put Algeria in a difficult 
position, with renewed human rights violations and another cycle of terrorism.  
This chapter also examines the leadership of Algeria post-independence, tracing the 
direct and indirect responsibility for human rights violations, especially after the death of 
Boumédiène in 1978. A majority of the interviewees who have participated in this research, 
as well as information in secondary sources, point to the French Officers who dominated the 
political scene during the presidency of Bendjedid and then took power after coup of 1992.    
 
2. Historical background of the post-independence era 
After the Algerian War of Independence, Boumédiène and his troops launched a coup 
from bases on Algeria’s borders against the Government of the Provisory Republic of Algeria 
(GPRA). The establishment of a government of the peoples’ choice after seven years of 
bloody war was difficult, and Algerians had paid a huge price for their independence. Their 
new leaders, afraid of losing their hard-won independence, had merely avoided conflict of 
any sort after the departure of the French.  
The first government had been established under the new constitution of Algeria, 
enacted in 1963. Amidst a massive wave of violence against the original revolutionaries, 
Boumédiène’s troops, with some support from the FLN fighters, established a new regime 
after making a deal with Ben Bella to lead the country against the GPRA. The military had 
dominated power under the FLN, the only political party with a council of revolutionaries. 
This was appointed by Boumédiène for the express purpose of giving full support to his 
regime. This chapter will examine the sources of power in the formation of the military 
regime in Algeria, although its main focus will be on the violations of human rights that were 
so much a part of this, and included murder, disappearances, torture and political 
imprisonment.  
                                                          
301
Mohammed Bougherira, “Algeria’s Foreign Policy 1979-1992: Continuity and / or Change”, PhD thesis, 
European Studies Research Institute, School of English, Sociology, Politics and Contemporary History 
University of Salford, Salford, UK, p.4; there are several studies that have dealt with the 1988 demonstrations 
and their aftermath. See, for example, Khalid Duran "The Second Battle of Algiers", in Daniel Pipes, Sandstorm 
(New York: University Press of America, 1987), pp. 33-60; Arun Kapil, "L'èvolution du règime autoritaire en 
Algèrie: Le 5 October et Les reormes politiques de 1988-89", Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord (AAN), vol. 29, 
1990, pp.417-457;  Martin Stone, The Agony of Algeria (C.Hurst and Co.Publishers: London, 1997), pp.64-209; 
and Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria (Reading: Garnet Publishing Ltd: 1996), pp.107-392. 
 95   
 
The Algerian military regime was responsible for structuring violence through 
dictatorship after seizing power in Algeria after independence in 1962.
302
 The first regime 
was dominated by a group of military officers, and soon resorted to massacres and other 
blatant human rights violations against Algerian citizens. The coup d’état of 1962 against the 
GPRA had disregarded the interests of hundreds, if not thousands, of citizens, including 
politicians and a large portion of the Algerian elites, who were well educated and the most 
competent to fill positions at the many levels of governance in Algeria. The competition for 
power among the revolutionaries and those still stationed at the militant bases outside of 
Algeria’s borders contributed to open conflict and, in a number of cases, massacres. Violence 
was the only likely way for the militant conspirators to seize power in Algeria. In 1965, the 
elected President of the Republic,  Ben Bella, was arrested and placed under house arrest and 
then in exile for more than 25 years. Violence became the continuing modus operandi after 
that time.  
As noted above, competition among the post-revolutionary leaders was the primary 
cause of the ensuing violence in Algeria. Tens of thousands of people were killed during and 
after the war for independence, often by close colleagues. Ramdane, Chaabani and ‘Arbi Ben 
Mhedi, all fell victim to the struggle, and the Algerian people were thus deprived of their 
potential political contributions. Competition among military officers for power also created a 
large gap between regional leaders and the central power, as represented by the GPRA; at one 
point a key meeting in Tripoli in effect represented a coup d’état against the Soummam 
Congress.
303
  Moreover, it was this competition that opened the door for French Officers to 
join the revolution through military bases in the East and outside the borders, and hence they 
were able to gain influence without having been involved in battles inside Algeria.  
French Officers, then, were the other factor responsible for the hegemony of the 
military against the politicians in this bloody competition. It was this competition that 
ultimately resulted in massive violence against Algerians in the many subsequent coups 
d’état. It included the jailing of Ben Bella, the first President of the Republic, in 1965, and 
the murder of Mohamed Boudiaf in 1993, along with the subsequent murders of hundreds of 
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politicians and elites. Many questions have been raised about the death of the second 
president of Algeria, Boumédiène, in 1978. Brahimi, one of the revolution leaders and former 
prime minister confirmed that Boumédiène was poisoned by one of the French Officers.
304
 
The coup d'état of 1992 opened a new chapter of violence against civilians, and left 
thousands of civilians’ dead, including President Boudiaf, who was shot in front of the public 
and the media. Thousands of Algerians were jailed in the process, many of whom are still 
missing today.
305
 Many scholars and political analysts have blamed the events of 1992 on the 
military regime, principally for seizing and retaining hegemony in Algeria following 
independence. The coup of 1992, conducted by a group of French-trained officers, sometimes 
referred to as ‘the deserters’,306 against the first fully open and free elections in Algeria, 
appears to have been directly related to the French agencies and their economic interests in 
the area.
307
 This coup, which affected the majority of Algerians, was characterised by the 
regime at the time as a popular liberation from Islamic domination, and hence to protect 
‘democracy’.308  
Stora states that the people who made up Algerian society after 1962 were placed in a 
unique situation: they had no point of reference during the years of war that might have 
helped them to develop and improve upon their ethos, or to change their behaviour, and thus 
they had a sense that they were living in an unpredictable and arbitrary situation. Many of 
them had apparently begun to think primarily about their personal interests, having been ‘up-
rooted’ with painful memories of their past, with their anxieties exacerbated by the loss of 
identity.
309
 To comprehend what is happening today in Algeria, one must consider the 
historical and ideological foundations of the state as it emerged from the War of 
Independence. Central to the Algerian state was the army, which had become the country's 
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legitimacy-granting authority. Leaders remained in intense competition with each other to 
ascend the pyramid of power in the new Algeria. Lahouari Addi prefaced his comments on 
legitimacy by characterising it as a standard by which to attain high political position.
310
 The 
legitimacy upon which any system of power rests is fundamentally based upon principles that 
are forged in the history of each country. In Algeria, legitimacy is inseparable from the 
struggle that the independence movement waged against French colonial domination in the 
1950s and early 1960s. 
The intervention of the military into the political system was based upon the 
legitimacy of revolution.  The military acted as the ‘owners’ of the nation by virtue of their 
victory against the French. While national sovereignty added to the legitimacy gained from 
the revolution, competition among revolutionary leaders of the ALN, the ANP and economic 
opportunists in particular, was manifest. This internecine competition, then, brought about a 
splitting of the state's power that would have deleterious consequences for the state's 
provision of services and the efficiency of its decision making well into the future. From that 
time on, most of the political power in Algeria, based upon the “power of legitimation,” has 
been retained by the army and the executive power that the army cedes occasionally to 
civilians to run the government and handle the rents from the country’s income, which is 
based primarily upon energy exports.
311
  
This legacy plays itself out today. The government's everyday doings are hampered 
by the clientelistic practices of networks that enjoy the support of high-ranking army 
officers.
312
 Everyone involved retains a political position or administrative power vested in 
official responsibilities, but only insofar as a privileged individual relationship with a 
member of the military hierarchy is preserved. Such relationships in Algeria have become the 
basis for choosing people for various positions, and successful relationships between state 
personnel and individuals in society are particularistic rather than universalistic,
313
 whether 
they are based on family or tribal bonds or on common material interests. Addi states that 
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…the state, [then,] exists in two dimensions: in one, it is visible, official, 
obedient to rules; in the other, it is obscure, hidden from public view, 
guided by a changing balance of forces that only initiates can discern.
314
  
 
Personal security has become extremely tenuous in Algeria.  The country continues to 
face the decay of the military system that was begun by Boumédiène after 1963. Human 
rights in Algeria remain the last item on the agenda of opportunistic and powerful generals.  
Human rights are theoretically protected by the constitution of the country, but since the 
military enjoys a dominant position, there is no real respect for the constitution.  
That the regime has been consistently supported by the West is confusing from the 
context of global democracy.  The support for the regime is apparently based on economic 
interests. It is thus interesting to examine this case through the prism of neo-colonialism; this 
perspective is useful in sorting through the often-confusing evidence of the Algerian military 
regime and, particularly, understanding the French who supported the violence and human 
rights abuses in Algeria. Economic opportunism among people in power, including 
businessmen and generals, many of whom continue to exercise power in Algeria, will also be 
taken into consideration in this chapter in an attempt to unravel the causes of violence in 
Algeria. 
 
3. The Role of the Military in the Proliferation of Violence  
Many scholars have analysed the causes of the Algerian crisis with a focus on the 
nature of the regime itself. According to Brahimi Abdelhamid, the absence of democracy, 
liberty and transparency in the functioning of institutions ultimately caused the crises of 
Algeria, and particularly the crisis of the 1990s. It was based on the absence of a separation 
of the powers of the executive, legislative and judiciary, as well as on the regime structure 
and the internal conflict between members inside the ruling circle during the last four 
decades. This led to a crisis of confidence, which periodically undermined the Algerian 
regime before being intensely exacerbated by the political and social explosions of the 1990s.   
Abbas Aroua and Anwar Haddam view the changes that have taken place in Algerian 
politics as a systemic transformation, one which responded to international waves of change 
and global patterns that fit democracy far better than dictatorship. Nonetheless, the power 
structure in Algeria had remained the same since independence. Youcef Bouandel states that 
a comparison with the past is useful in understanding the change of political power from 
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dictatorship to a more democratic form of government in Algeria today. The nature of the 
authoritarian regime is helpful in explaining the “weakness of newly created/legalized 
political parties in the early stages of the process of transition”.315 And while it is helpful in 
understanding the crisis of Algeria, one must first analyse the current political structure to 
identify the main protagonists and examine the relationships between them, and the main 
issues that divide them.  
There are two institutions that comprise the power of the contemporary state in 
Algeria, and both were inherited from the War of Independence (1954-1962): the army and 
the government. These institutions date back to the dichotomous power of the resistance 
bases outside of Algeria, which were commanded by general staff of ALN, and the GPRA.
316
 
The GPRA was set up in 1958 to represent the FLN abroad, mobilise the funds needed to 
organise the underground movement, and support the refugees who had fled to Morocco and 
Tunisia. Stora states “the task of the GPRA was to win support on the international political 
scene and to undertake any eventual negotiation with France.”317  But it was the general staff 
of the ALN that was actually in charge of the Revolution.
318
 When the war ended, the ALN 
"dismissed" the GPRA and took over the running of the new state. Almost half a century after 
independence, the key decision maker in Algeria remains the military, and the government is 
still seen as the body that executes policies made by the army.
319
  
The experience of Algerian politics demonstrates above all that Algeria has never 
achieved the stability that diverse political opinion and opposing political systems could have 
brought to the country, and as such, Algerians have never enjoyed peace, neither before nor 
after independence. Even with 132 years of French colonial presence, including seven years 
of active warfare at a cost of more than two million lives, Algeria is still paying the “bloody” 
price of long-term colonialism. Continuing violence remains an integral part of the socialist 
system of government established after independence. It is alive and thriving today, with the 
public sector playing a pivotal role.  
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The regime’s legitimacy has rested mainly on historical grounds, particularly 
regarding the role that the FLN played during the War of Independence. It has also depended 
on the state’s ability to provide for most of its citizens’ economic and social needs. The 
country’s economic performance, particularly enhanced by the generation of ‘healthy 
hydrocarbon’ revenues, has enabled the state to invest in social programmes such as free 
education, health care and subsidised housing. While these can be viewed as good and 
worthwhile achievements, there remains a darker side to this period, where the regime has 
systematically violated political rights and civil liberties. Under the umbrella of the 
revolution, the regime has systematically limited political and individual rights, and has 
targeted freedom of association, in particular.   
From an opposing view, Muslim Baba-Arbi wrote in his paper, “The Military 
Association and the Path of Democratic Change in Algeria,” that the history of the Algerian 
military is tied exclusively to the independence war, while the ALN, in contrast, were the first 
to re-structure Algerian society after 1963. Baba-Arbi notes the statement of researcher Elias 
Boukraa that “it is kind of exaggeration to identify the Algeria political system as 
military….”320 Elias Boukraa clarified his statement by defining what he meant by a military 
system: one that is defined five conditions. The first is: the full presence of the military as a 
leading power; Second is: the full subordination of political power to the military; Third is: 
the complete domination of military ideology; fourth is: the use of military intervention to 
control the country’s affairs, and its full control over the political space; fifth is the full 
independence of the military in managing themselves in their own bases.
321
  
According to Boukraa, in applying these five points of the military system’s definition 
to the Algerian power structure, only two conditions are applicable: the independence of the 
military and its control over the political space.
322
 Therefore, Boukraa observes that it is an 
exaggeration to refer to Algeria as a military regime: the military does not dominate all 
political positions, and has no any ideology capable of hegemony. 
 On the other hand,  Houari notes that while the military is prominent in the Algerian 
political system, Algeria is nevertheless not a military regime or a military dictatorship such 
as those evident in Latin America in the mid – late 20th century. It is, rather, an authoritarian 
regime that obtains its legitimacy from the army. Even though it now has a multi-party 
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system, the de facto appointment of all presidents remains with the military, and elections are 
merely processes to legitimize military options. Addi regards the military in Algeria as a 
hegemonic political party exercising domination over civilian political parties in ways that 
are similar to those of the Communist party of the Soviet Union in the past. He adds that the 
military regime delegates authority to the civilian elites, but does not allow them to exercise 
real political power: “the Army is the source of power”323 
Baba-Arbi notes that the contemporary Algerian military is a direct descendant of the 
revolutionary army, but one that denies all of its revolutionary past.  Sidhum, on the other 
hand, denies that the military has any relation to the ALN,
 324
 which was essentially the 
internal force during the war. The military was structured by Boumédiène and supported the 
continuation of the French Officers. Most of the ALN officers were killed or jailed, and the 
survivors were later excluded from the military.
325
 Boumédiène forced them to retire, albeit 
with some privileges, such as permitting them to own small businesses, such as coffee shops.  
Moreover, he allotted free transport to them as well as pensions, an obvious concession to 
keep them from interfering with his powers and agenda. 
Sidhum and Chouchane and others have clarified
326
 the formation of contemporary 
Algeria.
327
 Sidhum recounts the background of ten colonels who were commanders of foreign 
military bases, and who, in a meeting in Tripoli in 1958, changed the principles of the 
revolution. They assumed the right to change the council members (Council National 
Republic Algerian -CNRA) as well as the GPRA, and then they created a new group called 
“L’état Major des Frantiers”. Boumédiène became a leader of this group. It was further 
strengthened by the adherence of French sub-officers, who had deserted from French military 
bases and joined Boumédiène’s bases outside the borders, well beyond the battlefields.  
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Baba-Arbi expresses a preference for military control in Algeria over that of the 
politicians, on the grounds that the later were not capable of exercising real power in Algeria. 
However, most of the interviewees in this study did not agree with this stance. First, there 
were capable professional politicians in Algeria after the war, although competition among 
the military officers for the power during the war had led to the deaths of many of them, 
including Ramdane, Mohammed Larbi Ben M'hidi and Mustapha Benboulaïd. Others were 
able to take charge of international affairs. Ben Bella, Aït Ahmed and Brahimi played 
significant roles as politicians in both local and international events. Second, as Mesli and 
Sidhum noted, the French authorities were conscious of their interests in the country as they 
continually sought to adhere to a specific set of policies that ostensibly supported their 
dealings within Algeria, and especially their economic interests.
328
  
According to Chouchane, the regime in Algeria after independence depended vitally 
upon one person: Boumédiène. After his victory over the GPRA, Boumédiène moved to 
consolidate power quickly. He staged another coup d'état, this time against his ally and the 
person who had supported his rise to prominence (albeit for his own purposes, to seize power 
and to attain a high position). The then president, Ben Bella was removed without resistance. 
Boumédiène, who now had complete power, seized the opportunity to reorganize the 
ministries in December 1964; he considerably reduced the duties of the Minister of Planning 
and Guidance, Belkacem, who was a member of Oujda group, which controlled the 
Ministries of Information, National Education, and Youth.
329
 As the president of the 
Republic, head of the government and Secretary General of the FLN, Boumédiène controlled 
appointments of the Minister of Interior, Finance and Information. Opposition forces thus 
banded together against Ben Bella.
330
 Boumédiène had prepared well for this; indeed, he had 
been working towards the leadership since independence.
331
 As Minister of Defence and 
commander of the military forces, he conducted a large-scale liquidation of revolutionaries 
and supporters of Ben Bella in particular. He engineered the resignation of Ahmed Medeghri, 
the Minister of the Interior, by removing the prefects from his authority and linking them 
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directly to the presidency. He compelled Kaid Ahmed to leave the Ministry of Tourism by 
taking away the hostelry management committees, then in conflict with the minister.
332
  
Most of the other influential political revolutionaries were killed in bloody conflicts 
with the military. Colonel Chaabani, the youngest and arguably the best educated of them, 
someone who had been involved in the revolution from the beginning, and a revolutionary 
who had won many victories, was killed by his colleagues following a questionable judicial 
ruling by Boumédiène, signed by Ben Bella,
333
 and fraudulently forced through the legal 
system. Ait Ahmed, one of nine politicians who represented Algeria extensively during the 
negotiations with French authorities, was arrested in Kabylia, and sentenced to death, 
apparently on Boumédiène’s orders. Boumédiène was now in a position to launch a coup 
d’état against Ben Bella. After he publicly argued that Ben Bella and his followers 
represented a danger to Algerians, a case pressed particularly by his supporters in the 
“Willayas” regions, and in the media, he effectively portrayed Ben Bella as corrupt, someone 
who must be removed to protect the principles of the revolution. This, then, became his 
rational for staging another ‘legal’ coup d’état, this time against Ben Bella. Boumédiène fully 
consolidated his power in seizing the presidency in May 1965, following the deaths of a 
number of Algerians, mostly from among Ben Bella’s supporters.  
The structure of the Algerian military after independence has undergone many 
changes, particularly during the Boumédiène period. After the coup d’état of 1965, 
Boumédiène built the new military establishment from three groups: revolutionaries, who had 
supported him and who had helped him in his coup d’état against GPRA in 1962; the French 
Officers - deserters, who had been stationed in the military bases in the East and outside 
Algeria just before independence; and young Algerians who had joined the military after 
independence as “professionals”.  
Chouchane states that the Algerian military before 1967 was not stable. It faced many 
challenges both within and outside the country. The French government still dominated most 
of the civilian positions because the revolutionaries had little experience in politics or 
economics. They were soldiers, and most of them were uneducated. Boumédiène took 
calculated risks in using people from different backgrounds to support him in his drive to 
consolidate power. Other revolutionaries, those who wanted to stop him, or otherwise stand 
in his way, were effectively liquidated by his troops, and either killed or jailed.  
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After Boumédiène had fully consolidated power, and especially in the period of 1967-
1977, military training and executive control over the military troops were placed in the 
hands of French Officers. This group within the military, despite having good military skills 
and being well trained, were not professional; these officers had little concern for ethics, and, 
as French Officers, had had little political and ideological training. They were trained to win 
wars on the battlefield, with scant regard for ethics. Chouchane has said that they were a 
military force without political or ideological direction, lacking principles and conditioned to 
an ethos of violence and absolute obedience.  
At the beginning of the presidency of Chadli Bendjedid, and after the death of 
Boumédiène in 1978, Bendjedid announced that Algeria would be built by its citizens. The 
first major change that he made was to replace the French and Soviet trained officers, who 
had come to Algeria to train the army, with others from within the Algerian army trained 
overseas. During this period religious and political groups, socialists and Islamists emerged, 
along with competing views of ethics and personality.
334
 Bendjedid focused on the economy 
of the country and its social life to begin to help citizens to remediate the poverty and 
widespread diseases that had affected Algerians after independence. He was aware of the 
military cadres that Boumédiène had established, as well as the many French Officers and 
revolutionaries who had been killed by Boumédiène and his supporters. But Bendjedid 
occupied a special vantage point: He was the only person who had established strong ties 
with all of the military leaders. He was thus in a privileged position, one which gave him 
constitutional protection. He was the only person who had emerged from the original 
revolutionaries to hold the grade of General, apart from Boutaflika, who had been nominated 
for the presidency inside the Revolutionary Council, but was rejected by the remaining 
French Officers. Bendjedid had another advantage: he did not oppose any party within the 
political or military groups. All these advantages, however, did not prevent the French 
Officers from staging a coup d’état against him in 1992. His fatal mistakes began when he 
passed the leadership of the military to one of the French Officers,  Nezzar, as his Minister of 
Defence. 
Based primarily on the trust that Bendjedid put in the French Officers, especially his 
close relationship to Arbi Belkhir, the Secretary General of the presidency, and the Minister 
of Defence, Nezzar, most of the senior positions in both the military and politics were 
occupied (and, in the view of many observers, corruptly) by the French Officers. They were 
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subsequently involved in politics and were appointed to high positions in the country’s 
bureaucracy. By the late 1980s, after they had pushed the president to create the Military 
Security Agency (SM), and then effectively destroyed this organisation, they were in 
command. They finished this rise to the pinnacle of power when they staged another coup 
d’état against president Bendjedid, and put themselves in the top military leadership 
positions, taking complete charge of the country in 1992, and filling most ministry portfolios 
with their supporters. It is this group, then, that appears to hold power today and apparently 
continues to use massive violence against the Algerian people for their own interests.
335
   
Chouchane had sided with the ‘professional group’ within the military from the first, 
and had repeatedly said that the graduates of the military academy between 1978 and the 
crisis of 1990s were the true ‘professionals’. They had no agenda against Algeria and its 
citizens, he insisted.  They were different from the French Officers, whom, he said, retained a 
plan to keep Algeria under tacit French rule. Professionals, he said, had no interest in politics 
or the economy; they merely wanted the support of leaders, irrespective of their political 
programs. Chouchane said:  
…I can tell you that if the professionals had been at the top of military 
leadership at the time of the crisis, I do not think Algeria would have had 
this crisis, or any human rights issues…and I do not think there would have 
been any coup d’état against any political party, whatever direction the 
country had taken.
336
  
 
 
3.1 The Conflict among Revolutionary Leaders and the Origin of the Military in Algeria 
Algeria’s decolonization experience is dramatic and unique. Between 1954 and 1962, 
Algeria experienced a guerrilla war, and ultimately forced France to accept Algerian 
Independence. More than a million Algerians were killed in the War of Independence. 
Following independence, Algerians still experienced extensive violence. Political violence in 
Algeria actually began during the war. Killing and terror had already made their appearance 
in the army border camps and within the Maquis.
337
 Many political leaders and soldiers were 
assassinated by their own revolutionary colleagues. Other revolutionaries were driven into 
exile, killed or jailed. Political leaders were threatened and removed from their leadership 
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positions. The political competition rampant among military elites had taken a bloody toll on 
civilians in Algeria, both before and after independence.  
The conflict among the leaders of the revolution started in the early years of war. In 
1956, the Congress of Soummam had highlighted the principles of the revolution and had 
tried to limit regional power within the country. However, in some regions leaders found it 
difficult to demobilize. The triumvirate that initially headed the provisional government was 
led by experienced politicians and suffered significant disagreement. Brahimi and his friend, 
Yazid Benyezzar, were with Belkacem when an attempt to seize power with the help of 
Suliman Hothman and Chabou AbdelQadir and others from among the French Officers, 
particularly in Tunisia, took place.  They moved to arrest his colleagues at bases where the 
GPRA’s leaders had located after the Tripoli Congress. Brahimi and Nezzar quickly informed 
the other leaders, who stopped the operation and threatened Belkacem.   
Sidhum used the death of Ramdane in March 1958, as an excuse to mobilize military 
elites to move against some of the key revolutionaries of the Soummam Congress. Ramdane, 
believed in civilian political control over military power. The Soummam Congress had 
decided in August 1956 that the political control of Algeria would be held by politicians, not 
the military, and that the leadership of the Revolution would be drawn from local people 
inside Algeria. The military bases and any other organisations outside the country would be 
under the control of the inside national leadership. The Government’s leaders subsequently 
turned against Ramdane, jailed him in Morocco, and then killed him even before he reached 
the designated prison. 
Salah Eddin Sidhum has noted that power in Algeria was literally stolen from the 
revolutionaries by military officers. These officers were not politicians; they had no 
legitimacy, and had not been part of the revolution. They were militants, “adventurers”, as 
evidenced by their killing of Ramdane in Titouan, Morocco. The political regime which now 
led the revolution did not respect the principles of the Revolution as articulated by the 
Soummam Congress in 1956. These leaders were guiding the Revolution in a very direction 
different from the one designed in Soummam in 1956. The CNRA was supposed to have held 
regular meetings in Morocco or Tunisia or Cairo, to debate important political issues and to 
guide the revolution in the same way as the Soummam Valley Congress. In early September 
1956 this Revolutionary Council put an end to these meetings. From then on it would be the 
military members who decided how to run the Algerian Revolution.  
According to Sidhum, competition and conflict among Algerian politicians over 
national power gave the military revolutionaries a chance to seize control over the country. 
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Sidhum states that the conflict among civilian politicians in 1962 meant that the civilian 
revolutionaries inside Algeria suffered intense war casualties in battles against the French, 
and lacked the necessary support, while the bases in Tunisia and Morocco should have been 
continuing to supply them with arms and military support. Lakhdher Bouragaa, in his 
interview published in Elkhabar, a prominent newspaper, said that Algerian revolutionaries 
in Tunisia were living well while people inside Algeria were living in great hardship, 
engaged in a bloody war without arms or and even the basic necessities.
338
 The conflict 
among regional leaders inside Algeria clashed with the leadership of GPRA in military bases 
outside Algeria, especially the Eastern base of Ghardimaou, commanded in the early 1960s 
by Boumédiène, who even then was plotting to seize control over the revolution and the 
country.
339
   
Brahimi observed this train of events closely, and said that he met with Ramdane just 
a day before his death outside the country, and was shocked when he read in the Algerian 
newspaper ‘El Moudjahid’ that Ramdane had been killed in a battle in the Algerian 
mountains.
340
 He was deeply confused by the report until he asked one of the three leaders of 
GPRA, based in Tunisia, about the event. Ben-Toubal (his name in the war was Si Abdellah) 
told him that they had decided to jail Abane in Morocco in early months of 1958 to remove 
any possibility of him seizing power, but his colleagues Boussouf and Belkacem had turned 
against him and killed him in Nadhour, Morocco on May 1958. This murder had profound 
implications for the political system and the revolution, opening the door to a structuring of 
systematic violence by the military forces. Thus, they actively joined the competition for 
political power after independence.
341
 Sidhum noted that this competition among the military 
elites grew significantly until it led to the outbreak of civil war. Sidhum also observed that 
the President of GPRA Ben Khadda had mentioned to him that he had resigned his position 
specifically because he did not want to see Algerians fall back into a war among themselves 
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in a competition for power. Soon Boumédiène, backed by his external military command, 
attacked Algeria from both Tunisia and Morocco, killing hundreds of Algerian civilians who 
resisted this coup d’état from external military bases. 
Bloody resistance and civil war of this sort had been part of Algerian social life for 
more than forty years before Boumédiène’s coup d’état. Brahimi, Sidhum and Chouchane 
had observed and even participated in this history. On the other hand, the military elites who 
have controlled Algeria since independence have had a very different historical background. 
The revolution did not legitimize such attacks on internal bases of the ALN. Boumédiène 
therefore, organized a strong military that was based outside Algeria. The ANP was created 
not to fight against French troops, but to aid him in his personal quest for power after 
independence.
342
 Nonetheless, the external revolutionary groups were formed to break the 
isolation and encirclement that the French authorities had introduced along the Eastern and 
Western borders with the Morice Line. Boumédiène recruited young Algerian refugees in 
Tunisia and Morocco, and then, surprisingly, invited disaffected French Military officers to 
join the new Algerian military. His rational was the need to train Algerian soldiers in the use 
of the new weapons that the revolution was increasingly receiving from communist countries 
in Eastern Europe and Asia. Boumédiène led D’état major, which became a strong military 
establishment soon after independence. 
Sidhum has stated that none of these military groups were directly involved in the 
revolution. Rather, they were engaged in preventing aid from reaching the revolutionaries 
through Tunisia and Egypt. These external troops grew stronger, were equipped with better 
weapons than those of the revolutionaries, and eventually increased their numbers to 45 000 
soldiers.  The revolutionaries inside Algeria never had more than 20 000 troops, and fought 
mostly with very basic weapons. This situation was largely ignored by the revolutionary 
leaders in their competition for power. Chouchane mentioned that this competition opened 
the door to international intervention.
343
 Belkacem had already begun to accept the direct 
participation of French soldiers in his personal competition with Boussouf and Ben-Toubal, 
and then later with Boumédiène.   
Sidhum has also noted that a group of ten Algerian colonels met in Tripoli (Libya) on 
the 26
th
 of May 1962, to legitimate their quest for power.  This flaunted national law which, 
incidentally, was in accordance with international law on this point. This meeting, then, 
represented an attempt to change the principles of the Algerian revolution, as defined in the 
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Congress of Soummam. Many politicians and civilian leaders had been removed from their 
positions in the CNRA on the orders of these colonels. Military members asserted dominance 
over the CNRA, and in effect replaced national political leaders and civilian administrators 
who were educated and highly capable in their jobs. Military members soon came to 
dominate the council, while politicians and civilians became the minority, holding one third 
of the seats. Following meetings in Tripoli in May and early June 1962,
344
 civilian politicians 
were further weakened and ultimately became unable to take any action against the military 
members, who held the majority and pushed through all their decisions, thus enhancing their 
control over the revolution. Sidhum notes that this became an integral part of Algerian power, 
and this, in his view, remains true today that “Algeria is still suffering this assertion of illegal 
power, which is essentially countered by the principles of independence, and the Tripoli 
meeting in 1962.”345  
According to an interview published online with Boussouf, Boumédiène’s legacy 
remains the primary source of the problems that Algerians are experiencing today,
 346
 
particularly as regards his recruitment of French military officers and administrators after 
independence. Boussouf clarified that this directly affected the composition of the elites after 
independence. The main reason for the violence, which cost the lives and freedom of tens of 
thousands of people, was the elite competition to seize power. Boumédiène disguised his 
formative role in creating military elite, while Boussouf, who brought Ben Bella to the 
presidency, sought to show the public and the other leaders that he never wanted to seize 
power or, for that matter, to be president. Others, he said, were more qualified and had more 
experience in their struggle against French colonialism.  
Who created Boumédiène, in effect, placing him at the heart of post-revolutionary 
politics? The answer to this question points to the source of the violence in Algeria from 
independence until the explosion of human rights violations in 1988, and then the civil war of 
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1992 and its aftermath. Why was Boumédiène chosen? Why choose someone new to the 
ALN rather than someone who had more political experience and at least some role in 
revolution? What political or military group seized power to promote to a key leadership 
position a single personality?  
Central to these questions is the history of the military intelligence service in Algeria 
following the revolution. In the spirit of the adage, ‘he who gains the information, gains 
power’, the post-revolutionary history of Algeria is filled with the names of revolutionaries, 
civilian and military, who rose to leadership positions through ties to this hidden power, 
sometimes called the power of the shadow.
347
 While little is known about this, it is known 
that many of the struggles and problems faced by the post-revolutionary regimes and the 
political elites in organising politics, security, economics and even the social issues which the 
French colonial model had left behind devolved upon the shadowy topic of security. The 
security apparatus controlled every major change in the country, as leaders or parties had 
limited capacity in which to play out their roles in the process of change. Assassination 
threatened anyone who disregarded those tightly controlled limits.  
It was ‘security’ and ‘intelligence’, then, that initiated most of Algeria’s fundamental 
human rights violations. In December 1957, Ramdane,
348
 was killed as part of a “settlement 
account”, where special military security units had taken the extraordinary role of guiding the 
Algerian Revolution. Abane, whose views were deeply influenced by Hadj, was a member of 
the MNA (the National Algerian Movement), and in the ensuing conflict between the FLN 
and the MNA, he chose to be involved with FLN only as long as they shared a single 
purpose, which he defined as Algerian Independence. He was aware that this disagreement 
could lead to his assassination. Abboud Boussouf, in an interview in Aljazeera, Qatar TV, on 
October 4
th
, 2005, mentioned this group in a discussion of his cousin, Abdelhafid. Abdelhafid 
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Boussouf occupied the position of General Principal of the West Region in the 1956 ‘Wilaya 
5.’349 Later he was transferred to Oujda, Morocco, in a reorganisation of the resistance. 
 Abdelhafidh Boussouf, an early leader of the intelligent services, and the head of the 
“Bs” group, as French authorities called them, was one of three people who created this 
“Shadow power”350. At a meeting of the group, information was divulged regarding Ramdane 
and his growing relations with French authorities, particularly in discussions of 
independence. They realised that Ramdane had become too powerful based on his 
international ties and may well have been able to seize the leadership of the revolution, and 
ultimate power after independence. They started to consider Boumédiène as the figure who 
might be preferable to Ramdane in such a position.  
After the assassination of Ramdane, Boussouf invited Boumédiène to return from 
Egypt, where he was studying at the Mosque of al- Ashar, and in one of the public schools 
under the sponsorship of Sheikh Albachir al-Ibrahimi.
351
 Boussouf, who was prominent in the 
middle period of the Revolution, was running a booming business in arms and information 
between Eastern and Western countries.
352
 The competition in this business was principally 
from another agent and member of the SSP under the leadership of Boussouf.  Messoud 
Seghar was a businessman who had significant success in dealing arms and military 
equipment. By 1960, Boumédiène began planning to rid himself of the SSP, and of Boussouf, 
by using secret information from Seghar.
353
 He then developed his own relationship with the 
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 Massoud Seghar was a member of the SSP and a businessman dealing in arms and military materials, and 
was working for Boussouf when he lost his position to Boumédiène .  At the time, Boussouf was away in Oujda,  
Morocco. After Boumédiène  seized power, Boussouf  was arrested and severely tortured. Saghar gave up 
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French authorities. Boumédiène seriously considered seizing power through this liquidation 
and assassination to many formal revolutionaries. He was behind the death of Benali 
Boudghène, known by “Coronal Lotfi”, head of military region no.5 (Willaya 5), who was 
killed by the French army with the help of information supplied by Boumédiène.
354
  
Violence among the revolution’s leaders played a major part in diverting the 
revolution from its original purpose. Individual interests, combined with competition for 
power, changed the political direction of the revolution that had been in play since the 1930s. 
The meeting of the fourth CNRA in Tripoli on May 1962, ran for three weeks, and was 
immediately tainted with suspicion. Boumédiène’s side launched an attack on Belkacem 
declaring that he and his team had gone to Evian to “liquidate” Algeria. With skill and 
dignity, Belkacem defended himself, producing the minutes of the talks and proving with 
resolute firmness that he had stood up to the French. When the vote has taken, the CNRA 
showed itself almost unanimously in favour of the veteran Maquisard –with the exception of 
Boumédiène and his army supporters. Next came, however, the elections for the supreme 
leadership of the GPRA, which would, presumably, conduct Algeria at long last towards 
independence.  
Abbas, a moderate nationalist of long standing, who had become a revolutionary, was 
by then a world figure commanding great respect. In the conflict between Boumédiène’s 
group and the GPRA, he was cast aside in a humiliating disregard for his past distinction. 
Belkacem was the logical candidate for succession; Boussouf and Lakhdar Bentobal begged 
him not to accept the presidency on the grounds that it would inevitably bring conflict with 
Boumédiène and Ben Bella, possibly leading to internecine bloodshed once the war with 
France was finished. Under pressure, Belkacem accepted. Instead of Belkacem, Benyoucef 
Benkhedda
355
 received the nomination, however.  
Together with Ramdane and Saad Dahleb, Belkacem had drafted the famous 
Soummam Platform of 1956. He had never committed himself to any of the warring factions 
within the FLN, and was not in conflict with Boumédiène and General Staff. For these 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
politics around the time of independence and continued in his business until he was murdered, and his money 
mysteriously taken.      
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reasons particularly there was merit in his selection for the presidency.  After his relegation to 
the lesser function of Minister of the Interior – he was level with Ben Bella – Belkacem was 
forced to accept the addition of Boudiaf.  Boumédiène and his supporters won most of the 
power at the fourth CNRA, and he withdrew his resignation –“in the name of higher interests 
of the party.”356 The struggle for power within the FLN was by no means resolved at this 
point; in fact, the internal conflicts were more acute then they had been at any time since 
1954. The “interior” leaders of the GPRA continued to feel abandoned by the General Staff, 
and by the “exteriors”, Boumédiène and his troops. The violence that Boumédiène apparently 
planned in his military program, after the Tripoli Congress, included killing another three 
million people (double the number of deaths since the war had begun in 1954). He was 
serious in his plan to start another war if the GPRA did not give up its power. 
 
3.2. Military Intervention and Political Algeria after Independence  
The case of Algeria exhibits two paths to violence: first, revolution from the bottom 
up, which began during the period of French colonialism and ultimately brought 
independence to Algeria. Second, through the implementation of a general theoretical 
framework that defined a sociological meaning of power, its significance as a cultural value, 
its relationship to personality, and its relationship to social, economic and political 
conditions.
357
 Algeria has experienced waves of drastic change. The creation and 
development of the Algeria after independence stemmed from very basic measures. The 
Algerian Army was founded as an army of liberation. Its political base was poor farmers, 
fellahin; and its officer corps was trained in the political aims of a war for independence. The 
public never got the chance to share power with the colonial power, even at its lowest 
echelons. 89 per cent were illiterate, had never been to school, except perhaps the families of 
the farmers’ leaders, and these people tended to have good relations with the French 
administration, and even occasionally were able to study in the French schools.
358
  
However, Algeria’s new bureaucratic elite had, for the most part, been born in the 
years of victory, as the French departed. The revolutionaries soon made themselves chief 
competitors for power with the FLN, and then with its French Officers, but now as a 
bureaucratic state machine, and not as a popular revolutionary front. The clash between the 
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military groups and the FLN outwardly seems to have come suddenly, but there was a deep 
dvide that festered between the two factions throughout their history.
359
 The government was 
effectively controlled by the army.
360
 There was a mass exodus, not only of settlers, but of 
French administrators as well. Thus, although a major proportion of the technicians and 
experts in Algeria had been French,
361
 the subsequent vacancies were soon filled by 
Algerians.
362
 
In August 1963, the authorities adopted decree No. 63-297, prohibiting the existence 
of competing political parties and thereby establishing a one-party system in Algeria.
363
 The 
Party of Socialist Revolution (PRS), under the leadership of Boudiaf, and the Socialist Forces 
Front (FFS), were outlawed. Government interference did not stop there, however, as trade 
union activities and student movements were also subjected to intervention measures, 
curtailing liberties and controlling the movement of individual citizens. In fact every political 
organisation in the country came under close scrutiny. The control of independent 
organisations was relentless, as witnessed in 1963 in the control of the powerful trade union, 
UGTA, and again in 1969, with the banning of the independent student union (UNEA), 
because it had insisted on its autonomy. To ensure full control in this area, the regime created 
its own organisations, including women’s and peasant organisations.364 
To silence its international critics, the FLN apparently misled the international 
community regarding human rights violations and the level of political freedom and liberties 
in Algeria.  After banning political parties and establishing a single-party system, the regime 
then created another party to participate indirectly in political life. Formally called the 
Communist Party, the (PAGS) Parti d’Avant-Garde Socialiste, it has served some of the 
regime’s interests, including bolstering the Council of the Revolution. As Aggoun and 
Rivoire note:  
…While Algeria, in theory, opted for a one-party system in which the FLN 
would play a vanguard role, in practice the FLN became a rear guard party. 
Following Boumédiène’s coup d’état in June 1965, the running of the 
country was entrusted to the Council of the Revolution.
365
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Although, bureaucrats in the army and government were associated with the FLN, it 
did not play a role in determining the direction of the country’s policies. The party neither 
held any congress nor had any formal organisational structure until Boumédiène’s death in 
December 1978. The army was the real power holder, and the Party was reduced to 
ceremonial duties.
366
 The FLN did exercise power over individual interests, even during 
periods of overt military dictatorship. The suggestion that the FLN was completely passive 
was a criticism, in fact, of poor policy. On the other hand, perhaps because of its extensive 
control over most political activity, the FLN found a difficult to maintain discipline and was 
thus susceptible to charges of corruption and failure. The relative success achieved under 
Boumédiène’s rule notwithstanding, the FLN ultimately failed in its developmental policies. 
Corruption, ‘clientelism,’ nepotism and widespread injustice became the currency of Algerian 
politics under the FLN. Because it was only through party membership, and membership in 
its mass organisations, that promotion and career development could be obtained, individual 
initiative was curbed and a conformist attitude took over. Thus, the FLN’s decay began. The 
party no longer represented vital social interests, and factions within the regime, hitherto 
hidden, surfaced.
367
 “The struggle between the different clans has been one of the 
characteristics of the Algerian transition, as each faction has sought to impose its vision of the 
distribution of power.”368 
However, the FLN leadership was not fully open and honest in their positions and 
their promises to their supporters, and were not responsive to the needs and demands of 
citizens. They were unable to stop the violence or bring a peaceful resolution to their 
colleagues, who had different perspectives as to the nature and purpose of national policy. 
Conflict, in this setting, was inevitable. As Bouandel notes, “the Party needed authority to 
attract political support”369 by any means other than manipulation and obligation, and it 
became increasingly evident that the leadership’s apparent popularity was more myth than 
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reality, orchestrated by official agencies in support of the system. For almost three decades of 
authoritarian rule, party political activity in Algeria was prohibited. The absence of a tradition 
of pluralism and electoral competition affected not only the nature of the political parties but 
also their development in the post-1989 period within the multi-party system.  
While violence was practiced against political parties in the transition from 
‘authoritarianism,’ the army qua political regime used more brutal means of liquidation, 
assassination and even massacres of civilians and revolutionaries in many regions of country, 
principally to keep elites in power. During independence, the seizure of power by the army 
border units, led by Boumédiène, took place in phases. The influence of the French in this 
violence requires some clarification, because it points to its role in maintaining its control 
over Algeria through indirect and oblique means.  
Algeria, as a new state following its independence in the early 1960s, and after 132 
years of colonialism, employed the military coup d’état to such an extent that it has become 
recognised in the country as a legitimate method of transferring power.   While Algeria has 
manifested instability in its formal political life, with many different political regimes, only 
one single military cadre has actually controlled the country since independence. The coup 
d’état of the “external revolutionaries”, called the “Oujda group”, against the interior troops 
of “GPRA” was organised under the political cover of the FLN and the revolutionary council. 
Unsuccessful coups d’état of 1966, 1967, among others, were launched by individuals, and 
were easily thwarted by the security services and the SM (Securité Militaire). Hence, the 
successful coup d’état of 1991 demonstrated that the army had moved collectively against the 
democratic elections and the civilian political parties, employing violence, and seizing power 
under a cover of a new ‘political party’ in order to legitimise its actions internationally, and to 
give them a democratic patina.   
Colonel Samraoui, in his book “Chroniques des années de sang”,370 describes the role 
of the army regime in the Algerian violence after independence and particularly during the 
political crisis of the 1990s.  The author explains the full effect of the SM, which he calls “the 
heart of the Algerian power”, and “a state inside the state”, and describes how this powerful 
machine became a monster during the 1990s under the pretext of saving the country from the 
“fundamentalist peril”, while its real goal was the plundering of the wealth of the country.  
This was an act, or series of acts, that was accompanied by crimes that spared neither 
Islamists, nor democrats, nor intellectuals, and not even the military themselves.  These 
                                                          
370
 Mohammed, Samraoui, Chroniques des années de sang (Paris: Denoël, 2003), pp. 3-7 (Trans : ‘Chronicle of 
the bloody years’). 
 117   
 
“predators” broached no protest against their power. The resulting violence cost thousands of 
lives, came immediately after many years of war against French colonialism, and has never 
really ended.  Civilians seem to have no ability to assume and hold power.  Observers 
continually ask the same basic question in this regard: why can’t the military organise the 
political system rather than continuing to compete directly for power with civilians’ 
politicians?  Why has the military, in effect, continually seized political power, treating it 
almost as a hereditary right?   
 
4. The Role of Military in the Clash of October 1988 in Algeria and the formation of FIS 
According to Samraoui, the October 1988 events were a decisive point in the 
contemporary history of Algeria.
371
 Indeed from October 5
th
 to October 10
th
 an unprecedented 
popular revolt took place, one in which thousands of young people attacked the symbols of 
the regime in the main cities (FLN branches, ministries, banks and state supermarkets etc.). 
The subsequent repression was severe, especially after a state of emergency was proclaimed. 
The army, under the command of General Nezzar, fired on crowds, killing more than 500, 
with thousands of demonstrators arrested and systematically tortured. Samraoui and his 
colleagues learned that the uprising was ignited by the army, specifically by General 
Belkheir’s clan, and stemmed from a planned food shortage meant to provoke the revolt. The 
ultimate aim was to trigger a much wider political opening. The effect was that numerous 
high-level political and military figures were singled out for punishment. Subsequently new 
faces took the reins of power, among those, was the apparently ruthless General Mohamed 
Médiène, whose alias was ‘Toufik.’  
However, these political changes provoked a divergence of opinion among the public. 
On one hand was the scepticism of the cronies of the old regime, who used the one-party 
system to accumulate illegal wealth. On the other hand, there were many who really believed 
in the ideals of the Algerian revolution, and who continued to hope that a new era had begun, 
one which democracy and prosperity would prevail.  Great hopes were placed on the prospect 
that a competent and honest politician would become prime minister
372
. Unfortunately, and 
unknown to these optimists, the regime would accept only a façade of reform; no real power 
sharing with the emerging political forces would be tolerated.  
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Under the new Constitution of 1989, President Bendjedid opened political power 
sharing to both sides, as well as to a range of ethnic, religious and nationalist groups and 
parties.  Many parties were now legalized, including the Islamic Front for Salvation (FIS); 
indeed this party, established in September 6, 1989, and headed by Abbassi Madani and Ali 
Benhadj, was about to offer itself as an alternative to the FLN. According to Samraoui and 
Zitout, the FIS party played a positive role in the social life of Algerians. It was clearly the 
most successful party among more than 40 organisations and political parties. It appealed to 
religion and the basic needs of the citizens.  It directly supported people in their social and 
economic struggles, in many respects much more effectively than the government had been 
able to do. The FIS had come to be seen very positively, especially in the aftermath of a 
major earthquake which struck the Tipaza region; FIS militants distinguished themselves by 
organising an effective relief programme for the victims, while the political authorities of the 
region were preoccupied primarily with protecting the property of high ranking generals in 
the region. The engagement and vitality of FIS militants contrasted sharply with the inertia of 
the authorities; Samraoui states that the FIS militants, who had previously pursued only 
electoral gains, further impressed the population by setting up “Islamic markets”, where 
surplus fruit and vegetables—donated by charitable peasants—were sold at low prices. The 
puritanical and moralizing FIS political discourse also gained more sympathizers in the face 
of the poor governance that prevailed, and the serious economic and social conditions that 
had long existed, and that now confronted younger Algerians. However the secret services 
actively infiltrated every emerging and potentially influential political party, with special 
attention devoted to the FIS and the FFS (Socialist Forces Front).  
 
4.1. A Fight for Power at the Summit  
Meanwhile an intense internal fight for power and influence was taking place at the 
highest levels of the army. Samraoui notes that the government at this time, under the 
leadership of Mouloud Hamrouche, who was struggling to guide the country, confronted by 
simultaneous crises. Samroui focused in his interview remarks on the economic and political 
crises of that time, observing that the power struggle, in particular, represented a serious 
threat to the economic and political reforms undertaken by the Hamrouche’s government. 
Hamrouche was about to succeed in depriving the established apparatchiks of their power to 
extract resources from the state’s coffers. This seriously disturbed the “politico-financial 
mafia”, a small number of generals and their cronies who took 10-15% from every 
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transaction made by the state.
373
 Moreover, the opposition also quickly engaged in this power 
struggle. A destabilization campaign arranged at the highest levels by the SM was initiated 
and provoked (principally through leaks) repeated scandals involving the prime minister and 
his close collaborators in the media.
374
 Finally the power struggle ended with the fall of the 
only general who could challenge the “politico-financial mafia”, leaving the prime minister 
and the Algerian President deprived of any genuine intelligence. Instead they were provided, 
from that time on, with disinformation. 
Samraoui has noted that the role that the SM played during the first free elections in 
Algeria included investigating any possible transgressions of FIS leaders or any other 
Islamists and releasing this information tothe media, especially after the local elections, 
where the FIS dominated most of the regions of the country. The SM was providing the 
falsified information to the public as well as to the presidency and to Bendjedid himself. Most 
of the reports were designed to create disinformation through erroneous predications 
regarding the local and parliamentary elections of June 1990 and 1991. An example of this 
was the report predicting the outcome of the only local elections ever held in Algeria, which 
took place in June 1990. It was clear that without some sort of intervention the FIS would 
win. This opinion was shared by many observers as well as by the secret services. Samraoui, 
who was in charge of that matter, produced a report predicting 40 per cent of the votes to the 
FIS, 30 per cent to the FLN, 20 per cent to the other parties, and 10 per cent to the 
independent candidates. However his senior officers were unhappy with this report and gave 
it to another officer for “review”. This officer simply changed the numbers.  He put 80 per 
cent in favour of the FLN, apparently without reviewing the accompanying analysis.  Later 
on, it became clear to Colonel Samraoui that the generals’ aim was to support the strongest 
party and to weaken the FLN to some extent (but not too much) while giving way to FIS (and 
thereby establishing some control over it) in a scheme that would let the generals preserve 
their privileges. The real results came as a shock to the president, who thus became aware of 
the dirty tricks being played.  At this point, however, it was too late.  The FIS won the local 
elections with a landslide victory, with 4,331,472 votes (54.25 per cent of the votes). 
4.2.The Period of Boumédiène and the Structure of the Military  
To discuss the military regime in Algeria today, we should go back to the history of 
Boumédiène and his officers, including the French Officers. According to Chouchane, 
Boumédiène had joined the revolution by 1956 as a simple soldier at a time when he had 
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recently returned to Algeria from Egypt. By most accounts Boumédiène was not a legitimate 
revolutionary
375
. He was not invited to any of the high level events or congresses nor did he 
contribute to the writing of the protocols of the revolution. Participation in these events had 
been considered essential to establish that participants were eligible for positions of power 
within the military. The Algerian constitution blocked anyone from power who had not been 
one of the revolutionaries. Boumédiène was never invited into any of the congresses or 
internal negotiations with leaders of the revolution such as Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed and 
Boudhiaf. Boumédiène, rather, had been given a leadership role in the new military bases on 
the Eastern boarders by the GPRA and Boussouf. These bases, which were called the “Etat 
Major General”, were created in 1956 to break the isolation barriers that the French military 
had set up under Generals Chall and Morris. Electric fences running from north to south on 
both the eastern and western sides of the country separated Algeria from its neighbours. 
Boumédiène has claimed that his mission was part of the revolutionary war and that he was 
conducting his operations under the orders of the GPRA.  
The Etat Major General was made up of soldiers recruited by Boumédiène himself. 
They had joined the military during the latter stages of the revolution, or just before 
independence. These soldiers were originally Algerian citizens trained by the French, and had 
later deserted and joined the revolution. Sidhum argued that Boumédiène was never involved 
in the battlefield as a revolutionary, but that he got his position through his personal ties to 
Boussouf.  Boussouf, for his part, had actually transferred his leadership of the Fifth Region 
military base to Boumédiène, who was still studying in Cairo at that time. Sidhum notes that 
the leadership of the Fifth Region military base was actually located outside Algeria.  The 
other regions’ leadership was on the battlefield in the war against French troops. Thus 
Boumédiène was, in many ways, not part of the revolution, and certainly not known to active 
revolutionaries.  
There is evidence that Boumédiène planned early on to take power from the leaders of 
the GPRA, and to ultimately seize control of Algeria after independence. On the one hand, 
Boumédiène used his forces against his colleagues, who had vied for the highest office with 
him. He killed Colonel Chaabani and Mohammed Khidher.
376
 On the other hand, he made 
deals with French Officers to help them gain legitimate involvement with the revolutionaries 
even when they had been refused by most of the regional military base leaders, including 
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Brahimi. The GPRA’s leaders had refused any collaboration with the French Officers as well, 
except for Belkacem, who wanted to use them in his power struggle against his colleagues 
and in structured military campaigns against the revolutionaries of the GPRA. Boumédiène 
could not become involved directly in the political process, so he sought out a politician who 
was well known to the national military leaders, was prepared to act as his front man, and 
was willing to allow him to hold the real power. In addition, Boumédiène needed to find 
someone who would work with the French Officers; they were the only military group who 
supported his bid for power. The French Officers subsequently gathered together in the 
border bases under the direction of Belkacem, who was just one of the three leaders of the 
GPRA at that time.  It was his intention to make use of their training and skills to form a 
strong and professional military. Boumédiène, moreover, made use of this situation by taking 
control of these soldiers. 
The person who was ultimately chosen to give legitimacy to Boumédiène’s bid for 
power was Ben Bella, someone who was seldom in accord with his revolutionary colleagues. 
To facilitate this move, Ben Bella resigned from the GPRA and joined Etat Major General. 
The evidence suggests that the GPRA would not likely have chosen Ben Bella as leader.  
There were a number of more experienced and prominent politicians in the organisation, 
including Ait Ahmed and Boudiaf, who were long-serving and well-respected politicians. 
Ben Bella, however, was in a strong position constitutionally.  In the first place, he 
was considered to be a legitimate revolutionary. Moreover, although he knew about 
Boumédiène’s agenda, he nevertheless felt that Boumédiène was the right choice for this key 
position.  He had the support of the French Officers and also had an arrangement with some 
of the leaders of the military regions that included their support for him in exchange for his 
support of their ambitions in their own quests for positions of power. 
In Brahimi’s view, the military under the leadership of the French Officers was 
principally responsible for the violence in Algeria that followed independence, and 
intensified significantly in the 1990s. Brahimi’s views resonated well during my interviews 
with other key Algerian figures, all of them now in exile.  Haddam, for example, agreed with 
Brahimi’s views and added that the only way Algeria would survive politically and 
economically would be to dismiss these people from the military and other official 
positions.
377
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Chouchane stated in his interview that the responsibility for the Algerian tragedy 
should be shared between the French Officers and the revolutionary leaders, who had, in 
order to minimise risks to themselves, allowed the officers to gather at the Etat Major 
General’s bases.  This permitted them to form a powerful military unit. Chouchane said that 
the good relationship that had existed between Belkacem and the French Officers had 
allowed them to gain access to the revolutionary leadership, and thus contributed 
significantly to integrating them into the “Etats Major General”. This relationship was a 
prerequisite to Belkacem’s seizure of power from his close colleagues, Boussouf and Ben-
Toubal. In 1959, the border troops under the leadership of Boumédiène formed a plan to take 
over the ALN and to dominate political life in Algeria after independence. Because 
Boumédiène had had considerable success against the French forces using the forces he had 
gathered at the Etat Major General’s bases, his profile and standing among the 
revolutionaries and the Algerian civilians was increased. This gave him the confidence to go 
ahead with his plan, and to take power from the leaders of the GPRA. 
Haddam has advised researchers and historical writers of the Algerian situation to 
look closely at this stage of Algerian history, and to ask whether there was any international 
intervention in the country after independence. Haddam thinks that there was an agreement 
between the French authorities and Boumédiène, through the French Officers, to provide 
assistance to help Boumédiène take power in Algiers. How else, asks Haddam, could 
Boumédiène have moved his troops from “Ghardemau”, on the eastern borders, to Algiers, 
where the GPRA was in complete control.  Chouchane, Brahimi and Zitout, however, 
disagree with Haddam regarding the question of international intervention. It is their view 
that Boumédiène received support from the French Officers in the East and through an 
agreement with Ben Bella in the West, as he was very clever in his dealings with some of the 
regions’ leaders. Furthermore, Boumédiène and his officers were willing to use violence and 
to start a new war if necessary, and to move militarily against anyone who tried to stop them. 
His French Officers had a great deal of experience in the use of violence against Algerian 
civilians, stemming from well before their involvement in the revolution, so there was no 
need for any international support in this regard.
378
  
After striking their deal with Boumédiène, the French Officers officially became a 
part of the ALN. They then commenced their agenda to take power in Algeria, cooperating 
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with Boumédiène in removing people from the FLN Council. Boumédiène ordered the killing 
of a number of the FLN members, and even some of his own leaders on the General Staff, as 
part of his agreement with the French Officers. The French Officers had their own agenda, 
which they clearly implemented during the period of Boumédiène, and completed during 
Bendjedid’s rule. They now occupied the main positions in the military and held considerable 
political power. This gave them significant influence in the President’s office, and ultimately 
the power to remove the President in 1992.  
The French Officers, as Chouchane and Haddam have noted, had a plan that they 
prepared and began implementing as soon as they had the opportunity to do so. The first part 
of this plan was put in place in 1959, with their acceptance into the ALN. The second part 
began when Boumédiène accepted their proposal to place themselves in positions of power. 
Boumédiène had effectively revised history in the eyes of the civilian population, and this 
enabled the French Officers to pose as military heroes and to demand respect. The 
revolutionary-legitimacy rule (legitimate participation in the revolutionary struggle) was 
supposed to have been the only way that military figures or civilian politicians would be able 
to move into positions of power, but Boumédiène overcame this by creating a professional 
army with skilled soldiers. Other revolutionaries accepted offers of comfortable civilian 
positions.  Their only alternative was to face the likelihood of violence against them as had 
been carried out against opponents to the French Officers’ agenda. This was ultimately the 
fate of Abbas, Ait Ahmed and Boudiaf.   
The French Officers, as Haddam and Zitout have noted, apparently did not feel any 
responsibility for the well-being of the country or its citizens. Violence was their only 
strategy, and obtaining power and dominating the politics of the country their only goal. It is 
vital to add that their success through violence was supported by the French authorities, who 
were their main protectors against any external intervention. They also prevented the news of 
what was happening in Algeria from reaching the media, as exemplified in the events of 
1994. Chouchane is perhaps more sympathetic to their role in his observation that the French 
Officers’ agenda only came to fruition in 1992, after the coup d’état. Moreover, the 
likelihood of the French Officers holding on to power is no longer likely, as the political 
situation in Algeria has changed significantly and many of these people have either died, 
retired or have been transferred to positions outside the military.  
Chouchane adds that:  
Due to my position in the ANP, I was very close to these people, I knew 
them personally and most of them were my colleagues when I was an 
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officer in the ANP; there was only two or three grades between me and 
them …These people only believed in violence and massacres, they 
believed that this was the only way to keep themselves in power.
379
  
 
These methods had essentially failed with the Algerian people in 1961 when General 
de Gaulle in his speech said, “je vous compris” (“I understand you”), but the French Officers 
did not understand that Algerians would not accept rule-by-violence.  The result was the 
rapid and chaotic spread of violence throughout the country; with more than 200 000 killed 
and more than 50 000 disappearances from the 1960s through the 1990s. 
The Algerian Army of today is very different from the ALN of the revolution era. The 
ALN stood by the wishes of the Algerian population and their goal of liberating the country 
from French colonialism. The main aim was to protect the principles of the revolution and 
Algerians, through liberty, legality and equality. But the leadership of the ANP today has a 
different plan. They are only concerned about their own interests, and not those of Algeria or 
its citizens. Their project is limited by the interests of France and the Western countries and 
also their need to be protected against being charged for their crimes against the civilians of 
Algeria.  
The former General Nezzar,
380
 in his book, The Memoires of Khaled Nezzar, puts the 
full responsibility for the violence of post-revolutionary Algeria on the fundamentalists of the 
revolution, who, he says, refused to allow Algeria to have a strong professional army. Nezzar 
believed that a reorganized ALN through the “Etat Major General” was one of the core 
obligations of the post-independence era. Algeria needed a new military that was modern, 
strong and professional. Moreover, Algeria has a multitude of different ethnic groups formed 
by religion, region and even language that could endanger the country at any time.   
Brahimi, in his book Aux origines de la tragédie algérienne (1958-2000), responded 
to this interpretation noting that the children of French military schools (the French Officers) 
…have no reason to wage violence against Algerians, their only motive has been to take 
power from the legitimate politicians and to protect themselves from any legal action that 
could be taken against them for the crimes they have perpetrated on the Algerian people since 
Independence.
381
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4.3.The Process 
In 1959 the Algerian Military made the first move toward its transformation when it 
committed itself to the bloody competition for the leadership of the GPRA. By 1965, a 
second change took place in the military and power in Algeria with the coup d’état of 
Boumédiène against Ben Bella, which put the French Officers in a strong position to hold 
power after Boumédiène. Political power and senior positions in the new Algerian 
bureaucracies were determined by the French Officers and their supporters, largely due to 
their ruthless tactics and the simple fact that they tended to be better educated. Ben Bella 
exercised authoritarian control over the French Officers because he was a former leader and 
politician during the revolutionary era. He gained additional power through his position as 
President of the Republic. French Officers had difficulty achieving the level of power 
achieved by Ben Bella and as a result his Minister of Defence, Boumédiène, was able to end 
the political life of Ben Bella and initiate a campaign of massive violence in Algeria. 
Chouchane says that it is clear from the first agreement between Boumédiène and Ben 
Bella to share power together, that Boumédiène had planned this arrangement when he first 
became part of the ALN. By the end of the revolutionary era, Boumédiène separated his 
colleagues into supporters and those who opposed his agenda for the country. The first group 
was given positions of power, and those who opposed him were convinced to accept deals 
that released them from military positions, or were arrested and either tortured or killed.  
After the coup of 1965, the French Officers finally obtained political power when 
Boumédiène allowed them to take part in the Central Council. Entry to the Council was 
reserved for revolutionaries only. Colonal Zebiri wrote in a newspaper editorial
382
 that the 
reason that he attempted the failed coup d’état against Boumédiène in 1967 was because the 
French Officers held more positions and exercised greater control than the genuine 
revolutionaries, who had been pushed to resign and had lost their positions within the military 
and/or politics.
383
  
Boumédiène became the only person who could lead the country after 1965.  He 
appointed French Officers to senior military positions, but he kept for himself the Ministry of 
Defence, the Presidency of the Central Council and the Presidency of the Republic. Because 
he knew the French Officers and their agenda, Boumédiène was cautious. In addition to the 
positions that he retained for himself, he also created another military unit in parallel to the 
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ANP.  The purpose of this unit was to provide him with personal security and to protect  his 
position. This new “Military Security” (SM) was outside of the constitution of the country; 
no one was authorized to control this force apart from Boumédiène.
384
 Because of its 
autonomy, weaponry and tactical centrality, the SM, then, gave Boumédiène dictatorial 
power and dominance over the military. Boumédiène became increasingly strong as he 
extended control over the military and, especially, the French Officers now in the military.  
As noted above, major questions emerged during the Boumédiène period.  Even more 
pressing questions followed it.  What was the role of the French Officers after the death of 
Boumédiène in 1978, and until the coup d’état of 1992? Why did such intense violence 
follow the coup? What was the reaction of the SM to this unprecedented violence? These 
were some of the questions that I put to Chouchane in our interview.  He replied that the 
answers to these questions [regarding the origins of the violence] are complex and the media 
have not yet asked this kind of question for different reasons…however, the main reason for 
these events began in 1978 when the French Officers totally dominated the Algerian military. 
Towards the end of the Boumédiène period, French Officers gave themselves the right, for 
the first time, to join the Central Council of the Liberation Army; they then also gave 
themselves the right to membership of the Revolutionary Centre. Before this time, the role of 
French Officers was limited by the military and their work was kept to the army, but through 
their membership in the Central Council, they became involved in Algerian politics and took 
control of the government. These were the most important changes to take place in Algeria 
after the death of Boumédiène.
385
 
During 1978, French Officers managed to reach a position where they had control of 
the military, politics and the administration of the state and domination of Algerian society. 
As they were working together as a team, they were able to upgrade their positions from time 
to time and to improve their situation with the help of educational assistance from military 
schools in France, Belgium and Russia, as well as other countries.  By the end of 1978, more 
than 90 per cent of the leadership positions within the Ministry of Defence were held by the 
French Officers. The General Secretary of the Ministry of Defence was directly influenced by 
this group, under the leadership of Latrach M. Amin, who was an officer of the French 
military up to the final stages of the War of Independence.  
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After the death of Boumédiène, the ANP came under the control of two opposing 
powers, neither of which worked for the country or its citizens:  
1. The Military Intelligence agency (Securite Militaire, SM) under the leadership of 
Qasdi Merbah: this group was created by Boumédiène from a group of special 
officers who had no relation to any of the French Officers. The officers of this unit 
(SM) always stood behind the revolution and did not give support to the ‘Clandestine 
power’386 or the French Officers.387 Chouchane supported president Bendjedid in 
1992 in the coup d’état of the French Officers against the emerging democracy, but 
they could not stop the coup because they were simply too weak at this point; the 
president had just completed a reorganisation and did not have a consolidated power 
base. Thus the French Officers achieved another key victory, and further enhanced 
this when they were able to compel the president to reorganize the SM, integrating it 
directly into the regular military troops. With this action against the SM, the French 
Officers put themselves in an unassailable position vis-à-vis the leader of the SM, 
Marbah, or, as they called him, “the files man”. Marbah controlled access to all the 
confidential files. He was the only leader who was a former soldier in ALN, had 
legitimate revolutionary credentials, and who held a grade higher than the French 
Officers. He eventually lost his military job and was given the position of prime 
minister.  This effectively moved him out of the way, and he was later killed.   
2. The second power was that of the General Secretary of the Ministry of Defence: the 
leadership of this unit was under a French officer, Abdel-Hamid Latrach, who gave 
most of the high positions of the ministry to his French Officer colleagues.   These 
were especially powerful positions, and hence this group became the second most 
powerful after the President. He sent his mostly French Officers to military education 
centres overseas, including France, Yugoslavia, Russia and the USA, and built up 
strong international military relationships in the process. In our interview, Chouchane 
mentioned the names of some of those who are still in positions of power in Algeria 
today, including Arbi Belkhir, Guenaizia Abdelmalek and Mohammed Touati.   A 
few of them have retired after being granted amnesty,
388
 including Nezzar and 
Lammari. President Bouteflika gave them protection against charges from any court 
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in the country and thus protected them from being charged for any of their crimes 
against the Algerian people.      
However, the French Officers ultimately failed despite the high positions that they 
reached in the period of Boumédiène.  Both Chouchane and Brahimi note that they 
specifically failed in their competition with the SM, which was led by legitimate 
revolutionaries. Their failure affected the election of a new president after the death of 
Boumédiène in 1978. In effect, there were three candidates from the revolutionaries of the 
General Staff, L’état major, in this competition for the presidency: Bouteflika, who had 
worked with Boumédiène in the Western bases, and Bendjedid and Mohammed Salah 
Yahyaoui, who were from the Eastern bases, Ghardimaou. These candidates had no ties with 
the French Officers, but were not antagonistic to them. The French Officers, initiating a 
pattern that they were to follow repeatedly in later years, established a set of shared interests 
with these presidential candidates.  They were duly rewarded with new positions.  From these 
new positions the French Officers fostered changes in the country’s power base through the 
repeated use of extreme violence against Algerians and their legitimate leadership. They thus 
came to dominate the military, politics and administration. By 1990, the Minister of Defence 
was Nezzar, the head of Etat Major General was General Abdelmalik Gnaizia, the head of the 
land forces was their colleague Lammari and the General Security of the National Ministry of 
Defence was Mustapha Chelloufi. All of these men were colleagues from French military 
schools.
389
 They were now, in effect, the French Officers in power.  The leader of the SM 
was not a French officer, however, and was in a lower position and as such was under their 
control. The French Officers systematically prevented the SM leader from rising in his 
position, so that no ‘outsider’ would be in a position to challenge them. They thus used 
President Bendjedid, who had taken up the presidency after Boumédiène.  
President Bendjedid knew about the French Officers and their project, but he 
apparently thought that he was consititutionally protected by his position, and by his 
revolutionary legitimacy: he had been one of the earliest revolutionaries to join the FLN 
internally and the ALN in the Eastern bases. But he became vulnerable when he accepted 
their plan to weaken the SM and to remove from it the only officer who knew their secrets. 
Their plan was to cast the SM as an illegal organisation, and a danger to Algeria because of 
its extra-constitutional status and operation.  They knew that the SM had been created by 
Boumédiène to protect him from them as well as from his enemies among the revolutionaries. 
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They wanted to remove this organisation from the control of the president so that it would not 
repeat the situation that had transpired under Boumédiène, and had been repeated with 
Bendjedid. Later they created another security intelligent service, which became a tool in 
their hands to control the military, politicians, the economy and society.
390
   
Bendjedid evinced greater self-confidence because of his background and his 
constitutional position. However, because they provided him with a daily stream of (albeit 
often wrong) information, Bendjedid increasingly trusted the French Officers, eventually 
appointing them to most of the senior leadership positions in the country. They became closer 
to him and attached themselves to him socially.  When they turned against him and against 
democracy in a bloody coup d’état in the early 1990s, he was justifiably shocked.  They 
allowed him to resign his position or be killed, initiating a pattern that they followed with his 
colleague, Boudiaf.
391
  
In conclusion, the French Officers have been central to the Algerian crisis, from 
independence until the present. Their role in the major human rights violations and the 
systematic violence was initiated during the Boumédiène period, when few of them had the 
legitimacy to lead the country. After the death of Boumédiène in 1978, the French Officers 
come to dominate the Algerian military institutions and most of society.  
1. They were involved in the Central Council of the ANP, which had previously been 
forbidden to them because they had fought against the Revolution during the 
liberation war; 
2. They played a major role in sidelining their enemies among the revolutionary leaders, 
who were in competition with them for power;  
3. They stopped the SM and carried out the removal of Merbah, who had been the only 
person who could effectively challenge them due to his background in the military 
and his power within the SM.   
After the death of Merbah, the legitimate leader of the SM, the French Officers had a 
clear field to achieve their objectives. Indeed, they came to dominate most of the key 
positions in the country. In 1990, the Minister of Defence was Nezzar, the head of L’etat 
Major was Gnaizia, the head of the land forces was Lammari, the general security of the 
National Defence Ministry was Challoufi, and the general director of the SM was 
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Mohammed Médiène. All of these men, except for Médiène, were French Officers, and they 
subsequently became Generals and Major Generals.  It is interesting to note that Médiène, 
who was not a French Officer, remained at the lower rank of colonel.     
Speaking on the TV Channel “al-Hiwar”, Brahimi said that most of the violence in 
Algeria since independence, and especially during the period 1990-2000, was the 
responsibility of the French Officers, who just prior to independence had participated in the 
killing of Algerians along with French soldiers in France’s efforts to quash the revolution. 
They remain fully responsible for human rights violations on an unimaginable scale, and 
were instrumental in each change in the political system. They were behind the removal of a 
number of the participants in the revolution, particularly those who were capable of taking up 
positions of leadership in the country, and those who supported national development and 
sought to protect the national economy. French Officers were behind all of the coups d’état 
since independence, and apparently ordered the killing of hundreds of thousands of citizens in 
bloody massacres and disappearances. The evidence suggests that they were almost solely 
responsible for massive human rights violations against the Algerian people, often executed 
in the so-called ‘war against terrorism’.       
Brahimi noted that he knew the French Officers as deserters from the first day they 
came to the Algerian revolutionaries in small groups to negotiate joining the ALN.  Brahimi 
was one of the ALN leaders in charge of the negotiations with the French Officers, and he 
refused to accept them.  However, there were some leaders who felt that they should be 
accepted because of their skills in military technology.  They apparently thought that the 
French Officers would assist them in gaining power after the revolution. The French Officers, 
however, were driven by their own quest for power, through whatever means necessary. 
These French Officers may have been responsible for as many as one third of all Algerian 
deaths in 1990s in order to keep themselves safe and in power. Sidhum has said that the 
French Officers prepared from the start for their eventual seizure of complete power in the 
1990s. They ultimately exercised power at all levels of society. General Larbi Belkhir a 
French Officer who was in power until he died in Morocco on 28 March 2010, has been 
described to as the “presidents’ creator.”392  
                                                          
392
Ahmed Chouchane, personal interview, London (September 2009); Brahimi, A. H., interview, London 
(September 2009), Alshareq al-Awsat (the Middle East), a daily newspaper published in Saudi Arabia: 
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11385&article=554915&feature=. 
 131   
 
Samraoui, in his book,
393
 states that the French Officers’ putsch had, definitely and for 
the worse, consolidated the power of generals such as Nezzar, Belkheir, Touati, Lamari and 
their colleagues. All were former members of the French colonial army, who only joined the 
Algerian fighters for independence a few months before the withdrawal of the French 
colonial army from Algeria. These officers never fired a single round against their former 
masters. Riadh Saidaoui wrote that the irregular change of a president or a prime minister or 
even all of the members of government is no longer a major event in Algeria. It has become 
commonplace since the coup d’état of 1992. There have been many presidents, dozens of 
ministers and hundreds of MPs since the revolution.  Nevertheless, the military, the real 
power behind all civilian regimes, maintains the same leaders as it had after independence.  
Algerians will not accept French colonialism again, although Algeria will never be 
stable until it regains legitimate political power, and is able to practice constitutional 
government with full sovereignty and the legitimate actions of the three branches of 
government without the interference of the military.  
 
4.4.French Military Officers and their Role in the Violence  
The term “French Officers” was given to officers born in Algeria who had grown up 
in French and Jewish communities.
394
 They studied in French schools and were attached to 
French military bases, typically to support them in their operations against revolutionaries, 
especially inside towns and cities. They are sometimes referred to as “Harkists”395. Brahimi 
refers to them as “deserters” because they have admitted that they left their positions with the 
French military to ‘join’ the revolutionaries, ostensibly in order to gain a share of the power. 
These military officers were well trained and had strong training and experience with modern 
weapons, which they had used with the French army in battles against the Algerian 
revolutionaries. At the time of independence celebrations, these officers chose to abandon 
their positions on French military bases and join with revolutionaries in local regions. Some 
of them were more honest in that they chose to join the revolution as early as 1956 and 1957, 
and were involved with the revolution earlier then most of their colleagues.  Some of them 
were killed on the battlefield. These deserters had clear political, economic and social 
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objectives. Their ostensible goal was to keep the country under French hegemony, albeit 
under their immediate leadership. They clearly wanted to be sufficiently part of the 
revolutionaries so that they could share power after independence.  
After the declaration of French President de Gaulle proclaiming “Algeria for 
Algerians”, people began to believe in Algeria as a country, one for which independence was 
just a matter of time. The French authorities, however, had another plan for Algeria, one that 
might divert international attention away from the long years of bloody fighting, and hence 
limit international concern with their system as practiced in Algeria. Such international critics 
included observers from communist countries, social organisations and political parties 
abroad. The French strategy played into the hands of Algerians who were fighting with them 
against the “Fallaga” Algerians.396 
Many of the French Officers, especially those who were part of the groups of late 
1959 and the 1960s that sided with the revolution, were well organized and prepared not to 
help the revolutionaries, but rather to take power from them. They were involved in the 
revolution on their own terms, which included a significant share of the power in the military 
as well as in other more explicitly political positions after independence. Their plans were 
rejected by regional leaders, including Brahimi. He took part in the negotiations with them 
and witnessed their infiltration of the Algerian military through the border bases after 
Boumédiène had accepted them as a legitimate component of the revolution, clearly as part of 
his own plan to seize power.  
Former Prime Minister Brahimi wrote
397
 that the most significant changes in the 
Algerian military ethos took place when these French Officers, or “deserters”, joined the 
revolution and became part of the ALN. They had, after all, been trained in French military 
schools and continued to act, albiet covertly, on behalf of French interests. In 1961, towards 
the end of the war, these officers insisted on staying together as a group rather than being 
integrated into the new groups within the revolutionary forces.  They clearly wished to 
protect themselves because of their French background and to place themselves in 
advantageous positions, eventually hoping to gain power.  
398
 Haddam, Zaoui and Zitout 
believe that the involvement of the French Officers inside the military was prepared and 
organized by the French authorities to maintain their influence in Algeria and to continue this 
influence after independence. They were formally accepted into the military by some of the 
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leaders of the GPRA who were aiming to seize power in Algeria after independence. These 
officers, in turn, attempted to use their skills and experience to influence the groups that were 
competing for power and were sympathetic towards them.  
These French-trained officers, sometimes referred to as “deserters”,399 then, made it 
clear that they were better qualified to assist with the leadership of the country, if only 
because of their self-proclaimed better education. However, it is important to note that they 
still believed in Algerie Française, that the best system was for the new country to be under 
the influence of the French authorities through a controlled and manipulated Algerian Army. 
Using this strategy, this group worked to negate the principles and ideals of the revolution. 
Haddam has argued that their goal was to change the revolution’s purpose, and thereby to 
deny the people of Algeria their independence, their practice of Islam, indeed their 
Arabism.
400
  Chouchane has another view of this: that the French Officers were accepted into 
the Algerian Army in order to improve the chances of some of the various factions vying for 
power in Algeria after the revolution.  This competition began among revolutionary leaders 
and inside military regions, and became clearer after de Gaulle declared in his Oran speech of 
1958 that independence would become a strong possibility in the near future.   
After independence, the Algerian Army, which was supposed to be an extension to 
the ALN, with the goal of building a secure state by protecting the population from internal 
and external enemies, was turned against the civilian population, departing from the 
principles of the revolution.  Revolutionaries engaged in a bloody competition for power; 
violence was the means by which the military sought to achieve power for the “Etat Major 
General” soldiers against the GPRA. The GPRA, the legitimate government, had been the 
only organisation that represented Algeria internally, with the ALN, and externally in 
international forums.  
Brahimi argues that the Algerian situation today existed before independence as well. 
The Algerian authorities are mistaken, in his view, in stating that the Algerian crisis began 
with the cancellation of the elections in January 1990.  Rather, the events of 1990 were the 
products of planning by the French Officers that pre-dates independence, and were 
specifically designed to achieve the goal of reaching power by coup d’état. The involvement 
of the French Officers in the revolution, then, was part of their plan to take power in Algeria, 
and it was this plan that was finally realized in the coup d’état against Bendjadid in 1992.  
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Brahimi places the blame for the Algerian crisis squarely on the shoulders of these 
“deserters”, and argues that the instability of Algerian institutions was essentially 
programmed by French authorities immediately after independence through their Officers. 
French authorities had organized the infiltration of the ALN through their involvement with 
affiliated groups, especially during the period of 1958-1961. Brahimi mentions some of them, 
those who appear to have been sent on a mission to the FLN in Tunisia. Brahimi says that the 
experience of long years of war meant that some of these deserters had become loyal to the 
revolutionary principles, loved their country, and reached high positions during the struggle 
for independence; Mahmoud Charif, who became a member of the GPRA in 1960-62, Abdel-
Rahman Ben Salem, who became a leader in the operational region of the north-east in 1960-
62, and Belhouchat, who was appointed a member in CRA in 1965, and then the leader of the 
fifth military region, followed by the leadership of the first military region from 1964 to 
1978, until he became the Supreme Commander of the Armed forces in 1987-89.  
That said, most of the deserters were conscious infiltrators with the goal of attaining 
influence in the new Algeria, quietly supporting covert programs of the French authorities. 
Most of the positions of power in the ALN had been assumed by these French Officers, 
beginning as early as 1956.
401
 The same was true of the new Algerian administration, 
including its political and social organisations, which were infiltrated by French sympathizers 
to the point that Algeria was, in some senses, essentially recolonized in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Even as de Gaulle proclaimed Algeria for Algerians, French military schools opened their 
doors to “French Muslims”, with enrolments quickly reaching 250 000.  
It appears to have been the French plan, then, to infiltrate the leadership in Algeria 
through the Algerian French, and thus open the door to a form of guardianship and custody, 
allowing France to use its right of a UN Security Council veto to stop enquiries into the 200 
000 deaths of Algerian civilians. Ultimately the French authorities were looking for a way to 
maintain their control over the country after independence. They essentially used the 
president of the GPRA, Benyoucef Benkhedda. Sidhum was a witness to the French 
administration when they offered their help to Benkhadda and his GPRA government, closing 
both the “Mourise” and “Charle” lines, which were still there under the control of French 
soldiers. Benkhedda had chosen to give up his position in the GPRA rather than to take the 
French offer and go to war against the revolutionaries and Algerians. He refused the offer 
from the French authorities and treated the case as an internal problem.  
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Brahimi argues that the “deserters” were involved in Algerian bases in Tunisia as 
French representatives, claiming to be partners in the military effort until they reached power 
positions in the 1990s. The “deserters” were supported by the French in these covert 
activities. Moreover, Chouchane, in his interview, stated that “deserters” not only founded the 
modern Algerian military, but that many revolutionaries from the Eastern and Western bases 
soon joined together not to build a strong military force for the country but to support 
Boumédiène and his regime as a means to reaching the power. They took this power after a 
coup d’état in 1962 against GPRA and then by another coup d’état against Ben Bella in 1965. 
Boumédiène was said to have been incapable of reaching the presidency legitimately. The 
only route to power that Boumédiène could take was to open the door to the “deserters”. The 
deserters’ officers trusted and supported Boumédiène for two reasons: first, because they had 
refused to involve themselves with the revolutionaries inside the country, as had 
Boumédiène, and they felt that they could rely on him to suppress the revolutionaries inside 
Algeria. Second, their aim was to attain power.  Boumédiène was seen as a direct route to this 
end.   
 Chouchane has said that the leaders of the GPRA accepted these French Officers in 
order to involve them with the proviso that they would not take any position in the FLN, and 
would not be a member of the CNRA.  The intent was that they would have no right to share 
power after independence. The negotiation with regional leaders inside the country resulted 
in the demand that they be involved individually rather than involvement as a group, as they 
had requested.  They refused this arrangement based upon their rejection of this condition. 
This ultimately revealed the true plans behind their move to the side of the revolution.  
Brahimi, Sidhum and Haddam are agreed that the French Officers were not working for the 
country; rather they had an assigned mission from the French authorities, and they sought 
single-mindedly to achieve this mission. 
 
4.5.The Role of the Professional Army in the Violence in Algeria  
The third part of the Algerian regime’s structure is: ‘Professional Military Officers’. 
Before engaging in a discussion of “Professionalism” in the Algerian military, the meaning of 
the term must be clarified. Let us start with a general understanding, and then move to a more 
specific discussion relating to the meaning of the word as it is used in the case of the Algerian 
military.  
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Generally speaking, professionalism is a key factor required to do any job; it is a 
fundamental requirement in the military sphere. The nature of war itself, perhaps the most 
brutal and destructive force facing mankind, requires that those who do the fighting do so 
with extreme levels of discipline, commitment, and skill. Such things are thought to be the 
essence of military professionalism. However, there are different views about professionalism 
in the military; some scholars have refused to accept that the profession of arms is a true 
profession. Their objections centre around two points – that soldiers are paid to be on military 
bases, and there are obvious and extreme violations of their duty and professionalism 
reported with some regularity in combat situations, although “…not in the obvious sense of 
its practitioners generally being paid for performing their duties.”402   Rather, such 
unprofessional conduct in military establishments usually relates to severe human rights 
violations, especially in civil war.
403
 
Scholars have specified the definition of military professionalism according to their 
research area. John Allen Williams stated that the topic of military professionalism is one 
more often approached from a social science perspective than a military science one.
404
 In 
this view, providing a definition would be more relevant to scholars of social science than to 
military strategists.  Scholars who have considered the subject of ‘military professionalism’ 
include Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Charles Moskos and Sam C. Sarkesian.
405
 
According to Thomas Young, the term ‘professionalism’ could be defined as “volunteers who 
choose to serve, as distinct from conscripted soldiers.”406 This definition is extensively 
detailed in many works including those of Huntington, and Janowitz. Janowitz took a more 
sociological approach to the concept of military professionalism. In his book, The 
Professional Soldier, he argued that the military is a “reflection of the society it serves, 
although it will not be a carbon copy”.407 John Williams noted from Huntington:    
[For Huntington], the military was to operate as a conservative institution 
that “stuck to its knitting” and developed professional values that were 
consistent with its traditional mission: fighting and winning wars on behalf 
of its nation, as directed and controlled by the government and 
legislature.
408
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According to Huntington’s view, the professional work of the military is not 
concerned with political or social matters, but rather is related to the management of war and 
the structuring of violence.  The military profession, like other professions, develops 
internally.  To achieve success and effectiveness it must determine the most appropriate 
strategy for the mission. From this perspective, civilian control represents the possibility of 
additional resources, and this also tends to engender more civilian trust. In this case from 
Huntington’s view, “the military would remain a purely professional, corporate and expert 
war-fighting entity whose members differed significantly from the population of its host 
society in terms of values, beliefs and attitudes.”409 
In his book The Soldier and the State,
410
 Huntington clearly gives a definition of 
‘professionalism’ to simplify the difference between a professional corps as an association, 
which is professional body, and the military professional officer who is a professional man; 
he also examines the differences between profession in the military and civilian professions. 
Professionalism in Huntington’s view is a characteristic of the modern officer in the same 
sense that it is a characteristic of any other profession, such as that of lawyer or physician.
411
 
But, “when the term ‘professional’ has been used in connection with the military, it normally 
has been in the sense of ‘professional’ as contrasted with “amateur” rather than in the sense 
of profession as contrasted with “trade” or “craft.”412   
Huntington identified three criteria for a profession and indicated that the true military 
professional has to meet all of these three elements. The first characteristic is expertise: “the 
professional military officer has to be an expert in the management of violence.”413 By this 
definition, the military professional is a soldier who has good ethics to deal with violence 
while not creating the violence, and that is somewhat different to enlisted personnel, who are 
experts in the application of violence. According to Thomas, military professionalism is the 
“systematic creation of a class of people for whom war is a profession, and who pursue 
general and sub-specialisations in the art and science of conflict’.414  
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The second characteristic is responsibility.
415
 Huntington states there are three basic 
clients of any real profession, including that of professional military: the society, individuals, 
and the collective.
416
 Huntington, in his statement, connected the three, noting that “…the 
general character of the service and his monopoly of his skills impose upon the professional 
man the responsibility to perform the service when required by society”417. Thomas states 
that the management of violence, which should be a part of the military officer’s duty, can be 
considered legitimate only in the context of service to the state. Due to the responsibilities 
that the officer has in front of his civil society, he should employ his skills in arms only in the 
interests of society. If a professional officer has utilized his skills in arms for his personal 
benefit, he will be transformed immediately from society’s protector into a criminal threat to 
social stability.
418
  
A professional officer is he: “who could execute manoeuvres in an effective and 
disciplined manner on the battlefield.”419 The professional officer is a man in charge of 
mistakes that could happen under his control, because he is thought to be a practicing 
expert.
420
 Professional officers in democratic militaries must be competent across a range of 
skills, particularly in force and formation management.
421
 Many of these skills have been 
transformed completely by new technology. This is particularly true in democracies that 
aspire to deploy forces outside of national borders and participate in high-intensity warfare.
422
 
The third characteristic is ‘corporateness’.423 By definition soldiers constitute a class 
who live apart from general society. Soldiers must learn how to give their loyalty to their 
association first, and to put personal considerations aside for the good of the group with 
which they serve.
424
 This observation prompted Janowitz to argue that professionalization of 
a military establishment actually increased the likelihood that it would intervene in the 
political processes. There is a sense among professionals themselves that they are a part of a 
profession, with certain standards for admission to their ranks, and a set of competencies that 
should be exhibited by its members. In Huntington’s view, “…the members of a profession 
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share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from 
laymen.”425 The profession has to have strong ethics and discipline, running in parallel with 
the training, knowledge and skills that are required. This allegiance is fostered by lengthy 
training and discipline, and the sharing of their “unique social responsibility.”426 
 
4.6. ‘Professionalism’ and the Algerian Military at Independence  
The case of Algerian crisis and the military intervention in politics has many similar 
factors with many caces in Africa and South America particular. However, indeed, each 
country has potentially distinct principles and regime structures According to Amos 
Perlmutter, the modern military regime is distinctly and analytically a new phenomenon, 
restricted to the developing and modernizing world.
427
 However, since 1979, military regimes 
have controlled over 30 countries around the world. About 20 of these were in Africa and 
Arab Countries, nine in Latin America and the rest in Asia. During the 1970s, there were also 
military regimes in two South and South- east European states.
428
 In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
military regime ideology spread to neighrbouring countries, increasing the total number of 
military regimes in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
Military regimes have different degrees of dictatorship; authoritarian and autocratic. 
The military in Latin America for example played a key role in the nation-building process 
immediately after independence from Spanish rule. The intervention of the military in some 
countries in Africa and South America began as an attempt to fill the leadership vacuum until 
the arrangement of new elections. But, more often than not, after the military took the power, 
they found “legal” ways to hold on to it. Wiarada and Howard noted that the competition for 
power and the wealth of the country among local militia headed by landowners, who took 
part in the independence wars, caused weak central governments in 19
th
 century Latin 
America.
429
 The formal armies, which were then weak and poorly institutionalized had to put 
down these local militias in the national integration process of Latin American countries.
 430
 
By the 19
th
 century, the military regime in Latin America facilitated the expansion of 
capitalist forces by conquering or securing territories rich in raw materials or maintaining 
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commercial routes. Examples of such conquests are the wars of Chile with Peru and Bolivia, 
the war between Ecuador and Peru, and the war between the Triple alliance of Argentina, 
Uruguay, and Bolivia against Paraguay.
431
  
According to Frederick M. Nunn, the professional military in Latin America today has 
changed and has moved from the dictatorship and political leadership to professionality and 
political respect. In Brazil, the coup d’état of 1964 overthrew President Goulart, a populist, 
who ascended to presidency, as the legal successor of President Quadros after the latter's 
resignation in 1961. To appease the military's objection to Goulart's ascent to power, the 16 
Brazilian state governments compromised by creating a parliamentary system by which 
Goulart and his cabinet were accountable to the congress. But in the 1961's plebiscite, the full 
presidential system was restored.
432
 For the following 20 years,, the country was governed by 
successive regimes dominated by the armed forces and presided over by army generals, 
which is the similar to what Algeria has experienced since independence. But the professional 
officers in Brazil as well as in other Latin American states today are separate from the 
political civilian regimes.
433
 The control of any country by military regimes is claimed under 
the principles of nationalism and ideology, similar to the claims of revolutionaries as they 
seek to overturn the political status quo. By 1970 the young officers of Brazil decided to 
embark on a slow process, to end the military regime and to restore the civilian electoral 
process.  
In “Brazil Shatters Its Wall of Silence on the Past,” Eduardo Gonzalez wrote that the 
establishment of military professionalism was not accomplished without a measure of 
professional militarism in Brazil. Today’s Brazilian military is united, dominated by the 
political system of the country. Its evolution is inseparable from the political, social and 
economic evolution, and the army has always been a force to be reckoned with.
434
 According 
to Amos Perlmutte, Brazillian elites are professionals who took on the responsibility of the 
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country in difficult times. They “have always been the leaders of the army in time of 
stress.”435  
The professionalism of Brazil’s military regime provided a model, which 
has been exported for other military regimes and dictatorships around Latin 
America, systematizing the “Doctrine of National Security” [which 
justified] the military’s actions as operating in the interest of National 
Security in a time of crisis, creating an intellectual basis upon which other 
military regimes relied.
436
  
 
However, the theory of military professionalism as applied to Latin America countries 
does not produce the same outcomes in Africa. The military’s approach in Africa has been 
more complex than simply taking the positions of power; the soldiers’ solution was to 
abrogate political activity and to rule by administrative approval in cooperation with civil 
servants.
437
 According to Edwar Fiet, the military-civil service coalition as one without a 
consensus or basic legitimacy in which both military officers and civil servants often have a 
reluctance to assume responsabilities through direct involvement in politics even after a 
military-civil service alliance has been established.
438
 Soldiers look to the civil servants to 
help them establish legitimacy while the civilians look after their own personal and 
institutional interests.
439
 In Nigeria for example, the 1963 Republican Constitution of the 
country was suspended by the military rule. Feit referred to African armies as the ‘apotheosis 
of administration’ and saw them as reconstructing an administrative- traditional order.  
The Nigerian army is a basic part of the society and is not separated from the 
community.
440
 Bienen-Fitton and Campbell explain the interesting mechanism of the 
Nigerian dyarchy.
441
 This system of dual-powers (dyarchy) in Nigeria is a result of civil wars, 
which strengthened the military and established proper constitutional arrangements between 
federal and regional authorities. Civilians in Nigeria play important roles in consultative and 
advisory groups, while the political center in Nigeria is not powerful enough to dominate a 
vast country with a booming oil economy.
442
 Indeed, throughout the civil war and while 
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General Yakubu Gowon presided over the Central Government, Nigeria’s political affairs 
were ruled by a healthy respect for the central tenets of the spirit of the Nigerian constitution 
that was inherited from the civilian era of governance before the onset of military rule. The 
military regime imposed a new constitutional framework that sharply revised the doctrine of 
Nigeria’s Independence Constitution. It is that new framework, introduced by an 
ideologically impassioned military regime from 1975 onwards, which has taken hold in post-
military Nigeria.  
In applying the different definitions above as well as the case of Brazil to the Algerian 
case after independence, one central question that might be addressed is whether the Algerian 
military is a professional military, or rather a loose organisation of military groups 
periodically brought together in their desire to hold power. How about the soldiers who 
joined the military after independence in 1962: are they, rather, to be counted as 
professionals? In this case the most important thing to consider is whether there is any 
relationship between professionalism and the violence that has played such a big part in 
Algerian life since the independence. To make a clear analysis of the connection between 
professionalism and the military violence in Algeria it is necessary to clarify the meaning of 
“professionalism” that has been used in this case study. Using the definition of Riadh 
Saidaoui, the professional elite of the Algerian Army are the young officers who joined the 
military after independence in 1962.
443
 Most of these officers were born during the colonial 
period, but their age did not allow them to attend military schools; some were born after 
independence. They made up the majority of the Algerian military, and entered into the 
military by their own volition and with apparent personal satisfaction about the decision. 
They apparently chose the Army as their source of upward social mobility.  
Zitout, Chouchane and Zaoui have denied that Algeria has ever had a professional 
military, insisting that the military of Algeria was established from three groups. French 
trained officers, revolutionary officers and officers commissioned after independence. 
Soldiers who joined the military straight after independence are not professional soldiers, 
they insist. Zaoui divided this group into two kinds of officers, the first are soldiers who 
joined the military voluntarily of their own personal choice and chose it to be their own 
profession. This group are paid according to their education levels and their work experience, 
exactly the same as civilians. The second are the officers in the regular military forces. These 
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men entered the military under general conscription to serve for two years, a law that was 
later changed at the end of the 1980s to eighteen months.  
Zaoui’s view has been supported in a speech by president Bouteflika, where he 
mentions the national army, saying “…Algeria needs a professional military.”444 The clear 
meaning here is that the Algerian Army is not professional, in the common understanding of 
the word, that is:  well trained, working with a clear mission, which has been limited by the 
constitution of the country. In Zaoui’s view, a professional military cannot engage in political 
competition or be part of any kind of organisation or political party. This view has been 
supported by Anthony Forster, as well as Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, who note 
that: 
[Professional soldiers are these who accept]
445
 that their role is to fulfil the 
demands of the (civilian) government of the state (rather than themselves 
engaging in domestic politics or seeking to determine the overall direction 
of defence policy.)
446
  
 
They add that: 
 
[Professional soldiers are those]: who focus on conducting their 
professional military activities in an effective and efficient manner and 
whose organisation and internal structure reflect these twin assumptions.
447
         
 
Chouchane has a different view, one that links the definition of the professionalism to 
the case of the Algerian military. Going back to the more nationalist definitions, formulated 
by revolutionaries such as Lenin, Che-Guevara and Castro, “professional military 
establishments” are military organisations formed as political parties. They were political 
movements of armed revolutionaries. They were engaged as military establishments in very 
different ways. Some of these were successful as movements, such as the People’s Liberation 
Army in China, which limited the role of the military in its duties, defined legally, without 
any intervention in political or economic life. The political police in China are said to have 
full independence from the military forces.  
The same was true in the Soviet Union, where the Committee for State Security 
(KGB) was separated completely from the military forces.  A clear example of this is the 
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1991 Soviet coup d’état attempt, which is known as the August Putsch or August Coup. It 
was an attempt by a group of Soviet government officials to take control of the country from 
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Although the coup collapsed in only two days and 
Gorbachev returned to government with the help of the KGB, in support of civilian 
governance, it was then the KGB that determined that Russia would become a ‘democracy’ 
under President Yeltsin, who was to be elected formally in June 1991.  
Algeria remains locked in a much older pattern, where there is no separation between 
the military and the secret services. Chouchane compares the Algerian system to that of the 
Soviet Union in the seventies and to the former Yugoslavia and Cuba. However, the Algerian 
military of today is different from other military establishments. According to Mohammed 
Harbi, every country has a military establishment to deal with its security’s problems, but in 
Algeria the military control the country and deal primarily with political problems.
448
  
To analyse the case of the Algerian Military we must look at its unique elements.
449
 
First, the Algerian military was formed illegitimately, with its two most important elements, 
its leadership cadre and the secret services, created to serve the personal interests of key 
politicians like Boussouf, the actual founder of the secret services, and Boumédiène, who 
formed the ALN. Algeria has no professional military, but rather, an armed political 
organisation, a factor that was admitted by none other than Boumédiène himself.
450
 Second, 
although it has been mentioned frequently by observers of Algerian history that the Algerian 
military was established from a loosely organised army, the Frontier or Borders Military (also 
sometimes called the Army of Oujda),
451
 in reality the new military formed shortly after 
independence, the ALN, was established on the military base of the Fifth Military Region. 
This base was effectively controlled by Boussouf, who also established the military secret 
services, and then he relinquished his position on the base to Boumédiène, who used this 
powerful platform to become the leader of the ALN, and then the president of the country.  
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The Algerian military was based on three groups: young Algerian soldiers, senior 
military leadership, and the secret services. This last had full control over military and 
civilian personnel. The military leadership after Boumédiène fell under the control of the 
French Officers, who used the military bases to impose their rules on civilians. Chouchane 
confirmed this account with references to historical incidents.   
As regards to the era of the War for Independence, the founders of the Algerian 
military had a repeated pattern of turning against their own colleagues, including Belkacem, 
who was the first defence minister in Algerian history.  Belkacem had been discharged from 
his position in what amounted to a coup carried out by his colleagues in the SM. One of the 
key theorists of the Revolution, Ramdhan, was been killed by his colleagues in the SM; many 
others suffered similar fates at the hands of this group, which apparently acted without regard 
for the rights or well-being of others. They were clearly and exclusively driven by personal 
interests. 
Boussouf was the most important of the former leaders of the SM, and held files on 
many of the revolutionary leadership, reportedly for purposes of removing them from their 
positions, or even to assure that they would be put to death.  He came to be known as the 
‘Holder of the death files’.452 In April 2010, the French released a letter from their archives 
that gave more details about the arrests of revolutionary leaders Amirouche Aїt Hamouda 
(commonly called Colonel Amirouche) and Ahmed Ben Abderrazak, named “Si El Haouès”.  
They were subsequently brutally murdered in public. This letter was given to Amirouch’s son 
(Ait Hammouda), who has since placed full responsibility on the SM for the death of his 
father.
453
  
Chouchane has a different view to Samraoui regarding the military officers of the 
independence era. Chouchane argues that the young officers of that era have gradually 
established their legitimacy to lead the military, and are close to trumping claims by the SM 
and the French Officers. Although many of these officers, who have risen to high ranks over 
the past 40 years, are perhaps not professionals according to Huntington and other scholars of 
military sociology, on the other hand neither can they be described as clandestine officers like 
the French Officers. Their professionalism will be proven, he feels, when they reach the top 
leadership. They will leave the politics to politicians, he believes, and they will work 
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effectively to defend and protect the country.
454
 Chouchane believes that the officers of the 
Algerian independence era will be professionals, although until now they have been 
dominated by the French Officers, who have a self-interested political project as their primary 
focus.
455
 From this perspective, however, we can infer that the Algerian military has not yet 
been professional. And because officers of the independence era cannot establish a 
professional mission because of their leadership, they remain blocked from performing 
professionally.  Moreover, the military establishment in Algeria continues to hold political 
power, controlling all aspects of the state, including the courts, the government, and even the 
presidency.               
According to Saidaoui, the issue of military professionalism arose within the Algerian 
military immediately after independence.
456
 Many youths joined the military seeking 
professions to escape poverty and hunger, conditions that most Algerians faced after years of 
colonial rule. Another reason that professionalization was inhibited was mentioned by senior 
military officers in comments to the media. The revolution encouraged people to cheer on the 
revolutionaries in their nationalism, and to continue building the country to attain victory 
through force.  There was little room for professionalism. The French had left the country in 
dire straits.  Illiteracy was rampant.  The percentage of uneducated Algerians before the 
arrival of the French in 1830 was about 13%; by independence in 1962, that number had 
reached 95%.
457
 The French administration practiced racial discrimination even for early 
education programmes, and thus there was virtually no chance for Algerians to qualify for 
university studies, except, perhaps, for some of the most wealthy, who tended to accept the 
concept of a French Algeria. Some children of collaborators (Harkists) had the chance to go 
to French schools because their families were working for the French Army, then fighting 
against Algerians.  However, the vast majority of Algerian children had no right to education, 
or to work, or to become involved in any kind of politics. Moreover, even though the country 
itself was very rich in primary resources such as oil and gas, and had manufacturing 
industries, the income from these sources was reserved for French nationals living in Algeria, 
or controlling Algerian wealth directly from France. Algerians had come to expect a life of 
poverty and famine, working for the French, if they were fortunate, to attain the barest 
minimum existence 
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For these reasons, Algerian youth of the independence era chose to join the military as 
a profession, a job for life. They had no other options, apart from the grinding poverty of 
agriculture.   Meaningful agriculture jobs were restricted to rich families, who owned the land 
and/or had signed contracts with the French colonialists. The only agricultural employment 
available to the poor involved little more than slavery: working for small parcels of wheat, 
barley, or other foodstuffs in lieu of a paid salary. Hence, employment in the military, which 
was available in limited form, represented a major opportunity for thousands of young 
Algerians, and enabled them to have a sense of honour, in particular because so many of them 
sensed that independence was not far off.  
In its earliest establishment, the Algerian army began involving young people, most of 
them teenagers, who were encouraged to join in the interests of their country.  They tended to 
be oblivious to the private interests of leadership or politics. Their dream seems to have been 
exclusively to build a strong country, to protect their fellow citizens, and to rebuild and 
develop the country after the long bloody years of war. Unfortunately, the energy and 
idealism of these youth appear to have been dismissed by French Officers, and some of the 
revolutionary leaders. The competition among the revolutionary leadership became 
paramount, with the separate goals of the French Officers hidden just beneath, however, and 
the professionalization of the young military personnel was forgotten.  This conflict among 
leaders, and their relentless competition for power, gave the French Officers the opportunity 
to organize themselves and to create a network linking the military bases, particularly as they 
become the primary trainers and commanders of the military bases. There were, of course, 
the only professionally trained officers and soldiers in the immediate post-independence era; 
these were trained by foreign officers from the Soviet Union or France, who were attached to, 
and under leadership of the French Officers.  As noted above, while many young recruits felt 
a strong sense of nationalism and idealism, many others at that time had virtually no 
ideological principles or even goals. They were working for their wages; in the only 
employment available to them. It is perhaps not surprising that their capacity for ethical 
conduct and behaviour was limited.
458
 
Until 1978, the direct leadership of the professional soldiers in Algeria was in the 
hands of the French Officers and foreign training missions, mostly French. According to 
Chouchane and Souaidia, their fellow officers in the profession had little chance of 
influencing policy; rather, they were engaged in the most demeaning and difficult tasks: 
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torture, and guarding high security prisons. In the relative absence of an ethical framework, 
corruption flourished. In 1978 a change came from President Bendjedid, who mandated that 
all political systems would be directed in Arabic; he announced the “Algerianification” of the 
military, referring to the need for Algerian trainers, without foreign direction. Any 
weaknesses in military preparedness would be covered by sending troops to study in Eastern 
Europe.  
Between 1978 and 1990, the Algerian military experienced profound changes, as did 
civilian society. Some fundamental liberties and rights such as the freedom of religion and 
free speech, forbidden at first, gradually became permissible.  The advent of these freedoms 
led to the legalization of political and religious groups, and varied activists, Islamists, 
socialists and nationalists came to be accepted. Chouchane argues that he witnessed the 
military after 1978 absorbing a new generation. Chouchane states that  
…before 1978, and when I joined the military school, we were taught only 
the history of Moscow and Stalingrad and others …we were studying 
Russian history with not one word relating to our revolutionary history 
…but when I took the position of programming and planning for the special 
forces projects, I changed the history program to other topics relating to 
Algerian history.
459
   
 
The changes witnessed by Chouchane point to the relative absence of professional 
military development during the years of the 1960s and up until 1978; there were no projects 
or principles to guide it, or even goals to achieve. The military was essentially a machine in 
the leaders’ hands, a leadership that was increasingly dominated by the French Officers. They 
were using the soldiers as they wanted, especially in carrying out violence against civilians, 
mostly for the purpose of protecting themselves, and preserving their positions of power. 
Samraoui, however, was one of these military professionals, and he has a very different 
perspective from that of Chouchane. He places the responsibility for protracted 
unprofessional behaviour on all of the military who were involved in the coups d’état or in 
the frequent killing of civilians, regardless of their positions,  Those giving and taking 
unethical and unprofessional orders were all responsible in his view.  Samraoui insisted that 
professional soldiers had played a major role in committing the crimes that have been 
committed since independence, and especially during the crisis of 1990s. He assigns greater 
blame to the French Officers, however, citing the proverb “the responsibility is on he who 
gave the order”. Although the Nuremburg trials discounted this as a defence, it can 
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nevertheless be said that professional soldiers of the Algerian military who committed crimes 
of violence on the orders of their leadership, faced severe punishment if they failed to 
comply, including the likelihood of extra-judicial execution.   
In his book, The Dirty War, Souaidia noted many cases of human rights violations by 
the Algerian military against civilians, including massacres, torture and kidnappings, 
especially in small villages. Most of the massacres were conducted by young soldiers, and 
many of these were newly admitted students in the military schools. Souaidia was the truck 
driver, often transporting troops to the scenes of subsequent massacres.
460
 The massacres of 
Ben-Talha and Raisse that took place in 1994 were the bloodiest in the post-independence 
era.  More than 400 men, women, and children died in less than 6 hours. These massacres 
were formally Orders de Mission from the military leadership, apparently controlled at the 
time by the French Officers, to the young professional soldiers.  
The Algerian soldiers who fought against their own citizens, killing thousands of 
people in cold blood, were professionals according to Saidaoui’s definition of the word.   
Most had been trained in military schools run by the French Officers, and were systematically 
taught that their principal enemies were civilians and Islamists.  As with professional soldiers 
everywhere, they had become experts in violence. It should not be surprising, then, that they 
played a central role in the violence of the 1990s. Boumaarafi, for example, who killed 
Boudhiaf, was one of these professional soldiers.  He killed the president on orders from his 
leader, Smaein L’amari.461  Professional soldiers in Algeria accepted their role as they had 
been taught, with the exception of a relatively small number of nationalist soldiers, who 
refused to engage in the killing, and who were consequently killed, arrested, or driven into 
exile, and sought  asylum in Western countries. 
The conflict between professional soldiers and civilians in Algeria likely owes its 
origins to military training, where soldiers are traditionally taught that Islamists are their 
enemies. If the soldier does not confront (read: ‘kill’) them, they will likely be killed by 
them.
462
 Such training conditions encourages soldiers to commit violence against civilians, 
until it becomes a competition between soldiers as to who can kill the most, and thereby raise 
his grade and increase his salary and bonuses. The officers who joined the military during the 
period of the crisis, after 1988, had their training through the civil war, or as many tended to 
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refer to it,  “the war on terror”. They learned about their enemies, and faced them every day. 
They grew up with violence, and practiced it daily.  They were encouraged by their leaders 
and the media, which showed graphic images of massacres and other crimes, describing them 
as having been perpetrated by ‘Islamist terrorists’ and Algerian Muslims.463 The media464 has 
played a major role in keeping professional soldiers involved in this war between the French 
Officers and the Algerian people.
465
  
From Chouchane’s viewpoint, whatever the atrocities committed by professional 
soldiers during the crisis of 1990s, they have never equalled those of the French Officers who 
are in positions of highest leadership in the military.
466
 The French Officers had a program, 
which was explicitly against the Algerian people, and they have struggled relentlessly to 
achieve this goal.  The professional Algerian officers are still far from decision making, like 
the “group de la Coste.” 467 The professional officers by all accounts have had no particular 
goals or interests that would pit them against the Algerian citizens; rather, they have been 
obedient tools in the hands of their leadership, keen to complete their missions as they receive 
their orders.
468
  
Most of the former military officers who participated in this research
469
 believe that 
the ‘professional soldiers’ who had their training during and after the violence of 1990 
represent a greater danger to the Algerian people. Since 1993, with the encouragement of the 
military leadership, the Francophones from the civilian population, and the media in 
particular, ‘professional soldiers’ have been convinced of the validity of the war against 
terrorism, and have been willing to engage in violence against civilians.  Based on their 
training, many civilians are regarded as terrorists, and these soldiers have been meticulously 
trained to make war against civilians.  Such ‘heroics’ can raise their military grades. 
Moreover, many have faced death daily from armed groups on the battlefields in the 
mountains and forests, and have seen many deaths. The Algerian civil war has broken apart 
social relations between civilians, such that there is little trust remaining, even among family 
members. At this stage, it has become impossible to return to conditions of peace and the 
trust among civilians and soldiers.  
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…they [professional soldiers] involved in this war [war on terror] … have 
no confidence in any of the civilians or even in their military colleagues, as 
they have examples from what was happening every day,…thus, it is 
impossible to convince them of [the importance of] peace and [ending 
violent …crime…and from here the danger comes.470   
 
Habib Souaidia agreed with the previous views, saying that the Algerian crisis was 
based on the absence of trust between leaders and followers which has deteriorated since the 
revolutionary period. This lack of trust has affected civilians and the military, as well the 
soldiers themselves. However, after the coup d’état of 1992, the regime used the special 
forces within the police and gendarmerie and security services to limit the popular revolt and 
civil disobedience, which emerged after the reversal of the election of 1991-92. Military 
establishments have little capacity to deal with popular revolts, not to mention wars on terror, 
and they tend, rather to respond with wholesale violence against civilians.  In this case, the 
greatest incidence of violence against civilians since independence occurred; thousands of 
civilians were killed and tortured; houses were attacked without any legal sanctions, and 
people were arrested (and worse) at all hours in both private and public places.  
Human rights violations, then, were commonplace in Algeria in that period. Civilians 
tended to be treated as terrorists and enemies, especially by the opposing political parties 
such as the FIS and the FFS. This pushed young people to take action in self-defence, and to 
avenge their relatives.  Their retaliation against the troops further reinforced the negative 
military ethos regarding the commission of violence: “…this was the main factor in the 
formation of Islamic terrorism.”471 This in turn became a tool in the hands of the military 
leadership and some of the political elites who saw this situation as useful in protecting their 
interests and their positions of power.  They seem to have encouraged the clash between the 
military and civilians, and the continuation of violence in the country.
472
 Elites within the 
military and politicians spared no effort to protect the secularity of the country from the 
‘extremist’ Islamists.  Their argument was that they had to protect democracy in Algeria.473      
It was in this way that key military and civilian elites ‘turned on’ the green light for 
violence, with the active and tacit consent of the central political and judicial powers. Key 
governmental decision-makers come from within the military leadership, and are thought to 
control most aspects of the political system. Souaidia, as an ex-professional officer in the 
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Special Forces for fighting terrorists, had been unaware of the full reality of this struggle, 
perhaps because his training in military schools took place before the period of crisis in 
1990s. He recognized that the violence was directed and had a purpose; later he became 
aware that the winners in this struggle were opportunists, corrupt self-interested individuals 
who had seized power and maintained it. There were key military leaders and their supporters 
who would stop at nothing to retain their power hegemony, and to destroy any attempts to 
reduce the violence and turn the country to a path of peace and democracy.  
In addition, Samraoui stated that there was another power that circumvented the limits 
on the military detailed (if not enacted) in the Algerian Constitution. This power is neither 
legislative nor executive nor even judicial.  Rather, it is the power of the SM, a dominant 
national force since the period of Boumédiène, who originally created it to protect himself.  
After his death, this organisation came under the control of the French Officers. The officers 
of SM “have the authority to intervene in any political, governmental or civil association in 
the country. They have the power, moreover, to make changes in legal or legislative 
provisions.
474
  
According to Samraoui, the SM officers were planning and executing major acts of 
violence, directing responses to riots, and intervening in popular revolts from the beginning. 
Their primary instruments were the professional soldiers of the military services. In October 
1988, SM officers were involved in triggering major riots in Algiers. A simple march turned 
into a horrific riot subjected to extreme violence after the military intervened in a clash with 
civilians. The security services, especially the Department of Intelligence and Security 
(Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité - DRS), were managing the violence by 
triggering riots in the streets, and then reporting through the media that the situation in 
Algeria was extremely bad and that the people needed to change the political system. 
Following this, the next role of the military was to restore peace and calm in the country by 
using professional military personnel to confront civilians and unarmed people with 
structured violence that inevitably led to human rights violations.
475
   
Chouchane’s views in this matter are in agreement with my other interviewees.    He 
stated that the professional officers of the independence period were not in positions of 
control, and that decision making in the country during the crisis of 1990s was dominated by 
the French Officers, who remain dominant today. Chouchane assumes that if these 
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professional officers had reached decision-making positions, the crisis would not have 
reached the levels of crime and violence that were witnessed.
476
 
Chouchane expects the imminent (and very significant) retirement of today’s military 
leadership, if only based on their ages, in particular the following three leaders: the Director 
General of the SM, General Madean-Toufik (75 years old); Leader of the d’état Major, 
General Gayad Saleh (71 years old); and the Minister of Defence, General Abdelmalek 
Guenaizia (76 years old). He assumes that these retirements will give opportunities to 
professional officers to lead the military and to become key political decision makers. Indeed, 
these professional soldiers are likely to hand over many of the political positions to civilians 
that Chouchane expects will be selected carefully from among politicians and experts. The 
officers of the independence period may now have reached the penultimate level of power 
according to their military credentials, Chouchane notes:  
…these officers were my colleagues and I knew them since I joined the 
military. I was working with them…these are the right professional 
soldiers…they have no projects or any political plans or even problems 
with civilians stemming from the historical era. They have no specific 
ideological background,… so, whoever wins the elections will have the 
right to rule in the country regardless of the political party background or 
even the political system.
477
  
 
 Haddam agrees, noting that any negotiation or amnesty agreement will likely only 
occur with the first generation of professional officers, because they are the ones who know 
the historical background of the crisis.  The soldiers from the generation of the 1990s crisis 
had already developed their biases against civilians during their training, based as it was on 
the war on terror; they will likely continue to view civilians who insist on democracy as 
terrorists, and it will remain difficult to persuade them that civilians are in any way innocent. 
Soldiers of the crisis generation have full respect for their leadership, and the Algerian media 
has supported this enmity.
478
 
Soldiers of the independence era do not have an organized cadre, or group, as do the 
French Officers.  They have no particular political or personal designs.  Their income has 
come only from their wages, and they have not developed corrupt economic interests from 
public revenue. The French Officers were an organized, self-interested group, and they have 
retained a spokesman who represents them, General Nezzar.  He has been prominent in many 
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venues, and is frequently quoted in the media, even though he is retired. He is still the head of 
the French Officers’ group, and continues to defend his cadre from criticism that they 
confront from time to time. The professional soldiers, on the other hand, have only their 
professional duties, and are said to lack ambitions for higher office outside the military 
sector.  The military profession for these soldiers is like a civilian job; they assume that the 
contract can be broken at any time and for any reason. They have a reasonable existence, with 
scheduled holidays, leave, and retirement provisions, stipulated by the constitution.  
The professional army in Algeria is said to be largely unbiased, is not in contention 
with any of the political parties, any one of which they would allow to attain political power 
by democratic elections. Chouchane based his conclusions on the professional officers’ ethos, 
with which he is intimately familiar.  This ethos, in his view, is nonaligned, independent from 
other powers, and commits them to their mission as defined and limited by the Constitution. 
Chouchane believes that when the professional officers reach the highest levels of military 
leadership, they will likely guide the country successfully.  They know how to deal with civil 
society, and especially with social and economic problems, human rights, political freedom 
and social justice.  When they are in their constitutionally limited decision-making positions, 
calm and security will return Algeria. He is convinced that when/if this happens, the military 
will not be involved in or play any role with or against any political party in the country. 
Civilian democratic leadership will have finally become the dominant political form in 
Algeria.  
4.7.Expectations of violence under professional army leadership   
The analyses of Chouchane and Haddam were very different from those of analysts in 
the Hoggar Organisation.
479
  Dhina, Abbas and Masli agreed that violence in Algeria has 
reached a critical level, and that the state of the society, institutions and law are still far from 
reasonable: civil society remains limited and profoundly threatened.   Aroua states that 
currently the President of the Republic, who has the full power constitutionally to disband the 
parliament, but was unable to change the head of the customs department or the director of 
the Port of Algiers, has no choice other than to be submissive to the generals who gave him 
his position.  If he fails to do so, he will have the same end as had previous presidents: forced 
resignation, arrest, or even death.
480
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Chouchane puts his hopes for the future of Algeria on the professional officers, 
although history is not on his side. Many observers feel that there is little hope that leadership 
can make substantial changes in the system. Their views are based on the strong relationships 
within and among elite groups.  It is unlikely, for example, that the French Officers would 
survive in power without the protection of the professional soldiers. Their involvement in 
massacres, political assassinations, torture and serious crimes well into the 1990s precludes 
them from relinquishing their military positions.  Simply stated, when they step down from 
power they are very likely to be facing charges for their crimes in national and international 
courts. Thus, most interviewees believe that civilian control over the military remains a 
distant prospect in Algeria. 
The profound mistrust amongst the leadership, military, political and civilian 
administrative groups reveals that there is little chance of a creation of a democratic civil 
society in Algeria in the near future, Chouchane’s views to the contrary notwithstanding.  
Algerians are virtually without hope that they will become a real democracy while the 
military leadership, in power since independence, remains the most powerful force in 
Algeria. Sidhum proposes only one path for Algeria to establish a full democracy:  to build a 
strong unified civilian voice from the many political forces and human rights organisations, 
and to confront the military regime until the senior officers agree to return to their bases and 
profession, and respect the limits placed on them by the Constitution. 
On the other hand, Aroua states that the Algerian military has grown up with the habit 
of giving orders to politicians and administrators, and, even more significant, of satisfying 
their personal financial needs from the public treasury.  There is little to suggest that they will 
ever relinquish these perquisites of power.  Corruption, unfairness and injustice have become 
normal parts of Algerians’ lives, and ingrained in Algeria’s military ethos. Algeria ranks 
112
th
 on Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, well below most 
other states.
481
  
Chouchane’s view is based on the different elements of power in Algeria. The 
military, for example, has various sub-divisions.  Chouchane seems oblivious to one 
indisputable fact, however: the elites that are actually controlling the country are the French 
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Officers. They have dominated power since independence and took all important positions 
until they achieved the power to appoint presidents. Chouchane argues, however, that this 
power is transitory.  Power in Algeria is not inherited, and this applies to the French Officers 
as well.  Ben Bella’s children and relatives did not inherit power, nor did Boumédiène’s or 
Bendjedid’s children. It is clear that inheritance of power is not acceptable, and this will 
apply to the French Officers’ children as well.482 This authoritarian dominance, Chouchane 
therefore insists, is not going to exist forever. On the other hand, the difficulties that 
Algerians are living through today include profound economic and social problems, which 
appear to be expanding, and could result in a political explosion much larger than that of 
1988.  
Moreover, some elements of the international community have given up their attempts 
to rescue the old regime in Algeria.
483
 Independent human rights organisations have 
effectively condemned the military regime, blaming it for the massive human rights 
violations since independence, and especially during the crisis of 1990s.
484
 NGOs have put 
forward the case of Algeria in high-level discussions at the United Nations and in the media. 
Other elements of the international community have retained economic interests in the 
country, so much so that the discussion of human rights becomes an economic matter, and 
fails because of the ongoing economic competition among the European countries and the 
US.
485
 However, the resultant isolation of Algeria might assist political parties, who have 
failed to bring about change in the regime over the past half century, to become more 
organized and to finally confront the military dictatorship in new attempts to create a 
democratic state, giving rights to civilians, placing the professional military under civilian 
control, and beginning, for the first time, to abide by the Constitution.  
Chouchane provided examples in his interviews, including the case of General 
Nezzar, who became the ‘president-maker’ and spokesman for the French Officers.  After he 
went into retirement, he appeared to become a normal civilian, and played no part in the 
military or in any exercise of power.  He fled France in 2009 after a French court issued an 
arrest warrant based on legal proceedings that Souaidia brought against him in Paris. Another 
                                                          
482
 Chouchane, A. (13/5/2009).  
483
 M. Larbi Zitout, Aljazeera TV, Rachad website: <www.rachad.org> and see the same interview on the 
website: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KBCPWp9JiU0&feature=related>.  
484
 Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, “Algeria and the Paradox of Democracy: The 1992 Coup, its Consequences and 
the Contemporary Crisis”, Algeria International Watch, < http://www.algeria-
watch.de/en/articles/1997_2000/paradox_democracy.htm> (November 2000). 
485
 Ahmed Zaoui, Personal interview, Hamilton, NZ, part.2 (2010).  
 157   
 
case involved General Belkheir,
486
 who was removed from France by the security services 
because of a court order, which required him to respond regarding the investigation of mass 
killings, human rights abuses, torture and the disappearance of thousands of civilians in 
Algeria, based upon charges brought against him in France by a number of Algerian refugees. 
He was sent to Rabat as the Ambassador of Algeria in Morocco, and died in late January 
2010. 
Chouchane concludes that the Algerian leadership are guilty of fomenting and 
sustaining the crisis, which will only be resolved when they are removed completely from 
power.   He notes that General Lamari was reportedly killed earlier by one of his colleagues 
in the DRS in Algiers,
487
 although the media announced that he had had a sudden heart attack 
and was taken to a hospital where he died. Most of the secret files of the crisis have pointed 
to him as largely responsible for the mass killings of the 1990s, and perhaps directly 
responsible for as many as 20 000 disappearances.  Mohamed Lamari as well, retired at the 
age of 76, and later died in Morocco, in February 2010. Ali Tounsi, who was killed in his 
office in early March, 2010, by a close friend of his, Colonel Chouaïb Oultache, was in 
charge of military helicopters.  According to the media,
488
 the case was related to the files on 
corruption, which has been progressing through the Algerian courts since early January 2010, 
on the orders of President Boutaflika. The Algerian courts have opened major investigations 
into financial corruption, particularly in the national associations.  
According to Chouchane, the current situation in Algeria is reminiscent of the 
situation in 1957, and the Soummam Congress, the creation of the revolutionary army, and 
the creation of the special working group on principles of the Congress, which later became 
the military secret services of the revolution. The similarity with 1957, he reasons, revolves 
around the hegemony of the military secret services, which in 1957 had been directed by 
Toufik, and the secret services of the revolution, led by Boussouf. These organisations 
essentially had no rules, and were out of control while exercising immediate command over 
all of the military regions, departments within the military, and the key political groups 
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within the GPRA. Today, he notes, the same organisation exists in the SM. 
489
 The SM is still 
the main and most powerful part of the military regime of Algeria.  
At this point, Chouchane believes that there is no other way to gain peace and 
democracy in Algeria apart from an adoption of a fully legal and constitutional system in 
which each group fulfils its legal role, as delineated by the Constitution. The Algerian 
military has to assume an orthodox military role of protecting the country from foreign 
aggression. The military secret service should be limiting its role inside the military schools, 
dealing with soldiers, and reporting to military officers as a limited and controlled part of the 
Ministry of Defence. As Chouchane notes, such changes will not be easy, even if conditions 
are auspicious for limiting the power of the SM and moving senior military officers to 
military bases. These changes can only happen, he says, if the senior military officers agree to 
compelling the SM to operate within the law, and if there is clear punishment for violations 
of those rules, including the assignment of full responsibility in front of a military court.  
Chouchane believes that Algerian political parties are very weak, and that they are 
therefore incapable by themselves of reaching solutions to major political and security 
problems.
490
 Moreover, since most of the political parties are working under the SM’s orders, 
and benefitting financially from their subservience to the SM, they are unlikely to refuse such 
orders.  Also significant is the huge price that civilians have paid when they have actively 
sought change in Algeria. Bluntly stated, people are afraid to demand their rights as defined 
by the Constitution and by national law. So, Chouchane concludes, only the military can 
effectively bring about fundamental change at this point. However, on a positive note, most 
Algerian officers and enlisted men appear unwilling to continue to allow a few elite officers 
to control them, particularly when the policies that result from this system are obviously 
taking the country further into instability. It is the right time, Chouchane feels, for the 
military officers of Algeria to change their situations and the situations of all Algerians.   
As I close this chapter it will be useful to mention the words of Zitout. He said 
Algeria today is paying the price of the counter revolution, which began just before 
independence and centred on the military and the administrative sectors. By independence, 
revolutionaries turned their weapons on each other in a bloody competition for power. At that 
time, the counter revolution (French Officers) seemed dormant, but were in fact establishing 
themselves and organizing their ranks. Indeed, with the death of Boumédiène, the French 
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Officers were able to achieve certain important positions, among them Abdul Qadir Shabu 
and Alahum, who were from the French Army, and the first of this group to reach to the heart 
of power immediately after the inauguration of Bendjedid as a president. They managed to 
summon most of their colleagues from within the French Officers to positions of power in the 
military and the administration of the country. Zitout argues that in 1992, 30 years after 
independence, Algeria became a French colony again. In fact, Algeria today is governed by a 
French Officer, French administrator, by French rules and continues to embrace French 
culture and education.  Older Algerians cannot feel the changes fought for in the War of 
Independence. French penetration of Algeria has become clear, and legitimacy of the regime 
has been lost on the subsequent Algerian governments, which were dominated by the military 
straight after the colonial era.  To return to a state of legitimacy, Algeria needs a new version 
of governance led by educated men with the ability to drive the country forward and the 
willingness to take responsibility for the mistakes of the past “Algeria may call for another 
revolution in a different way,” said Zitout.491     
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FRENCH PENETRATION OF ALGERIA   
 
1. Introduction   
 
The recent history of Algeria is defined by the formation and reinforcement of a 
military dictatorship. The power base in Algeria began to shift in the 1960s towards the 
French Officers who, to this day, continue to be an important link to the French authorities. 
Moreover, France has also continued to exert a considerable influence over the political 
events in Algeria, partly as the result of its colonial past. Some argue that France continues to 
see Algeria and the rest of its former colonies as its private preserve.
492
 There is little regard 
in such neo-colonial relationships for the rights and well being of the citizens of these former 
colonies. All-too-frequent interventions, in fact, are often the primary cause of human rights 
violations.    
It is, perhaps, ironic that the French legal and political discourse is full of references 
to human rights, liberty, equality, fraternity and humanity. It can be argued that when it 
comes to its ex-colonies, French authorities do not always live up to those ideals. In Africa, 
for example, France has openly supported military dictators, some of whom have committed 
massive human rights violations. Dictators such as Jean Bedel-Bokassa of Central Africa,
493
 
Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (especially in his war against the Front de Liberation in 1977-
78),
494
 and armed groups in the first Congo war,
495
 not to mention the Hutu militias, which 
were responsible for the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda,
496
 all received at least covert, if not 
overt support from France. The French were also apparently involved in the coups d’état in 
Comoros in August 1975 and May 1978.
497
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The network of relationships between France and the Francophone countries seems to 
be based primarily on French business interests.
498
 As for Algeria, the French were 
implicated in each coup d’état that took place in the country after independence. Salem-Badis 
supports this interpretation, writing that  
The will to maintain a Francophone zone and a French presence in the ex-
colonies where there are natural resources and markets for French products 
has meant a French policy of active support to repressive and corrupt 
regimes.
499
 
 
The most egregious examples of French involvement in the politics of Africa over the 
past two decades have indisputably been in Burandi and Rwanda. However, the case of 
Algeria also figures prominently. After decades of colonialism, a war of liberation, and forty 
years of “independence”, Algerian politics continue to be dominated by a military regime that 
traces its origins back to French military schools. When Algerians ultimately voted for an 
Islamic program in 1991 in spite of the historical animosity of the French towards Islam, 
France viewed this as an unforgivable challenge and threat, and a violent response was 
forthcoming.  
However, before exploring the Franco-Algerian relationship, it is important to 
examine the theoretical body of work as it relates to assymetric political relationships across 
borders, referred to by James Rosenau as “penetration”, and often resulting in state 
intervention that pays little regard to of matters of sovereignty and international law.
500
 The 
French penetration of Algeria is not new, and did not grow out of the Algerian political crisis 
of 1990s.  French penetration is best known as part of the post-colonial era,
501
 even though its 
beginnings date back to pre-independence. A number of cases discussed throughout this 
thesis suggest that France, through formal and informal channels, has had a significant role in 
what occurred throughout Algeria’s independence, what might be referred to as the French 
penetration of Algeria.  
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2. Penetration and International Relations 
 
 Security and stability are the main goals in the formation of a state. To achieve these 
aims there must be a systematic organisation of citizens and their needs, which must be built 
on a legitimate domination of the institutions. The leadership of the state must be seen as a 
legitimate government by its population.
502
 In other words, it is widely substantiated that in 
establishing the security and stability of the contemporary state, governments must be 
legitimate and be guided by a clear constitution and/or set of regulations. According to 
Posgate (2012), the principle mechanisms that governments have are, ‘force’ and 
‘consent’,503 to create the climate and conditions within which they can protect their 
legitimacy. A legitimate government’s responsibility is to protect citizens, to the point of 
using force to simultaneously bring security, governance and development to a population.  
 Political legitimacy is a major factor in both the structure and systematisation of 
states.
504
  Legitimacy can be seen to contribute to the way that states behave toward citizens 
and outsiders. Governments that come to power illegitimately, devote more resources to 
maintaining their rule and less to effective governance, which reduces support and makes 
them susceptible to overthrow or collapse.
505
 By definition, Englebert (2000), for example, 
holds that: “a state is legitimate when its structures have evolved endogenously to its own 
society and there is some level of historical continuity to its institutions.”506 The state, which 
is built on the establishment of legitimate bureaucracy, is thus “a historical, structural 
condition of the entire state apparatus.”507 Political legitimacy is a central concept in political 
science, as it relates to power, and to the ways in which it can be used such that it is accepted. 
In this sense, it is ‘the core of political organization’.508 Beetham (1993) called legitimacy 
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‘the central issue in social and political theory’509, while Crick (1993) said it was ‘the master 
question of politics’510.    
 According to Englebert (2000), new African states often lack legitimacy because they 
are not the indigenous creations of local history. He argues, however, that this concept of 
legitimacy is arbitrary and Eurocentric.
511
 André Mbata B Mangu (2008) writes that 
“legitimacy entails the acceptance by the people of those institutions that seem to correspond 
to and promote the values of the society.”512 In fact, the power of most third world states has 
been entrusted illegitimately to local agents, at times connected to the colonial power’s 
continued penetration of their old colonies. Terms such as security, human rights, democracy 
and anti-terrorism have been used to allow the plunder of natural resources, for example. 
Increasing state capacity in Africa would require governments to be preoccupied first with 
national legitimacy and interests, and only very secondarily with the interests of outsiders.
513
  
The current world system of sovereign states has grown out of a complex set of rules 
that developed with and after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
514
 This underlined what is 
now widely accepted, that the sovereignty of the state should be respected by citizens of that 
state, and between states in the international sphere.
515
 Throughout history, relations between 
countries have been almost exclusively formal. Nations defined themselves by this 
separateness.
516
 Crawford notes that the Westphalia regime
517
 established the period of 
international law and regulation up into the early twentieth century.
518
  Even though not all of 
the international system’s features were intrinsic to the settlement of Westphalia,519 they were 
formed through a normative trial in international law that did not receive its fullest 
articulation until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when the balance of power 
among states changed, and when the norms of sovereignty, the formal equality of states, non-
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intervention in the domestic affairs of other recognized states, and state consent as the basis 
of international legal obligation, became the core principles of international society.
520
  
This chapter considers the institutionalization of political penetration in Algeria’s 
postcolonial history. Colonialism is a central factor in the instability of the state and human 
rights violations in the country both during the occupation and after independence. Algerian 
independence, which laid the way for a new state structure, was the starting point of an 
internal conflict among revolutionaries based upon what appears to have been international 
intervention in the nation’s political structure. The Cold War also affected Algerian politics, 
relations and competition among the revolutionaries and political elites, and the political 
direction of the state. However, the Algerian relationships with European and non-European 
states appear to have been limited and controlled to some extent by the French government, 
and this pattern seems to have affected Algeria’s external relations. 
Allegations of French domination of Algerian politics have been supported by two 
key factors. The first of these is inside Algeria, where the French Officers have appeared to 
play a leading role in maintaining extraordinary French influence in Algerian affairs.  The 
second factor has been said to have consisted of French political relationships with the West, 
and in particular France’s leadership in Europe, which tended to support French claims 
against the rights of Algerians. The strong relationship between the Algerian regime and the 
French government has appeared to impact the former colony’s relationship with other states, 
limiting the flow of information, and even Algerian migration.   
Historically, the relationship among states in the world system has been 
predominantly of a formal nature, which allowed for a clear relationship between 
governments without unofficial contacts. According to Linklater (1982),
 521
 the international 
political system is an arena of recurrence and repetition; it is the field in which “political 
action is most regularly necessitous” and least “susceptible to a ‘progressivist’ 
interpretation.” 522 International relations cannot be understood solely by the culture, language 
and legislation of the country, but language and culture appropriate the control of individuals 
and society is the connection in their social life.
523
 While political theory is limited to the 
theory of continued existence,
524
 international relations has been based on the moral 
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perspectives present in the structure of the modern state.
525
 In fact, the sovereignty of state 
should be, legitimately, the basis of world political organization,
526
 but illegitimately, the 
territories of sovereign states are today met by ‘decentralized networks’ through which state 
and non-state, local and international actors of violence interact.
527
 What many states today 
fear, it is argued, is not so much overt armed attack across their territorial frontiers, but rather 
subversion from within and foreign sponsored coup d’état. Indeed, the very loyalty of its 
citizens may be challenged by trans-national appeals that seek to reach out across national 
boundaries. At times indeed the notion of the sovereign state as a self-contained decisional 
unit’528 comes to be challenged, whether through the presence of foreign nationals within the 
decision-making apparatus or through the capacity of an external power to direct the state’s 
own nationals.
529
 This is the core concept of foreign penetration. 
 
2.1.International Penetration of Domestic Systems: Theoretical Studies   
In contemporary global politics, penetration is almost as difficult to define as it is to 
ignore. James Rosenau (1969) first elaborated the term ‘penetration’. 530 It has subsequently 
been subsumed under the broader categories of ‘linkage’ or ‘transnational’ politics. The 
process of penetration occurs, according to Rosenau, when members of one polity serve as 
participants in the political processes of another. Similarly, Andrew M. Scott (1965) sees 
informal penetration as existing when one country’s agents or instruments come into contact 
with the people or processes of another country in an effort to achieve certain objectives.
531
 
Further explanations of the concept, however, have tended to make it even more broad and 
vague.
532
 
Rosenau (1967), in his book Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy, noted that 
the penetrative participation of non-members in a given polity is accepted by that target 
country’s officialdom as well as by its citizenry, so that the decisions to which non-members 
contribute are no less authoritative and legitimate than are those in which they do not 
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participate.
533
 The non-members to whom he refers may include many categories of actors, 
ranging from international forces, to foreign aid personnel and ‘subversive cadres’.534 
Theoretically, the idea of these ‘independent organizations’ could be widely accepted if it 
comes from opposition parties or appeals to the needs of citizens, but almost never as an 
agreement between the regime and a foreign government to foster legitimacy and to develop 
policy outside the bounds of legality and the view of the public.   
Many examples of penetration offered by Scott (1969) also include military 
occupation, together with cultural exchange programs aimed aimed at very limited objectives. 
Further definitions and descriptions of penetration have tended to be even more all 
encompassing, in particular in relation to Africa and the Middle East.  
According to Jan Knippers Black (1977), the competition for power and material gain 
often appears to render vulnerable countries as effectively stateless polities. She argues that 
there is utility in reigning in the concept of penetration:  
…I would suggest, for example, that while external events and trends and 
attempts to influence policy through government-to-government 
interactions may facilitate penetration they fall beyond the bounds of the 
penetrative process itself. And I suggest that military intervention and 
occupation indicate a breakdown in the penetrative process.
535
    
 
The processes, which have been the focus of this study, are those by which France has 
attempted to modify or perpetuate the internal balance of political forces in Algeria. French 
policy towards Algeria encompasses, either directly or indirectly, all three of the “linkage 
processes” identified by Rosenau: “the reactive, the emulative, and the penetrative”.536 In one 
of his arguments for establishing a conceptual relationship between international and 
domestic systems, Rosenau (1965) has proposed a different view of the political system: “...to 
comprehend the fusion of national and international systems in certain kinds of issue-
areas”.537  He argues that some national societies have become so penetrated by their external 
environments that the penetrating powers become “the only source of legitimacy or even of 
the employment of coercive techniques.”538 Wolfram F. Henrieder postulates539 that because 
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the “national political systems now permeate, as well as depend on, each other and … their 
functioning now embraces actors who are not formally members of the system.”540  
Hanrieder  (1967) in his analysis notes that  
Such a system might be called the penetrated political system … a 
penetrated political system is one in which nonmembers of a national 
society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly 
with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the 
mobilization of support on behalf of its goals. The political processes of a 
penetrated system are conceived to be structurally different from both those 
of an international political system and those of a national political 
system.
541
  
  
This builds on Rosenau’s (1969) core arguments regarding the penetration of a system 
and the need to focus on the direct and authorative participation of non-members of a national 
system in its value allocation. To further clarify, Rosenau (1969) states:  
…no other type of penetrated system can be more all-encompassing than a 
postwar occupation, it does not necessarily follow that all military 
occupations constitute penetrated systems. France during the German 
occupation of 1941-1944, for example, would not be classified as a 
penetrated system since the French did not accept German participation in 
their affairs as legitimate and therefore resisted being mobilized in support 
of values that the Germans had allocated for them.
542
  
 
Consensus on the allocation of values caused by external events is a crucial element in 
defining a penetrated system.  
 
 
2.2.International Penetration of Societies   
As mentioned above, international events can impact on a number of strands within a 
state’s societal structure.  Culture, customs, traditions, and even religion, can be affected by 
foreign interference. According to Black (1977), cultural and informational exchanges might 
be of a penetrative nature.
543
 Although penetration could possibly involve or result in the 
mobilization of resources for domestic purposes, or in the integration of the polity, it is more 
likely to be a factor in the denationalization of resources and the disintegration of the 
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polity.
544
 The exchange of elites between states, ostensibly for the advancement of science 
and knowledge, is more likely to result in citizens who return speaking a different language 
and are engaged in a different culture and way of life. These elites often become the 
unofficial ambassadors between two countries. Indeed, under the covers of education, science 
and knowledge, these elites become an example to the next generation. As a consequence, 
this elite group grows in number becoming a powerful force in the bureaucratic structure of 
their home country. Indeed, they could not have achieved these positions, without the 
government’s support and that of the countries that they migrated to. A number of cases have 
shown that the culture and the identity of a society have been significantly impacted because 
the government could not control the importation of other cultures in the name of 
globalization, civilization and modernity. Johan Galtung (1971) points out that the elite of the 
state with hegemonic power characteristically link themselves with the elites of the nations 
within its sphere of influence in order to contain or control the masses of those nations.
545
   
For her part, Black (1977) uses Brazil and like-minded South American states to 
expound her theory of American penetration. The US presence in the Western Hemisphere 
post-World II is a response, on one hand, to the inflation of US security interests and on the 
other, to the acceleration of the structural differentiation of the political systems in the Latin 
American states. While allowing for a number of variables, the same theory could potentially 
be applied to the French penetration of Algeria.  
The principle of exchange facilitates the development of the society of states, but the 
reason for states as independent units is a constraint upon the level of sociability, which can 
be exhibited in their external relations. Because of the structure of political obligation, states 
cannot allow international obligations that are permanently binding nor can they dismiss out 
of hand any act of duplicity or violence outlawed within domestic society.
546
   
If the states-system is an artifact superimposed upon a given international 
morality, the attempt to legitimize the division between the two moralities 
must be denied. The sovereign cannot simply be the trustee for those who 
have contracted together and who authorized him to promote their 
interests.
547
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3. The French-Algerian Relationship  
After independence, succesive Algerian regimes built strong relationships with 
France, particularly in the area of security. These relationships are well documented from 
early in the independence era, when the French authorities signed a treaty with the 
Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) in Vienna. After the coup of 1962, 
the Boumédiène regime strengthened their ties to France by initially accepting French-trained 
officers into the National Popular Army (ANP), which had been formed outside of the 
country,548 thus indirectly facilitating the later rise of the French Officers in Algerian politics.  
Ben Bella and Boumédiène also built strong relationships with Arab countries, 
especially Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, which in turn helped them to take power from the 
GPRA and other revolutionary groups.
549
A number of armed groups soon formed to resist the 
regime. Some of them were involved in an intense armed struggle with the military 
establishment. Ait Ahmed, the leader of the Socialists’ Forces Front (FFS), which organized 
military resistance to his former friends Ben Bella and Boumédiène, was arrested in Kabilya 
as a result of violent resistance, and sent into exile. He did not return to Algeria until 1990. 
Mohammed Khidher was killed in Madrid; Colonel Taher Zbiri was discharged from his 
position as chief of the general staff after he expressed opposition to French involvement, and 
soon thereafter took over the command of the National Popular Army (ANP). Zbiri formed a 
military unit from the Eastern bases and attempted a coup d’état against Boumédiène and his 
regime. Boumédiène responded with air attacks, led by French and Soviet pilots, already in 
Algeria as military trainers. The attacks left a broad area of destruction and killed a number 
of soldiers and civilians.
550
 
At the same time, the French Officers were promoted rapidly, taking up high positions 
within the military and civilian political structures linked to improving relations with France. 
France, for its part, appeared continually to be influencing the economic and political 
decisions of Algeria. By the security crisis of 1988, which was followed by the coup against a 
democratically-elected government in 1992, the French had apparently become increasingly 
involved in the human rights violations carried out by the Algerian security services in both 
France and Algeria. After the hijacking of a French Airbus in 1994,
551
 and the bombing of 
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metro stations in Paris in 1995,
552
 France finally came under pressure from the European 
Union regarding its support of the military regime in Algeria. 
Two of the most significant scandals relating to possible French penetration of 
Algeria involved the cases of Ali Touchent,
553
 who was working in France for the Algerian 
Military Secret Services (DRS) under the supervision of the French Intelligence Service, and 
of the Christian monks of Tibhirine in Algeria, who were brutally killed after they were 
kidnapped in 1996. The latter case has recently been re-opened in a French court, after 
testimony by a former general in French military implicated the military intelligence services 
of both countries. Algerian witnesses maintain that the monks were killed by Algerian 
soldiers after the failure of long negotiations with French intelligence, much of which took 
place in the French Embassy in Algiers.
554
 The testimony of one witness led to the cross-
examination in French court of the former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, who had been 
the Minister of Internal Affairs at the time.
555
 These are only a few of the examples of the 
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questioning of France by the European Union regarding its dealings with, and likely 
penetration of, the Algerian military regime.
556
 
According to at least some of the Algerian officers in exile, the Algerian military and 
French intelligence agents were working together as a team in planning and executing 
violence in the two countries after the coup of 1992.
557
 Relations between France and Algeria 
have always assumed a dual character: public and private, especially after the military coup 
of 11 January 1992. In public, the French call for democracy and the respect of human rights. 
In private, the French authorities appear to be consistent in supporting military rulers who 
serve their interests, regardless of the levels of human rights violations. This dual, and 
perhaps even disingenuous, face of French foreign policy was especially evident in French 
President Jacques Chirac’s speech of October 1995, when he said that “France helps the 
people and not the military who are in power; it does not seek to interfere in this conflict, but 
encourages the Algerians to find answers to their own problems.”558 During a meeting with 
the French press regarding the value of co-operating with Algiers in matters of anti-terrorism, 
the French Minister of Internal Affairs, Jean-Louis Debré, declared that “Algerian Military 
Security would have us go on the wrong track…so that we would eliminate people who 
bother them.”559 Debre’s statement was unintentionally revealing, perhaps, clarifying the type 
of relationship that the Algerian regime expects to have with France. Claude Angeli and 
Stephanic Mesnier (1997) have noted that the Algerian Secret Service is not the only agency 
suspected of involvement in bombings in France. The Parisian authorities have also been 
implicated. An officer in the French Secret Service suggested as much when he admitted that 
“We are paying for promises made from 1993 to 1995, and especially by Charles Pasqua.560 
We are paying for the help granted to the Algerian regime in terms of arms and 
intelligence.”561 
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According to Brahimi, the French president was pressurized to discuss the issue of 
terrorism with Algiers after the Algerian Secret Service tried to eliminate members of 
opposition parties living in France, including ex-patriate members of the the FIS and FFS. 
Chirac apparently knew about the provocateurs in Paris. After he finished his official visit to 
Algiers, during which he pledged support to the military regime to oppose terrorism, he 
quietly asked Prime Minister Brahimi to stop his agents from committing violent acts in 
France.
562
A witness to this added that  
…the bombs that outraged Paris in 1995 –blamed on Muslim fanatics- were 
the handiwork of the Algerian secret service. They were part of 
sophisticated black propaganda war aimed at galvanizing French public 
opinion against the Islamists.
563
 
 
On 14 September 1995, a note from the DST had once again raised a warning flag for 
Debre, who was quietly concerned by the activities of the Algerian Secret Service. According 
to Angeli and Mesnier, the minister later (during a lunch with the regional press on 15 
September 1995) said that “the Algerian Secret Service is not only suspected of manipulating 
some of the bombers, but also the French authorities.”564 He later denied having said this 
after a scandal erupted involving the Paris bombings; the minister declared that “the 
Algerians are pushing us in the direction of persons of interest to them.”565 
History tends to repeat itself, however, and the massacres of civilians and the 
systematic bombings that took place in Algeria by the Organisation de l'armée secrete (OAS) 
against General de Gaulle’s policy in Algeria in 1961 had been designed to force the French 
administration to give up any negotiations with the FLN, and to continue the war against the 
‘terrorists’. The signing of the Evian accords provoked renewed opposition by the OAS. The 
Chief Commander of the OAS, Gen Raoul Salan, launched attacks against the Muslim 
population and even against political headquarters in an attempt to provoke a general breach 
of the cease-fire. De Gaulle, however, decided to allow the country to have an election, and 
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the results graphically demonstrated that a majority of Algerians wanted freedom. The same 
kind of covert operation occurred in both countries in the 1990s. The Algerian Secret Service 
and their allies in the French Secret Service were working hard to push the French 
government into the arms of those who wanted war and violence. Two journalists learned that 
Jean-Charles Marchiani, a close advisor to Minister of Internal Affairs Charles Pasqua, knew 
of the military’s willingness to respond violently to the election results of 1991, and possibly 
even proposed it. He confirmed that, for security reasons, he had demanded that “the 
operation should not be entrusted to uncontrollable Islamists, but to DRS agents.”566 For their 
part, the Algerian authorities demanded that the French authorities arrest the FIS officers who 
had fled to France. A list of 162 individuals to be deported to Algeria was produced.
567
 In the 
end, over 180 people were taken into custody in November 1993, and some of them were 
deported to Burkina Faso, including the FIS MP, Ahmed Zaoui.
568
 
The main reason for accepting this apparently penetrative relationship, from the 
standpoint of the Algerian regime, was to gain support for their internal war in Algeria, and to 
ensure the protection of their dictatorship.
569
 France’s rationale, on the other hand, appeared 
to be purely economic.  Algeria is one of the main suppliers of gas and oil to France, and a 
significant importer of its products. According to François Gèze of La Decouverte, one of the 
first French publishers to expose the involvement of the Algerian secret services in the ‘dirty 
war’, at the heart of this strong economic relationship, moreover, is political corruption that 
ultimately implicates a significant part of France’s political establishment. “French exporters 
generally pay a 10 to 15 per cent commission on their goods,” explained Gèze.570 “Part of this 
revenue is then ‘repaid’ by the Algerians as financing for the electoral campaigns of French 
political parties.
571
 John Sweeney from the Observer put it indelicately in 1997, quoting a 
political analyst: “e pouvoir [the Algerian military junta] has the French government… by the 
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balls. They have made secret donations to French parties and politicians, so that they can 
blackmail them.”572 
In 2001, a group of scholars and intellectuals from France and Algeria urged France 
to distance itself from the military-backed authorities in Algiers.
573
 They said that French 
foreign policy amounted to complicity in crimes against humanity. This group chastised 
France for supporting a regime which they described as determined to silence its opponents, 
to the point of killing them. They cited an Algerian army officer, Habib Souaidia, who had 
published a book in France describing the army’s involvement in massacres and torture.574 
They also revived calls for an international commission of inquiry into the violence in 
Algeria. Such calls put intense pressure on the relations between the two countries.
575
 The 
French Foreign Ministry said only that France would discuss the calls for an inquiry with its 
European partners. However, European diplomats said that France has always blocked 
attempts and stopped any form of intervention into the Algerian crisis, including 
investigations into human rights violations in Algeria.
576
 
International Human Rights Organisations have failed to investigate these massacres 
of civilians between 1994 and 1998. After a meeting of most of the political opposition to the 
Algerian government, including the FIS, the Human Rights commission, along with a number 
of NGOs and, in particular, Human Rights Watch, in Sant' Egidio, Italy, there was an attempt 
by these groups to stop the violence in Algeria by initiating contacts with political elites from 
the opposition living in the exile. The Algerian Military regime and the French authorities 
have refused to engage in any intervention, however, stating that the case is internal and that 
there is no right to external intervention of any kind.  France has threatened to use its Security 
Council veto against any intervention in Algeria.
577
 This alone should call into question the 
character of continuing French involvement in Algeria. 
 
4. French Penetration of Algeria  
Penetration has two sides, the military penetration into Algerian politics, societies and 
social life of Algerians, and the broader penetration of international relations. Scholars have 
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discussed both forms of penetration, with these debates relevant to the case of Algeria in 
particular.  
Linklater (1982) refers to what he calls ‘ethical particularism’ and ‘ethical 
universalism’. Each of these, Linklater maintains, is a way of defining the proper relationship 
between the members of a particular society and these persons or groups, which collectively 
form the outside social world. According to Linklater (1982), these policies could take two 
forms: they may either be ongoing social moralities whose imperatives make explicit the 
rules of conduct which ought to be observed by members in the area of their external 
relations, or they may be theories which seek to legitimize, or criticize, the postulates 
underlying these social moralities. The initial sections of this chapter make some 
observations about the general properties of the two points of view in practice. To discuss the 
case of Algeria through this theory, the main connection between the French penetration of 
Algeria and the human rights disaster in the country, which has destabilized the country since 
independence, should be identified.   
These political developments correspond to what  Coleman  (1994) and  others have  
called  ‘political  penetration.’  According to Coleman (1994), political penetration occurs 
when: 
…state power penetrates,  or seeks to penetrate,  a society through a variety 
of structures which schematically would include the following … 
executives, bureaucracies, armies, courts, police, parastatal agencies, public 
enterprises, etc. the ensemble of which constitutes the state apparatus 
through which the centre endeavours to establish and maintain its presence, 
exact compliance, extract resources and evoke a supportive response.
578
  
 
Political penetration is thus assumed to include not only the increased presence and/or  
influence  of  nationally  centered  bureaucracies  on the local scene  but  also  courts  and  
police,  presumably responsive to and controlled  by  the  center.  Coleman (1994) and others 
associate political penetration with the process of state formation. He argues that, with regard 
to state building, “internally the penetration by the centre of state power to  their  peripheries 
- everywhere and throughout history has involved varying degrees of modes of coercion.”579 
One commonly accepted means of applying such coercion has been the imposition of 
codified laws by courts through police power, often involving foreign penetration, 
particularly in post-colonial settings. 
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4.1.Algerian Crises and the Franco-Algerian Relationship  
The Algerian crisis affects the French state on a number of levels, at the centre of 
which is the historically unstable Franco-Algerian relationship. However, this relationship 
comprises various elements which may be summarized as being made up of the French view 
of their colonial empire: the changing nature of demand within the French economy for 
foreign immigrant labor; the attitude of a republication secular state to the political potential 
of religion; and the belief that this republican and revolutionary state provides a universal 
model of political behaviour, to name only three. At the same time, each of these in fact can 
be said to represent an aspect of French identity in Algeria.
580
 The French have never been 
blamed for the Algerian crisis, neither after independence nor after the coups d’état of the 
military regime, but, according to Adamson (1998), a series of responses exist which both 
illustrate the failure of the French state to extricate itself from the legacy of empire in general, 
and colonial Algeria in particular.
581
  
Lucile Provost, in her book, la seconde guerre d’Algerie: le quiproquo franco-
Algerien
582
 (1996), explains that the French war in Algeria has hindered the opportunity for 
development of the country to the level found in Europe. The conflict, started by Algerian 
leaders after the departure of the French, left the country in a competition for power that was 
the main reason for the most recent political crisis. She begins from the view that the Algerian 
War not only profoundly influenced, but also marked, the generation which found itself 
engaged in the conflict. Indeed, the effect of the Algerian war had not ended in the first years 
after independence. The questions the war itself raised about post-war France, the election of de 
Gaulle, and the inauguration of the Fifth Republic, were such that by the time Algerian 
independence came in 1962, popular opinion in both societies called for the complete 
separation of France and Algeria. Conflict among Algerian leaders was an internal issue, one 
that the society could have potentially dealt with. However, the continued exchanges between 
personnel at all levels meant that France was to retain major influence within Algeria itself, if 
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only through the presence of technical personnel, French investment in new industries, and the 
awarding of contracts to French firms by consecutive Algerian regimes.
583
  
In an interview, Zitout says that the French never planned to totally divorce themselves 
from Algeria. It can be argued, in fact, that the strategy of de Gaulle was to shift the traditional 
colonial system from inside the country to a system of control from a distance. The military 
have always been a key actor in the Algerian political system, a legacy of the call to arms to 
gain independence.
584
 French Officers were key this control, and slowly, in the 1990s, through 
their penetration of the most important government positions in the country, the French came to 
dominate the Algerian political, economic and even military bureaucracies. Indeed, more than 
50 years after independence, Algeria has not left France and France has not left Algeria. This 
‘neo-colonialism’ has affected a majority of the population of Algeria. France again played a 
leading role in the Algerian crisis of the 1990s.  
Algeria apparently views its relationship with France as critical, and one which has to 
differ from its relationships with other countries. Boumédiène became famous for his fiery 
speeches, which were always aimed at marketing his politics through his declarations against 
imperialism, totalitarianism and fascism, showing himself to be a revolutionary hero in Algeria 
and in the third world. He was the first to accept, however, the French Officers into his army, 
using them for the first coup d’état after Algerian independence, the blow against the GPRA. 
These Officers, along with a number of French administrators, chose to stay in Algeria, not 
because of their good reputation and their positions, nor to build a new Algeria, but apparently 
because of de Gaulle’s plan, which came to fruition 30 years after independence when the 
French Officers led a coup d’état and began their full domination of power in 1990’s.  
 Moreover, while Algeria’s relationship with the United States was severed after 
Algerian involvement in the war of 1967, with Arab nations lining up against Israel, there is 
evidence that the US supported the nationalization of hydrocarbons in Algeria by the French, 
resources which were under French control until 1971. This US support reinforced the notion 
that Algeria was of primary economic interest to the wider group of Western states. 
President Boumédiène, who was described as a man of radical, anti-colonialist 
sentiments, once declared that “Relations between France and Algeria may be good or bad, but 
in no way can they be trivial.”585 Boumédiène’s policies, in fact, appeared to depend on a 
                                                          
583
 Lucille Provost, “La seconde guerre d'Algérie. Le quiproquo franco-algérien” (Paris, Flammarion, 1996), 
p.199, bibliography, par [Marie-Blanche Tahon Anthropologie et Sociétés, vol. 20, n° 2, 1996], p. 161-162. 
584
 Robert Mortimer, “Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War”, Middle East Journal, 50, 
No. 1 (Winter, 1996), pp. 18-39. 
585
 Zoubir, Yahia H., “French-Algerian Relations: The Weight of History”, Aljazeera Network, 7/07/2011.  
 178   
 
strong relationship with France. He suggested that history “cannot be torn up”586 and that the 
willingness to turn the page has to be based on looking to the future of Algeria. Indeed, 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Boumédiène’s foreign minister and, 26 years later, Algeria’s President, 
declared in 2000 that, “Algeria seeks to have extraordinary, non-trivial, not normal, [but] 
exemplary and exceptional relations with France.”587 Under Jacques Chirac it seemed that the 
two countries were heading toward a historic treaty of friendship in 2005. Even after the 
breakdown of their relationship under Sarkozy, the presidency of Hollande has ushered in a 
new stage in France’s relationship with Algiers. France continues to believe that to dominate 
Algeria economically, they have to keep the French language and culture at the core of 
Algerian identity.  
In his speech to the Algerian parliament in December 2012, French President Francois 
Hollande mentioned the special relationship of Algeria with France, based on language, culture 
and education.  Hollande argued that this relationship had been affected during recent years by 
a “brutal and unfair” history. Moreover, Algeria is one of the richest countries in Africa, 
holding huge reserves of oil and natural resources. Algeria has continued to represent a 
significant market for France since independence, and has offered France a privileged 
opportunity to invest in Algeria, especially after the visit of President Hollande in December 
2012.
588
  
 
4.2.The Informal Relationship, Politics and Human Rights Violations  
As already outlined, the French-Algerian formal relationship was marked by peaks and 
troughs. Le Monde (29/03/1996) described it as reflecting on the one hand, a “famous love-hate 
relationship” between two countries or, on the other hand, the failure of the two countries to 
surmount the old colonial relationship. A third element is conveyed by the image of Algeria not 
having left France and France not having left Algeria. That these are not simply metaphorical 
images painted by the newspaper is clear when viewed within the context of the political and 
economic realities of the relationship.
589
 
If this description characterizes the formal relationship between the two countries, the 
informal relationship has been built on solid ground and is still very strong.
590
 The informal 
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Franco-Algerian relationship was developed in the shadows, partly to drive the formal political 
and economic connections, as well as to push politicians in Algiers, and in Paris particularly, to 
accept the status quo of both countries. During the war of independence, de Gaulle’s claim of 
“Algeria for Algerians”591 hid another, very different meaning than what may be superficially 
understood. De Gaulle’s plan was not to stand in the way of democracy and the elections of 
March 1962: the result was clear with 6 million of a total Algerian electorate of 6.5 million 
casting their ballots in the referendum on independence. The vote was almost unanimous. De 
Gaulle had pronounced Algeria an independent country on July 3, 1963. However, behind the 
scenes, France was apparently preparing for its new form of colonialism, entering the halls of 
power via the ‘back door’. Hundreds of officers were recruited and trained for this 
eventuality.
592
 Indeed, the officers were Algerian born, but loyal primarily to France. These 
officers, the Franch Officers as I have called them, have come to occupy the highest positions 
of the country, not only in the military, but also the civil services. The Evian accords had 
already constructed a platform for this plan. The French Officers seem to have tacitly 
represented French authorities in Algeria and in France. They were capable, and able to protect 
French interests in Algeria while undertaking and advancing their own public positions in the 
new Algerian bureaucracy.  
 
4.3.French Penetration of the Cultural and Intellectual Sphere 
France’s attempt to control Algeria through the integration of Algerians into French 
culture was no more clearly demonstrated than in the field of education. The imposition of 
French educational norms and the denial of Algerians to access and practice their own cultural 
identity revealed the colonialist policy at its most destructive. The French supplanted Arab 
educational values, and moved to effect and maintain Algerian subordination through structural 
changes in the pre-colonial educational system. Algerians resisted French inroads into their own 
principally Islamic culture. This resistance, at times passive, and at other times violent, as well 
as continuing French efforts to dominate the field, exercised a major influence over the course 
of the social and intellectual history in colonial Algeria. In addition to changes in the 
fundamental educational structure, the French never built enough schools to educate more than 
a small minority of school-age Algerian children. 
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Throughout this research, the focus has been on the French Military Officers, who 
appear to have been part of de Gaulle’s program of subversive domination.593 The French 
Civilian Officers similarly seem to have played a large role in the French plan, however. Zitout 
discussed this group, noting that Boumédiène’s apparent apathy towards the French was only a 
matter of pragmatism. For example, he never followed through on these speeches against 
French interests in Algeria. Boumédiène, rather, made Arabism a central focus of his speeches, 
allowing him to be feted later as a hero in the Arab world, while at the same time he not only 
used the French Military Officers to support his army against the GPRA, but he used the French 
Administration Officers to protect French culture and language in guiding the Algerian 
bureaucracy. Most of the Algerian administration retained the same rules as those of their 
counterparts in France. Indeed, Arabism actually came much later, and is not yet complete. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, the language of the Algerian administration and schools was French. 
Arabic courses in primary schools consisted of only one hour of study per week – the same as 
any other “additional course”. The same commitment to French could be seen in the political 
and economic bureaucracies. All official documents in Algeria were in French, including legal 
documents, and even the Constitution of the country.  
The goal of these French Administrators was clear according to Zitout. The impact of 
the French Administrators, then, was no less than that of the French Military Officers. Indeed, 
the Algerian regime was based on a military background, but it was also supported by civilian 
elites. Missoum Sbih, the current Algerian ambassador in Paris, was one of the French 
Administration Officers trained during the 1950s. He was given the position of Algerian 
education advisor. He was, moreover, the founder of the Advanced School of Administration 
(l’ecole superieure de l’Administration), which includes in its alumni most of the Algerian 
political elite, including ministers and even the previous and current prime ministers. Zitout, 
himself a graduate of this school, says that it is a copy of the French school of administration in 
Paris, not only in the way it was built, but also in its programme of study. Everything is taught 
in French, with little relating directly to Algeria and its unique culture and identity. There is 
little there that gives the feeling of being situated in Algeria or grounded in Algerian political or 
administrative culture.
594
   
This school is one of hundreds of schools in Algeria which did not see the influence of 
Arabic until the late 1970s and early 1980s. Alf Andrew Heggoy in his paper “Education in 
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French Algeria”595 pointed out that the Algerian educational system was established by the 
French during its occupation of Algeria. But, there were always challenges from the anti-
colonial groups, who set their own programme, which tended to emphasize Algerian identity.
596
  
Quantitative and qualitative progress for Algerian education usually only 
occurred as a result of Arab and Berber pressures on the French 
government. Until the 1880's, little progress was made because the 
Algerians themselves refused to send their children to French schools. 
Then, France gave control over local affairs in Algeria to the European 
settlers. These colonists were generally antagonistic to any reform in favor 
of the natives. When Algerians changed their minds and began wishing for 
access to modern education, they found change difficult to achieve. 
Colonists resisted their demands and the government in Paris was generally 
weary of challenges to the dominant Europeans.
597
  
 
Moreover, according to Chouchane, the French penetration of Algeria has continued 
after independence. “I am a military officer, I can be a witness to the progress of work inside 
the ministry of defense, which has never [adopted] the national identity, nor our language and 
culture.”598 Chouchane identified most of the post-independence leaders, past and present, of 
the Secretariat of the Ministry of National Defense as French Officers in the sense that we are 
using this term. General Chabou, General Abdel-Hamid Latrach, General Belloucif (the last of 
these was not from the French Officers, but they pushed him to resign after just two years in the 
position), and yet another French Officer, General Challoufi, not to mention many others who 
remain part of the French-influenced elites.
599
     
Benjedid, the president of Algeria for 13 years (until January 1992), now says that he 
regrets his support of the French Officers when they joined the FLN just before 
independence.
600
 As mentioned in the previous chapters, the account of president Chadli and 
French Officers was a clear illustration of French penetration of Algerian bureaucracy. General 
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Belkhir, sometimes referred to as a “president maker”, was a close friend of President Chadli 
despite the fact that he was a French Officer and, along with his colleague General Lamari, 
frequently worked together with French Security Agents.
601
  
 
4.4.French Political Mediation and Military Support of the Algerian Regime  
The political relationship between France and Algeria has never been straightforward. 
It has been shaped by memories of a brutal war which led to Algeria's independence from 
France in 1962, and the subsequent exodus of French settlers. On the other hand, Stora has 
observed that there were hundreds of thousands of Algerians who chose to leave Algeria and 
to move with the French soldiers to France.
602
 These Algerians, ‘Piers Noirs’ and ‘Harkists’, 
have retained their love of their motherland, and through the years they have formed 
themselves into a large community of Algerians living and working in France. Some of the 
Algerian elites have reached high political positions in a variety of countries, while 
maintaining strong links to their home country.  
France is thought to have aggressively used its contacts to take the lead in maintaining 
a close relationship with Algeria, to keep its guardianship over the Algerian political system, 
and its hegemony over the economic and investment sectors in the country. Even if this 
relationship at the level of political governance were ended today, however, it is unlikely that 
the close fraternal relationship between the two national military establishments would be 
weakened.
603
 French remains the dominant language in Algeria, and the country's elite looks 
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to Paris as a cultural reference point.
604
 Added to this, France remains Algeria's key economic 
partner. Joffe argues that while the Algerian and French political and business factions and 
lobbies in both countries often seem to be pulling in opposing directions, the reality is that 
they fit closely together. 
The violence in Algeria, however, has strained this relationship. There was resentment 
when it became more difficult for Algerians to obtain French visas, and when Air France 
stopped its flights to the country after a hijacking in 1994. Statements by French officials 
were condemned in Algiers as interference in Algeria’s internal affairs. However, throughout 
this matter, the French government backed the military regime in Algeria and supported 
Algeria's case with international lending institutions, shielding it from criticism based upon 
its human rights record.
605
 
Human rights abuses, particularly during the 1990s, have upset Algerian relations 
with countries in the region, however. Some countries have even tried to intervene through 
their human rights organisations. The Algerian regime has tended to use language laden with 
terms of violence against citizens and tourists in the country. The way that the Algerian 
regime communicates, in fact, has encouraged resistance to the regime within Algeria and 
among Algerian elites living in exile. Some of these elites have urged international human 
rights organisations to clarify the reality of this ten year civil war in the international media.  
According to Anis Rahmani, Algeria’s relationship with France has grown stronger 
since independence, although from time to time this relationship has been interrupted. While 
exile groups have attempted to indict the Algerian military in the ICC, Algeria has been able 
to maintain strong international relationships, especially with France, and in cases in which 
there have been strong indictments of the regime, both countries have worked together to find 
a political solution.
606
 Jack Mayer, of the Committee of International Affairs in the French 
Parliament, declared that the relationship between the two countries is akin to those of a 
family, and cannot be broken. A powerful example of this is the well-known case of the 
Tibhirine’s monks, who were kidnapped and later killed by the GIA, or perhaps the military, 
supposedly by mistake.
607
 Mayer said that France stood behind the Algerian regime, 
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supporting it in its war on “terrorists.” These incidents were deemed “occasional 
disagreements”, not capable of affecting the long-term relationship with Algeria. The 
relationship between these two states, in fact, is often compared to a stable marriage, unlikely 
to end in divorce.
608
 
Many of the Algerian elites living in exile confirmed in interviews that the Algerian 
military regime and the French authorities had this strong relationship, supported primarily 
by the French Officers in positions of power. That said, Joffe believes that a fundamental 
disagreement between the countries regarding human rights could become irreparable. 
However this has never happened, primarily because of strong French financial interests in 
Algeria.
609
 In many cases, one would expect that the French government would have at least 
investigated human rights violations in Algeria and even in Paris during the years of 
terrorism, including the cases of the plane hijacking from Algiers to France in December 
1994, the bombing in the Paris Metro in October 1995, and the murders of the Christian 
monks of Tibhirine in March 1996. Joffe has emphasized, however, that there was little 
damage to the relationship between France and Algeria. The significant French interests in 
the Mediterranean region, and the security alliance between the French and Algerian security 
services, may explain why the Algerian military regime continues to receive what appears to 
most observers to be the full support of France. 
The attitude of French president Nicolas Sarkozy regarding the massacre of the monks 
in 1996 is particularly instructive. According to a witness, Armand Veilleux, the monks were 
killed by Algerian military forces. Joffe predicted that this information would not damage the 
French Algerian relationship. France apparently wants to maintain a close relationship with 
Algeria as an integral part of its foreign policy.  
Joffe’s view of the French-Algerian relationship is that it is based primarily on 
economic interests. France has long planned to develop its industrial economy based on 
primary resources from Algeria. Algerian natural gas has been a main focus of French 
economists and political leaders.  
what the French president wants is just a good relationship with Algeria as 
it is part of his policy there…and the question about the union of the 
Mediterranean, which is a key French policy there, is based in part on 
Algerian cooperation with France. What the French authorities want is to 
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reinforce the relationship with Algeria, and there is no need to allow stories 
of crimes to damage the relationship between the two countries.
610
 
 
President Chirac was embarrassed by the bombing of the Paris Metro, especially after 
the French authorities failed to indict the security services in Algeria, which were at the time 
linked to the DRS in Algeria and hence implicated the French Secret Service.
611
 Salem Badis 
notes that “France has always sought a regime in Algeria with which it can do business…this 
regime should also be underpinned by generals sympathetic to French interests.”612 The 
French Minister of Internal Affairs, Jean- Pierre Chevenement, clarified the importance to 
France of the relationship with Algeria in particularly revealing language: “Let us have the 
frankness to say that if Algeria fell into an Islamist regime, the interests of France would be 
directly affected.”613Le monde diplomatique, the French newspaper, published an article by 
specialist on Algerian affairs and military regime supporter, Olivier Roy, who noted: 
 We support the undemocratic forces because they are secular, hence more 
susceptible, in our minds, to democracy one day […] we cannot eradicate 
[the extremists] in a democratic way.
614
 
  
 Lonis Aggoun, in his book ‘Françalgérie’, explores France’s role in a war the Algeria 
military leadership conducted against its own civilians.
615
It is clear that without the support of 
French politicians and the media, the Algerian military regime would not have been able to 
stay in power for long, and may even have failed in their attempt. Chouchane’s view is that 
the coup d’état of 1992 was planned and organised by Algerian generals [French Officers] 
and French agencies.
616
 Support from the French was clearly based on interests and the power 
and influence that the French Officers (with the Algerian military) exerted upon the French 
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government. Many more questions remain as to this complicated relationship, which has 
existed for decades between the two countries. 
617
 
The coup directly impacted not only the Algerian people. Foreign tourists and French 
officials were also affected by the subsequent ‘dirty war’, especially early on in the crisis. On 
October 24, 1993, three employees of the French consulate were abducted. The GIA (Groupe 
Islamique Armé) later claimed responsibility. The GIA threatened foreign agencies in 
Algeria, calling for the release of its leader, Abdelhak Layada, who was arrested in June of 
the same year in Morocco. Many foreigners felt deeply threatened. A French embassy 
employee, Lucile Schmid, described the fear saying: “We had the impression that the 
[Algerian] State was our biggest ally. This resulted in us working more closely with the 
Algerian authorities.”618 In fact, as it turned out, the cooperation stretched far beyond this: 
even some of the abductions carried out by the Algerian secret service (DRS) are thought to 
have been conducted in collaboration with the French interior secret service (DST).
619
 
Aggoun and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire meticulously trace the most significant stages of 
the hidden war in Algeria, conducted under the title of “war on terror.” The Algerian regime 
of the 1990s used the methods and the model which were developed and tested by the French 
during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962), including ‘anti-terrorism’ tactics, to 
fight against opposition. However, “the students outperformed their teacher in terms of 
manipulation and perversion”.620 "Françalgérie" clearly summarises an account of the 
particularly entangled relationship between France and Algeria during this difficult period. 
As regards the economy, politics, and the military, they note that “…this closeness [between 
France and Algeria] is shaped by clientelism, corruption, secret agreements and parallel 
diplomacy, which have trapped both countries in an inextricable net of mafia-esque ties”.621  
Aggoun and Rivoire document the promotion of the French Officers into senior military and 
political positions through the different eras of the country since independence. Aggoun and 
Rivoire agree with Brahimi’s view that it was the French Officers and their relation to France 
that ultimately structured the violence in post-independence Algeria. Samraoui and 
Chouchane agree that the Algerian crisis of the 1990’s was organized by the French Officers 
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and aided by the support that they received from France and the West.
622
 The French Officers 
gradually attained power as they established a network of corruption and elitism in 
“Françalgérie.”  
While the French Officers and their coup represent the first pillar in the power 
structure of the current regime in Algeria, the second pillar has had perhaps even worse 
implications for Algerians. The Algerian secret service (DRS), the MALG (Ministère de 
l’Armement, des Liaisons générales et des Communications), founded in 1958, laid the 
foundation for the later Sécurité militaire (SM).
623
 The DRS (Département du 
renseignement et de la sécurité) is legally just a small unit within the Algerian military 
structure, and has the role of collecting information for the security of the country. As with 
other revolutions, agencies were formed and quickly entered into a competition for power. It 
was the formation of the SM that initiated this competition among newly emerging secret 
services in Algeria. Later, the French Officers were successful in their demand that President 
Chadli break up this unconstitutional organisation, which by then was clearly out of control. 
According to Brahimi and Chouchane, it became a kind of sport for the French Officers to 
disestablish this agency and to cover their tracks by murdering Kasdi Marbah, the formal 
leader of the SM.  After the restructuring of the secret service, which took place on the eve of 
the 1992 coup, powerful figures, Mohamed Médiène, head of the DRS, and Lamari, head of 
counter-espionage, took control of all “security-relevant” areas. Their particular deftness was 
revealed in their ability to empty every political and societal structure and to employ or 
neutralize all political opposition through political manoeuvres. A close collaboration with 
the French DST developed when Yves Bonnet took over the leadership of the agency.
624
 
Aggoun and Rivoire note that the prelude to collaborative efforts between the two 
secret services in France coincided with the murder of Ali Mecili, a former revolutionary and 
close friend to  Aït-Ahmed, the leader of the FFS political party (Front des Forces 
Socialistes), in April 1987. However, a shadowy figure named ‘Amellou’ was hired by the 
Algerian secret service to commit the murder, and was smuggled into Algeria with help of the 
French DST, so that the investigations were stopped.
625
 During the 1990s, Lamari used his 
strong connections with the DST to serve his own civil war “projects”. Aggoun and Rivoire 
brought a large number of cases forward as proof of the deep relationship between the two 
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countries.
626
 As France became increasingly entangled in the Algerian Crisis, the DST 
illegally joined with the Algerian DRS in committing violence and covering up criminals acts 
of the DRS inside France. According Souaidea and Samraoui, Islamist agents, who were 
trained by the DRS among others, were committing crimes with the full support and 
protection of the French authorities.
627
 
Moreover, according to Aroua and Haddam, who were part of the Sant’ Egidio 
meeting, the focus of that meeting was to stop the killing machine that had got out of control, 
with massacres taking place in villages and cities every night. These further attacks put 
pressure on French politicians, particularly as the Algerian opposition agreed to measures to 
solve the crisis by the beginning of January, 1995. To the displeasure of the Algerian junta, 
some French politicians and intellectuals welcomed the initiative. Besides an extraordinary 
campaign against the meeting participants, who were characterized as accomplices to 
terrorism, France increasingly became the target of violence: in July, 1995, Cheikh Sahraoui, 
the 85 years old Imam of a mosque in Paris, was murdered. He was one of the founding 
members of the FIS and, as a moderate Islamist, was a contact person for French authorities. 
This murder displeased the radical faction of the Algerian regime. 
The murder, moreover, was a prelude to further attacks, including six bombs, which 
were placed in Paris metro stations and terrorized France for three months. Eight people were 
killed and 200 were injured in these incidents.
628
 The GIA was soon identified as responsible 
for the attacks, though the investigations stalled. According to Brahimi, Chirac knew at that 
time who had carried out the attacks in the Paris Metro, and he sent a letter to Algerian 
president Lamine Zaroual, telling him to stop Algerian violence in France.
629
 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, this is what subsequently happened: there has been virtually no Algerian-related 
violence in Paris since that time. Moreover, the man primarily responsible for the attacks, Ali 
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Touchent, an agent who was known to have worked for the Algerian secret service, was able 
to leave for Algeria unobstructed, though he was well known to French authorities. Others 
who were involved in the attacks were arrested, however, and sentenced to long terms of 
imprisonment. The court adeptly evaded the question of Algerian secret service involvement 
in the violence. In hindsight, the series of attacks appears to have been a successful means of 
silencing the French politicians.  
The attacks of the summer of 1995, which were systemically attributed to 
“GIA Islamists” by the media, made things difficult for the Juppé 
government and made his nuanced position vis-à-vis Algerian politics 
intolerable.
630
 
The French government continued to support the regime discretely, as it had always 
done. It is important to note that many French officials and business people, as well as 
members of the secret service, knew that the attacks were ordered by the DRS. For many, the 
attacks appeared to go too far: the former French Interior Minister Jean-Louis Debré decided 
to make it clear to Algerian officials in mid-September 1995 that the French government 
knew who had conducted the attacks and that a line had been crossed. He organized a press 
conference in order to pose the question of whether Algerian authorities stood behind the 
terrorist acts.  Despite the French warning to Algeria,
631
 and the consequent cooling of the 
relationship between the two governments, the military leadership had achieved its goal: 
France’s politicians continue to be reluctant to voice criticism of Algerian political 
‘methods’.  French penetration of Algeria has apparently tied their hands. 
Zitout noted in interview that there was little difference between the three agencies - 
the French security services, the Algerian security services, and the GIA, created by military 
security officers with the collaboration of some Islamists. A failure or lapse by any one of 
these would clearly have affected the other groups in both countries.
632
An Ex-Colonel of the 
DRS, Mohamed Samraoui, was a witness to the relationship that resulted in crimes against 
French and Algerian citizens. He elaborated over many pages how the Algerian agencies 
tightly controlled the Algerian community in France, to the extent that in 1993 at least 100 
officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) belonging to the DRS, along with hundreds 
of other informants, were operating in France.
633
 In the view of Samraoui, this is one of the 
rare cases where a sovereign state accepts such a huge foreign policing presence in its 
territory. The author further elaborates on the details of the partnership linking the French and 
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Algerian services, which he regards as “complicity”, adding that “this relationship has 
undeniably played a major role in this war,” costing Algeria thousands of lives. For him, the 
primary responsibility rests on the shoulders of his former chief, Lammari, who deliberately 
manipulated the Islamist violence in order to attain his personal goals. Samraoui primarily 
gave his testimony to make this plot public.
634
 
The strong relationship between the French authorities and the Algerian military 
regime, as it has figured in this research, is illustrated in the many cases that have been 
reported in the media as well as in government reports and academic research articles that 
support these conclusions. The French Algerian war, which essentially began in 1830, led to 
the gradual development of ruthless methods, which were also used during the War of 
Independence. This systematic and long term violence, including the egregious human rights 
abuses, which French military officers used against civilians in Africa, and in particular in 
Algeria, has had a long history. It was inherited from previous generations of French-trained 
officers, including those who killed forty-five thousand people within few days in the 
massacres of May 1945.
635
 French generals Bigeard, Aussaresses and Massu led French 
resistance to the bloody War of Independence, 1954-1962, leaving behind over a million of 
Algerian deaths and millions more tortured and sent into exile. In their support of the military 
regime in Algeria, and their continued success in cutting off investigations of the violence by 
human rights organisations, the French authorities were, in effect, still intervening in the 
Algerian crisis and hence contributing directly to hundreds of thousands of deaths. The 
French government declined to support the ‘platform’ of Sant-Egedio,636  which was the only 
agreement that the Algerians had agreed to capable of stopping the bloodshed. The French 
government appears, rather, to be taking an active role in continuing to silence human rights 
organisations in their calls for investigations of the massacres and the thousands of 
disappearances. The responsibility of the French government, media, economy and military 
extends even beyond what happened to Algerian and French civilians, over 200,000 people 
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dead, “…but also to French leniency, which amounts to complicity in crimes against 
humanity”.637 
According to Zitout, by the time of the revolution day celebrations in 1984, Algerian 
soldiers graduated to General positions for the first time, positions that had been dominated 
by French Officers. Belkhir, who was nicknamed the presidents creator, was the real 
president of the state at the time. He strengthened his position amongst his colleagues within 
the well-placed French Officers, leading the group to dominate the state by the late 1980s and 
through the 1990s. This was all according to the plan as laid out by the French government, 
right from the days of President de Gaulle.
638
  
From the beginning of the crisis in Algeria in the 1990s, the Generals of January, as 
they are often called, waged war against their opposition in the FIS, who dominated the 
parliamentary elections by winning the majority of seats in 1991. The war crossed Algeria’s 
borders and took on an international dimension. In France, after the end of the electoral process, 
the French political class almost unanimously condemned the coup, at least at first. The 
‘Franco-Algerian regime,639 and others hostile to the Islamists coming to power, could not 
publicly authorise the overthrow of a democratic election by military coup. The first 
announcement condemning the halting of the electoral process came from French President 
Mitterrand, calling the situation “an act at least abnormal.”640 Shortly after this, the military 
coup in Algeria was a fait accompli, and people awakened to roads choked with heavily armed 
military vehicles. According to Chouchane, the Algerian military regime did not have the 
power to undertake a coup d’état against democracy in 1991 without French support. In 
December 2012, in an interview recorded with French media, the ex-vice president under 
Francois Mitterrand, Jean-Charles Marchiani, SDECE (1962-1970), declared that  
…between the first and the second round [of Algerian elections], we were 
contacted to participate between the generals and the French and I have said 
previously, and Mitterrand, in his way, has been very clear, not in a formal 
way, but very clear, that the second round had no place [in the election].
641
  
 
The Algerian courts, in many cases, were key sources of information. Legal 
statements made by a number of French generals in the military regime opened a gulf 
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between revolutionaries and the French Officers. The bridge of trust, the confidential 
relationship between the Algerian regime and the French administration, had been in effect 
announced in court in Algiers. In 1992, General Moustafa Bellossif faced the French 
Officers, who accused him of corruption, saying that he was not beholden to France.  He 
noted that had not come out of French schools, and certainly did not take orders from France. 
The director of the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) from November 1982 
July 1985, Yves Bonnet, noted however that the Algerian Services maintained a close 
relationship with the French Services.  “They are my friends and I defend them”,642 he 
concluded. 
 
5. Informative Cases in the Franco-Algerian Relationship   
The central issue in the Algerian crisis after the departure of the French state is the 
historically contradictory Franco-Algerian relationship. This relationship, comprised of 
various elements, may be summarized as follows:  
1. The French state’s view of their colonial empire. France sees itself as the guardian 
of the newly independent states. The independence of these countries does not mean a 
complete separation from the French empire. Rather, it may be more like governance under 
an “Emirate” of the French Empire;  
2. The changing nature of demands within the French economy for foreign immigrant 
labor as well as the European crisis, which has meant that France remains in need of the new 
states' resources;  
3. The attitudes of a republican secular state to the political potential of religion. This 
has meant that the French have ignored their own human rights principles as outlined in the 
French constitution;
643
 and,  
4. A belief that France, a republican and revolutionary state, could provide a universal 
model of political behavior. Considering French history, this belief should be respected, but 
when it comes to revolts against its own empire, the French have apparently chosen to define 
these as forms of terrorism, or at least unacceptable acts of disobedience. They have 
seemingly forgotten that revolution represents a key part of French identity.
644
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Adamson (1998) notes that the main issue that could be raised between France and 
Algeria in relation to colonisation and post-colonial relationships is the impact of Algerian 
emigration and the role this plays in shaping not only the image of Algeria and the Algerian 
emigrant but also the particular dualities of French state policy with regard to immigration 
and the immigrant. The dualistic nature of this relationship is well illustrated by the events 
that have taken place in Algeria since the 1990s. In Provost’s (1996) view, France was seen 
as a place of refugees in the minds of some Algerians. Indeed, because immigration between 
both countries was not new, thousands of French-Algerians and Algerian Harkist’s who left 
the country in the independence days are regarded as immigrants. Many are still seeking to go 
home, with the Algerian government now having to accept them as Algerian citizens. The 
government will also have to provide an apology, which may come in the form of restoration 
of lost property, as well as recognition of their decades as refugees in France and other 
European countries.
645
  
Other contentious issues in Franco-Algerian relations relate to immigration, the 
restriction of visitor visas granted to Algerians, the debate in France on “national identity”, 
which in effect targets French citizens of Algerian origin, as well as Muslims in general, 
France’s threat to no longer recognise dual-citizenship, thus forcing people to choose one or 
the other, as well as other actions disadvantaging French people of Algerian origin. Algeria is 
also resentful of France paying ransoms to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to free 
French hostages.  
The idea that France was a place of refuge for Algerians fleeing the turmoil in Algeria 
in the 1990s was necessarily tacit and unrecognized (at best) during the Juppe administration, 
with its enactment of increasingly restrictive measures on immigration. After the defeat of 
Juppe's government, a new government had a more progressive view of the refugee situation. 
French immigration and asylum laws were subject to review by a Commission set up by 
Jospin in June 1997, headed by Patrick Weil, who was a known reformer. Most important, 
however, the formerly covert reception of Algerian refugees was transformed into new and 
broader policies, in which the statute on asylum was rewritten so that it encompassed more 
than only the people who faced immediate threats on their lives from government actions, but 
also those who were threatened by non-governmental organizations. This allowed the French 
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Government to treat Algerians, when required, not as immigrants, but as asylum-seekers, an 
important departure from international law.
646
  
The Franco-Algerian relationship was also impacted by the ‘Air France’ crisis of the 
1990s. After December 1994, the French-owned airline, Air France, stopped flying to 
Algerian cities for security reasons. The French government made this decision after the 
hijacking of Flight 8969 in December 1994, which left 3 passengers and 4 terrorists dead. 
The hijacking, and concern with terrorism in general, became a rationale for isolating Algeria 
and Algerians from the rest of the world. Most European airlines followed the French in their 
policy, thus making it increasingly difficult for Algerians to visit their families in Europe, and 
in France in particular.
647
 This case, according to many analysts, was proof of the break in the 
French-Algerian relationship over the issue of terrorism, even though at the same time, 
French agencies had participated in the staging of the coup d'etat (against the Islamists) in 
1992. Islam was apparently considered the basis of the terrorism. France's abandonment of 
the Algerian regime at that time was mandated by French-Algerian intelligence regarding 
potential violence in the heart of Paris, thus forcing France to support their allies in the 
Algerian military regime, particularly as President Chirac visited Algeria in 1999.
648
 
A further contentious issue relates to the nuclear weapons tests conducted by France 
in the Sahara during the 1960s. In May 2009, Algeria’s foreign minister Mourad Medelci 
declared that France should not just pay compensation to those Algerians whose health may 
have been affected by the tests, but that it should also take measures to decontaminate the 
area where the tests were undertaken. France’s response to this declaration clearly came a 
few months later when, in January 2010, France decided to add Algeria to a list of countries 
whose citizens were deemed to represent a threat to French national security: visitors arriving 
in France from Algeria were henceforth to be subject to increased security measures.  
The decision prompted strong protests within Algeria and resulted in the 
postponement of a planned visit to Algiers by the French Minister of Foreign and European 
Affairs, Bernard Kouchner. In an attempt to alleviate the crisis, in February 2010, President 
Sarkozy dispatched the Secretary-General of his Presidency, Claude Guéant, for talks with 
Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia and Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci, along with 
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other high-level officials in an attempt to resolve the issue. In June 2010 Claude Guéant again 
travelled to Algeria to meet with President Bouteflika and other senior officials for the same 
purpose. An absolute break in the French-Algerian relationship was apparently not an option 
for France.  Any significant breech would leave the security forces of both nations, and 
particularly France, open to formal reprimand for crimes against humanity committed since 
independence and in the 1990s, in particular.
649
 French penetration of Algeria at this juncture 
seems to have been profound. 
Despite both sides’ willingness to turn the page, which, as Boumédiène suggested, 
“cannot be torn up”, relations have often been marred with misunderstandings, conflicts, 
mutual suspicions and mistrust. Following a promising start under the presidency of Sarkozy, 
relations quickly went from bad to worse, at least up until the last months of his presidential 
period, which seem to have brought yet another hopeful development through economic 
channels, although one that reminds us of the exigencies of foreign penetration.  Recently, 
France has moved forward in its relationship with Algeria, in an effort to protect its interests 
in the area. However, a legacy of issues over the years has continued to complicate relations 
between the two nations. The kidnapping and murder of the French monks in 1996 in turn led 
to a number of issues, particulary when, in 1999, a French officer suggested that they had 
been killed accidentally by the Algerian army in a failed rescue operation.
650
 Even President 
Sarkozy who, at that time was looking for “the truth and only the truth”,651 found that when it 
came to French special interests in Algeria, especially with an economic crisis heating up in 
Europe, the truth was not entirely convenient. A similar scenario took place in January 2013.  
 According to Algerian media, the Azawat tribe in northern Mali took hostages of 
mostly foreign laborers in the middle of the Algerian desert as retribution for a French 
offensive.
652
 The Algerian military intervention was unprofessional, resulting in the death of 
a number of the hostages. Sarkozy had, at that time, called on the Algerian government to 
cooperate with the French authorities, arguing that “relations between great states are based 
on truth, not on lies”. It was a tacit requirement of the French government to defend the rights 
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of the foreign laborers. Their inadvertent killing by the Algerian forces complicated matters, 
especially considering the need for quiet resolution of the problem rather than having the case 
taken to court, and thus allowing the full truth of the events to come out. French newspapers 
derided the fact that France had appeared to have become the lawyer for the Algerian regime. 
The French Minister of External Affairs advised the media not to blame the Algerian military 
for the attack.  France then declared what amounted to a weak justification for the brutal 
intervention, arguing that because the Algerian regime had suffered from terrorism for the 
previous 20 years, they had to protect their natural gas installations from terrorism coming 
from Mali, who seemed bent on provoking a conflict with Algeria.
653
 This serves as yet 
another illustration of the French penetration of Algeria.
654
  
Politically, the Algerian government was against the war in Mali. They engaged in 
negotiations until the end the crisis, viewing it as an internal issue. But, just two days after the 
French soldiers started bombing the northern villages of Mali, the French Foreign Minister 
Laurent Fabius, told Algeria to close its border to the neighbouring country. “What we have 
in mind is that if African troops move into the north of the country, the Algerians will have to 
close their border.”655 A few hours later, Algerian Foreign Ministry spokesman Amar Belani 
confirmed that Algeria was closing its borders due to “the events in Mali.” Indeed, he had 
little choice thanks to the formal and informal penetration of the French. He ordered the 
military bases to allow French troops to cross domestic air space without taking any action.
656
 
According to the Guardian newspaper, the Algerian army made numerous mistakes in its 
handling of the hostage crisis, as admitted by the country's foreign minister. However, this 
case is only the most recent example of many that illustrate the depth of French penetration in 
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Algerian politics.
657
 France was apparently accustomed to issuing orders to the Algerian 
administration in crisis situations, with the Algerian political leadership facing little choice 
but to obey, even when those orders went against the interest of their citizens, such as 
happened with the elections of 1992.  
According to Zitout, Algerian politics have not changed very much since 
Independence. Regimes have changed, of course, but the basic patterns remain the same.  
Although politics in Algeria are built around the military, the early military revolutionaries 
and later the French Officers apparently were not struggling on behalf of Algerian interests, 
but rather were competing for the positions of power in the country. Without the support of 
the people, they necessarily depended upon the support of Western, and particularly French, 
interests.   France played a significant role in protecting the military regime in Algeria 
because of its own economic interests there.  This, then, was the basis of French penetration 
of Algeria.   
In an opinion piece published on 28 February 2013 in the weekly Marianne, a French 
general, Henri Poncet, declared that Algeria is the “best ally” of France.658 According to 
French military reports discussing the conflict in Mali, “Algeria has courageously committed 
to the side of France to support its commitment to Mali.” For the security of the 
Mediterranean, “Algeria and France should work together” it concluded.  General Poncet 
concluded that it was important for both parties to forget the events of over fifty years ago. 
Instead, he argued, it is finally time to build relationships that are part of a shared strategic 
vision and partnership. He suggested that that based on a common history, geography, and 
the complementarity of their economies, both countries could and should take decisive roles 
in their mutual future, shaping the current order and ensuring that the Mediterranean ceased 
to be a hostile frontier, dividing two worlds.
659
 France, of course, would have to serve as the 
leading partner. 
 
6. Human Rights Organizations and French Policy Regarding the Algerian Crisis  
It is useful to paint a summary picture of the formal French-Algerian relationship, and 
the response of human rights organizations in France and Algeria to what was happening 
daily in Algeria after the coup d’etat led by the French Officers and supported by successive 
                                                          
657
 “Colonel Urquhart Algeria made mistakes over hostage crisis, foreign minister admits”,  
guardian.co.uk (Saturday 26 January 2013).  
658
 See Channel d’Algerie, <http://www.tsa-algerie.com/diplomatie/un-general-francais-considere-l-algerie-
comme-le-meilleur-allie-de-la-france_23948.html>.  
659
 Ibid. 
 198   
 
French governments.  Independent organizations in Algeria as well as in France have strongly 
opposed the controlling policies of French governments in dealing with the Algerian crisis. In 
essence, the French provided significant support to the military regime in opposition to 
democracy, and the results of the elections of 1992. Moreover, French NGOs have failed to 
change French governments’ views on the crisis, or crises, over the past decades.  According 
to Camille Bonora-Waisman, “Democracy and Human Rights became principles of 
secondary importance.”660 In contrast, the EU government put pressure on Paris regarding 
human rights violations in Algeria. US President Bill Clinton followed Algerian events 
sympathetically, showing concern for the victims of the coup, and then unexpectedly adopted 
the French approach, particularly France announced that it would veto any UN intervention in 
Algeria, ostensibly proposed to investigate massacres and other crimes that had allegedly 
occurred the countryside in 1995.
661
 
It is critical to consider the impact of French political change on Algerian political and 
social life. According to Peter J. Schraeder, among the European countries that occupied 
African countries, France is the only former colonial power that has continued to support and 
intervene in its former colonies (and, indeed, in former Belgian colonies) throughout 
Africa.
662
 Whether socialists such as Francois Mitterrand or the more conservative partisans 
of Charles de Gaulle and Jacques Chirac, have been leading the French government, and even 
in the extraordinary case of Nicolas Sarkozy, the French have persisted in dealing with Africa 
as an extension of its “empire”. Algeria, however, occupies a special place in French 
international policies, perhaps because of its geographic location, although more likely 
because of significant economic interests.
663
  
In any event, the French-Algerian relationship has undergone dramatic shifts over 
time, according to the varying and shifting interest of the two countries.  French governments 
have manifested very different and changing views regarding Africa and, in particular, 
Algeria.  Algerian Independence in 1962, at least for French President Charles de Gaulle, was 
based on a contingent premise—that Algeria would remain in a special relationship with 
France.  Nicole Grimaud notes in this regard that:    
This tolerance shown by General de Gaulle toward Algeria was deliberate; 
he made it a point of honor that there should not be a rupture in the two 
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countries' relations. … De Gaulle saw cooperation as an exemplary act 
which he hoped would alleviate the painful feelings of the French over the 
loss of Algeria.
664
  
 
A short time after Algerian Independence, under the leadership of Georges Pompidou, 
the French government established a new “special-relationship” with Algeria. The issue at 
that time was oil, and the subsequent oil negotiations resulted in the nationalisation of the oil 
industry by Algerian President Boumédiène on 24/02/1971.  Pompidou expressed his desire 
for normalization the relationship with Algera, saying officially that “We will not give 
Algeria priority in our relations, but neither will we exclude it from the number of states with 
which we cooperate closely . . .”665 President Boumédiène answered that: “Between us and 
the French state, there is no longer any problem of interests. The only one that could still 
exist would be, perhaps, that of permanent relations.”666  
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing was the first French chief-of-state to visit Algiers, 
April 10-12, 1975, after four decidedly frosty years. He unsuccessfully tried to improve 
France’s relationship with Algeria, to the great disappointment of Algerians.  His somewhat 
trite motto, “Historic France greets Independent Algeria”, did little to improve relations.  The 
Algerian media responded in kind: “The liberty (Independence) of Algerians was taken not 
given [by France]”.  As a practical matter, however, the Algerian government gave its 
endorsement to France in its support of the takeover by Morocco of the Western Sahara, and 
thus chose to ignore the interests of thousands of Western Saharan refugees in the Algerian 
city of Tindouf. 
 The May 1981 French election results surprised Algiers; Francois Mitterrand, of the 
French Socialist Party (PS), proposed that France be the motherland of its former colonies, 
especially in North Africa and the Meditteranian, and hence a guardian of their internal 
problems, a policy that recalled the thinking of de Gaulle. This, in effect, encouraged French 
society to accept a multi-ethnic and pluri-cultural society, at a time when most French 
considered immigrants, and especially North African immigrants, as a threat to France, 
particularly in regards to a possible eventual dilution of national identity. “This attitude 
explains (even if not excusing) reactions of rejection and racist violence which [were] 
encouraged by the extreme right”.667 However, with a growing number of economic and 
social problems in French and Algeria, as well as the large gap between Algeria and Morocco 
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because of the involvement of France in support of Morocco, the Algerian regime soured on  
Mitterrand, ultimately seeing him as the worst French president ever.  
 Conciliation with the Islamic opposition in effect broke the silence of the Algerian 
military regime regarding the special role of the French Officers, who were actively 
collaborating at the time with French intelligent services in attempting undermine the 
Islamists in the elections of 1990/1991.  With the January 1992 coup d’état in Algeria, the 
French-Algerian relationship lost its vitality, although it continued on in a dormant state, 
awaiting the outcome of the next French elections. It can be said, however, that French 
relations with Algeria on the question of Islamists, especially after their victory in the 
elections, remained decidedly unstable, varying at times between conciliation, on the one 
hand, and eradication, on the other.
668
 In general, the French did not regard violence (the 
“eradication approach”) as an optimal way assure the safety of French interests. In Algeria, 
the eradication strategy consisted of directly countering, with violence, any violence 
committed by the Islamist armed groups; it also involved undermining the political project of 
Islamism of the FIS party.
669
 Under Jacques Chirac’s presidency, it seemed that the two 
countries were heading toward a historic treaty of friendship in 2005, and this was especially 
evident after Chirac’s speech in Algeria in 2003.670 While the military regime in Algeria was 
mired in problems of state security and Islamists, the French government was studying the 
case, trying to save their relationship with Algeria.  
 French governments had always backed the military regime in Algeria, however.  The 
French socialist government led by Beregovoy (April 1992-March 1993) preferred peaceful 
solutions as a formula for ending conflict in Algeria, although it also favoured the use of 
force after its formula for compromise was rejected by the opposition and the FIS. Six 
months after the coup, in the midst of a significantly cooled relationship, at a trade meeting in 
Algiers in July 1992, the French minister of agriculture and his colleagues prepared a 
platform designed to improve the relationship between the two countries.  This was a limited 
overture, however.  The absence of top-level French officials indicated that the French 
government would only accord limited approval of the policies of the Boudiaf regime. At 
Boudiaf’s request, Mitterrand agreed to meet with him in Paris on July 16,1992. The meeting 
never occurred, however: Boudiaf was assassinated just a couple of weeks before the 
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meeting.
671
 Significantly, the visit was to have been secret.
672
 Dumas eventually went to 
Algiers in order to attend Boudiafs funeral, and promised that “France [would] not economize 
on its help to Algeria,” and that “this [would] be visible in the days that follow[ed]”.673  
 By the end of 1992, the French-Algerian relationship was particularly strained, so 
much so that it threatened to affect significant components of French aid and support. Just 
before the French parliamentary elections of March, 1993, the socialists, anticipating defeat,  
initiated a process of reconciliation with Algerian regime. Increased economic aid was 
granted, and the PM designate, Abdesselam, was invited formally to Paris.  Pundits predicted 
success of the right, and Abdesselam made a point of meeting with members of that 
opposition, as well as with Georges Marchais, whose Communist Party had called since 
January 1992 for strong French support for the Algerian regime, including the provision of 
arms and military technology to confront “terrorism”, and support for the Algerian media, at 
a time when the only media allowed in Algeria was state-sponsored.
674
  Camille Bonora adds 
that:  
… it is worth emphasizing that,…the French media tend to affirm that 
France's Algeria policy has been one of unconditional support to the 
Algerian regime since the January 1992 coup d’état.675 
 
 In September, 1994, under the right-wing government of Balladur (March 1993-May 
1995), which was supported enhaced security rather than conciliation, France supported 
Algeria’s refusal to sign any accords with the Islamists in Algeria. Balladur apparently did 
not have a specific policy regarding events in Algeria, but was generally directed in his 
thinking by the basic idea that while an FIS take-over would be ‘a catastrophe’, it was not 
ineluctable. Upon this consideration, it was decided, in the words of Foreign Minister Alain 
Juppé, that everything had to be done in order to avoid the risk of an FIS take-over.
676
 
 In October 1995, under the Juppé government (May 1995- June 1997), France 
suddenly called for conciliation with Algeria, and urged the Algerian authorities to 
democratize their political system. This was typical of French responses to the Algerian 
crisis, and had been noted from the beginning. The Gaullist president, Jacques Chirac, during 
his visit in Algeria in 2003, emphasized a new, multiculturalist image of France. The 
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Algerian president bragged that “Together, Algerians and French, we are beginning to write 
the contours of a common destiny on a new page, without bitterness and without regret.”677 
 Unfortunately as is often the case, an incident was created in Paris by the opposition 
parties to sabotage reconciliation between the two countries. Nicholas Sarkozy’s (then- 
Minister of the Interior) new minorities policy, while continuing to attract Arab voters in 
France away from the Left, pressed the case of the Pied Noir, and particularly their right to be 
accepted by Algerian regime. Part of this involved trying to exorcise the lingering bad 
feelings and resentment left over from the war and the pains of decolonization, important 
inspirations of France’s extreme right party, the Front National.678 Indeed, following a 
promising start under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, relations quickly went from bad to 
worse, at least up until the next elections, to which Algeria committed its resources in a 
desperate attempt to get a leftist victory.   
 The victory in May, 2012, of Francois Hollande signaled a renewed focus on Algeria, 
with an apparent vision to bring French-Algerian relations to the same level of amicability 
and cooperation as existed with French-German relations. Hollande’s address to the Algerian 
MPs was well received, but was not enough for their requirements. Algerians simply wanted 
more: they wanted his apology for the French-led massacres, during and after the war of 
independence. Bouteflika, however, did not push Algeria’s case with Hollande, and sought 
only to reinforce the existing “conciliation plan”.  It was obvious that his primary concern at 
the time was to avoid being victimized by the “Arab Spring”. He made no request for 
reparations, as had been expected.  
 Hollande did pledge a one billion euro investment in a joint venture with the Algerian 
government to build a car factory (Renault) in Algiers. At a time when France’s automobile 
industry was shedding jobs and market shares, and when trade unions were screaming bloody 
murder about outsourcing, this initiative had domestic consequences for Hollande.
679
  
 The informal security relationship between France and Algeria was stable, and 
encouraged France to support a political plan in Algeria. France was looking at the Algerian 
situation as part of its security and economic stability. There were two ways to achieve 
enhanced security in Algeria, it was argued: conciliation with the Islamists, or re-launching a 
security war, giving significant support to the Algerian military regime so that they might 
destroy the Islamist parties and organisations.  
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In conclusion, various French governments have oscillated between support of the 
eradication of Islamists, and conciliation. Islamists have subsequently lost power and public 
support. The media has portrayed them as terrorists, most of their leaders have been killed or 
arrested, and the international community has tended to criticize what is often described as 
bland French support for the Algerian regime. France continues to look to Algerian 
authorities to find a “better solution” for the future of politics in Algeria.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ALGERIAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNISM 
 
1. Introduction 
 This chapter further explores one of the hypotheses introduced earlier, that the 
authoritarianism experienced by the Algerians is largely based on economic opportunism.  
The main supports of the military regime in Algeria, especially in the context of the “Arab 
Spring”, are petroleum deposits, oil and gas, which have increased the country’s cash 
reserves to over 200 billion dollars. According to Comp. Econ,
680
 the most important channel 
through which corruption affects economic growth is political instability. In Algeria, political 
and administrative positions are sought not for the honour or responsibility of the jobs, but 
rather for their remuneration without oversight. This chapter will focus on this broader topic 
of economic opportunism, which in most cases is expressed by powerful elites within the 
military, or by their partners in politics and administration.  In most cases this is expressed in 
blatant corruption, and it has apparently squandered a significant part of the the wealth of the 
country, leaving behind a hungry, poor, jobless, homeless, and undereducated people. 
Algerian oil-based wealth has helped to protect the regime from the “Arab Spring”, which 
has affected the stability of most of Algeria’s neighboring states, although it has also opened 
the door to opportunism and broad-scale corruption. Public funds have been far too easily 
accessible, with regime members suspected of syphoning off most of the country’s wealth 
with little accountability or responsibility. 
 
2.  Theoretical Base  
 In 1990, Tiihonen described the nature of the corruption that often exists within and 
between countries, outlining some of its humanitarian implications.
681
 Human rights 
organisations, seeking to ameliorate conditions leading to war and internal crises affecting 
most third world countries, have placed the issue of corruption high on their agendas. 
Corruption remains a difficult subject to analyse. Tiihonen noted that the main reason for the 
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difficulties inherent in considering corruption as a crime against the population is, in a global 
world, the complex phenomenon of economic development, dependent as it is in a neo-liberal 
world on big money and risk-taking. Most forms of corruption, it is argued, undermine the 
legitimacy of the political system and limit the delivery and quality of public services,
682
 
however, and therefore require the concerted attention of authorities if a rapid descent into 
underdevelopment is to be avoided. 
 Most countries today are suffering from an epidemic of corruption, through 
administrative mismanagement, underfunded bureaucracies, poor leadership, or the impact of 
an elite-centered institutional ethos.
683
 In fact, Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index, one of the only reliable international indices of corruption, has shown a 
steady decline in raw country scores over the past decade, suggesting that perceptions of 
corruption, at least, are on the rise. Political and economic corruption have no clear and 
agreed-upon definition, although bribery and influence peddling are usually included, and 
evidence of corruption is thus exceedingly hard to find. Additionally, the secretive nature of 
corruption further complicates the collection of evidence, especially where financial dealings 
may be the product of what appears to be normal trading among skilled government officials 
and businessmen.  Corruption can be disguised as an economic opportunity, and in many 
cases a corrupt interaction may also be a reflection of economic opportunism.      
 Scholars have differing definitions of corruption, and guilty parties in one case may, 
from another perspective (or set of national rules), be innocent.   It is evident that corruption 
tends to be embedded in economic activity.
684
 The United Nations’ statistics on the relative 
levels of criminality of its members have never included political or economic corruption as 
categories, principally because corruption appears only sporadically in national statistics on 
criminality,
685
 and hence the relative reliance of researchers on Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index over the past two decades. 
 Cases of corruption first appeared in the UN’s criminality statistics in this past 
decade, and international judicial proceedings and legislation had not focused on corruption 
per se until early in this century, when the UN Convention against Corruption was signed and 
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then ratified by most of the members of the UN General Assembly. Nevertheless, the reality 
in most countries is not encouraging.  Those charged with corruption are seldom punished.  
They tend not to lose positions of trust, and are almost never tried for breach of trust. 
Developing countries often mix public duty with personal interests, resulting in economic 
opportunism that easily shades into corruption. Some regard corruption as excusable in 
context, that is, as a kind of free trade conducted through a transparent agreement signed by 
all parties. In these cases, corruption is personal business conjoined with the duties of a 
public position.
686
  Nicolas Jacquemet defines corruption in the following terms:   
Corruption is understood as the diversion of a discretionary ability for the 
benefit of a third party, which is in remuneration offers. Any delegation of 
discretionary powers is thus a priori likely to be the object of it.
687
 
In another place he avers that “corruption is this rather uncommon agreement in which 
trustworthiness involves legal sanctions.
688
 Cooper Drury has defined corruption in other 
terms “as the abuse of public office for private gain,”689 whether this has occurred financially 
or in terms of status. Most definitions state that the gain and profit may accrue to an 
individual or group, or may be to another party which is closely associated with such an 
individual or group, adding that: “Corrupt activity includes bribery, nepotism, theft and other 
misappropriation of public resources”.690 Whether corruption has dominated the political and 
the economic system exclusively or not, it is a phenomenon that is regarded as damaging 
economic performance, whatever the sources of a country’s income.  It represents both a tax 
on productivity, and a market distortion.
691
 
 Mauro finds that “corruption reduces private sector investment even in countries 
featuring cumbersome economic regulations, where corruption might be expected to spur 
investment.”692 Shleifer and Vishny suggest that one reason for this is that corruption is more 
than simply a tax on economic activity, primarily because there is no central mechanism for 
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collection.
693
 They believe that this stems from the fact that corrupt agreements – between a 
briber and an agent, for example – cannot be enforced by third parties, due to illegality.694 
However, Mauro clarifies that economic opportunism starts from political corruption. In a 
world in which governments do not always look after their workers and do not act in their 
citizens’ best interest, “corrupt politicians may be expected to spend more public resources on 
those items on which it is easier to levy large bribes and maintain them in secret.”695   
 Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra argues that corruption refers narrowly to the exercise of 
public power for private gain. Public corruption is that which is undertaken by government 
officers through their positions, especially by decision makers, whereby a public employee, 
elected or not, uses his position corruptly in government in order to obtain private benefits. 
“The existence of corruption indicates a lack of respect for the rules and regulations that 
govern economic interactions in a given society”.696 People tend to engage in corruption to 
cover their needs, and often consider that the government should be covering them. The 
objective of people engaging corruption may only be to seek food and the basic necessities of 
life. According to Ackerman and others corruption, in some cases at least, is narrowly based 
on needs, especially when an official has discretion over the distribution of a good or the 
'avoidance of a bad' vis-à-vis the private sector.
697
 The official has an incentive to ask for a 
bribe to increase his/her income in exchange for a good that has little cost to them.
698
 A 
business firm has an incentive to offer a bribe and obtain benefits to which it would not 
otherwise have access, such as being granted a contract without competitive tender.  
 Cuervo-Cazurra identifies two views of corruption, one positive and the other 
negative. Although corruption is rarely justified on ethical grounds, some scholars view 
corruption in positive terms, as the ‘grease in the wheels of commerce’.699  Huntington and 
Leff state that “corruption is seen as facilitating transactions and speeding up procedures that 
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would otherwise occur with more difficulty, if at all”.700 Leff states: “Corruption is a way to 
bring market procedures into an environment of excessive or misguided regulation, 
introducing competition into what is otherwise a monopolistic setting.”701 Corruption is a part 
of undeveloped countries, usually generated among most of the population within their 
different positions and duties, and practiced in their daily life. Corruption enables free 
markets to emerge in situations of limited freedom. Thus, the markets in these countries are 
closely guided by the government or agents in the country and that closed economic system 
would not be able to encourage free trade investment and commerce. Investors who value 
time or access to an input more than others will pay more for it.
702
   
 Most scholars have a negative view of corruption, because it is rarely restricted to 
areas where it could conceivably add to the public welfare. Scholars tend to see corruption as 
‘sand in the wheels of commerce’, indicating that it has a negative effect on economic 
resources.  
703
 They argue that such resources could be invested far more profitably in other 
ways. Moreover, corruption does not ensure that the promised goods are even delivered. 
Investors do not have recourse in the courts to demand fulfilment of agreements, because 
bribery, a major form of corruption, is illegal, and thus secret. Even when the bribe results in 
fulfilment of a promise, the party affected faces increased costs.
704
 The official exacting the 
bribe, for example, can withhold approval of a permit until the bribe is paid, thus increasing 
costs to the bribe-paying firm. Government officials have a monetary incentive to create 
additional regulations with the sole purpose of generating opportunities for bribery.
705
 
“Corruption also results in the inefficient allocation of resources.”706 Nicolas Jacque notes 
another type of corruption: a second agreement on a primary contract, whose objective is to 
incorporate an additional reason for divergence from the original agreement, thanks to the 
payment of a bribe.
707
 Such an illegal agreement is a corrupt pact, creating a new support 
framework, but directed towards diverting the discretionary ability entrusted to the agent, in 
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favour of the corrupt practitioner. John Girling states that the concept of corruption goes back 
to Aristotle’s distinction concerning political constitutions.708 As Aristotle points out, each 
member hopes to attain a share of the good life. 
 
3. Corruption in Algeria: The Historical Context  
It is argued by many observers that a culture of corruption has infected the Algerian state 
since independence. It is said to have affected state institutions, weakening them and 
subjecting them to undue central control. United Nations reports classify Algeria, along with 
many of Arab countries, as being behind the newly industrialized countries regarding 
political and economic development. Algeria holds the dubious record of having the lowest 
level of physical capital productivity.
709
 It ranks 111
th
 in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index, 2011, and 105
th
 in the 2012 CPI, well below most countries in 
the CPI.  France, in contrast, ranked 25
th
 in 2011, and 22
nd
 in 2012, the most recent results.   
 Lahouari Addi locates the beginning of the economic crisis in Algeria, which 
appears to be inextricably bound up with violence and corruption, at independence. In 1962, 
the state, which was essentially public, was privatised, while commercial activities, which 
were essentially private, were made public.  At that time the Algerian revolutionary elites, 
like others in third world countries, believed that faith alone was enough to develop the 
country, by using the state without establishing institutions guaranteeing free expression for 
social groups organised as parties, trade unions, and other interests, thus denying them the 
ability to participate in the political process.
710
 One of the revolutionary leaders, Ait Ahmed, 
had a clear answer to Bouteflika when he urged him to share power with Boumédiène by 
supporting the coup d’état against the provisional government. He said that the role of 
revolutionary leaders should be to finish their mission of bringing independence to the 
Algerian people, so that the youth of Algeria would take responsibility and continue building 
their country according to the revolution’s principles.711Ait Ahmed wanted to pass Algerian 
political power on to the new generation after independence, but when he saw that 
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Boumédiène was corrupting the principles of the revolution, by using Ben Bella’s name and 
position in Algeria to rob the citizens of power, he stood against him in trying to stop him 
through the use of violence.
712
 Ait Ahmed then faced a violent reprisal from Boumédiène’s 
military regime. Although he fought against political corruption, he was eventually arrested 
and spent the next 30 years in exile. As a new state, the corruption of the Algerian 
Constitution would have a devastating effect: the spread of corrupt political and economic 
practices.
713
  
 The economic sector, which was expected to absorb all commercial activities from 
large-scale steel industry down to small local bakeries, effectively prevented the different 
social groups from enjoying any economic autonomy.
714
 Because of his unsuccessful 
economic policies, Ben Bella, the first president, afforded the military the opportunity to 
seize his position through coup d’état in June 1965. The military, which already dominated 
local political power in the country with the support of French Officers, used authoritarian 
means to cut off the opposition’s legal pathways to power. In 1992, when the French Officers 
reached the peak of their power through a coup d’état, the only political party, the FLN, had 
been reduced from political activity to ignoring professional military revolutionaries, sending 
them into retirement with some financial assistance, including permits for small businesses 
such as taxi and coffee shop licences. Meanwhile, the new military representative in the 
political wing of the National Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement National Démocratique 
– RND) became the only guarantor of legitimacy. 
 Maâmar Boudersa states that a discussion of corruption in Algeria is simply too 
broad a subject.  The reasons for corruption in Algeria must be analysed through the legal 
definition of the state in international law. Any country, to be so legally classified, has to 
have at least three elements: people, land, and organisation. According to Boudersa, Algerian 
communities have been corrupted by a military regime dominated by the military secret 
service (DRS) and, as noted repeatedly throughout this thesis, the French Officers. This 
corruption is the main reason why economic opportunism in most levels of the society was 
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originally able to gain a foothold.
715
 Corruption had become a part of the Algerian leaders’ 
lives. It is not new for Algerians to see their leaders using public trust and the wealth of 
society to build their own interests and power. In 1964 there was a major scandal concerning 
the collection of funds and jewellery from ordinary Algeria citizens, often Algerian women, 
to fund the building of the new country. It is emblematic of the post-independence period that 
the major collection that resulted from these donations was stolen, and is still missing today 
without any investigation or charges pressed against anyone in power.
716
  
 
4. Economic opportunism and decision making   
 According to Boudersa, the Algerian government is dealing with corruption through 
legal indictments, as it has the perfect right to do so. Joffe states that the nature of 
independent of Algeria and its claim to revolutionary legitimacy has been to mask the 
arbitrary power of the army at its core, which has systematically undermined other 
institutions.
717
 Algerian political groups have no legal legitimacy.  Legal processes are often 
strangely missing from the courts, and because there is no separation of powers among the 
legislature, judiciary and executive, ultimately there is no control over contracts and trade, as 
well as a lack of transparency at any level.
718
 A clear example mentioned by Boudersa 
concerns constitutional law, which has clear rules and articles regarding control over public 
agencies. These articles, in place since the first Constitution of 1963, have never been acted 
upon.
719
 Moreover, the government has never reported back to the parliament on expenses 
and the way in which the budget has been spent. In 1990, an international bank published a 
report saying that more than 60% of the Algerian debt at that time stemmed from smuggling 
public money out of the country.
720
  
 Under martial law and de facto military dictatorship since 1992, economic 
opportunism by public officials and corruption has been widely evident without legal 
indictment or redress.
721
 Brahimi stated that the military leaders have used this period, the 
‘red decade’, a period of rampant insecurity, lack of civic order coupled with freedom of 
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elites from legal sanction, to sell public property to themselves and their relatives at 
scandalously low prices. Brahimi divided the corruption and economic opportunism in 
Algeria into two parts: the first stemmed from the local departments and administration 
services, which affected virtually everyone directly. According to a publicized comment of 
the Minister of Internal Affairs, between 1997 and 1999 the Algerian courts investigated 83 
cases of alleged corruption concerning elected members in local government, including 
mayors, members of social committees and regional executive leaders (Willaya chiefs).
722
 As 
with most incidents of corruption in the world, these cases of corruption are difficult to 
control, or even detect.  Indeed, many of the people involved with corruption of this kind 
regard their actions as legitimate, part of their work, or their businesses, and even as their 
personal right.
723
 
 The expression of corruption became clear after the coupd’état of 1992, when 
politicians and leaders of public companies began functioning without oversight.  
Government intervention was limited by the emergency rules of Martial Law, which were 
directly administered by the military regime. This allowed officers and people in charge of 
public administration and finance companies to breach the public trust and in effect, to 
organize themselves in what amounted to a financial mafia. Thousands of people become 
very wealthy, holding billions of dollars of public money, and smuggling it into European 
banks. In the last decade, the Algerian media has claimed that billions of dollars were lost 
simply in the delay of major projects such as the Algiers Metro, the sea face of Algiers, and 
the East-West motorway.
724
  
 Brahimi refers to many incidents of corruption and economic opportunism during 
his time as prime minister. Many government projects were suspected of involving 
corruption. At the top were the leaders and military generals, allegedly using the public funds 
without oversight or responsibility.
725
 “Corruption was a taboo subject until 1990” says 
Brahimi. Indeed, it is interesting to note that before 1990, any reference (even in private 
speech) to corruption within the government was forbidden. It was at this time that Brahimi 
was placed on a ‘wanted list’ by the military and the Court of Algiers. He had made a 
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statement to the effect that more than 26 billion dollars was missing from the national 
treasury because of large-scale corruption and economic opportunism present throughout the 
public bureaucracy, including the military and the government ministries.
726
 He states that:  
Indeed, corruption has been raised publicly by myself and estimated at 26 
billion dollars for the past 20 years, all sectors. We had then attended an 
outcry. The various public media and "private" were mobilized by the 
government in tackling not to corruption and corrupt, but he who speaks 
and denounces it. Even the President of the Republic and Head of 
Government and the Secretary General of the FLN of the time are on the 
frontlines to deny the existence of corruption by focusing their attack 
against whoever denounces. In this context, I said publicly that my 
"statement is in line with the wishes of the grassroots has been denouncing 
the scourge of corruption" and that he had started when he was Prime 
Minister, procedures and mechanisms to prevent and control the award of 
major contracts with the outside. I said “it is true that certain provisions 
were not absolutely effective, they (the procedures and mechanisms) were 
not less punitive and sometimes reported very significant gains the country. 
One can indeed find cases in these controls have significantly reduced the 
price of services and foreign supplies.” But these details did not mitigate 
the vehemence of the attacks focused for two years on my person by the 
press and various prime ministers who succeeded between 1990 and 1992, 
namely: Mouloud Hamrouche Ghozali and Belaïd Abdeslam Ahmed. It 
would have been to wait until May 1999 to see the daily El Watan 
estimated 30 to 35 billion dollars "money of dubious origin" held by the 
migrant Algerians in banks.
727
 
 
 This public statement was sufficient for him to be indicted and placed on the military 
regime’s most wanted list.  Brahimi was one of the best-known leaders of the war against the 
French, and had occupied important positions in the political and economic spheres.  He had 
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served as prime minister from 1984-1988. By the crisis of 1990s, Brahimi was sent into exile 
in England, and lost his right to return to Algeria.  He also lost his Algerian citizenship.
728
  
According to his comments, the Algerian media played a major role in covering up incidents 
of corruption, focusing, rather, on showing only a favourable view of the military regime.
729
 
Brahimi is considered to have been one of the few honest military revolutionaries and civilian 
leaders, and it is not surprising that he risked everything to reveal the extent of the corruption 
in Algeria.    
 Brahimi’s declaration against corruption was based on his experience of leading 
different administrations, and especially his period as prime minister.  Brahimi’s government 
was well organised, and made the safeguarding of public funds a top priority. He placed 
foreign contracts and trade with public associations under the control of specialists, and 
punished anyone consequently charged with corrupt practices.  Brahimi’s government was, 
by all accounts, successful, and was said to have saved more than five billion dollars during 
his time in office. After his statement, however, the Algerian media was relentless in 
characterizing him as having violated the trust of the Algerian people.
730
 In 1999, the El-
Watan newspaper reported that there were between 30 and 35 billion dollars owned by 
Algerians in foreign banks. Senior military refuted these numbers, however, as the product of 
presidential elections, and in support of Bouteflika.  
 During his electoral campaign, Bouteflika promised citizens a focus on economic 
investments and an end to the corruption in the country. In October 1999, at the opening of 
the international exhibition in Algiers, Bouteflika’s speech in front of foreign and local 
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business investors was focused on corruption and economic opportunism.  He said that “the 
corruption has hurt the county’s economy more than it has been affected by terrorism”.  He 
argued that the only way to stop this phenomenon was to educate people and to put ethics as a 
priority within public administration and economic bureaucracies.
731
 No action has been 
taken by the subsequent presidents or even the government since then, however.   
 As noted above, political corruption is dynamically linked to economic opportunism. 
Bouteflika, who came to power at the invitation of the generals, could not turn against them 
over corruption. He had three terms in the presidency and would not have been able to win 
these elections without the support of the military regime.  He is thought to have used public 
funds from the primary source of funding in the country, petroleum funds through 
SONATRACH.
732
 According to Karim Moulay, Bouteflika has a long and sordid history with 
the military secret service, and was involved in many cases of corruption before he occupied 
the presidency, including using public lands in the desert (Adrar) for the princes from the 
Gulf countries to go hunting.
733
  
 Those responsible for the corruption are said to be in positions hidden from the 
public, and use the state security apparatus to work outside the law.   They use civilian sub-
contractors or lower rank officers to front their operations, and are primarily concerned with 
protecting themselves from public scandals. Should a scandal occur, blame can easily be 
transferred to third parties, the contractors or junior officers.  In fact, there has never been a 
conviction in the courts; instead files are changed or lost, and investigative committees tend 
to lose track of the original evidence, with fabricated evidence often substituted and doubts 
cast on its validity, usually resulting in the ‘freezing’ of the dossiers and the end of 
prosecution.  In a report published by the Algerian newspapers on 27 March 1992, and which 
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the French Officers have used expediently, a charge of squandering public funds was made 
against a retired general, Mostapha Belloussif, when he was military attaché in the Algerian 
embassy in Paris. Belloussif was accused of owning illegal properties and using public funds 
in illegal transfers, amounting to approximately 70 million French francs. He had an 
apartment in Paris and another house in Annaba in Algeria dating back to the 1980s. Charges 
were only levelled against him in 1992, which caused some confusion within the 
investigative committee of the court as well as in the understanding of then Prime Minister 
Brahimi, who saw the case as an individual conflict between French Officers and 
revolutionaries in the military regime.
 734
  Corruption in the military has been allowed, and 
Belloussif’s purchase of properties was not unusual.  In fact, the co-optation of lower ranking 
officers and public officials was the norm, with levels of corruption apparently rising with 
rank and stature.
735
    
 Brahimi was asked how many civilian leaders and military officers above those 
charged had benefited from illegal operations such as the preferential awarding of import and 
export contracts, critical components of public finance, the misuse of which had already 
bankrupted many public companies.
736
 Were there any charges or claims against them?  
While there are no charges against incidents of corruption, charges have been laid for 
“forgery and falsification.”737 However, corruption is not a phenomenon at only the 
leadership level; it has become a part of the public life of most of Algerians today. Because of 
the weakness of the justice system in Algeria, which, as noted above, is closely tied to the 
military regime, corruption charges tend not to touch those mainly responsible, particularly 
those in high positions.  Rather, when contractors very occasionally in these corruption cases 
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face charges, they tend to be helped to escape the country.  A trial would run the risk of 
revealing potentially awkward information.   
  Brahimi has referred to the crisis in Algeria as an ethical crisis across all levels of 
the regime, transforming itself into a public catastrophe. Most citizens have attempted to take 
whatever they can from areas of the economy under public ownership.
 738
 Moreover, 
according to many participant interviewees, the military regime is also responsible for the 
grinding poverty, which continues to ravage society.
739
 The prevailing ethos in society 
appears to be the result of the corruption and injustice.  Political corruption and economic 
opportunism have developed in the regime from the beginning, and Djilali Hadjadj noted that 
“petty corruption has spread throughout society and large-scale corruption has eaten away at 
state institutions.”740 Hadjadj, in an academic article, gives a brief history of corruption in 
Algeria after independence, and then outlines the corruption that took place in most of the 
country’s economic associations. His work represents an examination of the development and 
functioning of the mafia-like systems that grew up in the regime. He underscores the ‘Khalifa 
group’ case as the most extensive example of corruption in Algerian history, one that is well 
worth further examination. 
 The ‘Khalifa affair’ was an enormous corruption scandal with international 
implications; the Algerian government has been compelled to deal with it over the past five 
years.
741
 Rafik Abdel-Mouman Khalifa is the son of Laroussi Khalifa, a revolutionary leader 
and government minister.
742
 Rafik Khalifa began his career with a small pharmacy in Algiers. 
In 1998 he founded a bank (Khalifa Bank), which managed the interests of small private 
shareholders and institutional shareholders related to the Algerian government. Continuing 
his activities in France, he soon created an empire that eventually employed 14,000 people. 
Using his political relatives in Algeria and France, Khalifa expanded his business and dealt in 
a wide variety of areas. He owned a luxury car rental business before founding Khalifa TV in 
France, as well as Khalifa Airways, and buying a private hotel in Cannes, which had 
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belonged to the eccentric billionaire, Môme Moineau.
743
 He owned three villas in Cannes, 
and wanted to create a new city, la ville nouvelle, which he planned to name ‘Algeria’.  This 
caught the attention of the French media. He associated with French film stars Gerard 
Depardieu and Catherine Deneuve. Khalifa built up a €1 billion business empire that 
extended into banking, construction, aviation, media and the sports industry. He maintained a 
high-profile sponsorship of the French football club, Olympique de Marseille. However, in 
2003, a judicial liquidation of his indebted parent company began.  
 The Khalifa scandal began as a banking scandal.  An Algerian investigation revealed 
the disappearance of 50 million Euros from the Khalifa Bank of Algiers. He was accused of 
large-scale embezzlement from his customers.  Khalifa rejected this charge, saying that the 
amount, which was in cash in the bank, was more than enough to cover what he owed his 
customers. He declared he had spent the money on figures close to Algerian President 
Bouteflika. Khalifa represented the case as an historical and personal conflict between him 
and his father and the president, Boutaflika.
744
 The Algerian court opened 17 judicial 
investigations against Khalifa, who took refuge in London in 2003. The Khalifa Bank was 
closed on orders of Bouteflika.  One of Khalifa’s trials began in January 2007, and the 
Algerian authorities soon became caught up in a complex legal battle with the UK in their 
attempts to extradite him.  
 Dhina and Chouchane note that Khalifa was a small businessman who could not 
have reached the levels of power and wealth that he attained without the knowing support of 
the military and major international investors.
745
  According to Chouchane, Aroua and Zaoui, 
the Khalifa case is a classic example of competition, conflict and corruption at the highest 
levels in Algeria.  Most of my interviewees believe that the Khalifa Empire was formed by 
key people from the military regime, with the major support of French agents.  Khalifa’s 
downfall likewise stemmed from opposing military officers, and their political supporters in 
the regime, using corruption and economic opportunism in business as pretexts to bring down 
Khalifa in a dirty competition for power.
746
 Chouchane clarified that corruption and 
economic opportunism has little use in high-level competition among the ruling cadre 
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because it is a common practice for all of them.  It does have its uses against politicians and 
people in the presidential bureaucracy, however. 
 The Khalifa case is similar to other major cases of corruption, theft, embezzlement 
and economic opportunism. These include the SONATRACH scandal and the East-West 
Motorway scandal.  Before that there was widespread corruption in major projects such as the 
Algiers Airport and the Metro of Algiers.
747
 The Khalifa case, which is still working its way 
through the court system in Algiers, has uncovered a treasure trove of secret information that 
the Algerian media has refused, or not been allowed, to report on in public. Billions of dollars 
from public funds have been taken without even an apology to the Algerians who routinely 
suffer from hunger in what should be a very rich country.
748
 By late 2009 and early 2010, the 
Algerian regime proposed to make a new start with untainted personnel and a broad-scale 
policy of transparency in public administration.  Files dealing with allegations of corruption 
have been opened, and implicate some of the leadership and their partners from amongst the 
international investors. This policy was used first as a tool in the chaotic competition among 
the political and the economic elites of the country, rather than in the interests of legality and 
legitimacy.  
 In Turkey, when the opposition wanted change, they used hundreds of researchers to 
determine the best approach to exit their protracted political crisis, and they successfully 
moved on to a more thorough going democracy - largely without violence. The opposition in 
Algeria has not yet achieved this foresight, according to Chouchane.
749
 In Chouchene’s view, 
corruption and economic opportunism cannot be the main factors supporting the hegemony of 
the military regime. Economic opportunism, for example, is just a secondary element, one 
that is significantly less important than the larger issue of corruption, which, in turn, pales in 
comparison to what he regards as the betrayal of the Algerian people.  
The Algerian Military is in charge of massive crimes, massacres and 
genocide against Algerians since Independence, and in the 1990s 
particularly. Corruption and economic opportunism has never been 
sufficiently evident to charge… problem of corruption among the 
military leaders has never been raised…. The military regime has 
been involved in massive human rights violations and massacres of 
civilians; their hegemony in power is a much bigger [concern, and 
would be a priority in any] charges…well before corruption or any 
financial malfeasance.
750
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 Boumédiène was the first leader to replace civilian political leaders with military 
officers after independence, but he is thought to have been largely free of corruption and 
economic opportunism. His legacy was political dictatorship and military hegemony in 
Algeria.
751
 In Chouchane’s view, the main factor in military hegemony, which the Algerian 
crisis was based upon, was the formation of the Algerian military.  There was no central 
political or military leadership and that was, in his view, the primary mistake made by the 
early revolutionary leaders.  The revolution had no legislation or legal rules that could 
organise the military secret service, or define and limit its work and its interventions.  Thus 
the military took power in 1956 with little resistance, and continue to hold power today. For 
Lahouari Addi, corruption became a part of the system within the military regime. He notes 
that:   
Corruption is the general rule, involving not just individuals but whole 
networks that reach up to the very highest levels of the state and are tough 
to dismantle.
752
  
Addi and Bouandel based their view of the Algerian crisis on the domination of the military 
in all facets of the country. The military regime created a political face, the single party 
allowed in national politics, and so took political power. The FLN, created as a single 
political party, was guided directly by presidents who were also ministers of defence.  
Potentially, they had unlimited power, closing the door to democracy, pluralism and 
opposition. From this point on, corruption, nepotism and widespread injustice became the 
reality of Algerian politics.  
 In Algeria, every Member of Parliament, every government minister, even judges 
and directors of national companies, know that they have only a limited period in their 
positions. This tends to be seen as a chance to raise themselves and their relatives out poverty 
for the rest of their lives.  In the absence of any oversight, except (for reasons of internal 
competition) from the military regime, economic opportunism and corruption appear to be 
tacitly encouraged. According to Chouchane the military regime controls all parts of the 
public sector including the political and economic administration through their agencies, 
which are introduced as political parties or ministers and executive leaders of the state. These 
agencies have nothing to argue with or to disagree about apart from following the orders of 
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the shadow power of the military secret services, and they are paid from the public 
finances.
753
 Any of them refusing to follow orders will find himself out his position with a 
large file collated by the secret services released to the media under the title of ‘Corruption’.  
 Many examples of corruption were raised early in 2010, when the military secret 
services opened a large number of files against leaders in the government and national 
companies, and even compromised the standing of President Boutaflika.  Chouchane clarified 
this, saying the main reason the military secret service opened the corruption files to the 
public media was as a warning to the presidential administration, and to send a message to 
the president. When Boutaflika first came to the presidency he was virtually ignored by the 
generals and the senior officers of the secret service. The generals only agreed to his limited 
power for purposes of legitimacy:  he had the constitutional and electoral support that they so 
badly lacked. After he won election to a second term, he was confident enough to move on 
with his project of amnesty for corruption because he felt he had legitimised his position from 
both sides. He was the only person in power to enjoy full legitimacy in front of the generals.  
From his position as an elected president, he had the right constitutionally to make any 
changes in any public institution. He had come from the ranks of the revolutionary leaders 
who had established their political positions early in the formation of the state in 1962. 
Emboldened, Boutaflika tried to use his power to make changes in the military. The military 
secret service, as noted above, has attempted to protect itself by gathering detailed files 
against any politician wanting to turn against them.  When the DRS’s leader, Tewfik Median, 
received his termination notice from the president, he announced to the public that there was 
a serious issue of corruption involving the national oil company (SONATRACH), which 
related directly to the Minister of Oil, and indirectly to the president himself.  This case 
involved billions of dollars lent unofficially and surreptitiously to Dubai to help it out of its 
financial crisis, on the orders of the president, and without notification of the parliament or 
the public. 
 The SM has a long history of using these kinds of files, dating back to its founder, 
Boussouf, who developed a corruption case against Ramdane, prior to participating in his 
assassination.  He used confidential files against other colleagues as well.  Belkacem and 
Bentoubal were threatened with disclosures until they were removed by political means from 
the revolutionary leadership.  Files were used against President Chadli, involving information 
about his son and his brother. Corruption was the charge that removed President Zaroual, as 
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well as his supporter, General Batchine. While human rights organisations and the 
international community have welcomed transparency policies in Algeria, questions need to 
be asked about which part of the regime has instigated legal proceedings against elites in 
Algeria’s expanding civil society.  Why have such files not been opened against the military? 
It is common knowledge in the Algerian public that the military regime is the most corrupt 
organisation in the country.  Chouchane claims to have witnessed this when the SM senior 
officers offered him billions of dinars in his office.  His refusal to accept this co-optation, he 
says, led to his subsequent exile.  
 Needless to say, the investigation that the DRS opened after the corruption scandal 
of SONATRACH did not stop corruption or improve the economy, as Chouchane notes, and 
its example has not been applied to institutions or even by the president to his major projects. 
754
  Its cause was likely the result of a conflict between the DRS and the president.
755
 
Hammoud Salhi and Akram Belkaid in their interview with Aljazeera TV said that the 
corruption in SONATRACH is not unique among the national economic administrations, and 
it has already touched some other ministries, such as the Ministry of Transportation and the 
Ministry of Public Services.
756
 It is not, for that matter, a new situation for the Algerian 
government.  The case of SONATRACH has been a major story in the media because it goes 
to the heart of the state’s economy. Because of the rising price of oil in international trade, 
the Algerian government has been able to cover its fiscal deficit and foreign debt to the extent 
that it now has a financial surplus in the treasury. Due to corruption and the waste of public 
money, however, the Algerian government has been unable to provide a decent life for its 
citizens, especially young people, who are mostly unemployed and live in deprivation so 
much so that they look for a better life in the developed countries through illegal 
immigration, and risk their lives crossing the Mediterranean.  
 In the discussion on financial corruption and economic opportunism, this research 
has focused more on the case of SONATRACH over other companies. But it is important to 
note that almost no company in Algeria is innocent from accusations of corruption. The focus 
is on SONATRACH because it takes centre stage in the revenue gathering of Algeria. 
SONATRACH was established in 1963, and is responsible for the exploration, production, 
distribution and marketing of hydrocarbons and downstream products. Since hydrocarbons 
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account for 97.5 per cent of Algeria's export earnings, SONTARCH is the mainstay of the 
country's economy. With over 120,000 employees, Algeria's state-owned energy giant is the 
largest company in Africa. Through the investments of SONATRACH and its partners, 
Algeria has grown to become the world's third largest exporter of liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG), the fourth largest exporter of liquefied natural gas, the fifth largest natural gas 
exporter and the ninth largest exporter of oil. SONATRACH is ranked sixth among the 
world's natural gas companies in terms of reserves and production.
757
  
 As recently in February and March 2013, after the letter from the former 
SONATRACH vice president Hocine Malti, the French-language Algerian daily El Watan 
broke the silence surrounding the company. Addressing the shadowy leader of Algeria's 
intelligence service, the newspaper asked if he was really serious about investigating new 
bribery scandals involving SONATRACH and Italian and Canadian companies. This scandal 
was covered by international media, pointing to this case as an example of corruption and 
“breach of trust” by the former Algerian Minister for Energy and Mines and the head of the 
SONATRACH. When Italian prosecutors announced in January an investigation into the oil 
company ENI and subsidiary SAIPEM for allegedly paying €197 million ($256.1 million) in 
bribes to secure an €11 billion contract with SONATRACH, it provoked a firestorm in the 
Algerian media, until the country's own justice system finally announced its own inquiry on 
February 10, 2013. Investigations’ have been opened in Italy as well as in USA and the UK. 
The Italian court has accused both the Italian and Algerian sides of bribery and corruption.
758
  
 In 2006, Algeria passed a law giving SONATRACH a minimum 51% share in all oil 
and natural-gas exploration contracts signed with foreign companies, but that measure and 
other tough contract terms have stunted investor appetite. In late 2009, the country's oil 
ministry awarded just three out of 10 oil and natural-gas exploration permits on offer in a 
state licensing round. That doesn't bode well for Algeria's ambitions to bring more gas to 
Europe. Algeria, the third-biggest gas supplier to Europe after Russia and Norway, sends 
most of its gas to Italy, Spain and France, via pipeline or tanker. SONATRACH has also 
experienced delays of several months in completing a new gas pipeline to Spain. Some 
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foreign companies that are working in-country say bureaucratic delays in the Algerian oil 
ministry are one of their main sources of frustration there.
759
 
 Samraoui has mentioned in his book
760
 the extent of military opportunism and 
clarified how the military authorities have tended to deal with public assets. There is no 
oversight of military officers, and thus they spend as much as they want for their own 
missions against terrorism and conducting their own international trade. They care primarily 
about their positions and their own interests, looking to protect themselves rather than being 
concerned about public finances. The corruption and economic opportunism files that the 
secret service have periodically disclosed apparently have less to do with mismanagement or 
corruption, and more to do with political score-settling.  
It may seem as though the factions and interest groups give the regime its 
logic and dynamic. But, in fact, those factions are an effect of the political 
regime; there is not one of the groups in any of the factions that could 
thwart the regime's logic in using the power.
761
  
  
 According to the Algerian Movement of Free Officers, MAOL (Le Mouvement 
Algérien des Officiers Libres), corruption in the military sector is not a crime or even 
regarded as poor deportment.  Most senior military officers are wealthy, with their accounts 
in European banks said to be swollen with public funds. They built their wealth from their 
interventions in public contracts with international companies, especially in the contracts with 
the oil companies. A military group of ‘free officers’ recently posted a list of generals and 
other high-ranking officers who are said to have sizeable assets, in some cases equal to the 
GDP of some sub-Saharan African countries.
762
 Chouchane has clarified that the military 
officers had started focusing upon their personal wealth by the 1990s, when they realised that 
their domination over Algeria could easily be lost at any time. The political crisis that pushed 
the country to the verge of instability allowed the generals free reign to do whatever they 
wanted, without oversight.  No one was able to stop them, especially under martial law. 
 Helen Chapin Metz noted that the control of one single party, the FLN, led to the 
creation of an authoritarian system that proved impossible to overcome, and that resulted in 
the rise of religious extremists, “particularly in the form of the FIS” and the Islamic groups in 
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general.
763
 The failure of the economic system after independence, when the regime 
disbanded a number of large government enterprises and state farms, and the drop in world 
oil prices in 1986, together with poor domestic economic management, aggravated the 
already depressed economic situation.
764
 Social life was affected, resulting in social unrest 
that stemmed from the discontent of those youths who were either jobless and had no hope 
for their future, or were facing the fact that even with their high qualifications, many of them 
would remain unemployed or in dead-end jobs, and would continue to suffer from food and 
housing shortages. By the end of September and early October 1988, business income in the 
major industrial areas across the country, including Algiers, was significantly down with the 
subsequent unrest culminating in a series of labour strikes. The strikes were repressed by the 
military with considerable force and a loss of life estimated in the hundreds.
765
 
 In this case, Samraoui noted that the rise of the Islamists in the heart of the Algerian 
political arena began during the early 1980s, when economic difficulties in Algeria were 
giving rise to social depression and corruption.  The military regime had failed to care for the 
social life of the citizens, which opened the door for Islamists to create the space that they 
needed as they tried to minimize the large gap between the rich and poor calling on Islamic 
ethics and Sharia law. With the relative absence of the government in social projects, 
Islamists found the space to fill the socio-economic gap that had opened. They were 
successful in managing social work, which gave them the support of the majority of citizens. 
Charities in the name of Islam offered less corruption (corruption is forbidden). Muslim 
clerics criticised the military regime and its policies, the political hegemony, corruption and 
economic opportunism of the military, and presented a challenge to the ruling powers which 
ultimately drove the country to violent confrontations. The only solution the military regime 
could think of was to appeal to security, and to stop the growth of the Islamists by opening 
fire on civilians, most notably in October 1988.
766
     
 The Armée nationale populaire (ANP) movement767 has revealed many cases of 
military trading and investment, for which the Algerian public has paid billions of dollars 
without their consent or knowledge.  False information has been spread by the media, which 
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has long been thought to be working under military orders. A classic case of this took place 
between the Algerian secret service (DRS) and the French secret service (DST).  A meeting 
of Lamaari from the DRS and Yves Bonnet from the DST in Paris in 1993 resulted in an 
investment contract worth millions of francs to support an ‘extremist right’ political party 
against the socialists in the French presidential elections. The quid pro quo was supposedly 
French help in the Algerian war against Islamists. The Algerian military regime was annoyed 
by publicity surrounding cases of human rights violations, and particularly the question of 
“who is killing whom in Algeria?”, which was the central question of the Socialist Party in 
France. This was clearly a case of corruption, but could not be considered in the Algerian 
courts because money had been spent on a fake contract, in reality a trade between the 
military and some of the French agencies to support military technology. However, the 
Algerian military investment was a success and the French, who had strenuously defended 
human rights in Algeria in recent years, found themselves supporting the military against 
democracy, and cutting off aid to the victims of the military in the villages.  
 Another major case that reached the heights of debate among politicians and 
academic researchers was that of President Boudiaf.
768
 The relationship between the generals 
and the new president turned sour with Boudiaf wanting to deal with high level corruption. 
However because the generals were the main beneficiaries of that corruption, a clash was 
predictable. Suddenly most of the competent people investigating matters of corruption under 
Boudiaf’s orders were mysteriously assassinated.769 And so the pre-eminence of corruption 
continued, and continues, in Algeria. 
  It is clear that corruption in Algeria is endemic and tearing at the fabric of society. 
An official human rights group said in a report published in June 2013, calling for punitive 
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measures against corrupt officials. The information presented above indeed, is not going to 
shock Algerian citizens. They are living the corruption daily. Nor will this information 
surprise the international community including human rights’ organizations whom never fell 
short in their responsibility to report the corruption to President Bouteflika. In 2011, 
the National Consultative Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, an 
official body, wrote in its annual report that the disease of corruption had “spread throughout 
the country,” impacting on all classes and “undermining the social fabric”. Their report 
clearly noted that:  
The pervasive corruption and the impunity that facilitates it risks thwarting 
all attempts at enabling the economy and society to flourish…The 
operations of state institutions have become a source of enrichment and a 
way of serving private interest…It is time… to combat, effectively and 
tirelessly, all civil servants who seek only to enrich themselves.
770
  
 
 The commission, whose chairman is appointed by the president, said “exemplary 
and preventative sanctions” were needed to stop “corrupt officials from enjoying the proceeds 
of corruption, once they have served their sentences.”771 Algerian society is still suffering, 
while the government and the public sectors become paralyzed and unable to meet the needs 
of citizens. Poverty is widespread in Algeria, despite its vast natural resources, and many 
Algerians remain deeply disillusioned with the country’s ruling elite, the unemployment, 
which has exhausted young Algerians. While this is the case for most of the citizens, there is 
a part of the society who has the advantage of the membership in the regime; military and 
administrative officers, governors and their relatives, officials and those who are supposed to 
maintain public funds but who have rather used their power of the public positions for their 
private interests.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL PARTIES, ELITES, AND POLITICAL 
LEADERSHIP ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ALGERIA 
 
1. Introduction  
 The purpose of this chapter is to consider Algeria’s experience with political parties, 
which became a reality with the constitution of 1989.  This chapter examines the impact of 
political parties and leaders on human rights violations after Algerian independence.  To 
understand the political foundation of Algeria and its relationship to the violence that 
overtook the country, particularly in the 1990s, it is useful to focus on the political elites.  The 
previous chapters explored sources of government-led violence, especially in the context of a 
military regime led by the French Officers and and accepted by political parties and 
politicians as elites. Algeria today continues to suffer from opportunism, corruption and 
political decay.  Political parties have become the principal vector of these problems. 
The military regime that opened the door to political parties and democracy by way of 
the Constitution of 1989, and then to the multi-party elections of 1991, has shown its other 
face with the bloody coup d’état against President Chadli and his program of change in 
Algeria. This chapter will attempt to explain the complex relationship between political 
parties, the military, and politically inspired violence in Algeria.  At the heart of this complex 
relationship are the national intelligence services.  Boucheir discusses the relationship 
between the military and the intelligence services and the institution of the Presidency after 
1963, noting that the position of the army in political life began declining from 2004, while 
those who could be described as members of the army dressed in mufti in order to remain in 
control of the political decision making processes. Bouteflika freed himself from direct 
military pressure when he embraced his constitutional powers. Boucheir argues that  
There is no doubt that the victory of President custody again in 2004, is 
considered the beginning of the end for his opponents in various sectors, 
including defence, after only several military leaders, led by Chief of 
General Staff (Major General Mohammed lammari) and the first 
commander of the military side (Major General Faudil Sharif), and others, 
and…[adds Boucheir, that] …the adoption of the policy of President 
harmony and dragged it from the amnesty for members of the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS), and the possibility of dealing with the leadership of 
this organization, befuddled many officials in the army known by their 
secularism thoughts and anomies to Islam and Islamism.
772
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 In previous chapters, the core argument has been that the authoritarianism of the 
military regime has dominated Algerian politics, administration and the economy. President 
Bouteflika has challenged the military and French Officers by winning a second term in 
2004, and inviting the French president to make an historic speech in the Algerian Assembly. 
How do political parties fit in this new setting? 
2. Political Parties: General Definitions and Theoretical Perspective  
 2.1.  Introduction  
To study the relationship between democracy and violence in Algeria it may be useful 
to understand the political face of power after independence. Algeria had a single-party 
system before the events of October 1988. A revision of the Constitution was consequently 
launched in 1989 to create a fully democratic country. No political parties, formal or informal 
movements, or other political organisations had been allowed to emerge in the competition 
for power prior to that year. From the 1930s, the French government had permitted only elite 
politics: democracy was no more than an oblique topic for speeches. Whatever the reasons 
and the justifications of the regime, the Algerian people would not accept their 
marginalization in the political arena.   This had been one of the main reasons for the frequent 
outbursts of violence in the country.   
After living under a single-party system for close to three decades, Algeria opened 
itself up to a multi-party system with the Constitution of 1989, in order to ensure the 
participation of a large proportion of the population after the violent riots of 1988. After 
parties were legalized, however, the country was confronted with political violence more 
extensive than it had experienced previously. In order to understand the causes of this 
violence and instability, one must analyse the specific elements of the multi-party system in 
Algeria in relation to the features of the political system. It is useful in this regard to examine 
the link between the regime and the military, particularly the military’s subgroups and 
supportive political parties. This study cannot be considered independently from the historical 
era, and since it has been undertaken well after the early 1990s, must confront certain 
challenges involving perspective. As noted repeatedly above, the domination of the military 
in all economic and political areas of the society prior to the 1990s created a situation in 
which the Algerian population had come to realize the full extent of its exclusion from all 
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areas of decision-making. The new political parties of the late 1980s were immersed in this 
social and institutional culture of co-optation and violence. At this juncture, then, the 
hegemony of the regime was maintained primarily through the threat and use of violence. 
The use of violence had obviously been adopted from the beginning as a central tactic and 
strategy, and by the late 1980s was deeply entrenched in military policies. Political party 
behaviour was determined in large measure by this reigning socio-political culture.  
A recent definition of a political system in the Algerian context is a system constituted 
by all the forces, formal or informal, institutionalized or not, that help to either sustain the 
central power or call it into question.
773
 From this point of view, the army, the police, and the 
administration were all components of the political system in the late 1980s, but not political 
parties, nor other groups from ethnic, regional and religious associations. The concept of 
political opposition, which mainly presented itself in Algeria in the form of political parties 
in the late 1980s, was severely limited in this case.  
2.2. Definition and Theoritical Perspective  
Political scientists have had difficulty in defining parties because of the different 
functions that they perform in various kinds of governments.
774
 It is useful for purposes of 
this thesis to examine definitions relating to North African and Middle Eastern systems.  
Souad al-Sherqaoui defines a political party as: “any organisation or group of people working 
together for the benefit of certain general interests according to special principles that have 
been agreed upon.”775 A political party is an organised group of people with at least roughly 
similar political aims and opinions seeking to influence public policy by getting its candidates 
elected to public office. A party has a program, organisational structure, and an 
administrative apparatus that brings together its members, including its leadership, to seek 
effectively to widen its circle of supporters. Political parties are one of the major tools of 
political development in the modern era.
776
  
The multi-party system in Algeria established clear roles that related directly to 
political bureaucracy by the late 1980s.  Political parties, as they emerged, served to identify 
and train promising future leaders, to prepare them for political positions and, on a more 
sinister note, to expose their weaknesses and the points on which they were unwilling to 
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compromise and/or be co-opted.  In theory, political parties should play key roles in well-
functioning democracies. “They aggregate and represent citizen’s interests, formulate policy 
agendas that respond to those interests, and form governments and oppositions,”777 and they 
represent the democratic system, which gives the right to share power and to transfer the 
political leadership peacefully.
778
 Algeria in the late 1980s was far from being a ‘well-
functioning democracy’, however. 
Some scholars disparage political party systems because of the instability they 
potentially cause, and their effective opposition at times to government strategies and 
programs. In more democratic countries, political parties are seen as barriers to the 
government in passing its projects.  David Mayhew has a deeply critical view of the Congress 
of the United States in this regard. According to Mayhew, it is easiest to think of members of 
Congress, and their respective parties, as “single-minded seekers of re-election.”779 The role 
of parties is just to help mobilize voters in this context.
780
 Mayhew noted that winning parties 
do not make many changes in their political platforms once they get their politicians into 
Congress, for example. According to Mayhew, “members can successfully engage in 
electorally useful activities without denying other members the opportunity to successfully 
engage in them”.781 
Maurice Duverger noted that political parties in developed democracies have, as their 
primary goal, the conquest of power, or at least a share in its exercise. They try to win seats at 
elections, to name deputies and ministers, and to take control of the government.
782
 These 
goals in democratic countries are achieved by way of elections, which have to be related to 
their work on the citizens’ needs to solve their life problems. In this view the political parties 
are chosen by the electorate, in many cases, according to the benefits that they promise to 
afford if they win the election. Academic analysis of the nature of party systems is changing, 
however.  In the first half of the last century, when people referred to parties, they were 
thinking primarily of ideologies rather than the people who subscribed to them.
783
 With the 
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rise of global communism, emphasis in the analysis of parties was placed on their underlying 
social foundations: “parties were viewed as the expression of social classes in a nation’s 
political life.”784 Ideologies, social foundations, structure, organisation, participation, strategy 
– all of these aspects were in focus in analyses of party systems in the first half of the last 
century.  Since then, much greater emphasis has been placed on the characteristics of party 
members, their religion, ethnicity, socio-economic status, and political and individual 
interests.  My analysis, perhaps not surprisingly, conforms to this latter view: my research 
focus is on the pro-military secular parties, and the Islamic parties of Algeria. 
Kayden and Mahe describe political parties, whether in power or in opposition, as 
organisations and processes, as they are sometimes part of identity-making for individuals, 
groups, and ideas. In a parliamentary system, a party has a clearer path to governance than a 
party in a system of separated powers such as that of the US.
785
 A party in a communist 
country does not contest elections, but does legitimate the regime in power.
786
 “All parties 
appear to serve as a mechanism for integrating citizens into government.”787 Most analysts 
agree that parties are usually (but not always) structured as large groups, representing 
divisions in the society.
788
 Edmund Burke developed this understanding nearly 250 years ago, 
describing a political party somewhat idealistically as a “body of men united for promoting 
by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they 
are all agreed.”789 Again, this is far from the contemporary analysis of political parties based 
upon the socio-economic characteristics and the needs of individual party members. Many 
political scholars consider that the term ‘political parties’ does not apply to any political 
organisation that is in opposition and/or does not share power in some way. According to 
Huntington, political party formation is based on adaptation, independence, cohesion and 
organisational complexity.
790
 Political parties do not follow one form, but differ according to 
the reasons for their formation, and their structure tends to reflect this.  
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Political parties began to emerge nearly two centuries ago, but did not evolve to the 
modern form until a century ago.
791
 The different goals of parties and the varied causes and 
reasons for their formation mean the parties in general are one of the most important 
mechanisms for political participation, and one of the most important instruments of political 
socialisation in many communities.
792
 This is in spite of what was said about them at their 
origins, that they would be a tool of division and political corruption, that they would 
practically open the door to foreign intervention, that they would be a source of political 
instability and would lack administrative efficiency, according to the description of George 
Washington, the founder of the United States of America.
793
  
The Constitution drafted and ratified by the founders of the US in 1787 did not 
mention political parties or their role in politics. The constitutional arrangements laid down a 
number of key features, such as the separation of powers amongst the executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches. The transfer of power was set out, based on the policy of federalism 
and indirect election of the president by an Electoral College, seen as a means to insulate the 
new republic from parties and factions.
794
 Political parties are often described as 
institutionalised mediators between citizens and those who decide and implement 
decisions.
795
 They are the bridge whereby civil society can reach the power managers and 
decision makers. In this way the demands of members and supporters are represented in the 
general assembly and in government. In a democratic society the “nomination and 
presentation of candidates in the electoral campaign is the most visible function to the 
electorate [of political parties]”.796  
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Huntington focused on the place of modernity in politics, describing political parties 
as part of the modernization of a country.
797
  One potential role of political parties is to close 
the gap between citizens and their leadership, transmitting the citizens’ needs to the 
government, a process which can take place in the face of competition for power across the 
country. “Political parties in many developing democracies have faced the imposition of non-
competitive regimes.”798 Huntington attributes the political gap between developed and 
developing countries to the fact that: “The economic gap is well reported but the political gap 
is not.”799 He argues that this political gap is not due to economic reasons but rather because 
these countries are moving from traditional societies to modern societies which will place 
them at a disadvantage when compared to societies which have already gone through the 
transition. 
Brahimi presents a different view.  He argues that economic crisis is the major 
element shaping the political system and the stability of Algeria. It is clear that the political 
problems that many countries were/are struggling with, including third world countries, are 
because of economic crises. France and Algeria are good examples, where strikes and 
demonstrations became a daily feature of the lives of labourers, and the political system and 
government have to deal with these. The main reasons citizens are pushed out onto the streets 
are frustrations with the failure of the system to provide the basic amenities of life, and the 
resulting anger.
800
 Brahimi’s view has been supported by many scholars whom look to the 
formation of the new state, which was shaped by the French revolution and has been based on 
the economic theory. This economic theory was the main factor that drove the politics in 
France as well as in the West. The source of this drive could be justified by the aspirations of 
a rising bourgeoisie, linked with indignant peasants, wage-earners, and individuals of all 
classes who were influenced by this theory, which has been applied to the fall of the old 
French regime.
801 
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African countries need economic transformation, “to sustain pro-poor growth, to cope 
with population increases, to become competitive in the global economy and – last but not 
least – to create the conditions for better governance.”802  Since the late 1980s, the World 
Bank and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member 
governments have been telling Africans to foster ‘good governance’ as a necessary first step 
in development. Thus, good governance in this context broadly refers to clearly formed 
politics structured according to the economic needs of the state, which have priority over 
social-culture base, but, which mean following the institutional arrangements that have 
proven their worth in OECD countries since the Second World War.
803
  
However, current global political preferences have been based on democratic systems, 
allowing for the fact that democracy as a concept is understood differently across the world. 
In nascent multi-party systems, political parties are in a state of near crisis. Certain political 
behavior is indicative of a society that largely views political parties as ineffective, corrupt, 
and as failing the social needs. Young people become hesitant to join or become associated 
with politics generally. In Algeria, as well as in many other countries politics has become the 
interest of older generations.
804
 The youth view politicians and political parties as 
opportunistic, running for their own interests. Arguably, the same view is taken of the 
regimes and the governments that dominate these countries. At the same time, support has 
risen for independent candidates, special interest parties, and anti-party movements.  In fact, 
the right to vote has become a national service and obligatory for eligible citizens in many 
countries, with those who refuse to vote facing punishments that may include a restriction of 
services or incarceration.
805
 
Political parties in a number of countries have lost their mandate and standing in the 
country’s politics and even lost their members through their own mismanagement of the 
political system. In Pakistan, for example, political parties effectively frittered away their 
credibility to the point where the military’s overthrow of the established political order was 
accepted, if not welcomed, by the citizenry.
806
 In Peru and Venezuela, the collapse of 
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political parties that were viewed as corrupt and elitist, created a political vacuum that was 
quickly filled by populist leaders with authoritarian tendencies. These leaders rose from the 
ashes of discredited parties and they sought to further weaken their country’s party system, 
including legislatures, as a means to maintain power.
807
 The same scenario has taken place in 
many other countries. In Bangladesh, the recurring partisan political stalemate consigns the 
country and its citizens to abject poverty. Their frequent political shift from military 
authoritarianism to civilian democracy and popularly elected governments over the past 
decade has had little effect on the well-being of citizens. “Both of the main political forces in 
Bangladesh have contributed to the continuing political impasse”.808  
Since the early years of African independence in the 1960s, most of the continent’s 
leaders have rejected liberal democracy and the values and principles on which it is based, 
arguing that the democratic system is not compatible with African traditions while at the 
same time they describe their regimes as democratic. They claim to have an essentially 
African democracy or a kind of indigenous democracy, which is different from western 
liberal democracy.
809
 According to Uwizeyimana, only a very small number of African states 
in the post-colonial era have adopted unmediated liberal democratic values.  Attempts on the 
part of African leaders to subvert the principles of western liberal democracy, has led most 
African regimes to become what this paper calls “pretend democracies”.810 
Kenneth Wollack states that centralized decision making in a number of African states 
“the lack of well-institutionalized rules and procedures, and the decline of ideology or 
unifying principles have eroded public support and discouraged participation in political 
party activities.”811 In fact, today’s political parties have lost a level of their legitimacy in the 
face of their supporters and the wider population; experience has shown voters that whether 
in power or in the opposition, the political elite are self-interested, turning their backs on the 
needs of the people in favour of doing business and holding on to their positions of power for 
as long as they can. But when votes are needed, the politicians hit the streets. In states ruled 
by military regimes, the pretense of electioneering is unnecessary and if a vote is taken, the 
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questionable results released are 90 percent in support of the current leadership. This has 
been a common experience in many, if not most, African and Middle Eastern states.  
In a number of countries, the role of political parties is limited to being a simple front 
for the regime rather than as a political organisation fighting for their people’s rights. They 
have tended to act without transparency, taking positions of power for their own interests. 
Citizens dont know how parties make decisions; flying in the face of the democratic ideals of 
openness, accessibility and accountability, Political development literature in third world 
countries, especially in the late sixties and early seventies, came under fire for both the 
orientation of ideology, the methodology, and ultimately the usefulness of the process. In 
terms of ideological orientation, the literature is driven by the Western model of capitalist 
development; with the ultimate goal of orientating third world states towards westernization, 
with the ultimate goal of turning these countries into modern Western societies.  
In his report on political parties in Africa, Mohamed Salih stated that the democratic 
content of African political parties is still fragile and the prospects of genuine democratic 
consolidation vary from country to country.
812
 He noted a list of factors that he believes 
support his proposition:  
 The unclear relationship between parties and government, which privileges the 
governing party because it tends to rely on the state resources as patronage in 
order to maintain the party organization and management. 
 The African private sector is too small to support the establishment of strong and 
vibrant civil society organizations and a non-political middle class that are 
autonomous from the state.  
 “The weakness of the private sector is not only detrimental to civil society’s 
ability to make demands on the state and protect the interests of its membership;” 
which means that civil society is incapable of creating coalitions of interests with 
the political parties. 
 Political parties often only look to seize power and the control of the resources of 
the state for their own interest as a source of wealth, therefore politics itself 
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becomes a means to an end, devoid of any idea of protecting public interests vis-à-
vis private gains. 
 The weakness of African opposition parties and the inability of their leaders to 
aggregate interests, with the governing political parties dening them the 
opportunity to play their oversight role. 
However, according to Salih, if African political parties want to play their positive 
role, they have to build on what is uniquely African and seek bold changes informed by 
African reality. “In the absence of such a vision based on what African societies could offer 
to promote democracy, externally-driven blueprints will always result in the status quo being 
maintained.”813 
3. Political Parties in Algeria  
Politics in Algeria is indisputably different from the politics of most other countries. 
Mohammed Harbi, a historian, has clarified that democracy in Algeria, based on elections 
after 1962, has been driven and guided by the government and has no meaning to the general 
public. Algeria has long lived under a set of unwritten rules in which democracy was just a 
word in politicians’ speeches, and had little to do with practice.814 Saadallah agrees with 
Harbi’s statement that democracy is new for Algerian society. The first era of democracy in 
the 1930s was nothing more than speeches, with the practice of government far from 
democratic principles. Violence had become a part of the Algerian social culture, and 
especially directly before and during the war for independence.   
To understand the current situation in Algeria it is necessary to focus on the reasons 
for its violent environment, and how that might be changed.  Many Algerian observers look 
to democracy, which they view as a successful method of governance in the West.  However, 
they sense that even an implanted democratic system in contemporary Algeria could only 
achieve a minimum level of justice which, even then, would be at the expense of ethnic, 
religious and social minorities. According to Youcef Bouandel, the process of 
democratisation must be based on the development of political parties and political awareness 
within society. Political parties, through their activities and performance throughout the 
transition to democracy, would provide a strong basis for assessing both the nature of, and the 
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prospects for, the new democracy.
815
 The natural role of political parties should be to guide 
the political system while emphasizing the practices of democracy, and so to provide insights 
into the quality and stability of the political system as a whole.
816
 In the case of Algeria, the 
transition from an authoritarian military regime to a more democratic system has had many 
shortcomings.  Algeria’s political parties did, in fact, play a part in the structuring of violence 
in the post-colonial era, and particular the period of the 1990s. This gives rise to questions as 
to whether parties in Algeria have played a traditional party role, or whether they have been 
mere puppets in the hands of the regime, serving only to ‘legitimise’ the government.  
Scholars of political science and law have noted the changes to Algeria’s multi-party 
system since independence, and especially after the launch of the 1989 Constitution, followed 
by the political structure introduced by President Bouteflika during his presidential term after 
1999. According to Roberts:  
[Political parties in Algeria] are far too weak and divided and accordingly 
are too vulnerable to manipulation by the various factions of the Algerian 
army…that we should be concerned with the country’s political institutions, 
and consider how these might be strengthened.
817
  
 
While this view of political parties in Algeria represents one perspective,
818
 a more recent 
history of Algerian politics and its parties seeks to clarify the role of French colonial rule in 
the political structure of the country, including the party structure, and its involvement in 
human rights violations.  The political history of Algeria is relatively recent. Before the 
French, the Algerians were mostly labourers and farmers under what was nearly a ‘feudal’ 
system, with a taxation system that was dominated by two Jewish families (Busnach and 
Bacri).
819
 The people of Algeria have never really had a tradition of self-governance, power 
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sharing, or even of participation in the conduct of state affairs.
820
 There was no royal family 
or kingdom, and power in Algeria was not shared with community members.  The Ottoman 
Empire dominated the country through dictatorship under the principles of the Caliph in 
Islam.
821
 After the Ottomans, the French colonised Algeria and occupied the country by force 
for more than 130 years. Algerian citizens were deprived of even their minimal rights as 
human beings. They were classified by the French government at that time as sub-citizens, 
referred to as ‘Locals’, ‘Labours’ and ‘Farmers’. By the 1930s, the French government 
allowed some rights to Algerian elites, but these rights were very limited, and there was no 
right to criticise or even disagree politically with the French government. These elites could 
only request assistance in personal matters, and had no right to complain.
822
  Algerians could 
not engage in politics or, for that matter, vote in elections, as the French citizens in Algeria 
could.  Nevertheless, socially at least, the Algerian elites considered themselves a superior 
minority separated from an inferior majority of ignorant peasants (fellaheen), superstitious 
people (Murabits) and reactionary holy men (Ulama), who, in fact, were scholars of Arabic 
literacy and Islamic studies. Some writers took the ‘elite’ to include interpreters, lawyers, 
doctors, teachers, magistrates, journalists, a few merchants, agricultural workers, and 
students.
823
 The difference seems to be a misunderstanding of the term of ‘elite’.  
Those who included some merchants and agricultural workers were talking 
about the Algerian middle class in general, while those who defined the 
elite as a few doctors, lawyers, and journalists were describing the Algerian 
French-educated class.
824
   
 
 
3.1. Algerian Political Elites and French Colonialism  
As noted above, according to many scholars specialising in Algerian history, Algeria 
has never been ruled by her own people and the citizens of Algeria have never shared power 
or been involved in any political events through the long years of occupation. Saadallah states 
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that, whatever the term politics means, it is vastly alien to most Algerians’ lifestyles. If the 
meaning of the term ‘politics’ is to share power or to gain political rights in forming parties, 
or taking political actions, then it must be observed that these phenomena have never 
occurred for the Algerians under colonialism, or under earlier political systems dating to the 
dawn of history.
825
 The first group who tried to hold a political role in Algeria were from 
Morocco, formed by elites, educated and wealthy people, who attempted to gain the same 
rights for Algerian Muslims as those afforded the citizens in their home country.
826
 A few 
years later, the French authorities arrested them on charges of terrorism and they were jailed 
and tortured.  
The French controlled the country through occupation at all levels of government, 
sharing at some stages low administration positions with a few local Algerians who were 
educated in French schools, because their families were wealthy or land owning, and because 
they accepted Western culture in place of Islam and their traditional customs.
827
 These people 
were never organised to play a part in the government or to share political power. By the end 
of the 1880s, many voices from amongst the rich people and landed classes, in the East and 
the West of Algeria, started questioning the French authorities about the rights of Algerians 
in terms of equality with French residents. The elites started asking the French to put into 
practice what was mandated under French law,
828
 because Algeria was a French territory and 
the Third Republic, at least, had made it clear that the complete assimilation of this territory 
with metropolitan France had been decreed; the elite demanded that these concepts be applied 
to Algeria in spirit and in letter.
829
      
According to Sarrasin, the elites at that time had not only adopted the ideas of the 
West and its technical methods of work, but they were completely saturated in Western 
culture through their education.
830
 “They also wanted to transform Algerian society into a 
European one.”831 But they were struggling with the complex condition of their double 
personality, caught between a sense of superiority in regards to Algerian society, and 
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inferiority as regards to French society. Consequently, as Jean Jaures noted, they lost 
themselves between the two tasks,
832
 and thus failed to achieve their separate identity in the 
face of the French government. They lost the support of Algerians, who felt there was no 
difference between these elites and the French. On the other hand their expectations of 
equality with the French, political rights, containment of the Code de L'indigenat and other 
exceptional measures, parliamentary representation for Algerians, and equal education, 
taxation, and opportunities, were not supported by the French government. In short, the elite 
had chosen total naturalisation, assimilation, and all other measures that would help Algerian-
French integration.
833
 “The elites made only one condition to France – that she not ask them 
to give up their personal status as Muslims”.834  
In a more positive light, the elites had helped to developed the wider Algerian 
mentality, encouraging people to look after their rights and to choose their own way, whether 
as French or according to their own identity. Before the formation of the Association of 
Algerian Muslims (named in Arabic Ulama), which become AUMA and the North African 
Star, the native born Algerian elites continued searching for a solution to their dilemma 
through French civilization. Losing their language, customs, respect, and the friendship of 
their society, they turned to the European way of life. In many cases they mixed with the 
French, married French women, spoke the French language, lived with the French 
community, and sent their children to French schools, trying to bring them up on the French 
model.
835
 It is not an exaggeration to say that they played a major role in changing Algerian 
identity, which had always been Arab-Islamic, to one more reflective of a Western 
civilization: “...they [Algeria elites] were anxious to play a national role which would change 
Algeria's traditional and backward society into a modern and progressive one.”836 
According to Saadallah, a close look at the development of this Francophone Algerian 
elite can help Algerians to appreciate their national role.  
During the first decade of the Twentieth Century, this class was still weak 
and small. Faced with countless handicaps, including the nature of Algerian 
society, misunderstandings, the colonisers’ prejudices, and the 
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administration's repressive measures, the elite revolted against this 
situation. In their revolt they did not preach violence and extremism, but 
justice, equality, and tolerance.
837
  
Since the beginning of the 19
th
 century, politics in Algeria has been at least semi-
organised, and has included strong positions against discrimination, high taxes, the right to 
education and work. It was in this background that the revolutionary movement, in the form 
of the FLN, formed.    
  
3.2. Political Leadership in Algeria   
The formation of Algeria’s political system differs from those of other Arab countries 
and former French colonies. At the same time that the Tunisians gathered to support their 
leader, Bourguiba, Moroccans gathered to support King Mohammed V, the Vietnamese, their 
leader Ho Chi Minh, and the Egyptians, their leader Nasser, Algerians were rejecting 
virtually all of the personalities that had the potential to be national liberators.  After the coup 
against Masali Hadj and Bachir al-Ibrahimi, there was the assassination of Ramdane by 
colleagues. Later they accepted Abbas, apparently because he had a weak background, as a 
member of the Francophone elite he was seeking equality with the French in Algeria. 
Revolutionaries like Abbas were seldom accepted as leaders for this reason.  The unique path 
of the Algerian Revolution, then, is one without charismatic leadership.  In fact, Algerians do 
not believe in a single leader; it is not part of their political civilization.  Rather, they 
proclaim the slogan “[it is the] people who are the protagonists”. 838  
Saadallah developed three hypotheses to explain why Algerians do not follow a 
single, charismatic leader. First there is the old phenomenon that Algerians have exhibited 
throughout their history.
839
 The people will not accept a single, charismatic leader because 
they are determined never to be governed as a family kingdom. Thus the revolution has never 
been guided by just one person; the decision-making is always reserved for a group of people, 
such as the ‘three Bs’, who controlled the revolutionary power together. Although some 
voices among the revolutionary leadership were fighting for democracy and the 
parliamentary system, they were rejected in part for this reason.   As Belkacem put it, the 
most important thing for a new country like Algeria, with its deep conflicts among elites and 
the revolutionary leadership, and its long period of colonialism and war, is for Algerians to be 
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united to protect their revolution’s principles from any internal and external enemies, and to 
build their country at all levels.
840
 Single charismatic leadership is notably absent from this 
assessment. 
According to Saadallah, and Sidhum, single leadership was rejected after the death of 
Ramdane and the later coup d’état against Ben Bella. The coup of 1962 against the 
Benkhedda government (GPRA), in fact, was planned specifically to stop any single person 
from taking power as an independent president.  The reason Boussouf and later Boumédiène 
gave for their interventions was their overwhelming feeling of responsibility for preventing a 
single party or personality from seizing power, and the likelihood that such a person would 
not share power with the central committee of FLN, which was formed by the military and 
revolutionaries. But the reality, as Chouchane states, was that no such fear of a revolutionary 
figure should be used as a pretext to stop citizens from sharing power, and at that time these 
leaders of the military had no conscience regarding the well-being of their country and their 
citizens. The main goal of French Officers was to integrate Algeria into the French neo-
colonial system. This goal could be achieved only by their use of the legitimacy of the 
revolution.
841
 This was the only reason most of revolutionary heroes were excluded from 
power at independence.
842
 Sidhum notes that the responsibility had to be taken, and the 
decision of Ben Khadda to leave his position and to transfer power to the military and the 
French Officers was not acceptable. However, the eruption of violence among the 
revolutionaries lasted for some time, and took many lives. The hope of independence was to 
be free of any trace of colonialism.
843
  
For the same reason, many dissidents from the revolutionary elites consider Ben Bella 
to be the first personality among the political elites to lead the country in the history of 
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Algeria.
844
 Because single leaders had been rejected many times in the past, opposition to his 
continuing leadership mounted, and Ben Bella failed to remain in the presidency for more 
than two years (1963-65). In 1965 his Defence Minister, Boumédiène, carried out a coup 
d’état against him. Boumédiène justified his coup on the grounds of maintaining the 
principles of the revolution, and rejecting the dictatorship that Ben Bella was developing. 
Thus, he argued that Ben Bella was an incipient dictator, and that he wanted to change the 
revolutionary principles into a monarchy, as had happened in Morocco.
845
 
The second reason why Algerians have never accepted a single leader (as Saadallah 
described it), may be due to the democratic sensibility that Algerians have; their belief that no 
one person should monopolize the responsibility of decision making in Algeria. Leaders who 
transgress this thinking tend to receive a heavy punishment, including exile, as in the case of 
Ben Bella, or death, as was the case for Boudiaf. This democratic sensibility means Algerians 
will tend to rebel against their authorities and reject all forms of leadership, whether 
patriarchal, political or religious. Under the right to strike, which was legal through the 
Constitution of 1989, Algeria almost stopped working in May and early June of 1991, after 
calls from the FIS for action. More than 80% of general and private companies were totally 
blocked, and the economy of the country dropped to less than 50% of the average income of 
previous years.      
Saadallah’s third explanation is that the Algerian system has always been controlled 
by a small cadre of leaders because of the country’s national identity, causing the citizens to 
refuse to obey individual leaders.
846
 This phenomenon runs throughout the history of the 
country, and it has been observed by many scholars and travellers for centuries.
847
 Before and 
since the revolutionary era, Algerians have never gathered under a single leadership; power 
has to be in hands of a group of people. Decisions have to be taken by a committee, and any 
person in a leadership position who wants to make any changes in the country’s system of 
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governance will soon be labelled a dictator,
848
 someone who has to be stopped by other 
members of the leadership team.   
Politics in Algeria began in 1871 when the French government changed their policy in 
Algeria and moved from military control through the Ministry of Defence, to a kind of 
civilian system, for the purpose of eliminating traditional economic and political ties, which 
were in the hands of the military at that time.
849
 In 1871, the French government completely 
dominated Algeria under French rules, which declared that Algeria was part of France 
according to the French Constitution. According to this legislative decree, Algerian lands and 
properties were transferred to the French migrants under the rules of “public land and general 
interests for the public”. The French army was no longer allowed to enforce its own policies. 
The consequent Algerian insurrections failed in the face of the French military, which was 
then one of the strongest armies in the world. Stora stated that the failure of these revolutions, 
including Muqrani’s insurrection in Kabylia, pushed the case of settlement forward into a 
legal statement, the native born Algerian Code of 1881 (Code de l’Indigenat), which was 
established to regularise colonialism. Algeria became a part of France on the other side of the 
Mediterranean, attached to the Internal Ministry in Paris. Legislation passed in 1898 and 
1900 accepted that the country had a civil identity and an elected colonial assembly of 
delegates, rather than a military colonial system and its state-of-emergency, which had ruled 
Algeria since the French invasion in 1830.
850
  
The gap between the French and the Algerian citizens was wide. Algerians who were 
identified as farmers (Fellaheen) could not own land apart from a very few wealthy families, 
whereas the legislation the French administration adopted included the right to own whatever 
land they wanted, as long as it had been controlled by the Ottoman Empire in Algeria before 
1830.  The French settlers used their full rights to take as much land as they could. Many 
French business people bought huge estates and used Algerians as labourers on their farms, 
receiving a part of the agricultural crop in lieu of a salary. Algerians responded by forming 
unions and organizing to seek their rights from the French administration. The first Algerian 
political movement, the Star of North Africa (Étoile Nord Africaine), was formed by Messali 
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Hadj in 1925, launched and agreed to by the French authorities. Many young Algerian 
supporters joined this movement, from Algerian workers to intellectuals in Paris. After 
experiencing difficulties with the French administration, Hadj formed another movement in 
1939 inside Algeria, the Algerian People’s Party (Parti Populaire Algérien—PPA), with 
strong support from students and workers. Just two years later, the Vichy regime which came 
down strongly against Muslim Algerians, withdrew the PPA’s permit, making it an illegal 
party under French law.
851
  
Abbas had a slightly different approach to that of Hadj in fighting for Algerian rights 
as French citizens. He did not believe Algeria was in any way independent from France. In 
1944, Abbas formed the Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty (Amis du Manifeste et de la 
Liberté—AML), a moderate reform group that was later transformed into the ‘Democratic 
Union of the Algerian Manifesto’ (Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien—UDMA). 
By the end of the Second World War, and after the massacres of 8 May 1945, Algerians lost 
confidence in French authority and started looking seriously for independent 
representation.
852
 Many members of the AML joined the PPA, under the leadership of Hadj. 
They formed a small movement, the ‘Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties’ 
(Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques—MTLD), which maintained the 
same program as the PPA, known as the MTLD program.  It was focused on specific goals, 
including working toward the elimination of colonialism and implementing a system of 
national sovereignty, organising a general election without racial or religious restriction, 
establishing a democratic and social Republic of Algeria, and linking Algeria to its extended 
Arab-Islamic and African affiliates. In addition, the structure and organisation of the MTLD 
covered the entire Algerian territory intelligently and comprehensively.
853
 According to 
Bouandel, Abbas’ movement was destroyed by those who believed in French authority. 
Under the MTLD program, which was called “the return of the Algerian people to national 
sovereignty”, the MTLD won five of the fifteen elected seats in the National Assembly 
elections of 1 November 1946, but in 1948 the MTLD lost all its seats and was reduced to 
semi-legality. Two years later, it was suppressed by the police.
854
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By 1951, Algerian movements dominated popular thought in Algeria. The MTLD 
members formed other political groups such as the UDMA, the Algerian Communist Party 
(PCA), and the Society of 'Ulema’, a political-cultural organisation. In the following years, 
the conflicts between elites, who failed to organise themselves as a group despite many 
meetings, resulted in three groups launched with different ideologies: the supporters of Hadj, 
who had a strong belief in Algerian independence under the slogan of “Take and ask for 
more”, centrists, who hoped to obtain constitutional advances by cooperating with the French 
administration, and a militant group that proposed violent action as the only suitable solution 
for Algerians.
855
 In 1954 there was an open split when a majority of the centrists repudiated 
Hadj's leadership. An activist group of nine members formerly associated with an MTLD 
splinter group called for armed rebellion, and then established the Revolutionary Committee 
for Unity and Action (Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action—CRUA) with its 
headquarters in Cairo. Action was taken on the 1st of November 1954, after they organised 
themselves to work together and, quite literally, to start a war. They divided Algeria into six 
military zones, appointed commanders for each, and then launched a war against the French 
troops. 
4. The Single Party System and the Military Regime in Algeria  
The FLN was started by a few young revolutionaries taking action against the French 
military troops in the countryside, declaring by their actions the commencement of the war 
for independence. In less than two years, the FLN members grew in numbers and were 
guided, to some extent, by members of the formal political parties. They succeeded in 
establishing political-military structures and extending a series of guerrilla bases in the 
countryside. 
856
 The political leadership was soon arrested and jailed by the French Army’s 
pre-1954 urban middle class nationalist politicians, who had made their careers in the MTLD, 
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the UDMA and the Ulama, and included Benkhedda (Secretary General of the MTLD since 
1951), Ferhat (president of the UDMA), and el- Madani (leader of the Ulama). According to 
Bannoune, the subsequent successes of the FLN were made possible by the political and 
ideological content of the FLN platform, published on November 1 1954, which reflected 
much of the thinking of the members of the CRUA.
857
 “The first task of the Front was to 
obtain the popular support necessary to continue, and to develop its military action.”858   
Offering a different view, Saadallah stated that the revolution was started by 
anonymous people and guided by a group of revolutionaries. This group opened the door to 
the members of the other parties. This offer was a tactic to prevent the other political parties 
and national movements from engaging in revolutionary activities individually.  Leaders from 
different parties took part in the revolution, beginning modestly.  Hadj and Abbas, the former 
leaders of various parties and national movements, found themselves out of the game, as 
previously anonymous people started the revolution without consulting the political elite, 
who had decades of experience in politics, and knew how to deal with the French authorities. 
The Algerian political elites were unprepared for war, and found themselves reduced to little 
more than lowly recruits.
859
 Revolution against the colonial system in Algeria was in essence 
a popular movement, and it would have come sooner or later, with or without the 
participation of the political elites.  
The formation of political institutions in Algeria came about after independence and the 
official recognition of Algeria’s first Constitution in 1963. Revolutionaries who had fought 
the French throughout the war insisted on retaining power through the FLN. According to 
Henry F. Jackson, “the FLN in Algeria is a political history of the period of 1954 to 1965”.860 
But it was never a political party, as understood in other parts of the world.  It was not until 
the declaration of the National Charter by Boumédiène that FLN moved from its anonymous 
revolutionary organisation to the creation of a single political party. This change was part of a 
coup against the Algiers’ Charter of Ben Bella, held in early 1964. Jackson argues that the 
Boumédiène coup of 1965 caused a change in the FLN’s platform, and brought about the 
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demise of the revolutionaries’ ‘empire’, hidden as it was behind the title of ‘revolution’, and 
the structure of the FLN.  In reality,  
...the FLN… never truly functioned as a political party. It has existed on 
paper and in organisational form. It has been the subject of considerable 
thought, both in and outside the country. It has recruited members, 
employed organisers, printed pamphlets, generated an endless and mostly 
repetitive stream of position papers about its proper operation, but at no 
time has it filled roles of policy formation, leadership recruitment, mass 
mobilisation, or guardian of ideological standards.
861
  
 
For the tenth anniversary of the coup d’état, on June 19th 1975, the Boumédiène 
regime announced the drafting of the National Charter and elections for the National 
Assembly and the President of the Republic. On April 26
th
 1976 the first draft of the National 
Charter was made public. Later in the same year, another draft of the constitution was drafted 
by the Boumédiène regime and put forward in a lengthy and detailed ideological reference 
statement for Algeria. The Algiers Charter adopted by the FLN in 1964 criticized the state 
institutions and the bureaucracy of the country, asserting the pre-eminence of “[an] avant-
garde party profoundly linked to the masses”. In contrast, the National Charter of 1976 
asserted:  
To restore national sovereignty, construct socialism, struggle against 
underdevelopment, build a modern and prosperous economy, and be 
vigilant against external dangers requires a solid and constantly fortified 
state, not a state invited to die out, when it has barely re-emerged from the 
void.
862
 
One of the seven sections of this Charter was entitled ‘The Party and the State’, and in 
it appeared statements concerning Algeria’s sole political party, the celebrated FLN.  The 
Charter stated that “The FLN is an avant-garde party which is both ‘the guide of the 
revolution’ and the ‘directing force of the society’. Working through the mechanism of 
‘democratic centralism’, the party ‘controls the overall policy of the country’ and is, in 
theory, the single most important political institution in Algeria.”863  The Charter did admit, 
indirectly, that the FLN had become ineffective since independence and was not in a position 
to assume a policy leadership role. The Charter suggested that these difficulties were 
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temporary, however, adding that it “must modify its modes of organisation and adapt them to 
new situations”.864 
According to Belkacem, a former minister in Ben Bella’s government, the single party 
system started in Algeria during the war and continued during the post-independence period 
because the Algerian people of that time needed to be unified to achieve their goal of 
independence from France.  Within the different ideologies and viewpoints of the Algerian 
elites, the principles of the revolution were eventually shaped and the goal of independence, 
while distant and difficult to achieve, would be won. However, at the time the prospect of 
building the country, in view of the conflicts among the Algerian elite, was bleak.  Belkacem 
noted: 
For us then in 1954 to 62, the facts were posed in terms of ‘units of action’, 
and this action could be taken only under one party’s policy, which was the 
FLN, and I am currently asking, what would have happened to the country 
with the crisis of 1962 if they had accepted a multi-party policy, for 
example? The political leadership of the FLN comes from different political 
backgrounds, and every one of them could have his own party, so maybe 
the conflict will grow into a new war between Algerians.
865
 
 
From the opposite view, Zitout argued: “For most of Algerian post-revolutionary 
history, the FLN can scarcely be characterised as anything more than a front organisation for 
a government ultimately controlled by the military.”866 Chouchane regarded the FLN after 
independence as similar to the communist party in Russia, and this was especially true during 
the period of Boumédiène.  More than 70 per cent of the members in the central committee of 
the party were military officers. The period of Chadli’s leadership involved a number of 
changes in the FLN, some of which were geared to make it more like a political party, mostly 
by releasing military members and opening membership to a new civilian generation.
867
 The 
FLN was strong because it was the only party allowed, and most of its members had occupied 
positions in the political structure. They tended to have close relations with the military 
power holders, as well as externally through the country’s international relations. The FLN, 
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in Chouchane’s view, was the face the military regime used to establish itself in power, 
although the FLN became more independent through the multi-party system from late 1989 
to early 1992. Under the leadership of Mahri, the FLN began to openly oppose the regime on 
some issues.  The secret services were very active at this time, however, and Mahri was fired 
from his position as head of the FLN at the beginning of Boumédiène’s regime. The same 
thing occurred in other parties. In fact, the intervention of the Military Secret Services in the 
Islamic movements such as Nahdha (MNI), which soon fired their leader, Abdellah Jaballah, 
and who later formed another party, al-Islaah, had long-term consequences. A few months 
later, with conflict between members and opposition to Jaballah, they fired him and took him 
to court on charges of corruption. Jaballah pointed out in his statement against the military 
regime that they did not want him to be in a leadership position, especially after his success 
with both of his previous parties.
868
 The collapse of Nahdha and later al-Islaah was 
precipitated by Jaballah’s sacking. According to Abdelhamid Remita, one of the formal 
founders of the Nahdha movement, the party failed because of the dictatorial style of the 
leader.  In the meantime certain members were directed by government agencies to 
undermine the party, and they were successful.
869
 A similar role was played by the DRS with 
regards to the FLN.   They organised a coup against Mehri after he managed to go through a 
politically legitimate process to get the party out of the control of the military regime.
870
 
However, “military control was re-established in 1996, when the intelligence services forced 
Mr. Mehri to abdicate his position as party leader.”871 
According to Chouchane, Dhina and Samraoui, the Algerian military secret service 
was involved in most of the new political parties, and played a major role in some of them, 
albeit with different levels of focus and interest, depending upon how popular the party was 
with the population at large. In some instances they had their own members planted inside the 
executive committee of a party, and they would direct its policies and planning, often against 
the wishes of the other committee members, and sometimes in contention with other parties, 
or even in attacking government officials.  Ben-Fliss was the political face of the military 
secret service for a long time, was in the FLN, and by all accounts was the representative of 
the French Officers.
872
 Along with Abd al-Qadir Hadjar and many others, he would break up 
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any party program that did not suit his own interests. The power of these operatives was not 
unlimited, however.  Chouchane argued that “Hadjar can do nothing to the formal [party] 
leader, Abdelhamid Mahri, without the support of the Military Secret Service”. Mahri had a 
strong position in the FLN, mostly because of his record in the revolution, which gave him 
legitimacy. He was elected to various positions in the government, and was a respected 
personality among the other leaders and revolutionaries. This put Hadjar on a higher level 
than any other member of the FLN, making it harder to sack him, even if the military regime 
wanted to do so.
873
 
 
5. The Role of the FLN in Human Rights Violations in the Post Colonialism 
Period  
The historical background and the formation of the FLN as a popular party, and its 
success in developing political power and a strong military wing, which became the ALN, 
explain why it was that the FLN was able to become the single legitimate political party in 
Algeria.  It soon directed many of the country’s developments in politics, the economy and 
especially international relations. But, as has been shown earlier, the country was unstable 
politically and weak economically in the years following the revolution.  It also suffered from 
deep ethnic, racial, regional and ideological divisions, which severely complicated the 
process of planned change.  In short, the FLN should have been governed by civilian 
politicians, and ideally would have been able to exercise control over the military.  It was the 
military, however, that ultimately used the FLN to control civilian politicians.
874
   
In the view of many observers, the FLN should have been able to complete the 
Algerian revolution, and lead Algeria to stability and prosperity.  Some have said that Algeria 
would become the nation to traverse history.
875
 The FLN rejected external programs from 
Arabo-Musilman, according to the meetings of the central committee of the FLN.
876
 Ben 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
put, Ben-Fliss was used to complete the French Officers program against the FLN’s revolutionary members, and 
his mission ended with their dismissal from the party.  The same thing happened to former president Liamine 
Zeroual, who was appointed president when he agreed to work for the French Officers, but failed to follow their 
instructions regarding the ‘war on terror’. He was sacked, and when the officers later attempted to enlist him to 
undermine Bouteflika, he refused. See: Chouchane, personal interview, London (23/05/2009).    
873
 Chouchane, personal interview, London (10/06/2009). 
874
 Sidhum, personal interview, Algiers (01/09/2009);  Chouchane, personal interview, London (13/05/2009). 
875
 The original expression in French was: “l’Algerie devient une personne traversant l’histoire”.  Around that 
was the major belief of Algerians, in which the media played a major role in guiding them, that they were 
unique and that their country was the greatest, but needed strong leadership to protect them and their 
revolutionary principles from internal and external factors.  
876
 Even their statements on the Jewish community were just concessions, no more than theory.  Harbi, M., Le 
FLN Mirage et Realite des Origines a la Prise du Pouvoir: 1945-1962, Col. Le Sens de L’Histoire (Paris : Ed. 
Jeune Afrique, 1980) ; Stora (2001).  
 254   
 
Tobbal, one of the ‘three Bs’, was definite on this point.877 Throughout a key speech, 
delivered only one year before independence, Ben Tobbal indicated that the military would 
not be a part of the civilian power structure and democratic system after independence.  
The formal role of the FLN during the revolution was to bring independence to the 
Algerian people, and that was why even during open conflict between party leaders, the 
assumption was that they would stay together under one party, and allow other parties to 
develop after independence was achieved. The FLN was successful in its primary goal, but 
appears to have failed Algerians in its socio-political legacy.  For example, the ‘settling of 
accounts’ within the FLN leadership led to assassinations.  Violence, in fact, took a major toll 
among the FLN leadership. Henry Jackson argues that the Boumédiène coup of 1965 put an 
end to the FLN’s revolution. From 1954 to 1965 the FLN was a revolutionary movement 
charged with securing independence and initiating the country on an apolitical path to 
democracy.
878
 Events after that coup demonstrate that the FLN was never truly functional as 
a political party.
879
 In fact, it served varied functions: it was the political arm of the liberation 
movement, for example, after independence, it became the country’s legislative power and its 
executive power at the same time; it controlled the judiciary and the media.  Jackson notes: 
...its offices provided numerous patronage posts. It has been used as a 
means of diffusing demands and programme decisions from the top down 
to the masses but not the reverse. And repeatedly since 1962, as waves of 
popular discontent have risen against bureaucratic excess or indifference, or 
against the personalisation and centralisation of rule, the leadership has 
asserted that party reorganisation – leading to mass popular control – was 
now the first priority of the state.
880
  
 
Moreover, violence as usual was the first solution the military used in the name of the 
FLN, and by the summer of 1962, FLN members from the military and economic interest 
groups clashed. With the difficulties of keeping the country running without the Europeans, 
the internal and external migrations affecting thousands of people, and the sudden rise of 
rural people in the revolution, the trend toward the autonomy of the Willaya system, 
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factionalism, and regionalism began. Of the Willayas, three and four decided to maintain 
their councils. Boudiaf resigned from the political bureau when the general staff wanted to 
intervene.  The commandos’ base attacked Willaya Unit Four, and killed several people. In 
1963 the nation adopted a single-party system, which had not really been put forward at the 
Tripoli Congress, and this gradually took root. The party of Revolutionary Socialists, headed 
by Boudiaf, was destroyed and outlawed as an organisation. Every party organisation other 
than the FLN was denounced as representing divisive tendencies, and fissures developed in 
the foundations of a state under construction.  
By 1964 the Algiers Charter was designed to restructure the party.  This followed 
Boumédiène’s coup d’état of June 1965, when the country was being run by a sub-committee 
of the Council of the Revolution. While top officials in the army and government were 
associated with it, the French Officers intervened effectively in the council,
881
  which meant 
that the party would not ultimately play a role in determining the direction of the country’s 
policies.
882
 The army was the real power holder; the party just held formal status, which was 
respected because of its revolutionary legitimacy. By the time of Boumédiène’s death in 
December 1978, and just after the National Charter was launched,
883
 the establishment of the 
FLN as a formal structure of government was terminated, and the FLN ceased to play its 
originally intended vanguard role.
884
  
It was not only dominated by the executive (hence the army), but was 
also relegated to a formal status: that of presenting candidates for 
‘elections’ and acting as ‘transmission belts’ to mobilise support for a 
politically bankrupt regime.
885
 
 
6. The Events of October 1988 and Political Changes  
According to many scholars, the original cause of the events of October 1988 was an 
economic crisis.  It must be added that also significant was the failure of a system that did not 
tolerate transparent debate.
886
 A majority of Algerians knew nothing of the real financial 
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situation of the country. For many years, the country pursued policies to ensure social peace 
by ensuring that the essential needs of the population were met, but these policies eventually 
failed. Sociologist Lahouari Addi, in the Impasse of Populism, explains this, noting: “The 
deficit of the state’s enterprises is not an accident of accounting; it reflects the inability of the 
renter state to achieve a satisfactory rate of return in the production system to cover 
expenses.” According to Addi, the regime was paying the political price of power, covering 
the people’s needs through means such as manipulation of the price system.  The 
accumulation of defective and economically unsupportable policies led to an acute crisis. The 
trigger was a drop in oil prices in the mid-1980s.
887
 The uprising of 5th October 1988 was the 
most significant event since the independence in 1962, and provided the authorities with the 
opportunity to embark on a program of liberalisation.
888
   
Algeria took a different political pathway at this time, and underwent an important 
transformation in the 1989 Constitution. It was a date marking the “beginning of the 
transition from authoritarianism with the opening of political space to previously excluded 
groups.”889 The tragic riots of October 1988 were orchestrated by rival clans inside the 
regime, and they marked the end of the FLN’s hegemony over Algerian political life.890 
These events shocked the country, as they clarified many misunderstandings regarding the 
nature of political control.  The reform process was the product of individual need, the need 
of the authorities to legitimise themselves and to hang onto power.
891
  Hundreds of thousands 
of civilians took part in the subsequent events, which were regarded as the first approach of 
liberty in Algeria. The regime had been forced by popular demand to initiate the 
democratization process.   
With the political reforms of the Constitution of 1989, many political and social 
organisations were recognised for the first time, and were able to take part in the new 
political system. Before this, the FLN had been the only party that was officially recognised. 
Following the political reforms, Algerians had started to practice their rights by openly 
opposing the military regime. Almost fifty political parties and hundreds of social, religious 
and workers’ trusts and organisations were formed.  The lack of elite cohesiveness and 
legitimacy became graphically evident in the failure of the Algerian state to articulate a clear 
ideological direction. The president, Benjedid, sought to move the Algerian state on to a new 
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pathway towards democracy, but without affecting the principles of his party, the FLN.  
According Samraoui and Chouchane, the DRS was giving him incorrect information about 
what was happening in the country, and then sacked him in 1992.
892
  
The failure of the FLN to lead the regime was probably due to its illegitimacy in the 
eyes of most Algerians.  It had simply become unacceptable to young Algerians. This, 
combined with a chronically weak economy, and insecurity in social life and income,
893
 led 
to a precipitous decline in trust between the government and population. The government 
became useless to citizens, and this was accentuated by widespread bureaucratic corruption in 
most of the government services.  
The government and political sectors remained under the domination of the French 
Officers. The economic, social, and cultural landscape of Algeria had been radically 
transformed, the population had grown and become urbanized, and the demand for jobs, 
education, and housing was growing exponentially. The government failed to provide for 
these needs of its citizens and the system became a virtual time bomb, just waiting to 
explode. Indeed, in the face of these factors, the military secret service, who wanted to shift 
the basis of the political economy from socialism to capitalism, began to play a major role in 
driving the population to violence.
894
 Regardless of who started the major riots that 
followed,
895
 the result led to reform.  A number of measures were introduced, partly because 
of pressure from the street, but mainly because the current authorities needed them to 
legitimise themselves and hang on to power.
896
  The costs included hundreds of civilian 
deaths and thousands of arrests, imprisonments, and torture.
897
  
  7. The Multi-Party System and the Response to the Violence  
The changes in the political system after President Bendjedid announced that there 
would be a referendum to revise the Algerian Constitution triggered another important 
principle: the government’s responsibility to the National Popular Assembly. The referendum 
took place on October 10, 1988. The FLN, as a single political party, had three main points in 
its platform: the separation of the state and the FLN, free selection of candidates in municipal 
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and legislative elections, and the independence of “mass organisations.”898 The new 
constitution was approved in the election, with a majority of 92.27% of the vote and a 
participation rate of 73.08%. The separation of the FLN from the state did not affect the trust 
that FLN members had in President Bendjedid. The final report of the FLN included the goals 
of re-electing Bendjedid and transforming the mass organisation into part of the FLN party 
structure, thus attempting to protect their interests and retain their domination of the power 
structure.
899
  
Some parties formed opposition coalitions against the government and the military 
regime. Other parties, such as the RCD, a movement representing the Berber culture, had 
adopted principles such as the separation between the religious sphere and the society.  
Islamists had dominated the political ground, using sermons in mosques, universities and 
other public places to drive home their message. The FLN, after its separation from the 
military regime, was supported by former revolutionaries and children of Mujahideen,
900
 and 
the Abnaa al-Chouhada. These movements believed in the revolution’s legitimacy as the 
only acceptable route to political power in Algeria. In November 1989, Ait Ahmed, who was 
known for his opposition to the FLN after independence, returned from exile in Europe to 
reform his social political party, the FFS (Front des Forces Socialistes). In September 1990, 
and after ten years of exile, the former first president of Algeria, Ben Bella, returned to the 
country and launched his program by leading a new party, the MDA (Mouvement pour la 
Democratie en Algerie). These parties, as well as others, were built around personalities, 
typically a famous person who had been involved in the War of Independence, such as Ben 
Bella, Ait Ahmed and former President Benkhedda, who created the El Oumma Party.  
Former Prime Minister Kasdi Merbah, who had been the de jure president of the SM during 
the period of Boumédiène, led “the Algerian Movement for the Justice and the development” 
(Mouvement Algerien pour la Justice et la Development), the MAJD.
901
  
Many parties were involved in this political competition, some with just a few 
members. In creating a party, individuals gained support from the government and 
charities.
902
 The creation of political parties was made easier by the minimalist requirements: 
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only fifteen members were required to form a political party.
903
 The main focus of the 
government at that time was to divide the population’s support between many small parties, 
and so create conflict among the opposition parties themselves rather than with the military 
regime.
904
 The regime succeeded in this plan, which intensified the conflict between Islamists 
and anti-Islamists, such as the RCD and the Tahaddi against the Movement for an Islamic 
FIS, Nahdha and Hamas. Conflicts arose as well between Islamists (FIS and Hamas for 
example), and between anti-Islamists, such as the FFS and the RCD. Bouandel noted that 
while “the new law formally prohibited the creation of parties on a regional, ethnic or 
religious basis; its wording effectively permitted such parties.”905  
Even the legislation relating to political party formation noted that parties comprised 
of religious, regional or ethnic groups would not be allowed.
906
 Nevertheless, religious parties 
such as the FIS, the Movement for an Islamic Society (Hamas), the Islamic Nahda Party, and 
the mainly ethnic parties such as the RCD and the FFS, were legalised.  While the FIS based 
its program on the application of Sharia (Islamic Law), the RCD proposed the complete 
secularisation of the state, to the point of opposing Islamic rules in some of its opinions.
907
 It 
was evident that:  
[The] regime was deliberately encouraging the formation of political parties 
which, instead of canvassing alternative programs for government, were 
canvassing alternative, indeed diametrically opposed and totally 
irreconcilable, conceptions of the state.
908
 
 
Within one year of the open political system in Algeria, forty-four parties had secured 
their status with the Internal Affairs Ministry. Hundreds of social organisations started 
working legally in the country, including human rights leagues, independent women’s 
organisations and cultural movements. A new political dimension coalesced; a widespread 
belief in the need to minimise military authoritarianism.  
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These conflicts between parties, fed by the media and the DRS, exploded at times, 
ending in violence, deaths and arrests. Because free speech had been encouraged among 
citizens through their parties, politicians were subjected to public scandals as part of the DRS 
plans against the democratic system. The leader of the Labour Party, the PT (Parti des 
travailleurs) Louisa Hannoune, the socialist leader Ait Ahmed, Ali Belhaj, the vice-leaderof 
the FIS, and Mahri from the FLN, became increasingly angry about the way in which 
agencies of government used the FLN and its revolutionary legitimacy for their own 
purposes. The consequent violence that was generated after the elections led to the arrest and 
punishment of these leaders and their supporters.    
The FIS quickly emerged as the most powerful opposition group in the country. It 
carefully prepared for the elections, using sermons in mosques and speeches at Islamic 
events, and practised a new economic system based on charities, Zakat and the Islamic 
market, to assist directly in the well-being of Algerians, providing food and shelter.   The FIS, 
FFS and PT were more outspoken in their criticisms of the military regime than the other 
parties.  The military regime responded by creating other parties to dilute these criticisms.  
Examples of these included Islamists such as the RCD, and the MSP (formerly Hamas).  
Later, the regime created its own party, the National Rally for Democracy (RND),
909
 which 
eventually became the political face of the French Officers and the military regime in general. 
According to Addi, the results of the elections of January 1992 had not been 
anticipated by the military regime and the army was not ready to accept successful 
autonomous parties forming a government that it would not necessarily control.
910
  Party 
conflict became the pretext of the violence and coup of 1992. Former General Nazzar 
confirmed that the army had confidence that the winner of these elections would be from the 
nationalists, and there would be a narrow gap among the parties.
911
 The unexpected success 
of FIS triggered the violent crisis of 1992.  The military was launched into action, using the 
DRS, led at the time by Khalida Massaoudi,
912
 against the FIS, taking advantage of a 
demonstration by the anti-Islamic FFS in opposition to the FIS and its electoral victory.  
While some protestors were seeking to reverse the elections, this was never an aim of the FFS 
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leadership.
913
 The military regime was seeking any support it could find to justify its 
intervention in cancelling the elections and stopping the Islamists from gaining power.
914
  
Mourad Dhina has argued that the dictatorship in Algeria had the ability to use 
elections to protect themselves from critics by creating political parties and humanitarian 
organisations to redirect attention away from their government. It is not surprising that the 
military regime created political parties, trusts, and organisations, and was involved in some 
way or another with most of the political parties, including the major parties.
915
 The military 
regime has never agreed to the principles of democracy: decision making positions were 
conceived and designed to remain in military hands, with the political parties providing 
legitimacy and additional options to control the political arena.  That, at least, was the 
military perspective.    
Addi’s views reinforce the argument that the military had a serious problem with its 
own legitimacy, and switched to a multiparty system precisely to gain electoral legitimacy. 
After the coup of 1992, the opposition was effectively removed.  The military regime stopped 
the FIS by arresting the its leadership and killing or jailing many members. In doing this, 
however, the military regime had to resort to more drastic tactics.   They cited the global war 
on terrorism to justify their coup, and the human rights violations that followed over the next 
two decades.  The state of emergency that they declared in 1992 is still in effect. No party or 
civilian organisation has reached the level of effective opposition during these decades.
916
 To 
gain legitimacy in power, the regime has created the caricature of a political system for an 
international audience.  It has allowed the formation of limited parties and organisations, 
beginning with the FLN and the EGTA, then the RCD and the RND.  The military has three 
parties, the FLN, the RND, and the MSP, instead of the one party, the FLN, that it had 
previously. According to Addi: 
...functioning with two legitimacies, the political system in Algeria is 
confronted by three major contradictions: the first is relative to the 
antagonism of two legitimacies (historic and electoral), the second is linked 
to the inevitable competition between the real power (the army) and the 
formal power (the president), and, finally, the third results from the weak 
representation of the elected officials owing to the stuffing of ballot boxes. 
In order to survive these three contradictions, which risked proving fatal to 
it, the regime indirectly fashioned a singular typology of parties, in 
corrupting their respective leadership. It is known that the managements of 
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the FLN, the RND, and the MSP are not autonomous and obey the 
instructions of the administration.
917
 
 
8. The Role of the Current Parties in the Decision Making and Structuring of 
Violence in Algeria 
  
Since the War of Independence, Algeria has not had civilian control in the political 
leadership of the county. According to General Nazzar, the military always chooses the 
president and the government.
918
 Chouchane concludes his observations on the role of 
political parties by saying that the multi-party system in Algeria is a “big lie”. It is generally 
agreed that most political parties, and certainly those that are represented in the legislature, 
are tools in the hands of the military, and have no independent policies.   Such political 
parties present a democratic face for the military regime.
919
 
Under emergency rule, political parties have been formed, but many have failed to 
secure their licencing agreements from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The regime has taken 
the lesson of the FIS to heart.  Former Prime Minister (and strong supporter of the military 
regime) Sid Ahmed Ghuzali failed to get approval of his new party, formed in 2009, 
following intervention by the military in the political sector. The same thing happened to 
Ahmed Taleb al-Ibrahimi, who wrote in his memoirs of his struggles with his father, Bashir 
al-Ibrahimi, against the military regime until they refused his attempts to form a new political 
party. Since 1992, Algeria has had four presidents, eight prime ministers and hundreds of 
ministers, with many ministers dismissed after only a few months in office, whereas the main 
military leaders responsible for the violence in the country since independence, and the coup 
of 1992, appear to be secure in their positions.
920
 The Algerian regime requires that the 
president of the republic is determined by the military and elected by 90 per cent of electors. 
This system applied to the terms of Bendjedid in 1978, Zéroual in 1995, and Bouteflika in 
1999. If the voters do not agree on a candidate, the system goes into crisis. “The presidential 
election does not inform on the influence of the parties, but rather on the influence of 
institutions or of clans in such institutions.”921  
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Brahimi stated that the military regime is suffering from the internal and external 
isolation that it experienced after the coup of 1992.
922
 The only way for the government to 
survive and gain time, in the absence of legitimacy, has been to improve its political image on 
the one hand, while continuing to pursue its policy of violence to terrorism on the other.  
There always was massive fraud by stuffing ballot boxes by government 
officials, because the turnout was very low, and mainly because the 
overwhelming majority of the Algerian people do not trust the regime.
923
 
 
Indeed, the long-term lack of legitimacy, including the legitimacy of political parties, 
in Algerian politics has demonstrated that violence is a deliberate policy of the regime. The 
violence has been fed by the regime itself to justify its existence and to survive in power. 
The legitimacy of the regime through fraudulent elections serves also as a 
political cover to continue its policy of terror in the name of secularism 
against ‘fundamentalism’.924  
 
To conclude this chapter, it is clear that the democratic system in Algeria, established 
by a general election for the Constitution in 1989, has not been accepted by the military 
regime. Indeed, the regime that remains in place since independence enjoys power without 
legitimacy. The only legitimacy available to them is the legitimacy that came out of the 
revolution, and this appears to have lost its meaning for the present generation in the face of 
the constant and continuing failures of the regime.  The only way to achieve political 
legitimacy is to create a new political environment, with political parties and social 
organisations that enable the general population and the international community to have 
confidence in a democratic system. At present, citizens have been given the right to vote, but 
not the right to choose their leadership and their constitution. Addi has noted that political 
science attempts to explain:  
…a multi-party system without electoral alternatives! The populations have 
the right to vote, but not the right to choose leaders other than the ones 
designated by the administration.
925
  
 
Dhina, Aroua and Massli have supported Addi’s observation that Algeria has not 
chosen a president or even leaders in parliament by election, and that the regime does not 
accept the fact that the electorate does not support it.  According to Addi, after the coup of 
1992 the government routinely rigged the electoral results to prevent having to resort to 
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annulment. All political parties, whether government or ‘opposition’, are involved in a game 
that is controlled by the military. These parties are just a façade that their sponsors from the 
military and the DRS approve of.
926
 Addi analysed the sources of military power in Algeria, 
concluding that:    
...the regime makes use of three resources: the administration, which fixes the 
results; the legal system, which is incapable of annulling falsified polls; and 
finally, the police, which suppress every violent protest.
927
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study has explored the central question of why the Algerian military turned 
against its own citizens after independence. The research has been focused mainly on the 
protracted military intervention in the political system and its relation to the demise of 
democracy and the rise of human rights abuses in Algeria. As discussed in the first chapter, 
scholars and other observers have continually questioned the causes and consequences of this 
violence and, in particular, the civil war of the 1990s. This thesis has focused on the unique 
role of the Algerian military after independence and examined whether structural or 
organisational changes in the Algerian military caused the massive human rights violations in 
Algeria, especially those of the 1990s. Of central interest were the military actions during the 
Algerian political crisis immediately after independence, and later during the democratic 
period of 1989-1991. There is no doubt that violence by Islamic extremists resulted in 
significant human rights violations. According to interviews undertaken for this research, the 
FIS, at the time that it was formed, was not part of the violence that took place after the coup 
d’état following the election of 1991-92.928  
Violence in Algeria is the most disturbing aspect of a much larger problem, the 
failure of democracy, which was only instituted for the first time in Algeria in the 1989 
Constitution. The weakness of the political elites, including the Islamic movements, helped 
the military, directly and indirectly, in their violations of civil and human rights. From this 
key issue, three theoretical questions follow regarding the formation of a military ethos and 
the impact of political parties on human rights violations in post-colonial Algeria. The first 
question is about the fundamental structure of the Algerian military after independence in 
1962. This study examines the formation of that military establishment.  The domination of 
the armed forces in the Algerian system took root even before independence, however.  It is 
argued that after 1957, the Congress of Soummam, established the future role of the army and 
the security services.
929
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Algeria has had an unstable political system since its independence. Of major 
significance were the coup d’état of 1962 against the Provisional Government  (GPRA), 
another coup against the first president of the country, Ben Bella, in 1965, and ongoing 
revolutionary struggles for political and military control over the country. With the formation 
of a military regime heading the Revolutionary Council, and the single political party, the 
FLN, Algeria faced changes that affected national security, the political structure and even 
international relations. This study has discussed and analysed these changes and the human 
rights violations that followed every military coup in Algeria.  
I have attempted to clarify and outline the performance of the political system in 
Algeria, following the course of its history right through to the present era. Algeria is a case 
study that can be seen as an informative example of the challenges and dangers facing other 
countries in the region.  It raises many of the issues recently uncovered in the “Arab Spring”. 
However, we should not underestimate the wide the differences among the countries of North 
Africa and the Middle East in terms of history and political systems.  While many of the 
countries in this large region have similar problems, they are vastly different from each other 
as well. The central focus of this research is based on the analysis of the specific and varied 
sources of violence that Algerians were (and are) subjected to before and after independence.  
Several historical factors were precursors to the widespread human rights violations, 
which destroyed over 200,000 lives in less than a decade. The questions arising from this 
research have been covered in earlier chapters, drawing on information from the media and 
the comments of participants, observers and scholars. The information included in this 
analysis has been referenced with the help of key political and military people.  Through 
face-to-face interviews, as well as phone and written interviews, participants have 
comprehensively discussed the nature of the apparent illness that seems to beset the regime, 
and the dysfunctional nature of Algeria’s political system.   
Military regimes and their intervention in political parties, and particularly their 
human rights violations, are central concerns of this research. The history of the revolutionary 
war provides strong evidence regarding the basis and origins of the Algerian political crisis, 
and the widespread violation of human rights that has hurt the country so deeply, especially 
in the 1990s.  
According to the observations of the people who participated in this research, the 
main cause of the Algerian crisis after independence involved the French-trained military 
officers, to whom I have referred as the “French Officers.”  They have, by all appearances, 
owed their allegiance and their policies to France and, as regards their apparent need to hold 
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power, to themselves. Some of my interviewees were revolutionaries of the War of 
Independence (1954-62) and some were witnesses to the many crimes that took place in 
Algeria during the crisis of 1990 in the name of fighting terrorism.  The breakdown of the 
remnants of civil society that remained after the independence struggle probably stemmed 
from internal competition for the highest positions of power in the country. Brahimi, one of 
the revolutionary leaders who had occupied a number of positions in different governments, 
including the office of prime minister during the presidential period of Bendjedid (1984-88), 
witnessed the rise of the French Officers, and continues to blame them for the crisis.  
Brahimi’s evidence is supported by Samraoui and Chouchane who were witnesses to the 
human rights violations perpetrated against Algerians during the crisis of the 1990s.    
The violence in Algeria is ultimately a legacy of the French colonial regime, 
although it was unleashed in a far less controlled form against civilians during the post-
colonial era. However, the conflicts among the leaders of the revolution started in the early 
years of the liberation conflict. In 1956, the Congress of Soummam highlighted the principles 
of revolution and included the proposal that Algeria be controlled by civilian politicians, not 
by the military, and that local people have priority in taking positions of power over people 
living outside the country. While the revolutionary elites saw the politicians’ role in the 
revolution as controlling the new military forces, with the murder of Ramdane, the political 
designer of the Soummam process, the military assumed full political power.     
A few months after achieving independence, the country was divided into regions, 
and the discord among the leaders and their supporters erupted in a bloody competition for 
power.  Before the last troops of the French military left the country, Algerians were 
confronted by another war which started between the internal revolutionaries and the military 
commands of the East and West borders, led by Boumédiène, including officers from the 
French military schools. The French Officers had begun their rise to power.  The Leader of 
the GPRA, Ben Khadda, refused to engage in combat against his own citizens at the end of 
the war, and chose rather to relinquish leadership, leaving it in Boumédiène’s hands. Ben 
Bella accepted Boumédiène’s offer to become the first independent Algerian president, based 
on Boumédiène’s sense that he did not have sufficient legitimacy, and his lack of a war 
record.  He knew, of course, that at that time the real power of the revolution was in the hands 
of the three ‘Bs’, Boussouf, Ben Toubal and Belkacem. Soon Boumédiène was able to 
disestablish the GPRA, including its military divisions, and arrest its leaders.  He then 
replaced it with a Military Secret Service (SM) under the leadership of Marbah, to function 
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under his immediate command.   The role of the SM was to protect him and his position 
against threats from his colleagues and from other revolutionaries.      
The second question considers the formation and the structure of the military regime 
in Algeria. Eventually Boumédiène succeeded in his plan, using the support of the French 
Officers on the one hand, and the legitimacy of Ben Bella on the other.  He was thus able to 
rule the country from the shadows, that is, until he decided to seize full leadership through a 
coup d’état in 1965. Many people were arrested, and subsequently tortured and killed. The 
competition for power continued along these lines during Boumédiène’s reign, thanks to the 
personal security that he had found through the protection of the most powerful organisation 
within the security services, the SM. The SM was faithful to Boumédiène until he died, and 
this weakened resistance from other revolutionaries and regional leaders who often found 
themselves in discord with him. In fact, there were coup attempts against Boumédiène and his 
government, but they were typically crushed by the SM, which functioned outside the 
country’s legislation, and thus could do whatever their leader asked.  According to Brahimi, 
Boumédiène was closer to the French Officers than any other post-revolutionary leader, and 
may have suffered the ultimate consequences, although he is thought to have died from a rare 
blood disease.
930
  
The French Officers, who for the most part only became involved in the revolution 
(on the side of the Algerians) a few months before the ceasefire, apparently developed a neo-
colonial project over the 30 years following independence, and used this to empower and 
enrich themselves.  During the difficult Boumédiène years, the French Officers played a 
major role in developing a strong military establishment, training young soldiers to reliably 
obey their orders and preparing them to be used strategically. The Benjedid presidency was 
an auspicious moment for them to claim key positions in the different sectors of the 
administration, military, politics, media and the economy. Pressure was mounting on the 
president to close the SM because of the narrowness of its original role to protect 
Boumédiène and his regime, and because its power had come from Boumédiène, and not 
from the Constitution. The SM leader, Marbah, who was thought to have confidential files 
exposing the intentions of the French Officers, was appointed prime minister as a matter of 
convenience, and then was assassinated with his family in a bloody accident during the 
democratic period in 1991. After this, the French Officers were able to occupy the highest 
levels of power in the Ministry of Defence, which was controlled by General Nazzar, the 
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spokesman of the French Officers group and reportedly the designer of the coup d’état of 
1992, which ended the brief democratic period.  
The background to that coup is highly instructive, and points to elements of the 
“Arab Spring” by way of comparison. After a massive wave of violence, which took 
hundreds of lives in October 1988, President Benjedid’s government responded by 
introducing sweeping democratic reforms that brought the Islamists, led by FIS and an anti-
military coalition, which was led by the FFS, to power. The French Officers were clearly 
unwilling to relinquish their grasp on power, and awaited a chance to reverse the democratic 
processes.  With the support of anti-Islamist organisations, which were thought to have been 
formed and/or controlled by the intelligence services (DRS), they intervened in January 1992, 
sparking a bitter and bloody civil war that lasted for the remainder of the decade. The military 
ignored the legislative and judicial rules, and violated the principles of the country 
established after the revolution.    
Although the state-of-emergency began immediately after the coup d’état of 1992, it 
was extended repeatedly over the next dozen years. Thus, although the regime had to hold on 
to legitimacy in a way that retained democracy and protected itself from the violence that it 
encouraged and fomented after the events of October 1988, it continued to act illegitimately, 
conceding only in establishing a range of organisations, and political parties such as the GTA, 
women’s organisations and ‘protective organisations’.  They organised pro-government and 
anti-Islamic demonstrations and marches, such as the march of the FFS and the RCD in 1991, 
which allowed these groups to raise their collective voices in a war against Islamists. The 
respective positions of power occupied by the French Officers allowed them to unleash levels 
of violence not seen since the days of the Algerian War, and served to radicalise elements on 
both sides. Consequently, terrorist organisations increased the intensity of their attacks 
against civilians and officials alike. Military security agents (DRS) apparently used this 
situation to create more chaos in the country’s political, economy and security systems. The 
number of state security forces also increased, with the establishment of militia forces that 
further intensified the level of human rights abuses. It was in the midst of this extreme 
violence that the Algerian authorities engaged in a transition to democracy. The regime 
established the National Consultative Council (Conseil Consulatif Nationale (CCN), to take 
the role of parliament and to legitimise decisions taken by the authorities. Several political 
parties, created by security agents or guided by them, took part in this council, and supported 
the military in the fight against what was referred to as ‘the Islamic Danger’, while others 
abstained from being represented in what they perceived to be an illegitimate body. 
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Year after year, the violence continued to destroy lives. The prolonged instability 
and insecurity of social life in most regions of the country eventually began to concern the 
military regime, however. There was now the growing possibility of a spontaneous revolution 
against them, and this encouraged them to attempt to unite the country behind their 
leadership, and to bring the regions, communities, and ethnic groups more closely together, 
apparently not for purposes of social reform or in the spirit of amnesty, but rather to gain 
legitimacy in the national and international settings.  
On the international level, many of the human rights organizations have received  
positive responses from countries around the world supporting intervention in Algeria and  
investigation of the massacres and other  alleged crimes that occurred Algerian villages. The 
truth behind the assassination of as many as 200,000 people during ten years of crisis remains 
buried, and the alleged perpetrators have not been tried. The French penetration of Algeria 
was underscored in the United Nations in 1995 when the French representative vetoed 
intervention in Algeria. It is apparent that the French still consider that Algeria is not only an 
ex-French colony, but in some respects at least, an extension of French territory. 
However, Algerian national identity did not blend well with the socio-cultural 
backgrounds of the French Officers and their supporters. For the most part, these elites were 
deeply immersed in Western culture and French customs, and contrasted sharply with most 
Algerians, who were Arabs, who spoke Arabic, and who practiced Islam as their religion.  
Regionalism, moreover, complicated matters for the French Officers. Regional and ethnic 
differences, then, made it very difficult for the French Officers to plan some sort of national 
integration that would be accepting of their own identities. Algeria’s multi-faceted national 
identity, moreover, made it very difficult to select a single, popular leader. The French 
Officers and, indeed, much of the military establishment, were thus further encouraged to 
identify themselves as Francophone and anti-Islamist, particularly after the death of 
Boumédiène.  Efforts by the military establishment to guide the identity of Algerians, through 
the education system, media and social organisations, largely failed; the reality of Algerian 
society and culture, and interpersonal relations, was based upon an ideology and rules that 
were clearly different from those of the leadership (viz., the Francophone elite). This 
fundamental conflict was mostly hidden, but grew in the mosques and universities and with 
the support of other various factors, such as social, economic and the political confrontations, 
until it was dramatically highlighted by the advent of democracy in the early 1990s.  
The second part of the hypothesis, involving the spread of military intervention into 
political life, focuses on the subject of military professionalism, which supposedly affects the 
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role that the Algerian military should take to become politically subservient to civilian 
government, to avoid clashes with civilians, and to cease committing human rights violations. 
Whenever the question of “who kills whom in Algeria?” was raised during the height of 
violence, by scholars, politicians and through the international media, the question was 
typically reduced to two possible answers: the military regime or groups from the Islamist 
fundamentalists.  Ill-defined “terrorists” were sometimes included as well.  The analysis has 
tended to be focused on the military regime and how they view the issue. The question 
increasingly arises as to whether the Algerian military is professional enough to guide culture 
and politics sufficiently to support the well-being and fundamental interests of Algerians, or 
will it simply continue to institutionalise violence for the purposes of furthering its immediate 
self-interest.  Most of the evidence presented herein points to a conclusion that by now is 
obvious: the main interest of the military in Algeria has been to stay in power and maintain 
its hegemony over the administration of the country, and the economy, and control of all 
political groups. The Algerian military, it will be recalled, was originally formed on the 
frontiers of Algeria by Boumédiène in 1962, and officers have never been selected based on 
professional military qualifications.  For officers in the Algerian military, military service 
meant (and continues to mean) upward social mobility, power, and participation in the 
rewards of economic hegemony, opportunism, and much more.  There is a wide gap between 
the Constitution of 1976, which explicitly defined the role of the military as political and 
ideological, and the Constitution of 1989, which reflected the need for a professional, less 
politicised military, defined in Article 24 as an institution responsible solely for defence.  
It is probably not an exaggeration to say that the Algerian military has never 
practiced military professionalism, but has instead played the role of a clandestine political 
actor holding power positions in the highest levels of bureaucracy. The military relies on 
armed power and through this has gained political power. Indeed, most of my sources have 
indicated that it is only through violence that this regime could survive for any length of time. 
After the coup d’état of 1992, when chaos spread throughout the country, violent military 
responses became a standard reaction from the regime. French Officers had a simple solution 
to political unrest, and they applied it to civilians without hesitation.  We know, for example, 
that the Defence Minister at that time, Nazzar, justified the military-directed violence of 
October 1988 by saying that the army had not received “the white bullets, so we used the 
black ones”. The same solution was suggested against the democratic elections in 1991, and 
to justify the subsequent coup d’état, implying that democracy had “opened the door” to 
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Islamist terrorists. Thus, violence was the standard solution of the military dictatorship to 
most threats.  
By the end of the war and the immediate post-war period, the ALN evolved into the 
nation’s military forces. In the process, the leadership of these military forces became the key 
source of power in Algeria and the ultimate cause of most power struggles, coups, and coup 
attempts in Algeria.
931
 Boumédiène, who built a modern military outside the borders of the 
country and was involved in initiating the protracted violence, moved to play a central 
political role with Ben Bella at a time when the country was under Arab socialism. A political 
transformation took place, with the coup of 1965 against the Ben Bella government. Algeria’s 
first president, Ben Bella, was overthrown and Boumédiène, who was regarded as a political 
moderate, and not identified with any particular group or faction. He commanded wide 
support from the military establishment.
932
    
 Boumédiène immediately dissolved the National Assembly and suspended 
Algeria’s 1964 Constitution. The Council of the Revolution became responsible for 
policymaking and political decisions in the country. It was predominantly a military body 
intended to foster cooperation among the various factions in the army and the FLN. The 
original 26 members of the Council included former internal military leaders and senior 
officers closely associated with Boumédiène’s coup. Through this Council, supported by 
French Officers, Boumédiène practiced authoritarian methods against national associations, 
leaving the army to become the country’s legitimacy-granting authority. The flaw that led the 
military regime to begin relying on violence in the postcolonial period was its inability to 
endow itself with legitimacy. According to Addi, this inability “propelled the Islamists into 
the resulting gap, which has existed ever since the death of President Boumédiène in 
1978.”933 Violence was the only political tactic of the military regime, and the only way that 
it could survive in power. The coup against the first free elections in the early 1990s was a 
coup against democracy in Algeria. It was the most strident example of Algeria’s lack of 
military professionalism. As the political font of constitutions, presidents, prime ministers, 
and governments, the Algerian military would appear to be unable to establish itself as a 
professional military.  
Competition for power and the other factors that led to the establishment of the 
military institution has perpetuated the deep conflicts among the different military groups. 
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Three separate types of military officers developed within the National Popular Army (ANP), 
especially during the last decade. As has been mentioned previously, revolutionaries, who 
retained their military ranks after independence, were mostly incapacitated by Boumédiène’s 
policies. Boumédiène preferred the French Officers, and brought them into high-level 
decision making. The French Officers were the strongest group during the period of President 
Bendjedid, rising to the highest ranks within the military. As explored at length in previous 
chapters, their spokesman, Nazzar, became the Minister of Defence, and then a member of 
the High Council of State, the Haut Comite´ d’Etat (HCE), under Presidents Boudiaf and Ali 
Kafi. The third group was comprised of the youth officers, the ‘children of independence’. 
This group began their military experience conscripted into the national service, which was 
compulsory for all young Algerians.  In the early years of national independence, these young 
people chose to be involved in the military and to be soldiers in the ANP, striving for a 
position in administration or in one of the national parastatal companies because, as discussed 
in Chapter Five, corruption was part of the administrative ethos. The French Officers, then, 
continued to hold onto power, and to control all rival groups based upon the success of their 
strategies, and strong support from the international community and from France in 
particular.  
This thesis has also attempted to answer the third hypothesis, the role of the 
international communities in enabling the Algerian military to turn against its own people.  
The strong and supportive international relationships that the military regime and the French 
Officers enjoyed, particularly with the French government, date back to the early years of 
independence. Boumédiène and Ben Bella were the first leaders to emphasize a partnership 
with France.  They did so for a number of reasons. The treaty of Evian, the issue of the ‘Pied 
Noirs’ and ‘Harkists’, and extensive French economic interests in Algeria established sound 
bases for exchanges of goods and expertise between the two countries. The French 
government gave (and, by most accounts, continues to give) valuable assistance to the 
military regime, and in exchange for this it was allowed to penetrate deeply into the Algerian 
political establishment.  France conveniently overlooked Algeria’s abysmal human rights 
record, and the coup of 1992. It is worthwhile to mention that French support has been 
approved by at the highest levels of the French government, and reinforced by former French 
president Chirac when he said that France would never accept a ‘Taliban government’ on its 
borders.
934
 A casual observer might be excused for thinking that this was a condemnation of 
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Algerian democracy.  It certainly seemed so. However continuing French support is based on 
other factors as well.  French and Algerian cultures coexisted for many decades.  And France 
has major economic interests in Algeria, not the least of which involved petroleum in an age 
of growing scarcity.
935
 These dynamic interests would likely be challenged by a 
transformation of the political system in Algeria.  A shift to democracy in Algeria, seen in 
this context, might be seen as threatening to French interests.   
In 1992 the relationship between the French government and the Algerian military 
regime had reached a point where the Algerian and French security services were working 
together against civilians, arguably in both countries. Their aim was to convince French 
policy makers of the Islamist danger to French political power, and to force them to accept 
that violence was the only adequate response to the situation in Algeria, as support for what 
they called the ‘war on terror’. The conflict between the French military and their political 
leaders in the middle 1990s, mostly over the Algerian crisis, ultimately pushed the French 
government to intervene to protect the French Officers and their regime in Algeria. Indeed, 
after the French Airline hijacking, the bombs in the Paris metro, and the murder of the monks 
of Tibhirine, as well as a series of  crimes in France involving Algerian political opposition 
organisations and refugees, the French government hurried to accept all of the proposed 
French-Algerian security arrangements. French support for the Algerian military regime has 
been criticised in recent years by the European Union and other Western countries, including 
the USA. The French security services were ultimately successful in involving France 
diplomatically in the Algerian crisis.   
After 2004, the French authorities changed their relationship with Algeria as they 
looked for an acceptable civilian to support in the presidency. The French Officers were 
increasingly isolated, some were assassinated, and many were retired or demoted to lower 
positions overseas. The system was undergoing a drastic, if gradual, change.  While the 
French relationship did not radically change its direction in Algeria, once they had 
established full protection for their brokers, and assurances that no judicial or political 
pressure would be applied against them in or outside the country, the relationship shifted. 
This was noted in the national amnesty, which had been announced by President Bouteflika. 
The amnesty was supported by most Algerian citizens; they simply wanted peace after many 
long years of dictatorship and violence.  
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In September 2005, Algerians voted in an unprecedented referendum to approve a 
charter for “peace and national reconciliation,” offering amnesty to Algerian insurgents in 
exchange for laying down their arms. The charter also extended the same offer of clemency 
to the military officers, police and security agents involved in crimes during Algeria’s 
turbulent civil war. However this charter was rejected by opposition organisations, key 
personalities, the FIS, communist organisations and the families of the disappeared, who 
thought that there should be reparations paid to the relatives of those who had suffered from 
the violence.  
The unexpected finding of this research is the significance of corruption and 
economic opportunism in the Algerian military regime’s long-term strategy. The political 
opposition had long sought to determine the reason for the military’s continuing economic 
and political hegemony.  According to the participants in this research from the military 
sector, corruption, at least on the scale that it achieved, was a new phenomenon among the 
military leadership, evident only after the crisis of the 1990s. Before that crisis, there were no 
accusations of corruption against any of the generals, or even the president, and their 
hegemony on power was thought to come from their despotism and autocracy. The first 
military leader who abused power and established dominance over all sectors of the state was 
Boumédiène with his creation of the SM. But Boumédiène would not have been charged with 
corruption or economic opportunism, nor would the French Officers after him. Human rights’ 
violations before the crisis of the 1990s were apparently unrelated to economic opportunism 
and corruption.   The primary charges that the military regime of that era would have faced 
would have been breach of trust and violence against their own people, and perhaps their 
involvement in crimes against civilians outside their borders. Corruption was not a relevant 
concern.  
After the coup d’état of 1992, the military regime used all its strength to stay in 
power and to protect itself from rebellion against their security policies. They used public 
funds to reinforce public security and their war against ‘terrorists’. Because of the global war 
against terrorism, the international community approved of the coup, and the consequent 
human right violations of 1992, which have continued on into the present. Corruption and 
economic opportunism, however, are relatively recent concerns, and probably should not be 
regarded as key elements in the structuring of violence in Algeria. On the other hand, the 
DRS, which is said to control the country ‘from the shadows,’ is reportedly using corruption 
files to pressure any politicians or political parties who threaten to oppose the government’s 
policies. This tactic has been practiced repeatedly and successfully many times since the 
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revolutionary period. In fact, the same sorts of corruption files have threatened 
revolutionaries and leaders of the state during the revolutionary era and after independence. 
Ramdane, Abbas, Belkacem, Ben Bella, and even Bouteflika before he went to his exile, 
were all charged at some point with corruption and economic opportunism. In 2010, the 
corruption files were again opened, this time to allow for the regulation of general 
associations, in this case providing for longer terms for directors.  Many cases have since 
been opened for the express purpose of reducing levels of corruption in Algerian society.  
Conflict between the presidency and the military regime has caused the president to withdraw 
his intervention into the military sector, with the resignation of the Minister of Energy.
936
   
However, corruption remains a plague in Algerian society, mostly because of the 
poverty resulting from the protracted authoritarian regime. The generals failed in their 
attempts to restore civil peace and to provide the basic needs of Algerians.  Rather, they put 
citizens at the mercy of almost random bullets in a brutal dictatorship.  The country was 
plunged into chaos, and injustice, poverty, corruption and self-interest, all introduced during 
the War of Independence, proliferated.  All were consequences of the military character and 
its puzzling ethos, sacrificing the citizens that they were pledged to protect. The final 
injustice is that the senior military officers, including the remnants of the French Officers, 
and the FLN leadership, have granted themselves immunity from prosecution for what are 
some of the worst war crimes committed in the past century.   
At the end of this study, it seems important to draw conclusions regarding the 
analyses and observations of scholars and participants on the Algerian military regime’s 
hegemony, and the consequences of their interventions into both the political and economic 
spheres.  The many human rights violations are frankly baffling.  They were often carried out 
in front of the international community, with little or no constructive response. Through it all 
has been the single, political party, the FLN, which can scarcely be characterised as anything 
other than a front organisation for a government ultimately controlled by the military. The 
FLN has been used as the political face for the military regime to lend it a degree of 
legitimacy. The new generation of Algerians does not appear to accept any kind of legitimacy 
apart from that of democracy, however, and thus the impact of the political party has been 
negligible.  With the advent of a multi-party system in Algeria, ideologies that drive parties in 
the domestic political arena must now begin to lead them to define the national interest in 
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constructive and collective ways. This is just as true in regard to secular parties, former 
revolutionary and Islamic movements, which are linked to ideological issues on the one hand 
and to ethnic groups on the other. Domestic politics in Algeria demonstrate that the human 
rights violations during the period 1991-2001 were also influenced by cultural and 
ideological factors. Under the Islamists’ slogan, “Islam is the only solution,” and the slogan 
of secularists, “Algeria is not Iran or Afghanistan”, some compromise had to be reached.  The 
different ethnic groups, including the Arabs, the Berbers, and the French, contributed to some 
extent in forcing Algeria into fundamental conflicts that resulted in the human rights 
violations during the 1990s. Inexperienced parties and new political communities, in fact, 
failed to deal with the complicated problems facing the country.  
Political parties are key actors in the process of democratisation and the 
consolidation of new parliamentary democracies, but Algeria has little practical experience 
with democratic parties or, for that matter, with democracy. The Constitution was corrupted 
and replaced with seemingly arbitrary rules of a state of emergency after the coup d’état 
against the FIS, who had won the first free election in Algerian history.  Thus, the multi-party 
system ended in some senses even before it began to function. The military never accepted 
any changes through free elections, which, in any case, threatened their hegemony. The 
military had never accepted any party apart from those few that had been established by 
them, or had sworn allegiance to them, and for this reason, they refused to abide by the 
platform of San-Egidio, which was promulgated in Rome at the end of 1994, when the 
Algerian opposition met for the first time with international support to draft a solution to the 
Algerian crisis.    
Politically, the multi-party system practiced in Algeria after the coup d’état of 1992 
was based on an authoritarian regime that controlled the government and the populace 
through violence. The open democracy of 1990s was a lesson to the military, particularly 
when the electoral competition came to include over forty political parties. Most of these 
parties were quickly dismissed after the coup d’état of 1992. The only parties that survived 
were those that pledged their support of the military and abided by its security policies. 
Moreover, following the coup, the multi-party political system in Algeria has not included 
political positions in the parliament, or even allowed citizens to protest in the street. The 
military secret services were involved in most of the new parties in order to monitor and 
control them.   
The opposition can be considered as comprising only two parties, the FIS which 
chose violence as a strategy to regain their rights after losing them to the military coup d’état 
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just when they had almost succeeded in gaining power through democratic election in 1991. 
The FFS is an older party of the opposition, but has been ignored by the media and the 
government, which had always rejected their political activities. The other two parties, the 
RCD and the Labour party (PT), were somewhere in between, passively supporting the 
regime in its fight against the Islamists under the name of ‘war on terror’. The RCD gave its 
full support to the military services in the coup against democracy, in part because at the time 
they were in the process of protesting against the election results of 1991.  They deviated 
from outright loyalty to the military when they began to see that the regime was being 
criticised by the presidency and prominent countries in the international community.  
Hannoun, the leader of PT and a strong personality among Algerian politicians in the 
parliament, has come to represent the cause of democracy in Algeria, and thus receives 
considerable international support and attention for the regime, albeit indirectly, which is why 
most of her activities are covered by the media. This party is not a threat to the military 
regime.  For one thing, its program is not acceptable to most of the Algerian people. As Addi 
has noted:  
...the Algerian regime will never accept any opposition parties which are 
able to win a free election and able to make any changes which could affect 
it. The Algerian multi-party [system] is just a pluralist form unrelated to 
reality.
937
 
 
 In summary, the Algerian political processes before 1962 represented a stunning 
revolution, unique in the third world and Arab countries, ousting the French colonials at a 
moment of French hedgemony. However, since then Algerian politics have searched in vain 
for legitimacy, beset with an ongoing and self-perpetuating authoritarian regime, using force 
and practicing violence against its own people to preserve its power, while attempting to 
broadcast the image that it is a democratic, multi-party government, supportive of human 
rights and freedom, a beacon for the best principles of the Algerian people. The regime did 
not expect the events of 1991, when the Islamists almost achieved power through election. 
The military coup that ousted democracy in 1992 became an undesired international scandal, 
and lost prestige with the International community and with countries that had been regarded 
as sympathetic with the Algerian revolution.  
 Most of international secular political parties at the time declared that Algerians 
were not ready for democracy, although they were reluctant to criticize the trappings of 
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democracy that Algeria still, barely, retained: elections, attempts to maintain through other 
policies that Algeria was still a stable country with a democratic government, which has been 
formed from different political parties. Nevertheless, as careful and restrained observers have 
repeatedly noted, “The 2012 elections [for example] are devoid of any significance”. Unable 
to restore revolutionary legitimacy, political leaders tend to look back at the  Boumediane era, 
a testament to their inability to redeem their “democracy”.938 They were graphically 
dissatisfied with democracy in 1991, however, and thus they have apparently organized 
subsequent elections without democracy. Indeed, that was a successful method for Algerians 
during the previous elections of 2007, which demonstrated in the eyes of some academic 
observers that a multi-party system that does not confirm the participation of the population 
in the institutions of the state serves only as a democratic façade.
939
 
 Algeria's elections of 2012, which selected 462 members of Parliament from about 
26 political parties, ultimately established a “new” government led by the regime’s party, the 
FLN, and the RND, the military’s party.940 In view of this, many observers have argued that 
the multi-party system in Algeria has been little more than a political façade, catering to a 
single group, the French Officers, “Hizeb Franca.” The democracy and free elections that 
brought the FIS to power, and a sense of freedom to Algerians, faded quickly, and has never 
re-emerged.
941
 Consequently, Algerian elections, except, perhaps for 1991, have apparently 
not represented the interests of Algerians.  It is difficult to see the forthcoming elections as 
representing a change from these previous patterns. Perhaps, at the most, they will offer 
themselves as a sort of barometer by which to gauge the flavor of politics in Algeria after the 
rapid decline (health, presence) of the current president, Bouteflika.  
  Finally, through this research we can conclude that human rights violations, which 
have troubled Algeria since its inception, stem from historical factors and causes, but are also 
attributable to the particular features and opportunistic nature of the political environment.  
Of major causal significance was the path that the revolutionaries ultimately chose, 
establishing illegitimate and non-centralised leadership, which people were forced to accept 
through waves of violence. The authority structures formed by the military were largely 
apolitical, or simply operated through violence, and the fomenting of violence, which became 
functional and part of a mission during the revolutionary era. Later, after independence, the 
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military became an authoritarian regime, and their dominance of the society was supported by 
the French Officers, who had remained faithful to their principles and their neo-colonial 
program and to Western thought. The result was the weakening of all of the national 
institutions, including the presidency. 
All of these changes experienced by the Algerian regime were couched in the glorious 
revolution’s principles. The public sector, including political and economic groups, was 
targeted by these officers, using support from local extremists and from outside the country, 
especially neighbouring countries and across the Mediterranean. All of these voices seemed 
to oppose the Algerian identity, based as it was in religion and a traditional expression of 
patriotism. Algerian citizens have paid a very high price in blood, rights and wealth, and 
continue to do so.  However, hope still remains as long as people continue to struggle for 
their rights, and reject the dictatorship of a military regime with their daily demonstrations 
and strikes.  As the “Arab Spring” has graphically demonstrated, the day may soon come 
when they will rise up in a revolution against pervasive French influence, which ultimately 
supports military dictatorship and violence in Algeria.  It is, of course, hoped that such an 
uprising will be peaceful.  In the past, violence has only served to extend the life of the 
military regime, and to strengthen French influence in Algeria. The arrival of peace in 
Algeria would, of course, render moot many of the questions explored in this thesis.  
However, in the end, an understanding of violence, and the creation of agreements to end 
violence, will never seriously answer the fundamental and haunting question that underlies 
this thesis: why did the Algerian military turn against its own people? 
However, the regime’s clan-like system makes change unlikely. The president’s legal 
position is different from the actual role played by the president of the republic, especially at 
the decision-making level. True power resides with the military regime, able to invite a 
person to take on the role of president and powerful enough to limit his job and/or to fire him 
at will regardless of the cost to the public in monetary terms or in loss of life. So, the 
president is not the system’s master and his resignation or change does not undermine the 
regime. The power structure is impersonal and is not in the hands of one strongman and his 
family, but rather several dignitaries who are themselves divided into rival cliques. Algeria is 
unique among its neighboring countries. Moroccans gathered behind their king, while the 
people of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were able to lay hands on the source of pain and removed 
it in the ‘Arab Spring’. But in Algeria, the situation is different. There is no controversial 
political figure to attack, like Ben Ali, Mubarak or Gaddafi. The figures of decision-making 
in Algeria are known by their aliases, working in the shadows, almost as if they were a Mafia. 
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They cannot be seen on the public stage so how can be rooted out and removed to allow the 
citizens to heal after decades of pain? 
Moreover, Algerians have learned from the events of the 1990s, although there are 
signs of fatigue in the Algerian public. They have little interest to the "Arab Spring", violent  
protests, or more violence of any kind, for that matter. According to Larbi Sadiki, the 
Algerian public is highly politicised, they have learned from the past, and feel that they have 
led the way in rolling back Arab authoritarianism in the early 1990s: “first through bread riots 
and then through the ballot. And when democracy atrophied, they turned to the bullet.”942 
The success of the Islamists and Islamic parties in modestly free elections in 1991 was 
the result of many years of suffering the authoritarianism. Although Islamists were part of the 
Revolution, as part of Algerian society, they were never accorded political influence, 
reminiscent, perhaps, of Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt, banned with their leaders exiled or 
jailed.  Many Algerian Islamists have been tortured and executed since Independence, and 
particularly in the 1990s. “Moderate” Islamists in Algeria played a major role in supporting 
the military regime, were part of the presidential majority, and were given four ministerial 
portfolios in the government just before the elections of 2012. Their participation has not 
been supported by a majority of citizens, however, who apparently see them as support 
groups for the military regime, which has used them to complete its program, and to 
demonstrate to the international community that their intervention in the politics has not been 
against Islamists, the majority in Algerian society, but rather against radicalism and terrorism.  
It is difficult at this juncture to envision a political future for the Islamists, after a 
decade of severe violence following the 1992 elections. For the Algerian regime, Islamists 
are associated with violence and radicalism. The same scenario is about to be repeated in 
Tunisia and Egypt: the tensions between Islamists and other political groups in these 
countries only reinforce this view. Anwar Haddam, a former spokesperson for the FIS, draws 
similarities between Egypt in 2013 and Algeria in 1992, saying that:  
An Algerian scenario is now a possibility with a very broad campaign of 
repression against the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters, thousands of 
its members in prisons, more than a thousand killed and suicide bombings 
are becoming at least a weekly reality in Egypt … In both cases the army 
was the arbiter and unfortunately resolved the political dispute in its favor 
against democracy.
943
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Algerian history has shown that a president can be sacrificed if the military deems it 
necessary. Hence, one possible scenario for transition would be an internally instigated 
regime change, especially at the end of Bouteflika’s mandate in 2014. But if change comes 
from within the ruling circle, as per usual, the system will continue to be impenetrable by 
democratic forces; the military junta benefits from the opacity and complexity of its clan-like 
structure to control the means of power and in particular, the oil revenues. Leaders have no 
incentive to renounce to their privileges. Furthermore, the military regime and the economic 
opportunists from the French Officers and DRS in particular, will not be safe in a democratic 
state. If Algerians are given the opportunity to participate in free elections, the outcome could 
mean the ascension of a civilian president dedicated to cleaning up the corruption in the 
political and economic sectors and to stopping the international intervention and the French 
penetration in particular, not to mention the redressing of past wrongs. A change in leadership 
to someone who might not be controlled or trusted by the military regime could heighten 
insecurities, and this could lead in turn to renewed military involvement in politics and 
potentially renewed violence to protect the armed forces from being held accountable for past 
crimes.  There is no strong political opposition that could be penetrated and driven to disrupt 
the democratic process behind the scenes, as was the case in the past.  
All said, regime change and democracy seem unlikely, however. If the spirit of the 
‘Arab Spring’ were to touch Algeria, the results would likely be more violent and prolonged 
than the current crisis in Syria. Fortunately for the regime, the government retains access to 
wealth from oil deposits, allowing it to alleviate the immediate suffering of most Algerians at 
the first sign of discontent. “The country re-injects ten billion dollars in social transfers—
unemployment insurance, the health care system, subsidies and food price reductions—every 
year.” 944 One can only imagine the developmental potential of an Algerian democracy. 
 
EPILOGUE (2013/2014) 
The Algerian media broke precedent on April 27, 2013, in becoming the first among 
foreign media in its announcement of the illness of President Bouteflika, and his transfer to 
the Val-de-Grace French military hospital in Paris. The president had apparently suffered a 
blood vessel blockage that caused a mini-stroke. After his treatment, he was transferred 
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again, this time to “Les Invalides hospital” in Paris to continue his recovery. His escorting 
doctors stated publicly that the stroke incident was temporary and “will not affect the body’s 
vital functions.” Bouteflika had been treated in the same hospital in 2005 for a bleeding 
stomach ulcer. Returning to official protocol, the Algerian authorities remained silent about 
Bouteflika’s health. There was public and political discontent regarding how the government 
managed the health reports of the country’s president. Rachid Bougherbal, the director of the 
National Center of Sports Medicine, told the state news agency that “His excellency the 
President of the Republic must observe a period of rest for further examinations,”945 adding 
that “there was no reason for worry.” Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal said that the 
president was hospitalized, “but the situation is not serious.”946  
According to an Algerian daily newspaper, le Quotidien d’Oran, the president has 
moved his brother, Said, from his position as President advisor. The reason for this, according 
to the same source, was a “personal conflict”, which was said to have nothing to do with 
corruption files, mentioned in other sources, which suggest that the President’s brother is 
deeply involved in high level corruption.
947
 Millions of dollars were found to have been 
missing from the general treasury from the time that Said Bouteflika was Director-General of 
Electricity and Gas.
948
 Following disclosure of this information, Adel Charef told Aljazeera 
TV that the changes that took place in the pyramid of power was no coincidence, but rather 
revealed plans to prepare for a fourth presidency of the ailing President. According to Charef, 
there is a conflict among decision-makers in power regarding the fourth tearm. This dispute 
has become public only recently.
949
  
After his visit to Bouteflika in the hospital, French president Francois Hollande 
mentioned Bouteflika’s health, suggesting that although he seems to be recovering to some 
extent, he would not be able to resume his presidency. These comments were received quietly 
by the Algerian media, except for some elements of the opposition, inside and outside of the 
                                                          
945
 Express News, “Algeria president taken to hospital”, April 28, 2013:  
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/395363/Algeria-president-taken-to-hospital . 
946
 According to the American Stroke Association, a TIA, as it is known, is caused by a temporary blood clot 
and lasts just a short time. It "usually causes no permanent injury to the brain." A third of those suffering from 
TIA, also known as "warning strokes," go on to have a full stroke within the next year, according to the website 
of the association. Also: Paul Schemm, “Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerian President, Hospitalized After Mini-
Stroke: Report”, the World Post, 27/04/2013. 
947
 Salem Ferdi, “Le régime, le statuquo et le «risque» de l'ouverture Une présidentielle sans bouteflika n'est pas 
un gage de changement”,  le Quotidien d’Oran, 29/04/2013.   
948
 France24 TV 27/04/2013, “Bouteflika removes his Brother from his position as Presidential advisor”.  
949
 Aljazeera TV (Arabic), 27/04/2013.   
 284   
 
country, who criticised the source of the information, arguing that in a democracy such news 
should come from the Algerian government, not from an ex-colonial metropole.
950
  
On 16 July 2013, after 80 days of treatment in Paris, the Presidential Office 
announced that the President had returned to Algeria. According to an official statement, 
“after finishing his treatment and rehabilitation in France, Bouteflika will find comfort and 
rehabilitation here in Algeria.” No announcement specified when Bouteflika would resume 
his presidential duties. Moreover, the public and governmental agencies speculated on his 
return to his office as president and the effects of a potential leadership vacuum. This was in 
contrast to the French declaration about the President health. France, it seems, had a very 
different message, that “[Bouteflika] would conclude his recovery period and leave Paris in 
early July to head to Algeria.”951 
Logically, the Algerian opposition parties were calling for the invocation of Article 88 
of the Constitution, the filling to the presidency because of Bouteflika’s long-term 
disability.
952
  In this context, Bouteflika surprised the political community in and outside the 
country with his major p[olitical changes in the government and the military structure, which 
were quickly implemented. In September 2013, the Minister of External Affairs, Mourad 
Madelsi, and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Dahu Waled Qablya were removed. One week 
later, on September 12, 2013, Bouteflika turned to high-ranking military officers. In a major 
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shift, DRS investigations, led by Major-General Mehena Djebbar, now fall under the 
authority of the Chief-of-Staff and Vice Defense Minister, Brigadier-General Gaed Salah.
953
 
Bouteflika has also terminated two heavyweight intelligence generals, General Bachir Tertag, 
in charge of counter-espionage, and an officer in charge of security abroad, Major-General 
Mehena Djebbar, who is considered to be among the most prominent military figures in 
Algeria, and close to General Médiène, known as "Toufik", arguably the most powerful man 
in the country. 
Following these changes, which have affected people at the pinnacle of power, 
Bouteflika has announced a series of changes in the structure of the military bureaucracy 
itself.  Beginning with the Military Intelligence Services (DRS), the must powerful 
department in the military, and in the country for that matter, and previously known as 
Military Security (SM), Bouteflika, as President and Minister of Defence, has limited the role 
of the DRS to military matters only, and thus has moved this agency out of politics, further 
away from the media, and separated it as well from the judicial police, a former source of its 
authority.   
According to an interview with journalist Faisal Metaoui, on France TV, Bouteflika 
launched these changes in preparation for the next elections, which will take place on April 
17, 2014. Faisal Metaoui noted that  
Bouteflika and all those close to him are afraid of prosecutions in the future, 
because of the corruption cases [that] occurred during his three terms, 
which involved his brother Said and members of his family, as well as 
senior ministers, such as former oil minister Chakib Khelil.
954
 
 
On 2 February 2014, the new FLN leader, Ammar Saâdani, publically criticized the 
head of the DRS, accusing him of mismanagement and negligence.
955
 He blamed General 
Médiène for the precarious political and security situations in Algeria. It was the first time 
that the head of the official political party had leveled charges against someone at the highest 
level in the power structure, someone ostensibly responsible for his own appointment and, 
indeed, likely that of the President.
956
 Saâdani’s fierce criticism of General Mohamed 
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Médiène came as a shock to an Algerian public “trained” to fear the notorious DRS. 
According to Mr. Saâdani, the DRS “has [had a] role in major political assassinations and 
terror attacks against Algerians, [which] remains hard to corroborate and yet too genuine to 
discard.”957 He charged them with a failure to protect President Boudief in July 1992, when 
he was assassinated while delivering a speech live on TV.  The terrorist attack against 
Bouteflika in Batna (400 KM south-East Algiers) was said to be the result of  the failure of 
the DRS agency to protect him, and he noted a long list of failures of the DRS since the crisis 
of 1990s.
958
  
The Algerian public likely knew that Saâdani’s declaration was not, per se, a 
courageous and honest act, but rather had much to do with who was behind Mr. Saâdani in 
this attack against the heart of the “system”. “People know that the head of the FLN does not 
have the guts” to bash the DRS without solid support from within the military establishment,” 
according to Ahmed Chaoui, freelance journalist based in Washington DC.
959
  According to 
some observers who analyzed Saâdani’s criticism of General Médiène, the FLN leader was 
conciliatory toward potential presidential candidates, especially Bouteflika’s brother, Said. 
Saâdani led some Algerians to believe that the attacks on the DRS were in fact authorized by 
the FLN in direct support of Said Bouteflika, in the case that Abdelazziz Bouteflika is unable 
to  run for a fourth mandate. 
Some Algerians described Saâdani’s attack the DRS as a smoke screen, protecting 
Generals Gaid Salah and Bey in their alleged scheme to remove General Médiène from 
power.  By discrediting Médiène and the DRS, the door is left open for Said Bouteflika to 
present his prospective candidacy as viable. This view would suggest a pattern that runs 
counter to Algerian political tradition, in which political “dynasties”have been forbidden. The 
recent arrest of General Hassan, a senior DRS officer and strong supporter of General 
Médiène, signals that General Gaid Salah has declared an all-out war against the DRS. 
According to the Algerian daily, Echorouk, General Hassan is accused of forming a criminal 
group (a gang) to attack civilians, engage in arms trafficking, and commit serious security 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Algerian Oil Company ‘Hocine Malti’ to General Médiène; Hocine Malti, Algeria-Watch, General Toufik: 
Algeria's God. An Open Letter to Mohamed “Toufik” Mediène 16 february 2013 < http://www.algeria-
watch.org/en/articles/2013/malti_open_letter.htm >. 
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blunders, one of which led to last year’s bloody terrorist attack on the Tiguentourine gas 
complex in Amenas in Southern Algeria.
960
 
As the three pillars of the Algerian system continue to undermine each 
other’s plans, the political status becomes unsustainable. In the “brawl” to 
install an ally as the next president, the Algerian military is gambling with 
the security and stability of North Africa and Southern Europe. Meanwhile, 
it is clear that the Algerian voters will have little direct say in the outcome 
of the polls.
961
 
 
One week after Ammar Saâdani’s declaration, publicly accusing the powerful military 
intelligence chief of interfering in politics to the detriment of the country's security, the ex-
General Hocine Benhadid, who was security advisor for President Liamine Zeroual, returned 
to Algeria after 20 years of retirement to object to the Saâdani’s accusations and to accuse the 
President’s inner circle, publicly, of "treason." He declared to El watan and El Khaber 
newspapers that  
Here is what I'm asking from President Bouteflika: He came to power with 
the slogan 'pride and dignity'... so he should retire... with dignity and let 
Algeria catch its breath.
962
 
 
Benhadid, who once commanded one of Algeria's military regions, said he was speaking on 
behalf of others in the armed forces, without naming anyone, “because we cannot let this 
situation continue.” He specifically pointed to the group around General Qaid Saleh, saying 
that: “The chief-of-Staff has no credibility, and no one is fond of him,"963 In the midst of 
these attacks and counter-attacks, in his first official response to Saâdani's declaration, 
Bouteflika strongly backed the army, offering condolences to the families of 77 people killed 
when a military aircraft crashed in the mountainous northeast region of Oum El Bouaghi, 
saying that “No one has the right, whatever their position, to attack the People’s National 
Army and other state institutions.”964 
On February 22, 2014, the media reported that Algeria's President, who has not 
publicly addressed the country for nearly three years, and has not even been seen in public for 
much of that time, will be running for a fourth term on April 17, 2014.
965
  On 24 February 
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2014 a screen caption said that the presidency had confirmed that Bouteflika had informed 
the Interior Ministry of his intention to run in the April 17 poll, and to collect the appropriate 
documents for signature.
966
 We seem to know even less than ever as to whether or not the 
Algerian military will again, in the near or distant future, turn against its own people. 
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX: 1 
MAP 1 
 
 Circles in the map show the main locations of the ALN bases in and out the Algerian borders 
  Arrows show the principle attacks’ directions of the revolutionaries (ALN) against French strategic 
locations 
 Lines show the main ALN roads to the battlefield during the Liberation War 1954-1962.  
 
 
Source: Emmanuel GRANGE la guerre d’Algérie au cinema, Magazine “L’Algérie de 1954 à 1962” 4 April 
2013 
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MAP 2 
 
 Wilaya 1: Aures; Wilaya 2: the North of Constantine; Wilaya 3: Kabyle; Wilaya 4: Algiers;  
Wilaya 5: Oran; Wilaya 6: Sahara 
 
Map of Algeria at the time of the war: shows the approximate borders of all six Wilayas, which have 
been divided according to the Soummam Platform of 1956. The Map shows as well the approximate 
borders of all six Wilayas, and the most important French airfields, French military bases, and the 
Morice lines. The Information has been taken from WESTERN & NORTHERN AFRICA 
DATABASE: http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_354.shtml    
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APPENDIX: 2 
 
The family tree of the Algerian resistance from the beginning to the revolutionary era 
Source: Le FLN, Mirage et Réalité: des origines à la prise du pouvoir (1945–1962). Par 
Mohammed Harbi. Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique 1980.   
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APPENDIX: 3 
Algerian National Movements thoughts 1926-1962 
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APPENDIX: 4 
 
A Chronology of Key Events in Algerian History 
 
YEAR EVENT 
1830 French Invasion to Algeria 
1834 France invades Algeria and takes over the Algerian coast. The "Moderne Algeria " 
is created with new borders. 
1839 Algerian resistance organized by Abd-al-Qadir against the French occupants  
1840 The number of French settlers surpasses 100,000 
1847 Abd-al-Qadir is arrested and exiled to Syria. The french colonization can start 
exploiting Algeria for its only benefit 
1847-1897 Conflicts between Muslim groups and the colonist. Muslims are considered an 
inferior class of people and have few civil rights.  
1879 Northern Algerian is declared part of France. Algerians can apply for full 
citizenship only after renouncing Islam 
1920s Tension within the Algerian population Algerians are disappointed not to seen 
equal with the French Nationalism raises among Muslim Algerians 
8 May 1945 The massacres in the Sétif and Guelma regions on 8 May 1945, described at the 
time as events or troubles in north Constantine, marked the beginning of the 
Algerian war of independence. Algerian sources eventually estimated that the 
number of Algerians killed during the riots as more than 45,000. 
1954 Front de Liberation National, FLN, announced the revolution began from Ouras 
Mountains.    
1959 Referendum called by Charles de Gaulle that allows Algeria to chose between 
independence or continued anociation with France.  
1960-1961 Revolts against de Gaulle in France. French feel insulted and betrayed by the 
government.  
18 March 1962 The agreement of Evian: independent is going to be given to Algeria after a 
transitional period  
1 July 1962 99.7% of Algerians vote for independence 
3 July 1962 Independence of Algeria is proclaimed 
5 July 1962 Algerian ceremony for the Independence (Algeria gains independence from 
France.) 
18 and 25 
November 1962 
Legislative elections in France produce a pro-Gaulist majority and the 
reemergence of a “Popular Front” style alliance on the Left 
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1963 Ahmed Ben Bella elected as first president. 
1965 Col Houari Boumédiène overthrows Ben Bella, pledges to end corruption. (Coup 
d’état 1965)  
1976 Boumédiène introduces a new constitution which confirms commitment to 
socialism and role of the National Liberation Front (FLN) as the sole political 
party. Islam is recognized as state religion.  
1978 Boumédiène dies/killed and is replaced by Col Chadli Bendjedid, as the 
compromise candidate of the military establishment. 
1986 Rising inflation and unemployment, exacerbated by the collapse of oil and gas 
prices lead to a wave of strikes and violent demonstrations.  
1988 Serious rioting against economic conditions.  
1989 The National People's Assembly revokes the ban on new political parties and 
adopts a new electoral law allowing opposition parties to contest future elections.  
1989 Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) founded and over 20 new parties licensed. 
1990 The FIS wins 55 per cent of the vote in local elections.  
1991 Government announces parliamentary elections in June 1991 and plans changes to 
electoral system including restrictions on campaigning in mosques. FIS reacts by 
calling general strike. State of siege declared, elections postponed. FIS leaders 
Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj arrested and jailed.  
1991 December - In the first round of general elections the FIS wins 188 seats outright, 
and seems virtually certain to obtain an absolute majority in the second round. 
4 January 1992 The National People's Assembly is dissolved by presidential decree and on 11 
January President Chadli, apparently under pressure from the military leadership, 
resigns. A five-member Higher State Council, chaired by Mohamed Boudiaf, takes 
over.  
Street gatherings banned, violent clashes break out on 8 and 9 February between 
FIS supporters and security forces. A state of emergency is declared, the FIS is 
ordered to disband and all 411 FIS-controlled local and regional authorities are 
dissolved. 
29 June 1992 Boudiaf assassinated by a member of his bodyguard with alleged Islamist links. 
Violence increases and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) emerges as the main 
group behind these operations.  
1994 Liamine Zeroual, a retired army colonel, is appointed chairman of the Higher State 
Council,  then a five-year term as president of the republic with a comfortable 
majority in 1995. 
26–27 March 
1996 
seven monks from the monastery Notre-Dame de l'Atlas of Tibhirine in Algeria 
were kidnapped during, held for two months and were found dead in late May 
1996. 
1996 Proposed constitutional changes approved in a referendum by over 85 per cent of 
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voters.  
1997 Parliamentary elections won by the newly created Democratic National Rally, 
followed by the moderate Islamic party, Movement of Society for Peace. 
1998 President Zeroual announces his intention to cut short his term and hold early 
presidential elections. 
1999 Former foreign minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika elected as president after all 
opposition candidates withdraw from race, saying they had received inadequate 
guarantees of fair and transparent elections. 
1999 Referendum approves Bouteflika's law on civil concord, the result of long and 
largely secret negotiations with the armed wing of the FIS, the Islamic Salvation 
Army (AIS). Thousands of members of the AIS and other armed groups are 
pardoned.  
2000 Attacks on civilians and security forces continue, and are thought to be the work of 
small groups still opposed to the civil concord. Violence is estimated to have 
claimed over 100,000 lives in Algeria since 1992.  
2003 June Leader of the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) Abassi Madani and his 
deputy Ali Belhadj are freed after serving 12-year sentences. 
2004 April President Bouteflika is re-elected to a second term in a landslide poll victory.  
2005 March Government-commissioned report says security forces were responsible for the 
disappearances of more than 6,000 citizens during the 1990s civil conflict. 
2007 May Parliamentary elections: dozens are killed in the run-up, in a wave of fighting 
between the military and armed groups. Pro-government parties retain their 
absolute majority in parliament.  
2007 September At least 50 people are killed in a series of bombings. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb claims responsibility for the attacks. (Al-Qaeda's second-in-command 
Ayman al-Zawahiri urges north Africa's Muslims to ''cleanse'' their land of 
Spaniards and French.) 
2008 November Parliament approves constitutional changes allowing President Bouteflika to run 
for a third term. President Bouteflika wins third term at the polls in April 2009 
2011 January Major protests over food prices and unemployment, with two people being killed 
in clashes with security forces. The government orders cuts to the price of basic 
foodstuffs. Inconclusive protests continue into 2012. 
2012 May Parliamentary poll: Ruling FLN wins 220 out of 463 seats, followed by its ally the 
National Democratic Rally with 68 seats. Islamist alliance comes third with 48 
seats. Some opposition MPs allege FLN fraud. 
2012 September President Bouteflika appoints water minister and key ally Abdelmalek Sellal as 
prime minister, ending post-election uncertainty. 
2012 November Security alert levels raised over planned foreign intervention against Islamists in 
neighboring Mali. 
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2012 December French President Francois Hollande acknowledges suffering caused by France's 
colonisation of Algeria but stops short of an apology. 
2013 January The In Amenas hostage crisis: Dozens of foreign hostages are killed by the 
Algerian military special forces when a militant group attacks the GAS complex 
and kidnaps over 800 workers, most of them foreign engineers and technicians, 
during a four-day siege at a remote gas complex. Algerian special forces storm the 
site. PM Abdelmalek Sellal says the attackers entered Algeria from northern Mali.  
April 2013 President Bouteflika suffers a stroke and spends three months in France in 
treatment.  
14/01/2014 83 officers from different departments, including 50 of them from the DRS, are 
sent into retirement by the military, under the direction of the Minister of Defence, 
General Kaid Saleh   
 
Source: BBC News Africa, Algeria Profile, 13/06/2013: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14118856  
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APPENDIX: 5 
THE EVIAN AGREEMENTS 
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S 
GOVERNMENT) 
 
C. (62) 58    COPY NO.50  
 
3rd April 1962  
  
CABINET 
  
THE EVIAN AGREEMENTS 
 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs 
  
 My colleagues may like to have a summary of the main provisions of the agreement 
between the French Government and the "Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique 
Algerienne" (G. P. R. A.) signed at Evian on 18th March, 1962.  
  
 2. The Cease-Fire. This came into effect on 19th March and has been followed by the 
declaration of an amnesty and the release of all prisoners within 20 days. Civil liberties will 
be restored "as soon as possible" and the “Front de Liberation Nationale” (F. L. N.) will be 
considered a legal political organization.  
  
 3. The Transitional Period. This will last until the referendum, to be held in all the 
Algerian and Saharan departments not less than three months and not more than six months 
after the cease-fire. During this period French sovereignty will continue and France, which 
will be represented by a High Commissioner, M. Fouchet, will remain directly responsible for 
foreign affairs, security, defense, justice, currency, economic relations and, "in the last 
resort", the maintenance of order.  
Otherwise the country will be run by a 12-member French-nominated Provisional Executive 
under a Moslem President, M. Fares, and helped in its task by a local security force of up to 
60, 000 French-officered Moslem auxiliaries and a mixed "Tribunal of Public Order".  
  
 4. Algerian refugees abroad (who number some 300,000) will be helped to return. But 
all Algerian armed forces now in Tunisia and Morocco (about 30,000 in all) will remain 
where they are until after the referendum, in which they will therefore not vote.  
  
 5. The Referendum. The population of Algeria will be offered three choices:-  
 
 (i) Maintenance of Algeria as a French department.  
  (ii) Independence by breaking all links with France.  
  (iii) Independence in co-operation with France.  
  
Both the French Government and the G. P. R. A. favor the third choice. If this is adopted, 
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independence will be immediately recognized by France and responsibility immediately 
transferred. Within three weeks the Provisional Executive would organize elections for an 
Algerian National Assembly, to which it would remit its powers.  
  
 6. Independence and Co-operation (if the third alternative is chosen, which seems likely 
owing to the discipline exercised by the F. L. N. over the Algerian Moslems).  
 
 (i) Individual Rights. There will be no reprisals for acts committed or opinions 
expressed up to the date of the referendum.  
  Settlers will then have three years in which to decide whether to assume Algerian 
nationality or remain French (in which case they may continue to live in Algeria as privileged 
foreigners, even to the extent of enjoying the present French legal system). Their 
participation at all levels of the Government and Administration will be guaranteed in 
relation to their numbers, their property and employment will be safeguarded, and special 
courts will ensure that their eights are respected.  
  France will maintain the French nationality of all who now possess it in Algeria and do 
not wish to renounce it, and those French citizens, Moslem or European, wishing to leave 
Algeria will be free to go, taking their goods and money with them.  
  
 (ii) Economic Co-operation. Algeria will remain in the Franc Zone and will receive, for 
three years in the first instance, full economic and technical aid at the level at present 
provided under the Constantine Plan.  
  
Algerian markets will remain open to France and vice versa.  
 In the Sahara existing rights will be respected and oil and mineral resources exploited on an 
equal basis under the direction of a joint technical co-operation agency. French companies 
will have a privileged position for six years. Algeria will retain full sovereignty, grant all 
future concessions and promulgate legislation covering exploitation of the Sahara.  
  
 (iii) French Military Installations. French forces will be allowed to remain in Algeria 
for three years after independence, but they will be progressively reduced, 80, 000 only 
remaining after the first year.  
France will retain the Mers-el-Kebir naval base for 15 years and the lease can be renewed. 
She will also retain the use of other bases and installations (including the nuclear testing 
centre in the Sahara) for five years. Use of certain airfields may be further renewed thereafter.   
 
 7. Settlement of Disputes. Disputes will, in the last resort, be referred to the 
International Court of Justice.  
  
 8. There is little doubt that this agreement represents a considerable triumph for General 
de Gaulle. Many of its provisions - e.g. over military bases and guarantees for European 
settlers - are much better than could at one time have been expected and have only been 
wrung from the Algerians after a great deal of bargaining. Indeed, in agreeing to allow 
France to retain the use of her nuclear testing ground, the G. P. R. A. acted in the full 
knowledge that they would be likely to incur the odium of their fellow Afro-Asians. 
According to the United Arab Republic Ambassador in Moscow, the Soviet Government 
have been as surprised as his own by these far-reaching concessions on the part of the 
Algerians.  
  
9. On the other hand, it is possible that the G. P. R. A. were forced to make these concessions 
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through fear of partition and it may well be that the extremer elements among the Algerian 
nationalists have agreed to this settlement with the mental reservation that they can go back 
on their word when they have achieved complete independence. There must always be a 
doubt whether the safeguards wrung from the G. P. R. A. on paper will prove worth the year 
of delay during which the Organization de 1'Armde Secrete (O. A. S. ) grew from nothing to 
its present strength, especially since the French claim that the G. P. R. A. will now cease to 
function as such.  
  
10. The main obstacle to the application of the agreement is the O. A.S. which will 
presumably continue to sabotage it with every means at its disposal. But now that the French 
Army has at last moved decisively against the O.A.S. and, providing that the military impetus 
can be maintained, there is every reason to expect that its resistance will soon be broken, 
though not without further bloodshed.  
  
11. There have been signs that the O. A, S. have been losing the confidence of the Europeans 
(on whose continued support the O.A. S's position ultimately rests) because of:-  
 
a. Loyalty of the Army.  
ii. Absence of any effective O. A. S. counter-action following the siege of Bab-el-
Oued and the massacre of over 50 civilians by Moslem troops in Algiers on 
26th March. 
iii. Discipline shown by Moslems in the face of provocation.  
iv. Capture of General Jouhaud and other O. A. S. leaders.  
  
12. Reactions in France to the cease-fire have been restrained and its terms appear to have 
been accepted by the French people. There is little doubt that General de Gaulle will get 
another large majority in the referendum to be held in Metropolitan France on 8th April to 
approve the Evian agreement.  
  
13. As sovereignty over Algeria remains vested in France until the referendum, there is no 
question, for the time being, of our recognizing any Algerian Government and our contacts 
with the F. L. N. leaders and "representatives" will continue to be on an informal basis.  
  
H.  
Foreign Office, S.W. 1.  
 30th March, 1962. - 
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APPENDIX: 6 
1. Algeria’s share in France’s world imports and exports and France’s share in 
Algeria’s world imports and exports, 1960-92 (in %) 
 
 
France 1960 1970 1980 1990 1992 
Imports from Algeria 8.0 3.4 1.3 0.8 0.8 
Exports to Algeria 16.0 2.9 2.4 1.3 1.0 
 
Algeria 1960 1970 1980 1990 1992 
Imports from France 83.0 42.0 23.2 23.1 24.2 
Exports to France 92.0 53.5 13.4 17.3 18.3 
 
Source: I. Brandell (1981), a. 168 and UN, International Trade Statistics Yearbook Noted in 
Bonora-Waisman, Camille, France and the Algerian Conflict Issue in Democracy and 
Political Stability, 1988-1995. England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2003 
 
2. Algeria - Imports - million US$  
 
 
 
Source: <http://algeria.opendataforafrica.org/wxmujcg/algeria-imports-major-trade-
partners> 
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APPENDIX 7 
Presidents of Algeria since Independence 
 
President Political 
party 
Term of Office  
Ferhat Abbas FLN - 
GPRA 
19 September 
1958 
27 August 
1961  
Resigned  
Benyoucef 
Benkhedda 
FLN - 
GPRA 
27 August 1961 27 September 
1962 
Coup d’état  
Ahmed Ben 
Bella  
FLN - 
civilian 
27 September 
1962  
20 September 
1963 
Coup d’état 
Mohammed 
Boukharouba 
(Houari 
Boumédiène) 
FLN - ANP 
 
 
19 June 1965 12 December 
1976  
Died / Killed  
27/12/1978 
Chadli Benjedid FLN - ANP 9 February 1979 11 January 
1992 
Coup d’état  
Mohamed 
Boudiaf  
FLN - 
civilian 
14 January 1992  29 June 1992 Killed  
Ali Kafi FLN - ANP 2 July 1992 31 January 
1994  
Resigned  
Liamine Zéroual  General - 
ANP 
31 January 1994 27 April 1999 Forced to resign  
Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika  
FLN – ANP 27 April 1999 Present  His third term finish 
in April 2014  
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APPENDIX 8 
 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
 
Department of Political Science and Public Policy 
School of Arts & Social Sciences  
Te Kura Kete Aronui 
The University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton, New Zealand 3240  
 
Fax      +64 7 838 4633 
Yassine Belkamel - email: yb22@waikato.ac.nz  
  
 
 
PhD Research Project 
“Military Regimes, Political Power and Human Rights Violations in Postcolonial 
Algeria” 
 
Question 1.  What is the principle on which the military was structured in 1963 after GPRA 
was dismissed? 
Question 2.  What changes took place within the military following the coup against Ben 
Bella in 1965? 
Question 3.  What was the involvement of the professional officers in the military regime 
from 1975 to1992?  
Question 4.  Was the coup of 1991 the inevitable result of democracy in Algeria? 
Question 5.  Scholars have divided the Algerian army into three categories of officers, 
revolutionary officers, French-Trained Officers and Post-revolutionary 
recruits. What have been the differences among them regarding power, 
responsibilities and decisions taken?  
Question 6. In your view, will the Military ever accept civilian control and regulations?  
Question 7.  To what extant has the FLN been a political party? (Please clarify)  
Question 8. Why did the military regime reject the platform of Rome?  
Question 9. What is the principal cause of the violence and Human Rights violations in the 
1990s?  
Question 10.  To what extent does the current military regime depend for its existence on the 
support of other countries? 
 
  
 
